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 Abstract 
The Limits of Feminism 
 
What is it about feminism that invites so many different opinions on what ‘counts’ 
and what doesn’t? People from vastly different cultural situations variously categorise 
feminist practices as extreme, radical, reactionary, unbalanced, co-opted, 
revolutionary, elite, exclusive, progressive, passé, and hysterical. The desire of both 
feminists and anti-feminists to control feminism emerges as the limiting of what 
feminism is, whom it is for, and where it is going. The urge to limit feminism seems, 
in some cases, to overtake the urge to spread the word and celebrate feminism’s 
successes. And it is not just anti-feminists who attempt to limit feminism – even 
feminists spend an inordinate amount of time defining certain practices out of the 
feminist spectrum. In this thesis, I document and analyse the way we limit feminism – 
its participants, meaning, practices, language, history, and future. I explore the 
reasons why we need to contain feminism in this way, looking in particular at those 
who have an investment in keeping feminism comfortably small. I invite back into the 
realm of feminism a wide range of activities and theories we generally invalidate as 
feminism, including the words of several ‘unofficial’ feminists I interviewed for this 
project. In essence, this project goes towards the rethinking of the term ‘feminism’ by 
examining the widely differing and often contradictory definitions of ‘what counts.’ Table of Contents 
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Introduction 
 
I discovered the book as I wrote it, so that instead of imposing on my material the kind 
of unity that makes you believe that the author knew it all along…I’ve tried to keep that 
process of discovery intact. 
– Joanna Russ
1 
 
Imagine the journey up to and including this thesis as a spiral instead of a 
straight line.
2 It is not even a vertical spiral in three dimensions – a helix – because that 
might imply that I would be moving up towards some kind of religious epiphany or 
down towards an archaeological ‘truth.’ Let’s make it a flat spiral, two-dimensional. 
Look at the journey in terms of spiralling outwards to a sense of proportion, outwards 
to make connections with others in the world; and inwards into arbitrary boundaries, 
introspection, immediacy and intimate relationships. A feminist journey tends to 
happen in this pendulous, sometimes-erratic side-to-side movement rather than as a 
triumphant gallop down a one-way street with a great Las Vegas-style neon sign over 
the door of a building, flashing repeatedly: ‘Feminism,’ ‘Feminism,’ ‘Feminism.’ The 
journey spirals back on itself – it is a looping of revelations, delights, and 
despondencies. The feminism in it survives through the critical, the hysterical, and 
those moments of earth-shattering banality.  
I wish to show here some of the ‘artefacts’ of this journey. These artefacts have 
some accompanying analytical commentary: I have used the artefacts as ways into 
some of the important points I need to make from the outset. I want to ask my readers 
to allow the artefacts also to act as theory by themselves. While I do not always agree 
with the sentiments/analyses expressed in these artefacts, I certainly acknowledge their 
validity as theory about life and power. That the artefacts act as theory is an important 
                                                 
1 Russ, Joanna. What Are We Fighting For?: Sex, Race, Class and the Future of Feminism. New York: 
St Martin’s, 1998. Xiv. 
2 Similarly, Stanley and Wise use the idea of a spiral to describe feminist consciousness: “We prefer to 
think of the processes of consciousness in terms of a circle or spiral – there are no beginnings and no 
ends, merely a continual flow.” Stanley, Liz and Sue Wise. Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and 
Feminist Research. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. 120. My discussion of consciousness later 
in this chapter features many of Stanley and Wise’s arguments. Wasley 3 
point because, as you will see, it is the idea of including within feminism people, 
practices and ideas outside the usual realm of feminism that this thesis explores. Of 
course, the very fact that I have selected some pieces and rejected others constitutes an 
analysis. However, the selection is not about me ‘proving’ a theory distinct from the 
artefacts themselves. Rather, it is about me showing peripheral and contradictory 
theories I have produced and accepted in the past. These theories build a picture around 
what I want to say in this thesis. It is also about exhibiting the kind of conscious 
reflection on the interaction between my own life, my everyday experiences, my 
history, and the theory I present in this thesis. 
Artefacts 
I wrote this poem when I was five years old, and my mother recorded it for me. 
Over the years, the piece of paper has been lost, but I still remember what it looked 
like. On one side was my infant scrawl – “Days go slow…” – trailing off into an 
inkblot. Obviously writing it out was too time-consuming for me. However, my mum 
thought it was important enough to preserve, so she wrote it out for me on the other 
side: 
Days go slow when you’re little, you know 
At school a day takes a year to go 
But when I’m at home, the day goes so fast 
That I wish that a day would last and last. 
 
Perhaps this was my first inkling that all would not be well in a world of arbitrary 
constructions such as the measurement of time. In my five year old mind, time was like 
jelly – something unstable and inconsistent. And I wasn’t always happy about that. 
Words, descriptions, and understandings that make up our social reality operate on 
similar terms: they frequently seem stable but actually fluctuate from context to 
context. Take the word ‘we,’ for instance. It seems clear enough. And yet the meaning 
of ‘we’ varies, not just with each situation, but with the words spoken immediately 
around the word. ‘We’ could be referring to the speaker and listener(s); the speaker and Wasley 4 
certain other specific people; the speaker and his/her cultural/political/ethnic/sexual 
group; or even the entirety of the human race.  
But even more importantly, the ambiguity of the term ‘we’ has political 
consequences. As Mary Daly puts it: 
Sometimes, since the ambiguity about whether to use we or they [when talking about 
women] is not clearly resolvable, there are difficult choices. Since pronouns are 
profoundly personal and political, they carry powerful messages.
3 
 
In writing this thesis, I often encountered the problem of whether to use ‘we’ and/or 
‘they.’ At times, I wanted to identify with a particular group, such as the women in my 
circle of friends and family, or academic feminists, or feminist activists, or women in 
general. However, to do so was not always strategically wise. My specific identity 
moves across all of those groups, so I could (in theory) legitimately identify with all or 
any of them; but at various times, to use ‘we’ or ‘they’ to describe those separate 
groups would simply cause confusion or even a sense of hierarchy and division. 
Therefore, I have had to be extremely cautious about saying ‘we’ and ‘they.’ I have had 
to work hard to avoid creating the illusion that I am or am not, for example, a feminist 
activist; or that I can reflect ‘objectively’ upon activism as an academic; or that I can 
look on feminist activism with admiration, puzzlement or disdain as a woman outside 
the circle of feminists. My own complicity with certain forms of feminism, my critical 
stance, and my current circumstances all contribute to the decision to use ‘we’ or 
‘they,’ and even then I’m not sure I always get it right. Hirsch and Keller struggle with 
the same issue in their book Conflicts in Feminism:  
…multiplication is no escape from reification…without claiming to speak for all 
feminists, we have chosen to use a pronoun many feminists have discarded as 
exclusionary, at worst, or confusing, at best…we have come to a shifting and 
fluctuating “we” which we try to use carefully, referring at times specifically to the two 
of us, at other times more generally to a proximal and permeable group of feminists for 
whom we felt, at least provisionally and in specific circumstances, we could speak.
4 
 
                                                 
3 Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism. 1979. London: Women’s Press, 1991. 
25. 
4 Hirsch, Marianne and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds. Conflicts in Feminism. London: Routledge, 1990. 2-3. Wasley 5 
Whilst difficult, the use of the term ‘we’ is, as Hirsch and Keller point out, “preferable 
to the only other available option – a passive voice that elides agency from the endeavor 
of thinking and writing.”
5 In other words, identity and location are worth fighting for. 
However, my main point in this discussion is that terms and concepts that seem self-
evident, unambiguous and constant often turn on us when we least expect it. Evidence 
of such struggles, and critical discussion of these struggles, are common throughout 
this thesis. 
This piece was written at eleven years old. 
 
 
I wonder what stupid people think about. Most stupid people think they’re smart. 
Narelle quote ‘fools think that we are clever; but a wise man knows we are fools.’ I 
know what that is meaning, I understand it (beleive [sic] it or not!) 
 
Eleven years old, and I was starting to notice more subtle boundaries than the arbitrary 
ones of infancy – like the boundaries between myself and the other kids at school. They 
were white like me; they were middle class like me. But the other kids had what 
appeared to me more banal interests: fashion, collecting stickers and soaps. Although I 
didn’t have a name for it yet, I considered myself an intellectual. I sat for hours writing, 
describing my people and my country, building up and reinforcing the boundary lines. 
For a while there I rode high on my sense of superiority. It was probably high school 
that battered me down, for that was when the boundaries changed and it became 
                                                 
5 Hirsch and Keller. 3. Wasley 6 
obvious that there was more to superiority than intellectualism. But my eleven year old 
comments and quotation illustrate a profound point about the divisions between 
concepts such as intellectual and ‘philistine’; scholarly and ‘mainstream’; academic and 
‘uneducated.’ Essentially, the point is this: the wise man may know he is a fool, but he 
often fails to account for the wisdom of ‘fools.’  
At the same time, I was starting to understand and recognise some systems of 
inequity in the wider world, and I chose to reject these: 
 
 
Things I hate – 
People that think fashion is the most important thing in the world. 
Little kids that build cubby houses with trees, etc. 
Male chauvenists [sic] 
Over-priviliged [sic] people 
Fake-artists 
 
Things I like – 
Storms 
Charitable people 
Babies 
Wind in trees 
Night Time 
Forests Wasley 7 
Science 
Nice boys 
Agatha Christie Books 
 
It is interesting that my recognition of inequities did not extend to those between ‘wise’ 
people and ‘fools.’ In feminist theory, at least, I see another version of this division as 
one of the most powerful obstacles to a broader demographic of women reading 
feminist theory. The version of the division I refer to is that between academic 
feminists (the ‘wise’) and non-academic feminists (the ‘fools’). The obstacle 
constituted by this division is that of scholarly conventions, something I address at 
length in Chapter 4 and 5. Obviously, I now have an intense interest in examining the 
boundaries between, and systems of inequity that operate through, the conception of 
certain women as ‘wise’ to oppression and feminist thought, and others as not. This 
thesis itself is intended not only as an exploration of such issues, but as an attempt to 
revise the boundaries by creating a piece of work that can be accessible to non-
academic women. 
Some may ask, in light of these goals, why it is I wish to write a scholarly thesis 
for a degree. I understand that doing so whilst aiming to create an inclusive, accessible 
text may seem like a contradictory project. But it is important to remember that I am 
not aiming to disparage academic work or suggesting we do away with scholarly 
feminist writing or careers; the only time I come remotely near either is in Chapter 4, 
wherein I offer some gentle criticisms of conventions within feminist scholarship that 
may alienate non-academic readers. Rather, my task is to show that various kinds of 
written and practical work, including conventional scholarly writing, as well as less 
traditional ways of producing feminist theory, count as feminist theory. I won’t go so 
far as to say that my use of this text towards a PhD is beside the point, but I would 
certainly assert that it can be reconciled with my political goals. Wasley 8 
In fact, it is one of these goals to show that it is indeed possible to write 
accessibly for academic purposes – as well as to show that it is possible to write 
considered feminist theory for a wider public audience. I understand that not all women 
will find this book accessible in the way that a book like Men are from Mars; Women 
are from Venus
6 is, or a That’s Life!
7 magazine is. I recognise that there is a variety of 
reading abilities amongst Western women, not to mention the factors of interest and 
time. But hopefully interested non-academic readers will be able to at least browse at 
this thesis, choose to read sections they consider relevant, and engage with it on an 
intellectual and emotional level, even if they do not wish to read it from cover to cover. 
Art from the years between 1986 and 1990 (my early teens): 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Gray, John. Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus: A Practical Guide for Improving 
Communication and Getting What You Want in Your Relationships. New York: HarperCollins, 1993. 
7 That’s Life! Magazine. Australia: Pacific Publications. Wasley 9 
 
I think that drawings like these are an obvious, if unconscious, reference to 
being female in Western society. The first drawing shows a conceptualisation of 
‘woman’ as cultural: created and influenced by factors such as time, history, nature, 
sexuality, religion, fertility, power, and the material. Strangely, though, I also feel that 
it refers to the specificity of being an individual woman with personal experiences and 
knowledge to bring to and resist culture. There are symbols of optimism as well as 
foreboding in the picture, and although I have no way of knowing what I meant when I 
drew it, I now interpret it as a statement about the power of the personal to effect 
change. The second drawing seems more complex to me. It gives me a sense of 
women’s oppression; their martyrdom; their ultimate essential femininity. The dollar 
note lying beside the man on the couch calls up thoughts of economic oppression and 
even prostitution. But again there is a real feeling of specificity: this is a real, living 
woman, and that is a real man sitting like a thundercloud, guarding the household 
money.  
These drawings give me an in-road to discuss my attitude towards the binary 
opposition between abstract structures of power and personally embodied oppression 
and resistance. I find Daly’s comment that: Wasley 10 
…even feminists…are unable to name their oppressor, referring instead to vague 
‘forces,’ ‘roles,’ ‘stereotypes,’ constraints,’ ‘attitudes,’ ‘influences.’ This list could go 
on. The point is that no agent is named – only abstractions
8 
 
useful here as a way of reflecting on relationships between men and women, women 
and culture. Colleagues in the academy have previously taken me to task for talking 
about ‘men’ and ‘women’; anti-feminists and feminists, instead of patriarchy and 
feminism. But abstract concepts, structures and systems do not always allow for 
adequate explanations, and they can, in fact, draw attention away from oppression and 
feminist resistance as lived experiences. Similarly, some have expressed distaste for my 
use of terms such as ‘real life’ and the ‘real world’ when discussing feminist theory and 
activism – particularly without highlighting these terms using inverted commas or 
similar. However, I argue that there are such things as real life and the real world in 
comparison with the occasionally dogmatic, often scholarly, and sometimes bizarre 
world of organised feminism. In addition, my aim is to create a theory which connects 
with the real world in the sense that I will expose the relationship between the feminism 
as a ‘product’ of academia and activism, and the lived experiences of writing and 
practicing feminism. 
This is an excerpt from the journal we were asked to keep in the Feminist 
Thought unit I did in 1996, the second year of my undergraduate degree: 
 
                                                 
8 Daly. 29. Wasley 11 
I turned to look at a house and saw straight through a window, into a mirror, into my 
face, hair, shoulders. For an instant it went through me like a shudder, and I now 
understand the coldness, the thrill: as though sucked into some separate dimension, I 
was part of another household and another life. I was someone else’s daughter, 
someone else’s sister and someone else’s lover, free of these legacies, handed in on a 
separate census form. My own census form is sitting on the table in front of me, but 
even as I fill it in, things are changing: there are truths which refrain from self-
evidence. 
 
  My attention to the personal and ways of doing personal experience is not a 
hearkening back to the Enlightenment ideal of individual autonomy.
9 I do not believe 
that we exist in a vacuum; rather, I insist on constant attention to the way we construct 
ourselves within, and are constructed by, cultural patterns and structures such as 
language, the media, capitalism, systems of moral values, religion, patriarchal 
oppression, and so on. The danger of structural accounts of the self, however, is that 
one can begin to envisage cultural structures as monolithic, faceless powerhouses that 
exist outside ourselves. I do not subscribe to the idea that we are somehow programmed 
by these ‘influences’ to be obedient subjects who perpetuate oppressive cultural states 
with very little dissent. As Stanley and Wise put it, structures “are constructed from 
within interactions and events – they do not exist outside of these to be ‘released’ 
within them.”
10 I prefer a concept of agency, in which we (as groups and individually) 
act out or act upon these systemic forms of oppression in variously compliant, 
complacent, subversive and revolutionary ways.  
The self-as-agent allows for a conception of feminism that I feel better suits 
contemporary Western oppression and resistance than the idea that women must 
overthrow crushing oppression by means of a revolution. Because sometimes, this 
revolutionary mentality makes historical struggles seem so much simpler than 
contemporary ones. At least back then oppression was obvious: 
                                                 
9 Humm, Maggie. “Individualism.” The Dictionary of Feminist Theory. Hempstead, Herts: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989. 103. 
10 Stanley, Liz and Sue Wise. Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and Epistemology. London: 
Routledge, 1993. 138. Wasley 12 
I can be Virginia Woolf’s grand-daughter or great grand-daughter and wander 
the streets of Perth as though they were the old alleys of London. I can look for the 
men’s university and compare it with the women’s university; go to the library and try 
to find the terrible, essential discrepancy which is behind poverty, inequality and 
oppression; see the grey winter streets overcome with sunshine and cherry blossoms. I 
can be and do, but my journey would ultimately come to a dismal end at a park bench 
in the Supreme Court Gardens or Forrest Place. For, even as I searched, the recollection 
would come to me that those great struggles have come to an end: I can go to any 
university without a letter of introduction and walk on the grass; I can find glorious 
books that explain women’s poverty without trying to rationalize it. 
I look up through the leaves of overhanging trees in these gardens and 
endeavour to ascertain whether or not the sun is shining, thinking on my own good 
fortune at being born in such a sweet decade of enlightenment...the 70s – the liberated 
70s. And as I’m peering and thinking, a man in a wig and cloak descends the stairs of 
the Supreme Court, and I’m reminded of the newsreader predicting that the women of 
W.A. will live in fear because the judges’ ‘bias against women.’ The ABC called it 
sexism, but Mr Packer thought the word too strong. Just thinking of television sends a 
host of images flying towards me like angels avenging apathy: story after story of the 
bad mother, losing 10kg in 13 weeks, miniskirts are back in, beauty, beauty, beauty. 
My heart is pounding. 
In Forrest Place, I rise from the park bench and walk the clean-swept 
pavement. Everywhere in glass cages the mannequins watch me with sharp nipples and 
gaunt bodies...I don’t know whether they scorn me or plead with me. Either way, I’m 
unreasonably upset and I stop in the middle of the mall, even though it’s not the done 
thing, and I have to watch a dotty old woman in her dressing gown and a girl with pink 
hair to get any comfort. I look up at the sky and see that the sun isn’t shining, and there 
are no cherry blossoms: it is not yet spring.
11 
 
Oppression is not always so obvious now as it was in Virginia Woolf’s day – it often 
takes more subtle forms. It lives inside relationships, workplaces, families, sex 
discrimination acts, and statements of equal opportunity. In addition to the usual 
reviling of historical forms of oppression, I think we sometimes almost mourn the ease 
with which we could identify women’s oppression. It is so slippery these days that 
many instances of discrimination are doomed to be threshed out in the courts because 
sexist behaviour can be pinned on other motivations. A sexist employer, for instance, 
could easily claim that ‘he’ offered a woman her job back after taking maternity leave 
but that she didn’t want the time commitment required at that job level – so she was 
offered a lower level job for less money. This behaviour, with its apparently ‘just’ 
fiscal motivation, is condoned within a cultural-economic structure that does not 
support women’s combination of forging a career track with childbearing.  
                                                 
11 Wasley, Sasha. Excerpt. Feminist Thought Journal. Unpublished journal. 1996. N. pag. Wasley 13 
Similarly, it’s easy to attribute moments of everyday feminist resistance to other 
motivations, or to write them off as not-feminism because they did not start out with 
feminist intentions. It is intriguing that, even back when I wrote those journal entries, it 
was the small, piecemeal resistances and subversions that kept me going – the dotty old 
woman in her dressing gown, for instance. At some point, someone would usher her 
back to the nursing home, but the very fact of her escape was exhilarating – that she 
might have the freedom to wander in her pyjamas without being burned as a witch. In 
these pieces, I can see myself edging towards being able to name little resistances as 
‘feminism.’ This thesis is a larger-scale reclaiming of personal, everyday, unofficial 
resistance as feminism.  
The next artefact is a poem, written some years back, on seeing a painting by a 
female relative who was a victim of child sex abuse. 
 
in your art 
serpents twist obscenely and stretch 
up to the sky 
pursuing chubby oblivious birds 
in your mind 
the hunt is good  
the serpent grasps and shakes 
the bird between bursting teeth 
it squawks through the wrench, then is quiet 
the fear of the bird  
is nameless 
formless 
endless 
the feathers are irrevocably stained 
 
when you were eleven 
you watched as a man cut the head off a snake 
it wriggled and thrashed as though it still lived 
you knew then 
serpents don’t die 
 
it’s your birthday 
it might be your second or your fortieth 
it might be in your room or in a dream 
it doesn’t matter 
the serpent stalked and twisted then 
coming after you 
and it does now 
inside you Wasley 14 
 
it is my fortieth birthday 
and it feels like my second 
when I was little, at school,  
we had a kind teacher who said 
paint what you feel 
I painted twisting serpents 
 
Take this as an example of my desire to look out towards other women for feminist 
information, and for feedback on my own feminism. Importantly, the poem also shows 
recognition of a non-academic woman’s ability to comment and theorise on feminist 
issues. I saw the picture this woman had painted and I understood exactly what its 
feminist protest was – I recognised the darkening sky and the faceless serpent. Perhaps 
the recognition of unofficial feminism is not so much a realization that non-academic 
women theorise feminism and oppression, as the crumbling of long-held boundaries we 
reinforce. The reasons why we reinforce those boundaries are many and varied. In my 
case, it was self defence. My cleverness, my school-smarts were, after all, the things I 
clung to, protected and coveted. Letting go of the boundaries between intellectual and 
everyday feminism meant letting go of an oddly cherished anxiety, and seeing that 
knowledge could be shared – competition was not inevitable.  
I now read the poem as a struggle: the switch from “you” to “I” in the last verse 
is kind of a folding in on itself of the intersubjectivity. The boundary seems to reassert 
itself, as though there is simply no way to accept feminist theorising that doesn’t at 
some point centre itself back in me (that is, academia). Similarly, the next piece (1993) 
expresses a deep and abiding obedience to the boundaries between the academic and 
the non-academic. My comments on the way we adapt our language to different 
audiences seem rather detached and strangely indifferent to the effects of such practices 
on reinforcing the boundaries between varying intellects (or levels of education, or 
levels of feminist consciousness). However, there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction. 
Perhaps it is the final, somewhat piteous, lines of the following that show an 
unhappiness with the way we tailor words, ideas and genre to specific ‘mentalities’ – Wasley 15 
even if this unhappiness has selfish motives. This thesis reflects similar dissatisfaction, 
taken somewhat further: I openly discuss the idea that there are levels of consciousness 
(with feminist consciousness generally touted as the best level), and look at ways in 
which we can ‘level’ the conventional perception of consciousness. 
 
 
Adapting. 
Like chameleons, we adapt the way we speak. If situations were colours, our words 
would blend and change tone – our inflection, voice, the words, the colloquialisms and 
the ideas. For some people, in some places, I swear, I complain, I deepen my voice, add 
a sarcastic, gloomy tone. In other situations I speak cynically and righteously, the 
words are passionate and academic, my voice is loud and clear, the ideas are violent 
and strain and heave at the bounds of my mind and the limitations of words, my eyes 
and hands speak their own, silent words. It’s all a part of trying to be myself. 
Sometimes I feel like I can only be myself with a few people. 
 
The final two pieces were written around 1997/1998. The first was something I 
wrote for me, intended for my own meditation, never to be seen by anyone else, least of 
all another academic. The second piece is a reflection on a group work exercise 
required in one of my honours units, written shortly before I submitted a very scholarly 
thesis called “Partial Sisterhood: Optimism and Ethics for a Feminist Collective.” 
Although written with different intentions and on entirely different topics, both pieces 
bring me neatly towards a discussion of consciously connecting feminism and everyday 
life. This discussion includes the way we (as feminists) tend to erase what we regard as 
the imperfections and weaknesses that colonise everyday life when we produce Wasley 16 
feminism in the forms of writing and activism – but read the artefacts themselves 
before we proceed. 
Piece 1: 
When I worked at the newsagency, I had to tear up the leftover Playboys and 
Penthouses at the end of each month. I would see pictures of beautiful women as I 
went: Sophie, 23 ‘I like to take control, I enjoy giving massage – using oils...’ Sure, 
Sophie. The pictures are undeniably, if culturally, erotic. Simultaneously, they are 
irritating, disgusting, artistic, humiliating. Once, a man bought one, explaining that 
he’d written an article published in it that month. He did have to explain. I was judging 
all the men that bought them, watching their faces, putting them ostentatiously in paper 
bags like they used to put tampons in paper bags at the supermarket. As if it’s 
something to feel as shameful about as our bleeding. 
  Whole Asian families would flick through soft porn magazines – tourist families from 
the Hilton. Japanese salarymen would laugh and comment in their terribly sexist 
language (their characters for wife mean ‘inside the house’; the characters for husband 
mean ‘master’). Once, a couple of Japanese girls asked for Playgirl. I was sorry to say 
we didn’t have it. Revenge? Double standards? Inversion? 
  It was satisfying to tear up those magazines each month. 
  I don’t care what people say about using porn for your sex life. I can’t accept it. I 
agree: porn is the theory, rape is the practice. But my feelings on it aren’t even that 
rational. 
  Once, when Cleo was a real woman’s magazine, we convinced my friend’s mum to 
buy one for us. We wanted to see a penis. Imagine our disappointment when all we got 
was a bum. 
 
Piece 2: 
    ‘But do you think that this Other was already there, or is it a construction of the 
dominant?’ [a fellow student] asked when, during work on our group project, I was 
declaiming on my pet topic of specific otherness. 
     Good question. One that forces me to re-evaluate everything I’ve held dear for the 
last three years (poststructuralism...deconstruction...neo-Freudianism). I don’t think I 
can definitively answer the question, but I can circle it, and play with it. Where was I 
coming from with this ‘specific otherness?’ Irigaray and Kristeva, of course – that’s 
where I’m always coming from. But Kristeva might shudder to see the way I twist her 
abject for my own purposes. It’s more the Irigaray that I’m calling on: her own 
particular brand of deconstructive-socialist-psychoanalytic-radical feminism. The little 
touches of ambiguous essentialism, and the rays of hope: there can be something more 
than this masculine language; that we can engage with Derrida, Marx, Freud, Lacan in 
a deliciously mischievous way; that we can articulate our difference. For some time 
now I’ve noticed that there is something left when we dissipate (capital-T) Truth. I was 
resistant to the idea: it is much easier, after all, to take the weight off my own shoulders 
and blame it all on society, the mode of production, patriarchy, colonialism. The 
material I’ve read, however, and the ideas that proliferate as a result of this reading, 
urge me towards a greater accountability. I’m reminded of the inexhaustive and unique 
nature of personal experience. I recall that there are parts of me that have escaped the 
system – how? The overwhelming contradictions of oppressed existence make up one 
answer to that question: something’s gotta give. But isn’t there something else? 
Something that escapes ideologies without any particular political impetus or rationale? 
An underside of otherness. In my paper for this unit, I wrote: 
          Did we make them Other...or did they exist even before we started  
          categorizing? If we cannot name these Others, or even consciously imagine  
          them, they must pre-exist our will and, therefore, escape our controlling  
          relegation to the realm of Other. 
It sounds a bit essentialistic, doesn’t it? Wasley 17 
     But you’ve got to understand: there’s only so much theorizing a feminist can take. 
At least Irigaray asks us to do something with what we’ve got. I’m even inclined to 
think her ideas might work if we could just stop arguing about whether or not they 
constitute essentialism. The critics have covered every angle: yes – she is essentialistic; 
no – she is not essentialistic in any familiar way. I’d like to know who disguised 
himself as a god and told us that ambiguity is wicked. I mean, we need to stay 
progressive about this: there’s no point hiding in patriarchal definitions of feminine and 
masculine, or in urging the human spirit to overcome. But where would women be 
without specificity? Subsumed, as usual, into sameness. And where would we all be 
without human agency? I don’t know, but I bet we wouldn’t be using toothbrushes to 
clean the drain, running through the CBD on a treasure hunt devised by two 
schoolgirls, asking for a free cup of water in McDonald’s. We wouldn’t be 
manipulating the base – mutating patriarchy and consumer capitalism – as we do every 
single day. We talked about the longing for politics in our last class – for solutions to 
the problems that drag us down over and over, even if they don’t work, or even if they 
could never be put into practice. It’s necessary to find a creative space in the paralytic 
nihilism of my heroes’ theories (Derrida, Althusser, Lacan). I need to ground myself 
somewhere – in ethics and in optimism. Otherwise this whole university degree – this 
whole exercise – means nothing. 
 
However, it is not, as I seem to suggest in the above, theory or academia that is 
devoid of politics (in fact, these are shot through with politics in profound and 
complicated ways). Rather, it is the connection between our feminist theory (and/or our 
feminist activism) and the lived, daily reality of our personal experience that may lack 
politicisation. Where I long for politics is in the gap between my written work and 
myself the feminist writer; my activism and myself the feminist activist; my feminist 
ideals and what I do every day. The first piece, whether intended this way or not, is an 
honest writing of my own life as feminist theory. There is a consciousness in the way I 
write: I used the words “real women,” feeling guiltily defiant (I might be accused of the 
‘crime’ of essentialism). Resentfully, I made explanations for this essentialism and my 
anger. I asked questions I did not have answers to. There are references to both 
systemic and personal forms of oppression and resistance. In short, this piece explored 
the everyday as theory and activism – not just as the grounds for theory and activism. 
The second piece explores in a more abstract way the need to find connections 
between feminism and the self. At the time, I was talking and thinking a lot about 
something I had named “specific otherness.” Now I think about it, specific otherness 
was simply agency – the idea that there is something in all of us (natural or not) that Wasley 18 
enables us to resist bigger structures, like societal norms. I think after years of training 
in post-structuralist thought, which eroded for me the idea of anything natural in 
humans by claiming humanity/masculinity/ femininity to be nothing but culturally 
determined (or, at least, that was how I understood it), I needed a more positive 
alternative. I didn’t feel like post-structuralist thought was entirely right for me. I felt 
like I had a soul.  
I think the most important thing about this piece is that I seemed to make a 
connection between the ideas of agency, ethics and optimism. I’m not sure how the 
connection worked back then, but I can certainly form a connection between these 
concepts now. In the context of a feminist work, this connection is: women exhibit 
agency in their use and performance of cultural/political systems; it is ethically urgent 
that we give attention to such agency; and such agency (and the attention to such 
agency) leads to optimism because it allows us to observe, accept and admire the 
spread of feminism – even to those women we tend to imagine it hasn’t reached. 
Optimism is a very important, and a very underrated, facet of feminism. The best way 
to achieve this optimism – the knowledge of the growing presence in feminism in the 
most intimate spaces of our daily lives – is through the exploration of how we do 
feminism. I am not just talking about what we do in the name of feminism. I am talking 
about the specifics of how we do feminism, and in particular how we integrate and 
reconcile feminism with everyday existence. Therefore, my call in this thesis is for a 
greater awareness of, and critical reflection on, the links between feminism as an 
ideology and our embodied, everyday enactments of feminism. 
  As a result, this thesis is written using three core principles: Wasley 19 
1.  We (in Western culture
12) limit feminism. We limit its participants, its meaning, 
its practices, its language, its history, and its future. 
2.  We all collude in limiting feminism – feminists, antifeminists, non-feminists. 
We have various investments in controlling feminism. 
3.  Greater awareness of the limits we impose is desirable because an awareness of 
the limits is the first step towards ‘de-limiting’ feminism. 
These principles are not, of course, the final word on the matter. Rather, they form the 
starting point for this project. The next step is to elaborate on what kinds of limits I’m 
talking about. For the sake of sense, I’ve split my discussion of the limits of feminism 
into three main areas: academic feminism; feminist activism; and intergenerational 
conflict amongst feminists. 
It was my experiences with feminism that led me to identify these limits. I 
knew, when I felt embarrassed, not proud, to give my highly awarded honours 
dissertation to my aunt and my brother-in-law to read, explaining that “it’s got a lot of 
jargon in it,” and “it’s a bit dry,” that something was awry. I had an inkling of this 
attitude occasionally throughout my university career. I loathed feeling ignorant when 
everyone seemed to be using the words that the lecturers used; I wrote down countless 
words in the margins of my lecture notes, promising myself to look them up in the 
dictionary when I got home. The problem is that my one and only beloved dictionary 
was published in 1942. A lot of the words I needed to look up weren’t even thought of 
until feminist theory and postmodernism came into vogue. I’m still not perfectly clear 
on what a ‘diaspora’ is – and this is not good for my academic self-assurance when 
many of my colleagues are doing dissertations with ‘diaspora’ in the title. 
I guess I will have to make the effort to find out what a diaspora is one day. It 
annoys me, though, that I cannot have a conversation, let alone make an intellectual 
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contribution, without having to pretend that I understand these words, and feeling 
pressure to use them myself. For me, the language issue is heavily involved with the 
limits issue. When my aunt has to wade through her own niece’s work with a dictionary 
at her elbow; when my brother-in-law puts aside my work in frustrated disgust, there’s 
a ‘no entry’ sign at work. However, inaccessible jargon is nowhere near the sum total 
of this project. I daily witness other ways of limiting feminism. Whenever I don’t do 
activism to a certain standard; whenever I read or hear something like ‘heterosexuality 
is irreconcilable with feminism,’ or ‘without an analysis of race, your work isn’t really 
feminism.’ Whenever I see writers dismissing obviously feminist acts through history 
as part of some other revolutionary movement or, in other words, ‘not really feminism;’ 
whenever I see young women scoff at radical resistance to oppression; whenever I hear 
big-name feminists sneering at new, different, or ‘third-wave’ approaches to feminism 
and sexism – these are the moments when I wonder why we draw such hard lines 
around what feminism is and isn’t. This thesis is an attempt to show how we can begin 
to break down some of the boundaries we have established between scholarly and 
popular writing, canonical and non-authoritative feminist voices, ‘pure’ and 
‘compromised’ feminist politics, contingent and absolute historical feminism and, 
finally, second- and third-wave feminism. 
So, this is the essence of my project: the identification of the limits of feminism, 
and an exploration of why we constantly demarcate and reinforce these boundaries. The 
positive side of this project is the attempt to uncover some of the practices we erase 
from feminism. We tend to look at feminism as a set of official activities (collective 
organizing, academic work, etc.). I want to explore unofficial feminism as feminism. I 
include a great variety of ‘outside’ practices within the bounds of feminism. From 
everyday choices, arguments and observations, to conversation, work matters, personal 
relationships and parenting. Misha Schubert refers to:  Wasley 21 
…the ingenious styles of activism that young women have brought to the movement to 
integrate their activism in their daily lives; to use every conversation, every social 
choice, every decision about how they interact with people and live their lives to make 
political statements…
13 
 
But it is not just young women who create feminist ways of life. I consider that the 
oppression of women of all ages can happen anywhere, and as a result, their feminism 
is everywhere. Feminism can be as grand and life changing as the decision to work 
with assault survivors, or it can be as minor and forgettable as a passing joke. All 
considerations of personal sacrifice, quantifiable labour and effectiveness aside, both of 
these practices count as feminism. 
Some Practical Matters 
Definitions of Terms 
“Feminism” 
At this point, I will define some of the terms I work with in this thesis, 
beginning with the word ‘feminism.’ This term is very difficult to define without 
incurring the disapproval of some group or another. The comfortable way to look at it 
is to equate it with equal opportunity. However, the idea of equal opportunity certainly 
doesn’t cover everything I have to say about feminism. Because, to some degree 
(although not absolutely), women have achieved equal opportunity. Universities can no 
longer keep women out of their grounds, or even out of certain courses. All jobs are 
(technically) open to all applicants, regardless of their sex. There is no reason why an 
employer can (legally) pay a woman less than s/he pays a man. Yet, life isn’t quite this 
neat. Note my use of the words ‘technically’ and ‘legally.’ Certain university courses 
are top-heavy with women, and men dominate others. Some employers simply would 
not give a particular job to a woman. And employers are still paying women, in 
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general, significantly less than they pay men.
14 Furthermore, certain jobs, courses, life 
choices, are just not palatable to men or to women. How can we call opportunity equal 
when we are still much more comfortable with/being male mechanics and female 
nannies? And more often than not, when there are exceptions, like the ‘househusband,’ 
everyone makes a big fuss and says how wonderful he is, and we see the case as 
extraordinary, despite our so-called ‘equal’ opportunities. In addition, there is the 
monstrous proliferation of sexy images of women, the industries that make money by 
feeding women’s insecurities about their appearances, the statistics on rape and assault. 
Equal opportunity doesn’t cover women’s desire to walk alone and feel safe; to feel 
okay about our weight, wrinkles, breast size, and so on. 
The other big misconception people hold about the term ‘feminism’ is that it is 
about putting women before men in every situation. This is the ‘unequal opportunity,’ 
or ‘reverse sexism’ mindset, and it is what people mean when they say, “I’m not a 
feminist because I believe in equal opportunity.” Reverse sexism is another 
comfortable way to look at feminism, because it makes feminism the bad guy(!) of 
social justice movements. When people talk about feminism in this way, they are 
saying that feminism does to men what patriarchy does to women. It is the second of 
the two wrongs that don’t make a right. Often, people are happy to pin the blame for 
reverse sexism on small pockets of society. They will say, “It’s the few radical ones 
who spoil it for everyone else.” The ‘really militant’ feminists (read: lesbians, 
protesters, etc.) are the ‘trouble with feminism.’ They give feminism a bad name.
15 As 
Joanna Russ puts it: 
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Is it surprising that some of us try to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between 
Blameless Me, who couldn’t possibly bring down such treatment on myself (because I 
don’t deserve it) and Terrible Her, who does deserve it? We haven’t gone too far; she 
has. We aren’t crazy; she is. We aren’t angry or bad or out of control; she is. We don’t 
hate men (the sin of sins); she does. Don’t punish us; punish her.
16 
 
Feminism as reverse sexism means that feminism is much more about men than it is 
about women: hating men, destroying men, fighting men, triumphing over men. 
My idea of feminism is not about a gender-nihilistic equality, nor is it about 
men. Rather, feminism is a vision to work towards as much as it is a knowledge that we 
are fighting against oppression. I define feminism as: resistance to the suffering of 
women – the suffering women endure because they are women. It is as basic as that. I 
certainly don’t endorse the suffering of men, but I think that feminism is about resisting 
the sexism that happens to women. It is not about making women’s lives as good as, or 
better than, men’s lives. It need not be about comparing ourselves with men at all. It is 
simply about making women’s lives better for women. By extension, a ‘feminist’ is a 
woman who participates somehow in resisting the suffering of women.  
A definition like this may cause problems right at the outset for at least some 
readers. As Chris Beasley says in her book What is Feminism, Anyway?: “any brief, 
neat account of feminism is likely to be disputed.”
17 It is true that the variety of work 
and activity included within the framework of feminism is enormous – seemingly 
boundless. However, this variety doesn’t mean we should give up on the task of 
defining feminism in the way Beasley describes: 
…feminists are inclined – frequently deliberately – not to define what they mean by 
feminism, sensing dangers such as internal policing of both the field and of feminists 
by those who might like to determine what is to be included (or not), as well as the 
potential danger of constricting the unstable vitality of its meanings.
18 
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However, Beasley goes on to remind us that defining feminism can be: “a more modest 
task…a ‘clarifying device.’”
19 Rather than giving up, it is important that we do attempt 
to define the terms we wish to talk about, providing we define these consciously. 
Because defining a term, like writing a history of an event, is a rather sneakily 
subjective matter. Writing a history, for instance, says a lot about the historian – mainly 
about where the historian is coming from, and where s/he wants to go. To elaborate: 
when one writes a history, one chooses, consciously, unconsciously, strategically, or 
practically, to include or emphasize certain facts and omit or play down others. Despite 
its presentation of an apparently objective picture of an event, the history is just a 
version of that event. The history thus becomes a purposeful text. It shows a specific 
view of an event, often for the purpose of describing a series of events in a 
comprehensible way. In the same way, defining a term requires the definer to include 
and omit certain facets of the term, even if these facets are openly discussed and put 
aside. The definition becomes a strategic and workable definition. This is not a good or 
a bad thing – it is a just a normal part of defining a term. What would be the point of 
defining something if we didn’t need to use that definition for a specific purpose?  
Beasley herself, for example, defines feminism focusing on its fluidity and its 
fragmented nature – whilst taking pains to identify feminism’s common features, 
including the critique of misogyny and male superiority.
20 Her purpose is to discuss the 
very act of defining feminism, paying attention to the great variety of work within the 
term, and exploring the concept of feminism’s boundaries. Therefore, Beasley’s 
definition is a workable one for her purposes: she needs a definition that both supplies 
boundaries for feminism and allows for an exploration of the great variety of work that 
falls within its scope. In Talking Back,
21 bell hooks’ definition of feminism is similarly 
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workable for her purpose. Her purpose is to explore how feminists talk back to 
domination – particularly the domination of black women, but with consideration of 
other differences such as class. Therefore, hooks’ definition of feminism is strongly 
inclusive and geared towards shared aims: 
Unlike many feminist comrades, I believe women and men must share a common 
understanding – a basic knowledge of what feminism is – if it is ever to be a powerful, 
mass-based political movement…I suggest that defining feminism as “a movement to 
end sexism and sexist oppression” would enable us to have a common political goal. 
We would then have a basis on which to build solidarity.
22 
 
These diverse definitions of feminism show how workability is a vital feature of any 
definition of a term like feminism. 
From amongst the great variety of ethos, forms, politics and expressions of 
feminism, then, I draw a definition to use in this thesis: resistance to the suffering of 
women. What I need from this definition (the workability) is something simple that will 
strike a chord with the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ feminists for and about whom this 
thesis is written. I acknowledge, then, but strategically sideline, definitions of feminism 
that do not allow the inclusive framework of feminism I wish to explore. Therefore, 
those definitions (implicit or otherwise) which emphasize the boundary between 
rigorously scholarly feminist theory and less developed feminist theory
23; definitions 
that insist upon an ever-present consideration of cultural differences
24; definitions that 
claim feminism’s indefinability
25 – these and other definitions will inform my work, 
and form the background of my discussion. However, I foreground a definition that 
allows me to search for a broadly accessible feminism. Therefore I use my definition of 
feminism as resistance to the suffering of women – a definition that enables me to 
envision feminism in a creative and inclusive way. 
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I should also make the point here that although I use ‘resistance to the suffering 
of women’ as my definition of feminism, at certain moments in this thesis what the 
term ‘feminism’ describes will vary. Sometimes I use the term to describe the 
enormous spectrum of activity that comes under the definition ‘resistance to the 
suffering of women.’ But – and this is important – at other times I say ‘feminism’ when 
I mean a rather more constricted set of activities. The latter deployment refers to a 
limited feminism. Generally, these are the activities broadly accepted as feminism: 
namely, scholarly feminist theory, canonical feminist works and organised feminist 
activism. Likewise, when I say ‘feminists’ I often refer to feminist academics, 
researchers and activists, and feminist media personalities or ‘celebrities’ – despite the 
fact that the definition I am using potentially refers to many more women (and even 
men) who resist the suffering of women. The context in which I use the term will make 
it clear. However, it is worth making a point about this doubling up of meaning, 
because it highlights the idealism of my definition of feminism. In other words, ideally 
the term ‘feminism’ would encompass a much wider range of practices that resist the 
suffering of women than it actually does. Clarifying this point makes an even stronger 
case for workability as a function of any definition: my definition also acts as a political 
goal.  
“Consciousness” 
Another term I use and explore in this thesis is ‘consciousness.’ This term is 
used in a variety of ways, but I am mainly referring to its common use within feminism 
to describe a feminist awareness and understanding of sexism and oppression. Stanley 
and Wise identify a three-stage model of consciousness within feminist thought: “ false 
consciousness, consciousness-raising and feminist consciousness.”
26 It is common 
                                                 
26 Stanley and Wise. Breaking Out Again. 120. Wasley 27 
practice within feminism to make claims about ‘false consciousness.’
27 False 
consciousness is the idea that we (as women) wrongly imagine ourselves liberated, or 
that we accept sexism and oppression because we understand it to be natural. We may 
even believe oppression to be directed at individuals, without our sex having any 
bearing on our treatment (that is, sex is ‘not an issue’ in an individual woman’s 
oppression). Consciousness raising is perceived as the process by which a woman’s 
‘eyes are opened’ to sexism and misogyny, and may take place within group 
discussions or other forms of education (e.g. Women’s Studies courses). Feminist 
consciousness supposed to be the arrival at “a more objective state of consciousness.”
28 
I reject such a model of stages of consciousness. As Stanley and Wise remind 
us, “‘reality’ is [not] the same for everybody.”
29 And if feminist consciousness is 
reality; if it is the ability to perceive the one true essence of the social world, then what 
happens when women’s realities do not match? Which woman has the true feminist 
consciousness? The very idea of it is an easy way out for feminists to explain why 
some women refuse to embrace feminism. I have never yet met a woman who does not 
perceive sex-based discrimination in her life or the lives of other women. Their 
reactions to this injustice may differ. Some women react with complacency, others with 
indignation, and others still attempt to rationalize misogyny. But women in general do 
have “critical”
30 or ‘feminist’ consciousness – the awareness that women (not always, 
but often) suffer because we are women. The idea of levels of consciousness (for 
instance, the concept of ‘raising’ consciousness) also reinforces the hierarchy of 
knowledge I criticize in this project by suggesting that certain women have better or 
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loftier ways of thinking about sexism and feminism than others. Stanley and Wise write 
that: 
It denies the validity of people’s own interpretations and understandings. If these don’t 
match the interpretations of revolutionaries then they are false. ‘If you agree with me 
you are right, if you disagree then you’re wrong,’ is implied but not openly stated.
31 
 
It is easy to equate the lower levels with ignorance and naivety, and to equate the 
higher levels with wisdom, awareness and experience. 
A fellow PhD candidate I met at a conference was exploring the possibility that 
certain women could be more ‘conscious’ than feminists tend to give them credit for.
32 
After reading existing contemporary research on young people and sexuality, Bryony 
Hoskins wondered if she would find young people as naïve, disempowered and 
uncritical about sexual practice as the research described. Instead, she discovered that 
her subjects engaged actively in analytical discussions of the power relations between 
men and women in sexual relationships. Furthermore, the young women took some 
control of the research by talking about other aspects of their sexual experience. 
Hoskins writes, “Gender may be highly significant in explaining relationships, but what 
I am asking is, is it exclusively important?”
33 She goes on to say that, “women’s own 
stories of past or present relationships should not be reduced in academic accounts to 
gendered and heteronormative patterns.”
34 In other words, the hallmarks of feminist 
consciousness (that is, the ability to attribute behaviour and attitudes to structural and 
abstract concepts) cannot always account for the full implications of lived experience. 
Nor do these always effectively represent the state of a woman’s consciousness. 
The conceptualisation of consciousness “as a ‘process’ at the same time that it is 
seen as a ‘state’”
35 might be a more productive basis for theories of feminist 
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consciousness. This conceptualisation makes connections between actual events and 
situations, and ‘consciousness’ as a unique
36 and constantly renewing operation by 
which women learn about and make sense of these. In fact, its links with personal 
experience mean that such a conceptualisation often gets left out of ‘developed’ 
feminist theory altogether. bell hooks makes the point that we only rarely include 
evidence of the development of consciousness in feminist theory – to the detriment of 
our readers.
37 The reason we leave these parts out is that we don’t think they really 
count as feminist theory – we see work in which we develop consciousness as part of 
the journey to feminism, or as a very rough draft of our more advanced feminism. But 
these works are vital. Firstly, they are vital because they can provide a more complete 
picture of what feminism really looks like – its struggle, its internal contradictions and 
its emotion. And they are vital because, as less polished or scholarly forms of feminist 
theory, they might resonate with non-academic or activist women, allowing us to make 
links across the feminist divide. 
“Representation” 
The final term I wish to define before I begin is ‘representation.’
38 One of my 
core assumptions in the writing of this thesis is that there are a number of ways of 
looking at and describing certain phenomena. What I discuss in this thesis is not so 
much feminism itself as the representation of feminism. I want to examine the way we 
express what feminism is, and how our depictions of feminism influence others. I aim 
to pick away at some of the monolithic representations of feminism. By ‘monolithic,’ I 
mean depictions that rely on the vision of feminism as a single block of activities, or a 
type of behaviour, or one particular ideal, instead of as a great squirming multiplicity of 
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discussions, ideas and practices. In short, I do not subscribe (as should be evident by 
now) to the notion that there is a single Truth of feminism, or how to do feminism, or 
‘feminists,’ or even ‘oppression.’  
Rather, I believe that there is only a multiplicity of interpretations of these 
things. Representation is what happens when we describe our individual interpretations 
of things such as feminism. These descriptions might be direct or peripheral, resulting 
in overt or implied representations. When certain representations gain currency and 
popularity amongst certain groups, then they tend to carry more weight as ‘Truth.’ It is 
these ‘Truths’ of feminism – these commonly deployed representations of feminism – 
that interest me in this thesis. And it is these ‘Truths’ that I will critically examine here, 
exploring the ways such representations gain currency, who benefits from particular 
representations of feminism, and the wider effects of limited representations of 
feminism on women in general. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethics, as a necessary consideration in any politics, is about being fair, and in 
feminism, it is specifically about being fair to women – all women. This includes the 
women we would not normally think of as being interested in feminism, women who 
take an active dislike to feminism, women who rejoice in the name ‘feminist,’ and, 
finally, myself. In this project, I aim to be fair to all these women. I am fair to 
‘unofficial’ feminists by making my feminism as readable and understandable to them 
as possible, and by recognising such women as feminist theorists and activists. I am fair 
to anti-feminists by exploring the reasons for their antipathy to feminism without being 
patronising, invoking notions of false consciousness, or imagining these women to be 
absent from my reading audience. I am fair to self-professed feminists by adding to 
their/our conversation in a way that is thoughtful, considers many arguments, and, 
despite my attempt to renunciate scholarly conventions, refuses to ‘dumb it down.’ And Wasley 31 
I am fair to myself by allowing myself to identify with more than one of these groups at 
a time (because sometimes I don’t fit the ‘official’ feminist mould, and sometimes I 
do), and by writing about a topic that lends itself to optimism. 
The ethics I use as guidelines for my work come from the knowledge feminists 
have shared with me. Where I was once very resistant to the idea of sharing feminist 
knowledge, the women I know outside of academia and activism have always been 
willing to share. Previously, when I spoke to these ‘unofficial’ feminists about 
feminism, I felt as though I was educating them, rather than having a conversation. One 
of the moments that turned me around was when an aunt made the comment that men 
have an astounding amount of privilege compared with women, and that the most 
startling thing of all about this is that they (men) “are so oblivious to that fact.” This 
remark indicates a deep philosophical awareness of the respective positions of men and 
women, as well as the integration of feminist thought in the broader community of 
women. She was describing what I later found discussed in a scholarly piece of 
feminist theory: “the ‘alienation of advantage,’ the entrenched processes of cognitive 
distance through which the privileged in society fail to recognise their unfair 
advantages.”
39 I feel now that, in fairness, my own knowledge – along with that of 
other academics – should be as available to unofficial feminists as they make theirs to 
me. I base my ethics, then, in the potential for a mutual education
40 between ‘official’ 
feminists and ‘unofficial’ feminists (and myself, wherever I fit in that dyad). In 
essence, the ethics I draw from my relationships with ‘unofficial’ feminists are an 
ethics of the everyday: ethics in the common sense understanding of the term. Kind of a 
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moral obligation to the women who helped get me where I am. I want to go towards the 
repayment of a debt. 
The best way to explain the ethics I’m referring to here is to say that there is 
nothing ethical about postponing the sharing of knowledge, and change, for the sake of 
prestige, accolades or one-upwomanship. Women have a rich history of sharing 
knowledge through long telephone conversations, gossip, heart-to-hearts, and coffee 
chats. Knowledge is not a commodity when we’re away from the official workplace; 
it’s something in abundance to slop around then offer as seconds and thirds. It’s 
something to give with love, like food, and then to reheat and give with love again. It 
occurs to me as I write this that a more graceful way to express my gratitude for this 
shared knowledge would be to do everything I’m saying but without all the fuss. 
However, I’m of the opinion that we need to make a fuss over theories that are in their 
babyhood – and the theory that ‘outside’ women have much to offer feminism is 
definitely still in need of development. At the moment, such a theory could go in two 
directions: in the direction of honest respect and acceptance; or in the direction Silliman 
and Bhattacharjee warn against: 
…acknowledging such materials [the work of ‘unofficial’ feminists] should not mean 
that ‘real’ scholars in the academy must encourage lesser forms of intellectual activity 
in other locations, as this can only lead to a patronizing relationship...[rather there must 
be] the recognition that intellectual activity in the academy is impoverished by the 
narrow definitions that constrain it.
41 
 
Until an ethical approach of honesty and respect is a widespread thing, then, writers 
who use this approach are going to have to draw attention to the fact. 
Location, Multiculturalism and Difference 
Perhaps the other important ethical issue I need to elaborate involves my 
representation of difference in this thesis. It is probably already obvious that I have 
opted to locate my research mainly in the Western body of activity and theoretical 
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works of feminism. In other words, I generally draw on feminism that circulates 
throughout the Western world – mainly that of Australian, British, Western European, 
New Zealander, Canadian and North American feminists. While I feel that some of 
what I am saying about the over-categorising of feminism in Western culture is 
applicable to Third and Second world countries,
42 I also know that feminism can 
operate quite differently in such countries. Feminist activism and theory can fulfil 
different needs in other parts of the world. Women’s oppression can take different, 
often more devastating forms. I am acutely aware that this project entails some 
criticism of conventional ways of defining of feminist practice – criticism that might be 
both inappropriate and misappropriated in other cultures.
43 I choose, therefore, to locate 
this work in the feminist practices and goals I am most familiar with, and in the setting 
of patriarchy I am most familiar with. 
Cultural and ethnic difference does, however, play a large part in my project, 
and the use of theory by such theorists as Audre Lorde, bell hooks, Gayatri Spivak, 
Chandra Mohanty, Ien Ang and Trinh Minh-ha evidences this.
44 I am particularly 
interested in how these women describe the submersion of the ‘different’ voices in 
feminist theory. So, it’s not so much that I ignore issues of difference (in fact, 
differences – particularly differences of education and opinion – constitute a key focus 
in my work), as it is that I work with issues of difference within the context of Western 
feminism. I don’t see difference as a disabling issue for feminism; rather, I believe it is 
quite possible to write and mobilise responsibly about/around difference within 
feminism. My attitude towards difference can be partly elaborated by looking at Donna 
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Haraway’s work on situated knowledge.
45 Situated knowledge is about speaking from a 
place that is known. In other words, it’s about awareness of your own space/place in the 
social world, and speaking from that place. Critical analysis of my own situation means 
that I can avoid a patronising relationship of ‘objective distance’ from the group I am 
studying (this is the mentality that claims: ‘as an outsider, I can see your behaviour 
objectively, and therefore I know more about you than you do yourself’). 
Acknowledging my own position of privilege or subordination in relation to others 
allows me to form “partial” connections with outside groups.
46 
Elizabeth Enslin takes Haraway’s theory into a situation of non-Western 
feminism. Her essay “Beyond Writing: Feminist Practice and the Limitations of 
Ethnography”
47 is about her work in Nepal as an anthropologist. The fact that she has 
married into a Nepali family who have a history of activism in their local area 
complicates her position as a researcher. Enslin lives and works, therefore, with 
expectations from varied sources, which tend to pull her in opposite directions. For 
instance, she has an obligation to her U.S. University to produce scholarly 
anthropological research – her institution expects an observer role. But her new family 
expects her to join in with their local activism (her new family publicly advocate 
women’s rights and have set up literacy programs) – her family expects a participant 
role. In fact, her husband’s niece wrote a letter to Enslin in which she confronted her 
with these words: 
I want to say that you came to Nepal for two years, you wrote a book about the 
women’s movement, you did a PhD. But your work seems like nothing. Your book 
has no importance. After all, what is writing? You looked, you saw, you wrote a 
book. But that book won’t do anything if not accompanied by work, by practice. 
Right?
48 
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With a niece and possibly other family members making those kinds of demands, her 
own concerns about imposing Western feminist values on local women, as well as a 
university that might withdraw funding at any moment, Enslin realised she would have 
to find a way of dealing ethically with different ‘investors.’ 
Enslin describes how she takes part in local activism toward women’s literacy, 
and monitors her work carefully to decide when she should step back. I can express 
what Enslin describes as an ethical way to do research in this one word: accountability. 
Enslin proposes that we stay accountable to all those who have an investment in us. She 
goes on to say that the best way to do this is to base our research in physically, 
academically, and emotionally local relationships (that is, we ought not write from 
afar). Enslin’s ideal researcher is the woman who lives, writes, works and acts (or 
doesn’t act – depending on which is appropriate) among the women she wants to assist. 
Enslin believes that such a researcher is necessarily accountable to the people she 
researches because she must literally answer to the women for whom she acts and 
speaks. And she must answer to herself as well – because she’s a part of the community 
where her research takes place. In other words, it’s not necessary to give up 
researching, writing and reading in relationship with an institution in order to be 
ethical; it’s more a matter of choosing a responsible way to research. But there is a 
word of warning: the style of a work, says Enslin, is not always telling. Sometimes we 
need to pick up on the gaps between whom we write a work for and whom we write a 
work about, so that we can see the real relationship the researcher has with those who 
invest (financially or emotionally) in her. 
My own work does involve speaking about women different from myself. 
Although the women I write about are generally Western women, I discuss non-
academic feminists, women who choose not to identify as feminists, women who do 
not participate in organised feminist activism, and even anti-feminists. I, however, am a Wasley 36 
self-professed feminist with an academic background. I have taught, presented, and 
been published within academic contexts, and I am working towards a postgraduate 
degree. I have read a lot of scholarly feminist theory and I have taken part in organised 
activism. But I argue that I can partially connect myself with these women who are, in 
certain ways, different from me. I have formed these connections by working with such 
women on this project, discussing feminist theory and activism, representations of 
feminism and feminists, and the issues surrounding the identity of ‘a feminist.’ 
Moreover, the project has been a point of connection in that I have negotiated my use 
of the interviews with these women.
49 I have also worked within the existing 
connections I have with these women (those of family and friendship), thus following 
Enslin’s ideal of doing feminist work within local communities. I do not believe that it 
is always necessary to ground one’s work in the local (in fact, this dictum might be 
used as a way of escaping responsibility for assisting with broader feminist projects), 
but I certainly appreciate the connection it has allowed me with women different from 
myself for this project. 
Methods
50 
Interviews 
In order to form a tangible body of knowledge from ‘unofficial’ feminists, to 
which I might refer in my own work, I interviewed four women I know. Traditionally, 
the power dynamics of interviewing as a research method have been highly  
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questionable.
51 Interviewing has the potential to be inaccurate and misleading, not to 
mention downright oppressive in process or outcome. On the other hand, interviewing 
can be mutually rewarding and enlightening, and ethically sound. The point is that the 
technique of interviewing is a precarious one and, as such, the researcher must make 
the decision to interview based on suitability to her research, and including reflection 
and discussion on the politics of interviewing.  
Because a more complex involvement with the participant is likely to occur 
during open-ended interviewing
52 (such as I used) than in close-ended interviewing, the 
interviewer must minimize the betrayal inevitable in an “inherently manipulative” 
process.
53 Betrayal may come into play if the interviewer is not entirely open about her 
research topic, or if she deceives the interviewee as to her use of the interview material. 
Or, on a more subtle level, betrayal occurs when the interviewer does not cross-check 
her analysis of the interview with the participant. Some would even go so far as to say 
that a researcher betrays her participants when she does not gear the research towards 
their needs; when she does not reciprocate during the interview process, or when she 
fails to honour the minds of women
54 by presuming to interpret their words for them. 
Another form of betrayal is the interviewee’s sometime interest in withholding certain 
information from, or lying to please, the interviewer. She may have secrets she will 
never tell anyone; she may not feel she knows the interviewer well enough to divulge 
certain personal information or, conversely, she may feel she knows the interviewer too 
well. Family members (and I did interview family members), for instance, often have 
                                                 
51 Oakley, Ann. “Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms.” Doing Feminist Research. Ed. Helen 
Roberts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. 30-61. For more on feminist interviewing, see 
Sandra Kirby and Kate McKenna. Experience Research Social Change: Methods from the Margins. 
Toronto: Garamond, 1989. 
52 Shulamit Reinharz describes open-ended interviews as “semistructured or unstructured interviewing,” 
and close-ended interviews as “survey research or structured interviewing.” Feminist Methods in Social 
Research. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 18. 
53 Stacey, Judith. “Can There be a Feminist Ethnography?” Women’s Studies International Forum 11.1 
(1988): 21-27. 
54 McCall, Michal and Judith Wittner. “The Good News about Life History.” Symbolic Interaction and 
Cultural Studies. Eds. Howard S. Becker and Michal McCall. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990. 49-89. Wasley 38 
an investment in keeping particular feelings or experiences from each other – they 
must, after all, continue to have a relationship after the interview is over.  
All of these problems fall into areas of feminist debate on ethical research, 
representation and subject-object distinctions. One key benefit of open-ended 
interviewing is that it can dispense with the idea of the researcher as god – omniscient 
and objective, but invisible. Instead, the researcher can be present in the text as self-
reflexive and reciprocative asker of questions, thus disrupting old subject-object 
hierarchies. Interviewing (particularly open-ended interviewing) can also create a more 
inclusive style of research by being open to the unexpected, and allowing the 
expression of difference during interviews. Too often, the urge to create theory that can 
be applied universally leads researchers to resist or recuperate descriptions of 
difference, and ignore accounts of reality that don’t fit into the research framework. 
Allowing participants to speak without the restraint of structured questions can open 
the interviewer’s eyes to new possibilities that will expand, rather than disprove, her 
research. 
I treat the words of my interviewees as words of authorities on feminism: that 
is, I give my interviewees’ ideas and language the same weight as any other theorist’s 
ideas and language.
55 The interviews took place over the course of this project, and 
were tape-recorded open-ended conversations. I asked the interviewees broad questions 
such as, “What do you think feminism is?” and “Why do you think some women refuse 
to identify as feminists?” The interviewees then took as long or as short a time as they 
chose to answer the questions. We often went off on tangents, discussing issues that 
arose during the conversations, and sharing anecdotes. The recordings are quite 
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splendid texts in their own right, filled with toddler babble, dogs barking, phones 
ringing, kid’s videos and the thousand other interruptions that make up daily life. I 
believe that my choice to interview unofficial feminists I know means that I was 
necessarily accountable to these women for the sake of my existing and future 
relationships with them. Therefore, I chose to work through the sections of interviews I 
used in this thesis with the interviewees in order to use their words fairly. If the 
interviewee felt I was taking her ‘out of context,’ we negotiated clearer ways for us 
both to say what we wished to say. Throughout this thesis, I refrain from treating the 
feminist theory of these women as raw data: in other words, I do not analyse or 
compare their words, attempt to treat a laughably small group as a demographic, or 
pityingly dismiss their ideas as false consciousness. Rather, I draw on their words to 
support my own ideas, or to show different (often surprising) sides to a given issue. 
One of the questions that some readers will no doubt ask when reading the 
theory of these interviewees is: how is this information valid feminist theory? Joan 
Scott, in her essay “The Evidence of Experience,”
56 provides an interesting discussion 
of ‘experience’ as a basis for understanding. This discussion strikes me as closely 
related to the question of whether or not my interviewees’ experience-based theory is 
valid feminist theory. Where Scott claims that, “The project of making experience 
visible precludes analysis of the working of this system and of its historicity; instead, it 
reproduces its terms,” I would ask if Scott has accounted for the individual’s 
interpretation of his/her experience in the project. Scott’s concern that using experience 
(or experience-based theory) allows for no frame of reference, or understanding of 
wider patterns and structures, seems to me to elide the possibility that those who have 
the experience are able to historicise and contextualise their experiences. In other 
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words, Scott’s essay seems to suggest that, without the superior knowledge of an 
‘interpreter’ (that is, a sociologist or a historian), experience must needs stand alone, in 
need of a framework. I contend that my interviewees often do provide that framework, 
discussing their experiences in relation to others’ understandings of feminism, 
stereotypes, the history of gender difference, international inequities, and so on.  
In addition, the problem of claiming validity for my interviewees’ words as 
feminist theory might raise the question: does it provide an original or considered 
perspective on its topic? Sometimes the answer will be yes, but sometimes the answer 
will be no. As I discuss in more detail in the next section of this chapter, the usual set of 
criteria for writing theory is not the set I use in this thesis. Nor do I always deploy the 
theory of others in a conventional way. The way I work with my interviewees’ theory is 
as complicated as the way I work with conventional feminist theory. Sometimes the 
interviewees’ theory will raise interesting and important questions, but at other times it 
will reiterate theory that has been circulating in academic circles for some years. In the 
latter case, my very point in including the interviewee’s theory may be to show how 
‘unofficial’ feminists are capable of arriving at the same knowledge as ‘official’ 
feminists, despite their lack of background in scholarly theory. Sometimes the 
interviewees’ theory makes points that have been made some time ago and ‘disproved’ 
by more contemporary work. At other times, their theory makes claims that are 
considered damaging to more commonly accepted feminist goals (for example, 
interviewees might make use of stereotypes feminists have identified as false or even 
dangerous). When I include the theory of interviewees that feminists may consider 
shoddy or invalid, I often do so with the purpose of re-opening what may be considered 
a ‘case closed’ area of feminist research, for further consideration.
57 
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What I am saying here is that I neither critique nor valorise my interviewees’ 
theory in a blanket way throughout the thesis. As is the case with the ‘official’ theory I 
have referenced, I variously use the interviewees’ theory to support points I make, to 
provide points of departure from viewpoints conventional to scholarly feminist theory, 
and, even, from time to time, to illustrate or give examples of arguments that conflict 
with my own. 
Style 
I use an unconventional style of scholarly writing in my thesis, mainly to 
demonstrate the possibility of embracing ‘other ways’ of writing feminist theory. I 
attempt to use everyday language and terms to create my argument. I use the kind of 
grammatical conventions we might find in speech rather than writing, such as 
contractions (‘I’ve’ instead of ‘I have’) and emphasis (italicized words, so that readers 
can hear what I’m saying as well as see it). I try to avoid the overuse of academic 
jargon as much as I can. I use my own fiction to extend and clarify my analysis, as well 
as to make my writing interesting. Where I wish to do an extended analysis of another 
theorist’s work, I often use a conversation format to show how my ideas interact with 
the words of that theorist, and this adds some liveliness and warmth to an engagement 
with another theorist’s work that might otherwise appear dry and difficult. 
Writing these conversations was an extremely complex task, and needs some 
discussion of its own. It was, in general, difficult to create a balance between respect 
and critique; between merely valorising the theorist’s work, or dissolving into a circular 
argument. One of the things about the conversations that made it worth the effort, 
however, is that they give the theorist concerned a kind of right of reply. Where one or 
two quotations taken from a theorist and presented in a static way or out of context 
might sabotage the complexity of her or his argument, the conversations generally use a 
number of quotations on the topic and, therefore, provide a good picture of what the Wasley 42 
theorist really wants to say about the topic. One disadvantage, however, is that the 
theorists’ ‘replies’ cannot genuinely take into account my own questions or difficulties 
with the theorists’ ideas. As a result, the technique puts me in some danger of 
representing the theorists as stubbornly adhering to their own ideas – a representation I 
have done my best to avoid. It would be wise to remember that all theory is part of a 
broader ongoing conversation, and other theorists have the right of genuine reply as 
soon as my work becomes a public document. 
The main reason I use these unconventional forms of writing scholarly theory 
is, put simply, accessibility. This thesis is about the way people draw boundaries 
around what feminism is, effectively limiting certain people’s access to feminism. 
Moreover, I am being critical of the way these boundaries work. Therefore, it is vital to 
my political rationale for the thesis (in order to avoid hypocrisy and making a critical 
gaffe) that I write as accessibly as possible. 
Key Sources 
The following is a breakdown of the theorists whose work and ideas I draw on 
throughout this thesis. 
Interviewees or ‘Unofficial’ Feminists 
Interviewees for this project include two of my sisters, Narelle Wasley and Kim 
Borin, and two friends, Kerry Allan and Belinda Rapps. Apart from saying that these 
women come from a variety of professions and personal situations; that they range in 
age from 24 years to 42 years old; that they are white Australians of the middle or 
working classes; and that they have no formal background in organised feminist 
practices or scholarly theory, it would be absurd to undertake a discussion of 
demographical details here. After all, I am not trying to claim that these women 
‘represent’ the views of a particular group of women, such as non-feminists, or 
‘unofficial’ feminists, or non-academic feminists, or young women. Nor do we require Wasley 43 
demographic information about the feminist theorists and activists we commonly 
discuss in feminist theory. In fact, these women would prefer to keep various details of 
their lives private. Therefore, I will not make these women research objects or case 
studies by revealing their personal details to my readership. 
All interviewees drew heavily on their personal experiences as women, as well 
as sharing their ideas about abstract concepts such as sexism and feminism. In the same 
way that reading a book by a feminist writer gives me information about that writer’s 
feminist position, the interviews provided me with a detailed understanding of what 
these women think about feminism. Quite simply, I chose to interview these particular 
women because I knew that they were of a ‘feminist persuasion’ (either because I know 
them very well or because they told me so), and because they were willing and 
available to be interviewed. My goal was to gather a small bank of theory from women 
who have no formal or conventional connections with feminism so that I could include 
in my work theory from outside the feminist canon without drawing exclusively on 
internet sites and other popular cultural forms such as songs and novels (and I do also 
make use of such texts in sourcing feminist theory). In addition, I have drawn on a 
cheaply-produced documentary aired some years ago during the centenary of women’s 
suffrage in Australia (1999),
58 in which street interviews with women on the topic of 
what it means for women to have the vote prompted some valuable information about 
feminism in the daily lives of women. I group these sources loosely under the title of 
‘unofficial’ feminist theory. 
Michel de Certeau 
  The theory of Certeau
59 on the politics of everyday life also provided me with a 
basis for constructing my own ideas on everyday feminism. Certeau was a pioneer in 
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this area of theory. He describes how daily activities, such as watching television, can 
constitute political resistance. Such activities involve individuals using their own 
uncontrollable powers of interpretation. So, while the television producers intend a 
particular meaning for their audience, this meaning is not necessarily the one their 
audience takes from the show. Rather, people frequently twist the elements of a text 
into what they want it to mean – something that may be quite different from the 
intended interpretation. We can read this manipulation of ‘the system’ as political when 
the things we manipulate are things that are supposed to manipulate us. So, when we 
take control of something that was intended to control us (such as advertising, as a tool 
of consumer capitalism), we are resisting our own management.  
Certeau identifies two different forms of resistance, which he calls strategy and 
tactics.
60 Broadly speaking, strategy involves forms of resistance which become an 
accepted part of culture (or as counter-culture); whilst tactics constitute resistances that 
remain irreconcilable with both culture and counter-culture. Certeau’s work provides 
useful categories for my project: it is possible to see the more ‘official’ forms of 
feminism (such as organised activism and academic feminist theory) as strategies, and 
the everyday patchwork of feminist activity I discuss in this thesis as tactics.
61 I discuss 
this distinction in more detail in Chapter 3. The important point here is that Certeau 
makes a case for conscious reflection on tactical resistance: he identifies a gap in 
cultural theory on resistance and calls for research into the everyday. While Certeau 
does not apply his ideas to feminism, feminism’s tradition of concern with personal 
experience means that Certeau’s ideas certainly lend themselves to a feminist analysis. 
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Janice G. Raymond 
 Raymond’s  book  A Passion for Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female 
Affection
 62 was, for me, a model text on how to reclaim and resurrect historical and 
international activities that have been written out of feminism. Raymond focuses on 
friendships between women (both lesbian and platonic) from times gone by and from 
cultures other than the West. Raymond does something quite revolutionary in the 
current historiographical
63 climate. She celebrates these friendships as relevant to, and 
as part of the history of, feminism. She does not, as is the fashion, attribute the 
empowerment women have sourced in female friendships to other causes – religious 
fanaticism, communist revolution, liberal social movements, etc. In this thesis, I use 
Janice Raymond’s confident reclaiming as encouragement to name historical acts of 
feminism as feminism, and examine the push to analyse and contextualise feminism’s 
history out of existence. I also found inspiration in Raymond’s accounts of female 
friendship for a number of my ficto-critical pieces. The final part of her book is a 
wonderful explanation of an approach to feminism that involves both materialism 
(realism) and idealism (vision).
64 Raymond’s realist/idealist position assisted me to 
make clear my perspective on optimism as a vital part of feminism. 
Liz Stanley and Sue Wise 
  Stanley and Wise’s book Breaking Out Again: Feminist Consciousness and 
Feminist Research,
65 as well as Liz Stanley’s Feminist Praxis,
66 and a more recent 
essay by both authors, “But the Empress has no Clothes!”
67 showed me that I was not 
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alone in my concern over the exclusivity of some forms of feminist work. Stanley and 
Wise wrote respectfully about working class women’s ideas and theory as early as 
1983.
68 While my suggestions for dealing with this problem are different from those of 
Stanley and Wise, they certainly brought the issue of feminist ‘snobbery’ to the 
attention of the academic world. I do not agree with the idea that elitist – particularly 
contemporary – feminist theory
69 is somehow ‘less feminist’ for its elitism, but I 
absolutely concur that such feminism can function to exclude certain women from 
learning about issues that might be of interest to them. 
Other important sources 
Other sources, such as Ann Oakley
70 and writers from the compilation Women’s 
Words, edited by Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai,
71 inform my methods. All of 
these writers critique the conventional ways researchers use interviewing as a method 
of data collection. Work by Mary Daly
72 and Luce Irigaray
73 on ideas of playing with 
language also inform my writing style. The work of journalists such as Elizabeth 
Wurtzel,
74 Susan Faludi
75 and Virginia Trioli
76 showed me how women have integrated 
established literary disciplines like journalism, feminist theory and popular writing to 
produce interesting and thoughtful feminist works. Various feminist historians, and 
historiographical writers, such as Marlene LeGates,
77 Susan Magarey,
78 and Gordon, 
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Buhle and Dye,
79 contribute to my discussion of ‘over-contextualizing’ historical 
feminism in a way that writes the revolutionary activities of women into oblivion. 
Some of these writers contribute directly to my work, while others contribute in a more 
circumspect way, informing my ideas, examples, and writing style.  
Chapter Synopses 
In Chapter 1, “Boxing Feminism,” I discuss the how, who, why and when of 
‘boxing’ feminism (that is, deciding what is and is not feminism) and, in doing so, 
establish some of this necessary background to the discussion that makes up this thesis. 
I begin to unpick the reasons why it is necessary to cordon off feminism in this way and 
who stands to gain by privileging particular kinds of feminism over others. Above all, 
this chapter introduces in a detailed way the concept that limiting, or ‘boxing,’ 
feminism is actually a problem. It is a problem because it reduces access: when we box 
feminism, we put up no entry signs that keep certain women among us outside vital 
discussions and practices of resisting the suffering of women. 
Part 1 of this thesis, Feminist Activism, consists of two chapters. Chapter 2, 
“What Counts as Feminist Activism?,” is a discussion of the practices we regard as 
legitimate feminist activism and why. I break down the criteria for feminist activism 
into four categories: Collective, Public, Sustained and Radical, and provide features 
and examples for each of these categories. I also examine the contradictions and double 
standards inherent in using such categories as criteria for feminist activism. This 
chapter has two main purposes: to provide examples of what counts as feminist 
activism, and to explain how building these boundaries both serves and subverts 
feminist goals. I look more widely at feminist practices in Chapter 3, “A Day in the 
Feminist Life.” This chapter includes information on Certeau’s politics of the everyday 
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and a discussion of how the everyday can function as feminist activism. I provide 
concrete examples of everyday feminist activism in the format of a personal diary (a 
ficto-critical piece), combining discussion of theories of feminist activism with 
descriptions of everyday activism. 
In Part 2 of the thesis, Feminist Theory, there are also two chapters. Chapter 4, 
“What Counts as Feminist Theory?,” is a discussion of what we regard as feminist 
theory and why, focusing particularly on the issue of scholarly conventions. It includes 
an in-depth discussion of how scholarly styles and contexts affect accessibility. The 
main focus of this chapter is on the metalanguage of social theory: that is, how 
academics perpetuate the requirement for scholarly feminist works, and the treatment 
of unofficial feminist voices as ‘raw data’ in the academic arena. This chapter is a 
transition into the discussion of everyday feminist theory in the following chapter. 
Chapter 5, “Seven Deadly Sins,” explores a number of ‘unscholarly’ practices to 
discuss how ‘sins’ of feminist theorising (stylistic and ethical no-no’s) can in fact 
contribute vitally to the canonical body of feminist theory. In this chapter, I introduce 
forms of theory that are accessible and ‘out-there.’ In particular, I discuss feminist 
theory that makes use of popular genre, suspect concepts, outdated methodologies, 
humour, and instructional styles.  
Part 3 of this thesis, Problems of ‘Intergenerational’ Feminism, contains one 
chapter. In Chapter 6, “Which Wave am I Surfing?,” I look at some of the ways in 
which feminists limit feminism using the concepts of ‘waves,’ generations and ‘the 
backlash,’ as well as the problems that arise because of such categorization. By 
mocking up a diatribe on third-wave feminism from the point of view of ‘second- 
waver,’ and vice versa, I explore how we limit generations of feminism. To clarify, I 
parody the persona of the second-wave feminist all young feminists (supposedly) ‘love 
to hate’ – the stereotypically extreme ‘radical’ feminist. I also illustrate stereotyped Wasley 49 
ideas of the ‘post-feminist’ who claims that feminism is redundant in an equal society, 
and the postmodern feminist (the theorising feminist who draws on Foucauldian and 
Derridean ideas of fragmented identity and power as relative and associative rather than 
conferred). Rather than merely describe the ways we box the generations, I act them 
out in this way because I think it makes my point clearer. As readers, you will probably 
recognise these parodies, and (hopefully) consider how the perceptions therein have 
hardened into stereotypes that drive a deep wedge between younger and older 
feminists. I then examine the way we delineate the backlash against feminism, 
highlighting a couple of situations in which feminism is mistaken for a backlash against 
feminism, and explaining the significance of such misreadings for any discussion of the 
backlash. Finally, I discuss ways to break the habit of this clear-cut delineation of 
generations of, and the backlash against, feminism. 
Moving on 
What I want to do about the limiting of feminism is explore the problem, 
because awareness of a problem is always the first part of working through it. While I 
talk about it, however, I will be trialling my own solution to the problem. Of course, 
there cannot be one final solution to a problem like the limiting of feminism. The issue 
itself is so variable that it precludes a single solution. Boundaries around feminism/not-
feminism vary from group to group and person to person; they vary according to place, 
time, the content of the feminism being produced and read, what the feminism is for, 
and even with the moods of the speakers and listeners. So my solution is not a general 
bandaid to the limiting of feminism – it won’t necessarily translate into a good solution 
for a similar problem in another culture, or even in another specific situation in my own 
culture. But it is, nevertheless, a solution. My solution is to talk about the problem of 
limiting feminism accessibly, by minimising my use of highly abstract or jargonised 
language, by using fiction and personal experience as ways of expressing my ideas, and Wasley 50 
(importantly) by drawing heavily on conversations I’ve had with women outside 
organised feminism, as well as drawing on my reading of more conventional feminist 
theory.  
My purpose in exploring the limiting of feminism in these ways is to show two 
things. Firstly, I wish to make the general statement that feminism comes in many 
forms. The variety of manifestations of patriarchal oppression require a variety of 
feminist responses – from grand, public, group acts of protest to small, private, 
individual moments of piecemeal resistance. Suggesting that feminism is limited to the 
former kind of resistance attempts to control and curtail both what feminism is and who 
feminists are. Secondly, my purpose is to move from general statements about limiting 
feminism, to specifics in the variety of manifestations of feminism. I do so partly by 
presenting instances of ‘unofficial’ feminist theory and practices, and partly by 
attempting to produce this thesis as a scholarly, yet accessible, work. By using my own 
work as an example of unconventional feminist theory, I show two things: that 
thoughtful, original and scholarly feminist theory can be accessible to more than the 
anticipated academic audience, and that feminism can be accountable to the women it 
focuses on. 
The thesis is, therefore, a political as well as an intellectual task, and I want to 
ensure that my readers understand that, although it is possible to write accessible 
intellectual theory, it can certainly be more difficult than simply being accessible, or 
simply using scholarly conventions. At times, the political/intellectual fissure creates 
almost irreconcilable conflict. I know that this thesis is, in many places, nowhere near 
as accessible as I would like it to be. The scholarly demands of the degree have often 
curtailed the creative flow that seemed to lend itself to a more accessible style, and I 
have had to return to a more sedentary, possibly denser kind of theory. Without 
wanting to make this a disclaimer, I suppose I am admitting here that some sacrifice of Wasley 51 
politics is intermittently necessary in a task like this, as well as some sacrifice of 
scholarliness. However, I do wonder if this happens for other writers more often than 
we suppose, and suggest that we extend the discussion about feminist epistemology, 
writing and practice to include such obscured struggles. 
Uh-oh! I’ve been had! 
There is one point I must make now that is very important to a discussion of the 
boundaries of feminism. It is that the boundaries I make use of in this thesis are 
arbitrary boundaries. The way I have carved out clear categories of feminism is a 
rhetorical device – I do so for the sake of coherence and to sort out my own ideas. I 
know that this is so because the writing process was difficult and convoluted. Sorting 
feminism into its ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ varieties, then sorting examples within these 
two realms into further categories was often a confusing task. I made many false starts 
and did a lot of revising. Several times, I shuffled examples around because they 
seemed to fit better in another category. I even re-use that widely contested division 
between feminist practice and theory,
80 although I am the first to acknowledge the 
difficulties I had in separating the two at times (the question, ‘Where does ideology end 
and ideological practice begin?,’ rears its head repeatedly).  
Similarly, I struggled with the contradictions inherent in describing 
‘conventional,’ ‘traditional,’ ‘official’ or ‘limited’ feminist practices. How can 
feminism, as a radical social justice movement, ever be conventional? Is feminism 
entrenched enough as an academic discipline or a social practice to have traditions? 
Can something so subversive have a level we can nominate ‘official’? And can the 
limits that feminism explode for women in turn create limits? Certeau’s distinction 
between strategies (official feminism), which are able to “produce, tabulate and 
impose” spaces in culture, and tactics (unofficial feminism), which can “only use, 
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manipulate and divert these spaces”
81 is a useful one here. There are, in other words, 
different “modalities”
82 of resistance. A similarly worrying problem is the distinction 
between official and unofficial feminists. I do not believe that any one woman is 
always or never an official or unofficial feminist: these categories are not static, and nor 
are women’s purposes, desires or strategies. Language can be very oppressive at times. 
And yet I needed to find a way to describe practices that have become well-known, 
accepted or common to the degree that these now constitute a widely deployed 
representation of the sum-total of feminist practice and feminist theory. I am, therefore, 
obliged to use terms that occasionally confound me and my purposes.  
I suggest that, as a reader, you should not take these terms and categories too 
seriously. They are here to aid understanding. I accept that there is a lot I lose by using 
such categories. I lose a broader, more accurate picture of the confusing mixture of 
failures and deviations that get us locked out of the clubroom of ‘official’ feminism. I 
lose the chance to show how feminism, as a living idea, is constantly on the move, and 
we cannot pin it down into categories, no matter how many of these categories we 
devise. Perhaps most importantly, I lose the opportunity to break down the deeply 
entrenched binary oppositions between terms such as ‘official’ and ‘unofficial,’ 
practice and theory, ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional,’ despite the fact that I take 
some pains to break down certain other binaries (for example, public/private in Chapter 
2 and abstract/experience in Chapter 4). However, I believe that it is necessary to use 
some of these categories in order to meaningfully explore some of the other boundaries 
that have become reified within academia, activist discourse and feminist ideology. 
Some readers might find the fact that I use boundaries to discuss the 
dismantling of boundaries a little too ironical for them to take my argument seriously. I 
consider it a good laugh, and a clever trick on the part of language. It actually reminds 
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us that, just as reinforcing the boundaries of ‘real’ feminism is a farce, breaking them 
down is an equally difficult, uncontrollable business. By looking past the limits, to 
‘what else’ constitutes feminism, rhetorical and linguistic practices have actually forced 
me to establish new boundaries between the ‘other’ things that count. This 
deconstruction-reconstruction process also reminds us that we are not always dealing 
with easily divisible genre or practices when we attempt such projects. We are often 
dealing with the abstractions of ‘language,’ ‘practice’ and ‘thought’ and, as such, must 
be prepared for something that resembles a vast, shifting clump of sea grass. Ideas flow 
through each other, tangle and split, break free and collide, resulting in a mass of 
movement. My boundaries are more like buoy-lines: superficial divisions that allow the 
submarine, submerged, subversive ideas to continue their interactive ebb and flow 
beneath the surface. To me, the limits of feminism that we usually recognize and call 
on are bigger, harder, more destructive than the generally wily, conscious, slippery 
boundaries I utilize in this thesis. Haraway said it beautifully: 
In the consciousness of our failures, we risk lapsing into boundless difference and 
giving up on the confusing task of making a partial, real connection. Some differences 
are playful; some are poles of world historical systems of domination. Epistemology is 
about knowing the difference.
83 
 
Who would have thought it was possible to get playful with ancient, entrenched, and 
continuing differences? 
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Chapter 1 
Boxing Feminism 
We put women into ‘feminism’ and ‘non-feminism’ 
and within those boxes there are hundreds of boxes. 
— Kerry Allan, 2001
1    
 
In this chapter, I present a general introduction to the idea that we ‘box’ or draw lines 
around chunks of work and activity that count as feminism. This chapter acts as a 
background to the rest of the thesis, including a broad discussion of the who, how and 
why in the urge to control feminism, as well as an introduction to the writing technique 
(ficto-criticism combined with conventional criticism) I will make use of in subsequent 
chapters. This is a fast-moving chapter, as is consistent with my excitement about the 
subject, and because its aim is to take readers into the overall discussion with energy. 
“Boxing Feminism” is both a ‘setting the scene’ of some of the ways in which we limit 
feminism, and a way of familiarizing my readers with my perspectives – political, 
theoretical, and emotional – on this topic. 
 
  How long have I been doing feminism? How long have I been making progress 
through the lesser fortunes of women? How many centuries, millennia? And I still 
encounter opposition every way I turn. The opposition has been the one thing that has 
stayed the same: the only constant in feminist history.  
You might say I’m wrong to write my feminist life this way. I’ll be wandering 
back and forth between my ages, persona, and memories, you see. It will piss some 
historians off: they’ll tell me I only have a right to my own moment in time, and 
anyway, what am I doing remembering all this? What claim have I got to all this 
knowledge? Most women only get little bits and pieces of this knowledge, and have to 
struggle along with their fragments. I’m taking it all. 
And it will piss some of the scientists off, too. They’ll say it’s not linear, not 
calculable. They might say words like ‘anomaly’ and ‘freak.’ Fortunately, I’ve been 
around long enough to know the avenues. No one can ever dissect me (although they 
want to) again. For god’s sake! I remember when they had the nerve to lock me up for 
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crying over all the contradictions I live with. They administered, electrocuted, incised, 
and excised. But I haven’t been around for all this time for nothing; I know how to 
regenerate the parts of my body they damned and removed.  
 
It may seem to the scientist and the historian in all of us that I’m merging 
history, criticism and fiction in a very irresponsible way. I assume the bodies, names 
and actions of women who died long before I ever lived, and sometimes in places I 
have never even visited. I acknowledge that my right to integrate all the contexts and to 
take on the voices of other women through international history is precarious at best. 
But what I’m trying to do is actually to be responsible – in an alternative way to the 
usual – to as many women as possible; to account for the women who did feminism 
before me, as well as beside me. I’m trying to say that it’s more responsible to 
acknowledge the movement of feminism through time and space than to close off such 
movement. I’m tracing a genealogy – my own genealogy as a feminist. I’m not being 
blind to context; rather, I’m making the choice to place these historical and global acts 
in the context of the spread of feminism. This tactic can then act as a foundation to talk 
about this spread of feminism into the daily lives of women who are living today in the 
Western world. 
Because the point I want to make is that feminism has a movement of its own. 
When I say movement, I mean actual motion. It spreads and integrates into women’s 
lives in a way that is unacceptable to the Western desire to control, delineate and 
document social movements like feminism. Feminism is untidy and there is no way to 
restrain it: it’s about ideas
2; it’s not something women can go out and get a degree in, 
or engage in at work in a women’s health clinic, then leave at work when they go home 
to the kids. Perhaps it is the very untidiness of feminism to which many people object. 
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It gets so mixed up in real life. As long as feminism is safe in the women’s collectives, 
brought out and aired once a year at the Reclaim the Night march, then it’s all right. As 
long as it’s in the universities, captured on paper in written tasks like “Do a feminist 
reading of Moby Dick,” then it’s all right. Doing a ‘feminist reading’ implies that we 
would be looking at Moby Dick in a distinct and unusual way – a way that steps back 
from real life, but allows us to return to a somehow ‘normal’ interpretation when we’ve 
finished the assignment. But the fact is that we cannot confine feminism to a style of 
analysis in this way. It is present in ‘normal’ interpretations. It is present in every 
objection a woman makes to her status as a second-class citizen, whether implicit or 
explicit. Because feminism is intangible (it cannot be contained in feminist textbooks or 
street demonstrations), and because it is so much a part of daily life, it is impossible to 
draw lines around the edges and say, “there is Feminism.” This is threatening or 
difficult for people who stand to lose from feminism’s widespread success and they try, 
therefore, to enclose feminism in sets of rules, stereotypes and clichés. 
Non-feminists Boxing Feminism 
   Let me tell what I mean when I talk about resistance to the messy movement of 
feminism. However, I should first point out that the term ‘non-feminist’ is not 
interchangeable with ‘anti-feminist.’ People don’t identify as feminists for a variety of 
reasons,
3 whereas anti-feminists show an active antipathy to feminism. Sometimes non-
feminists do feminism, but don’t associate their activities with more traditional feminist 
practices. Sometimes they simply don’t have the time or the background to name their 
activities at all. Some of the ways anti-feminists and non-feminists box feminism, 
however, intersect and replicate. This manifests in the “I am not a feminist” syndrome. 
Non-feminists might accept the goals and principles of feminism as their own, but they 
do not accept the accompanying stereotypes. Anti-feminists do not generally condone 
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the goals, principles, or stereotypes of feminism. However, the effect is often the same: 
the use and re-use of images that represent feminists as hysterical, dogmatic, extremist, 
irate and altogether abhorrent beings. 
Sometimes, when I think of all the obstacles anti-feminists have put in the way 
of feminism, all I can hear are the names. Shrew, slut, scarlet women, witch, it was. 
Mary Daly picks up on a lot of the old names: hag, fury, harpy, crone.
4 Then later, in 
more genteel times: bluestocking, spinster, hysteric, old maid, loose woman. Virginia 
Woolf thought about the names too: 
Z, most humane, most modest of men, taking up some book by Rebecca West and 
reading a passage in it, exclaimed, “The arrant feminist! She says that men are snobs!” 
The exclamation, to me so surprising – for why was Miss West an arrant feminist for 
making a possibly true if uncomplimentary statement about the other sex? – was not 
merely a cry of wounded vanity; it was a protest against some infringement of his 
power to believe in himself.
5 
 
Each name carries a category, a picture of a woman, maybe muttering over a cauldron, 
or plotting a violent castrative revolution. The name-calling is nothing to the 
destructive power of the stereotypes. To demand what you deserve and need was to be 
a shrew: a nagging, uncontrollable, aggressive whiner. To be lower class and stand up 
to someone of the upper class was to be an insolent slut. Women who liked cats, were 
outspoken or promiscuous, or who even had epilepsy or a squint, were witches and 
hags, and more often than not gaoled, tortured and put to death.
6 
 
The things we had to do to avoid the names! What is it exactly that was so 
disgraceful about women that we deserved the names? I don’t know, but I know what I 
did to stay nameless. I had to think of my body as a kind of ugly, messy reversal of male 
anatomy. Something to be shorn, scented, and compressed. The things I put my body 
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through…I remember singeing and powdering my hair until it fell out and I had to 
wear a wig. I have scented my genitals with stinging perfumes and caused all manner 
of rashes and infections. I wanted the names that men approved: lady, maiden, mother. 
Even now, I still put on lipstick at times (although I hear it’s about imitating aroused 
female genitals). I have engaged in all manner of piercing and plucking and hot wax 
treatments – and none in the name of an honest sexual deviation. The corsets! Once, 
before a church picnic, I had the girl lace me so tight that a rib snapped when I 
stumbled over a rock later in the day. Once or twice in my long life, I have been 
allowed to let my naturally rounded fleshiness be itself. But mostly, I’ve been made to 
bind up and whittle down the comfortable plumpness that is necessary to protect a 
growing foetus. 
 
But even breaking down the names to their accompanying stereotypes doesn’t quite 
capture the fact of general and acceptable disparagement of women who did feminist 
things – a disparagement that continues today. Many women still live in terror that 
someone might apply the names to us if we make feminist demands. Now, we have to 
put up with man-basher, lemon, frigid, militant, feminazi.
7 Narelle Wasley says: 
I’ve actually had this argument...that I don’t want to be a nag. I said “I don’t want to be 
a shrew. If you would do these things, I wouldn’t have to say them to you all the time. 
And it makes me feel like a nagging shrew. And the trouble is that you are just not 
listening to me.”...That’s when I get angry. When I feel like I’m not being listened to.
8 
 
I still hear, over and over in this very day and age, young women using the word 
‘feminist’ like they are saying ‘nag,’ ‘shrew,’ ‘frigid,’ ‘unfeminine,’ ‘man-hater.’ “I’m 
not one of those feminists,” I heard a young woman say quite recently, “I still like the 
guys to do most things.”
9 I wonder if she knows how she conjures the image of a lady 
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reclining languidly on a chaise lounge while her stalwart husband scurries around 
alternately painting the house and cleaning the toilets. 
I opened the paper one morning not long ago to see an article called “Paying the 
Price of Feminism.”
10 It’s hard to work out if the author, Pam Casellas, is anti-feminist 
or non-feminist or something else altogether. But she certainly knows how to represent 
feminists as teeth-gnashing dictators. She discusses a report by researcher Jill Kirby 
that makes claims about high numbers of women who wish to stay at home rather than 
return to the workforce after having children. The “conservative” centre
11 that 
commissioned the report “challenges governments to recognize the reality of women’s 
choices and to adjust social, welfare and employment policies ‘to respond to 21
st 
century reality, rather than egalitarian dogma.’”
12 That actually sounds pretty good, not 
to mention radical, especially if you look at it alongside some of the feminist work that 
has emerged on the differing needs of women and men, or revaluing and (god forbid) 
remunerating work that women are more likely to choose. But Casellas calls it “a line 
of thought which might cause the most ardent feminist to burst a blood vessel” – which 
basically says that ardent feminists adhere to “egalitarian dogma.” Maybe I am looking 
in the wrong books, but I have never found a feminist who suggests that all women 
should be in the workforce. No matter what feminists say, non-feminists continue to 
box us. I told a male friend that I was studying feminism and he said, “Oh, I heard a 
good joke the other day. There was this lesbian, right...” 
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Feminism and the Laws of Femininity 
While non- and anti-feminists resisted and still resist the spread of feminist 
thought by deriding things that are feminism, attaching mean stereotypes to feminism, 
thinking up derogatory terms for feminists, and watching with pleasure when women 
accept those terms, they also curtail feminism’s success by naming some feminism as 
‘not feminism.’ Certain feminist practices are sentimentalized or pathologized. 
Emotions and actions that hint at a feminist sensibility, or offer the potential for 
feminist practice, mutate suddenly into the Laws of Femininity. Solidarity gets 
transformed into sentimental (not powerful) sisterhood
13 or sickening condescension 
(‘the girls’), and films about friendship between women are disparagingly called ‘chick 
flicks.’ That we manage to like other women is almost unbelievable, given our training. 
When we are fond of each other, and listen to each other’s ideas, it’s not always 
according to the Law of Feminine Sentimentality. Mostly, it’s with respect and 
discernment. What luck that there were some women – feminist pioneers
14 – who fitted 
so badly, so falsely, into the stereotypes that they knew, in their own hearts, that the 
stereotypes were wrong. What wonderful luck that these women were willing to share, 
not only love, but knowledge, with other women.  
Argument and disagreement becomes female competition for the attention of 
men. This is the Law of Feminine Rivalry, and it’s a tough one to combat, perhaps 
because it’s really enacted as well as mistakenly identified. The Lawmakers strip 
dissent, differing opinions and criticism of the dignified intellectual status they achieve 
when men do them. Instead, we’re bitching, gossiping, cat fighting. “Meow! Ffft!” say 
some men, getting all aroused, waiting for us to strip down to our bikinis and hop into a 
paddle-pool filled with mud. This Law is changing like the grinding turn of a great 
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stone wheel. It’s that hard to clear away all the stereotypes we’re supposed to apply to 
each other – images of rivals and bitches. It’s that hard to be friends and sisters and 
workmates, and to argue out of genuine disagreement – not for the approval of men. 
Anger and frustration manifests as the Law of Feminine Hysteria. 
 
In the late 1800s, Dr Freud noticed that many women were going mad – 
literally mad, as in mad as hell at the world. I was one of them. I growled at everyone 
who came near me; I shrieked with ire every time someone asked me what was wrong. I 
was carried off to a psychoanalyst, who asked me questions about sex. He told me that 
I was repressed, that I wanted to make a sexual conquest out of my father. I recall 
being genuinely surprised into calmness for a moment. “No,” I told him. “I hate my 
father. He touched me indecently when I was a child.” “Ah.” The doctor smiled 
contentedly. “You will find that your memory serves you incorrectly. You only wanted 
him to touch you indecently.”
15 I started shrieking again. 
 
Don’t they understand that there is enough social and cultural abuse for us to be pissed 
off about that they always don’t need to dig into our psyches to find neuroses? 
Pathologizing is a habit. The Lawmakers characterise lesbian love and sex as 
psychologically abnormal and, more often than not, linked to childhood trauma. Even 
worse, the Lawmakers recuperate lesbianism under the Law of Feminine 
Hypersexuality. It becomes a sign of women’s rapacious sexual appetites. And most 
revolting of all, the thing that makes me sick in my heart, lesbian sex is so subversive 
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of patriarchy that it must be reclaimed, and exhibited in pornography for the erotic 
titillation of men. 
Then there is the Law of Feminine Maternalism. Enjoying maternity – that 
immense feeling of power and activity that the capacity for childbirth gives women – is 
anything but empowering, according to the stereotypes. That we enjoy motherhood is 
merely a consequence of our natural inclination towards care and maternal love, and 
our incompetence to participate in anything that remotely resembles a public life. 
Sentimentally speaking, we are natural mothers, born to serve our children (that is, our 
sons). Our mother love is unreasonable (we’re blind to our children’s flaws), but 
honourable. Anatomically speaking, we are passive receptacles for sperm and 
incubators for embryos – utterly unfulfilled, and more than likely disturbed, if we are 
unable or do not wish to have babies. Never mind the alternative visions of the uterus 
actively growing the foetus; the amniotic sac and cervix protecting, and the placenta 
feeding, the foetus. Never mind the conflicting emotions and thoughts we have about 
motherhood: the annoyance, the resentment, and the impatience, tainting the love with 
guilt.
16 
Nothing we could ever do was our own – the Lawmakers reclaimed everything 
as (at best) ‘natural’ femininity or (at worst) psychosis. Everything worked according to 
the Laws. The Lawmakers manipulated all of our actions for the satisfaction and 
amusement of non- and anti-feminists. That we managed to resist male power 
sometimes – how can we explain that? For occasionally, we disregarded the way many 
men and women wished to understand feminists. Solidarity among women and 
resistance to male domination certainly caused havoc when we did them for ourselves. 
However, more and more women started to see through their God-given inferiority. 
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Feminism was on the move, spreading like a plague or a perfume. 
Feminists Boxing Feminism 
However, the unruly movement of feminism into the daily lives and psyches of 
women, particularly since the powerful dissemination of feminist messages during the 
second wave, is unacceptable to many feminists, too. The reasons vary: some feminists 
draw boundaries around what is feminism in the name of maintaining feminism’s 
radical edge.
17 Other feminists seem to believe that concern with the personal and 
everyday areas of women’s lives (concern that might stretch the boundaries of 
feminism somewhat) belongs in the early stages of feminist consciousness, and that 
feminism should since have come of age as serious theory.
18 Perhaps some feminists 
are taking care not to put their academic careers in jeopardy by expressing interest in 
unfashionable or outdated ideas (which then become discounted as ‘real’ feminism); or 
by writing in a way that is not quite scholarly enough. For many feminists it is none of 
these and all of these – many don’t explicitly address the issue of what is/is not 
feminism, or draw overt lines around feminism in their own work. But the lines are still 
there, implicit and assumed. It’s a pastime of most contemporary feminists to mark out 
their territory. This is one feminist’s comment that marks out where ‘true’ feminism 
begins and ends: 
Women who teach, research, and publish about women, but who are not involved in 
any way in making radical social and political change, women who are not involved in 
making the lives of living, breathing women more viable…If lifting oppression is not a 
priority to you then it’s problematic whether you are part of the actual feminist 
movement.
19 
 
The woman who said this is implying that teaching and writing about the oppression of 
women are not sufficient criteria by themselves for a woman to call her work 
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‘feminism.’ There must be some kind of clear activist component to her work. Then 
there is this from my conversation with a feminist who works neither in the fields of 
academic nor activist feminism: 
…[people] see you as a ‘big feminist.’ Big woman, big feminist woman. You know, 
you’re doing this feminist studies and thesis, all the rest of it...
20 
 
The term she coins for me – “big feminist” – implies that the scholarly work I engage 
in makes me a somehow more ‘official’ feminist than her. My work is the “big,” 
authorised and valid form of feminism, whilst other kinds of feminism are ‘smaller’ 
and less significant. Everyone has a way to box feminism. Street interviews with 
women from the Australian documentary The Centenary of Women’s Suffrage
21 
produced comments like this, often repeated (though in different terms): “Women are 
the same as men,” “I think there’s equity now,” and “We’re just like men.” These 
women express an idea of feminism that claims, putting aside biological differences, 
men and women are both human, and as such, should have equal rights (just as Pam 
Casellas characterized feminists by their “egalitarian dogma”).
22 Can you see where 
these women are drawing the lines? Essentially, one of the limits that women 
commonly place on ‘what is feminism’ is the belief that men and women are equal and 
should therefore receive the same treatment. An alternative line drawn by other 
feminists, however, implies that this perception is false. Germaine Greer says, 
“[u]npopular feminists ‘fight’ for liberation; popular feminists work for equality.”
23 For 
Greer, feminism is something very specific – the struggle for an expression and 
acceptance of collective female power – not simply the fight for equality. Opinions 
vary amongst feminists, but the result is almost inevitably the boxing of feminism: this 
is feminism; that is not. 
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Historical Boxing 
That feminism has been boxed and bordered has a history all of its own – a 
conscious history, so to speak, because feminists have often thought and written 
explicitly about what feminism is(n’t). It is some years now since feminists started to 
do this: it’s being going on, perhaps, since the word was coined.
24 The practice took off 
in the 1960s, but it was in the early 1980s (a transition point between what we call 
second- and third-wave feminism) that I think the boxing got really big. Two very 
interesting things happened as a result of the increasing influence of feminism in the 
academy and in the outside world. Those two things were crucial to the direction 
feminism would take. Let me explain. 
Pauline B. Bart describes how she: 
…started teaching courses on women in 1969 because of my commitment to the ideas 
and practice of the women’s liberation movement…Not only did we give students 
credit for participating in activist organizations, but sometimes I required a paper based 
on participant research in an activist organization. Women’s studies without activism 
was like the ocean without salt.
25 
 
However, the integration of this practical work with feminist study had a lifespan. In 
the 1980s, things began to shift. Bart was one of the course coordinators of Women’s 
Studies and feminist theory units who could no longer realistically require students to 
engage in activism – mainly because studying women’s studies didn’t necessarily 
involve believing in a feminist ethos anymore. Bart says, “[W]omen’s studies used to 
be the academic arm of the women’s movement. Now it is the women’s arm of the 
academic movement.”
26 Students can study Women’s Studies as an academic interest, 
and not a passionate political act. The evidence of this shift today is the striking number 
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of Women’s Studies courses that are changing their names to ‘Gender Studies.’
27 What 
was, and is, happening is a broad scale institutionalisation of feminism. In the 80s, this 
was amazing and somewhat horrifying for many feminists: they had to realize for the 
first time that feminism’s radicalness could be up for sale; that feminism could be ‘co-
opted’; in short, that feminism could actually be less than perfect. “With 
institutionalization,” says Bart, “came rewards. Upward mobility for teachers of gender 
was concomitant with foundation and university funding becoming available.”
28 But 
the rewards, for Bart, do not outweigh the pacification of feminism: without activism, 
many feminists found it hard to believe in the transformative power of the basics of 
their teaching and their students’ learning. Bart has “wept with anger and despair”
29 
over the fact that direct political activity is no longer seen as a necessary component of 
feminism. 
The departure of activism from feminist teaching was one of the first ways in 
which many feminists began to see feminist theory and feminist practice as separate. 
Despite certain efforts to break down the distinction between theory and practice in 
feminism, the two have never been comfortably married since. Today, feminists tend to 
represent feminism in these dualistic terms even when we discuss the instability of such 
a binary opposition. Some feminists even represent theory and practice as antithetical 
things
30 that a feminist can only combine with great reflexive effort. It is, of course, an 
illusion to represent feminist action without theory (any feminist activist must be 
predicated on some theory of the position of women in society, and some theory of how 
her activism might help, or why would the activist be doing it?), just as it is demeaning 
to feminist writers to suppose that their theory is not boundary-pushing, active political 
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work. However, when we say ‘feminist practice’ we tend to think of women 
collectively painting banners and demonstrating for the pro-choice movement or equal 
pay. And when we say ‘feminist theory,’ it conjures the picture of a pile of books, or an 
earnest-faced woman tapping at a computer keyboard. What I’m trying to say here is 
that the early 80s was characterized by something that hadn’t really happened in a big 
way in feminism before: a “new theoretical awareness”
31 that led to the marking out or 
taxonomising of kinds of feminism. 
  The second thing that happened in the early 80s was the growing sense that 
some feminists were privileging certain kinds of feminism over others. This privileging 
was couched in terms such as the ‘danger’ of untheorised practice,
32 and the 
‘redundancy’ of theory without practice (or the compromised nature of highly academic 
theory).
33 Ann Froines argues that it is not “morally superior to be an activist or 
morally suspect to be an academic,”
34 but the truth is that prestige became attached to 
feminist theory, and integrity to feminist practice at this time. Underlying this tension 
was the implication that some of us – not any one group; it depended on who was 
talking – were not really doing feminism (or not doing it properly, which usually comes 
down to the same thing). Immediately on the tail of the idea of ‘proper’ feminism was 
the dissatisfaction some of us started to feel with the way feminists were creating 
hierarchies of feminism. The result of this kind of boxing, said feminists like Liz 
Stanley and Sue Wise,
35 was to carve out elite forms of feminism that left the small, 
quiet, personal life-changing ideas of daily feminism out in the cold. Stanley and Wise 
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pointed out that to be a feminist in this era, meant working, studying – doing a job in 
feminist practice or theory. A 24-7 ideology of feminism was not enough: you had to 
meet more stringent demands before you could call yourself a feminist.
36 
Little has changed on this question since the 80s.
37 The work Stanley and Wise 
started on the elitism of feminism heralded a vast field of work in feminist theory on 
‘difference politics.’
38 Difference politics accounts for women who are different from 
the dominant social or cultural group of feminists. The kinds of differences that qualify 
for study are race, class, sexuality, generation and occasionally disability. This work is 
important and not to be sneered at. Many feminists (including white, middle class 
feminists) now admit that their experiences of being women are frequently 
characterized by a greater level of privilege than those of other women. There has been 
a nudging and poking that has made room for ‘different’ feminists to get a word in. 
However, difference politics left behind the women who didn’t qualify as feminists. 
Stanley and Wise got “fed up with being told” they weren’t “proper feminist[s]”
39 and 
wrote their book, Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research. 
Fortunately, they were clued up enough with the changes happening in feminism to see 
through that kind of boundary making, and know that their feminism was feminism. On 
the other hand, there were and are many women who listened too carefully to the talk 
that made them feel inadequate as feminists. They took to heart the boxing of 
‘feminism’ and ‘not-feminism.’  
Contemporary Boxing 
In drawing up unambiguous categories of feminism/not feminism, feminists say 
a couple of things about feminism which aren’t particularly useful: firstly, they suggest 
that there are certain practices which count as feminism and others which do not, 
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regardless of individual specificities in the ways, places and living people amongst 
whom we carry out such practices. The problem with this point is that, again, feminists 
are imagining feminism as a kind of static bloc of knowledge and methods, instead of a 
moving, growing mass of ideas and practices. The second problem of delineating 
boundaries around feminism/not-feminism is that accepting strict criteria for feminist 
work makes it necessary to exclude a great many other kinds of feminist work from 
analysis. In other words, in their effort to demarcate certain practices as ‘feminist,’ 
feminists actually leave out a major part of the feminist story: the part that covers the 
practices that might have arisen as part of the spreading motion, or movement, of 
feminism that I keep talking about. These feminists (and I discuss specific examples all 
throughout this thesis) miss or ignore feminism that might have come up in work that 
has a different purpose. Just as the careless toss of vegetable scraps into the compost 
might produce a pumpkin vine in the middle of a carefully tended flowerbed, a work 
that starts out in the field of philosophy or biology might end up with feminism wound 
all the way through it. Or a day that starts with a routine interview down at the 
Department of Social Security might end up as a full-fledged battle for childcare rights. 
Or a conversation that starts with a simple request for assistance from a wife to a 
husband might end up as a deeply passionate and political debate over the sexual 
division of labour in the household. 
The lines evident in many feminists’ practices and writing – lines imagined 
around a chunk of work called feminism – cut feminism off from the rest of reality and 
vice versa. These are the lines I’m interested in for this thesis: the ones drawn between 
institutionalised, formal feminism and daily, spontaneous feminism. Between feminism 
as we name it as a movement or discipline because it is organised and theorised, and 
feminism as it exists in the personal, everyday lives of women. Between capital-F 
Feminism and small-f feminism. A notion central to my argument is that many women, Wasley 70 
including feminists, are not willing to call the small-f feminism ‘feminism’ at all. For 
various reasons, feminists draw lines between their own feminism and everything else, 
which becomes quite firmly not-feminism. Shulamit Reinharz, for instance, claims that: 
“feminism is not open to everything…we are constantly on the look-out for what we 
perceive to be nonfeminist consciousness.”
40 The key word is “perceive.” What the 
constant boxing of feminism misses is that one woman’s feminism is another woman’s 
failure of feminism.  
 
The other day I saw a beautiful girl walking in the street. She had her head up 
to the world, a sexy shirt stretched across her breasts. Then a man stepped out at her 
from the side of a building, holding his grotesque penis out of the open fly of his 
trousers. He was grinning. “You wanna suck on this?” he asked vilely. She stopped 
short, shocked for a moment, then exclaimed, “Fuck off!” And strode away. 
Once, she would have slunk away from such a confrontation, terrified and 
bewildered. Her bewilderment lasted only an instant before she saw though the power 
dynamics (or something) and snapped her angry reply. 
 
I’ve discussed this incident, which happened to someone I know, with other 
feminists. Some of them said this wasn’t female strength – just individual assertiveness 
and the unshockableness of postmodern city dwellers. Perhaps they believe that 
feminism would only have been to engage in a martial arts beating or explain to him at 
length that she wasn’t going to play in his game of sexual power. But I ask, since when 
have women been assertive or unshockable? It was only twenty or thirty years ago that 
we had to train women in skills like these. It wasn’t that long ago that I learnt those 
things myself. Maybe that attitude won’t keep her mind and body safe in an 
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environment of still-overwhelming contradictions and men’s criminal desire to regain 
control. At least she’s got a chance of protecting herself throughout her lifetime. Look 
at the turning of the generations and at how the organised efforts have become 
everyday occurrences! But one woman’s feminism is another woman’s failure of 
feminism. 
Contemporary Boxing of Historical Feminism 
Feminists are even willing to sift back through history, naming things as 
feminism or not-feminism, in the name of historical accuracy. They claim that, since 
the word ‘feminism’ wasn’t around back then,
41 it is unfair to those historical women to 
call them ‘feminists,’ and it ignores other factors that might have been in play around 
the time that such women did their so-called feminist activities.
42 More unfair, I say, to 
name those actions as not-feminism. Doing so belittles historical female resistance as 
merely part of broader struggles, and it denies contemporary women the pleasure of 
claiming themselves a feminist history. When we talk about the history of feminism as 
a movement, we might do better to include the resistant activities of historical women, 
paying finite attention to the political, spiritual or other movements that may (or may 
not) have influenced or encouraged such women. These histories can be positive and 
productive if they identify alliances and frictions between feminism and other 
movements, rather than persistently writing feminist activities off as being merely a 
part of these movements. In this way, feminist historians might investigate the way 
both individual and collective resistance by historical women can provide a sense of 
progress and solidarity for contemporary feminists. 
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The Effects of Boxing Feminism: the ‘No Entry’ Sign 
I see this picture in my mind. It’s exaggerated, but it will give you an idea of the 
effect of boxing feminism. 
 
There’s an outsized crate, sealed and fortified, and around it stand a bunch of women 
with their arms folded, like bouncers. The crate is stamped with the word FEMINISM. 
There are other stamps, too: fragile; caution: not to be taken; keep out of reach of 
almost everyone; this way up; to be opened by authorised personnel only. Other women 
stand around watching, suitably impressed. None of them looks inclined to go near it, 
even if the bouncers would let them. 
 
In other words, to relentlessly box feminism means that a great number of 
women come to feel that feminism doesn’t belong to them, and also that they want no 
part of a feminism that has such strict rules. The picture is, of course, parodic, and even 
a bit facetious. It is even possible to argue that boxing feminism is a way of making 
feminism manageable for women who do not have the time or interest in feminism: that 
boxing keeps feminism alive by allowing a certain group of women to protect and 
champion it. In addition, some women may need the security of a limited feminism that 
does not extend too broadly beyond, for example, activism or academia. Indeed, I 
address some of the more very valid reasons for boxing feminism in the individual 
chapters on theory, activism and the generational debate; but my argument in this thesis 
is mainly that we have more to lose by protecting and limiting feminism than we have 
to gain. In fact, a picture of feminism that suits me better brings to mind old filmic 
images of The Blob
43 – a huge mass of unstoppable and uncontrollable goo, oozing into 
our lives, swallowing some, drowning others – and taking them perhaps on to 
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something wonderful (the Great Beyond; the unknown) – getting some people’s feet 
dirty and making still others look desperately around themselves for higher ground. 
Perhaps it seems like a malevolent image, but take the evil intent away and it’s an 
optimistic way of describing the movement of feminism. But the boxing and official 
stamping of things ‘feminism’ and ‘not-feminism’ is the picture we are more likely to 
recognize and understand. 
There’s a lot of talk about ‘the backlash’ against feminism
44 – a phenomenon 
blamed for the rejection of feminism. Another image:  
 
Some feminists are in a small, proud, and sometimes frightened huddle. Occasionally 
one of them will try to take a step out of the circle. But the surrounding men and women 
are ready to lash at them with long whips when any of them moves.  
 
This image is quite accurate in some contexts – in some middle-Eastern and third world 
countries, for instance, or even in various moments throughout history. But for a 
contemporary Western context, feminists sometimes cling to the backlash image in a 
way I find suspiciously comfortable. Instead of looking within the huddle for some – 
any – reasons for backlash responses to feminism, feminists look outwards and blame 
the ‘anti-feminists.’ All imagery aside, one comment feminists often make about the 
backlash is that women do not so much reject the goals of feminism as the name 
‘feminist.’
45 One woman writes: 
I used to hate the word feminist and wouldn’t have described myself as one, preferring 
the terms ‘equalist’ or ‘humanist,’ although in theory my beliefs were all pretty much 
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in line with what I thought of as feminism…I guess I didn't want the stigma that I 
thought would go along with it.
46 
 
When feminists ask ourselves questions about why women reject the name, the answers 
are often about unpleasant associations with the word: associations I’ve already 
identified, expressed in terms like ‘man-basher’ and ‘feminazi.’ Feminists often 
complain that they constantly hear women say “I’m not a feminist, but...”
47 The 
sentence often goes on with, “I believe in equal rights,” “I want better pay for my 
work,” “I demand respect from men.” The complaint is that these women are unwilling 
to identify as feminists because of the bad connotations of the word. My theory is that 
the sentence finishes silently like this: “I’m not a feminist, but I do feminism.” In other 
words, these women don’t reject feminism or feminist ideals so much as they confess 
(or boast) that they don’t work within the boundaries of feminism. 
I’ve actually heard some go so far as to suggest that we ditch the word 
‘feminist’ and start anew, as a remedy to feminism’s bad rap! bell hooks, for instance, 
suggests that we say, “I advocate feminism,” rather than “I am a feminist” in order to 
alleviate women’s apprehension of the label.
48 Or perhaps we could replace the word 
‘feminism’ with something less abrasive – humanism, or egalitarianism. However, to 
think women will accept a new term simply because it is not the word ‘feminism’ is 
tantamount to calling women dupes of the system. It’s saying that women can’t see past 
negative stereotypes and sex-pectations. The whole argument that women are afraid of 
people seeing them as feminists, however, doesn’t hold water. It is no longer the case 
that all, or most, Western women hide their independence and willingness to resist 
oppression. In fact, many women are quite prepared to brave the stereotypes, but 
honestly believe that they are not feminists. And this is because ‘feminist’ has come to 
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mean a very specific set of women – namely, activists and academics working in 
explicitly feminist fields. Those who talk about women’s unwillingness to identify with 
the word ‘feminist’ need to pay attention, in other words, to the question of whether 
women are actually rejecting feminism, or whether there is a component of such 
women being excluded from feminism. Is the current perception of the word ‘feminist’ 
simply a mistake on the part of non-feminist women, or are feminists colluding in the 
myth? 
This is not to say that feminists have everything to gain and nothing to lose 
from closely guarding feminism in this way. These feminists feel the pinch of boxing 
feminism, too. One of my own flirtations with organised feminism took the form of 
activism. I took on the role of university women’s officer during my undergraduate 
degree. It was one of the hardest and most demoralizing years of my life. I contended 
with a lack of support from the majority of students, a decided antipathy from the 
university’s student union, and conflicts of feminist agendas. But worst of all, I think, 
was the feeling of terrible loneliness when I found myself doing the women’s room 
clean-up by myself, or trying to get a fundraiser for the women’s department organised 
and ending up running at a loss. Hardly anyone was interested. I had a network of about 
three women who helped, but they weren’t the kind of people who turn up to regular 
meetings. I haven’t been near a women’s department since that year. But the point is 
that, in my case, taking part in ‘official’ feminism caused me slowly to stop 
acknowledging that feminism happens in daily life. I started to feel that I alone was 
doing feminism – and everyone else was rejecting it. Official feminists can sometimes 
feel that the public face of feminism is the only face of feminism. This feeling can be 
incredibly disheartening if your work is lonely, and incredibly alienating if you’re made 
to feel that you’re not doing ‘enough.’  
A more secure and long-term relationship I’ve had with official feminism has Wasley 76 
been my work with feminist theory. However, one problem with the guarding of 
feminist theory that has become apparent to me when speaking to women outside of 
feminist academia is that these women have a very lucid knowledge of feminist issues. 
This fact indicates to me that the guarding of feminist theory is neither useful nor 
ethical. In addition, I’ve felt impatience towards academic jargon. I’ve witnessed the 
annoyance and exasperation of a close relative when he tried to read my honours thesis 
and encountered a sea of terms that gave me good marks, but failed to further the 
feminist cause. I’ve felt my eyes glaze over with boredom more than once when 
reading overly dry feminist theory. I’ve been, and still get, tangled up and frustrated 
with my own attempts to write feminist theory because every way I turned there is yet 
another abstract quandary giving rise to yet another set of impracticable rules. 
“Feminists must remember to...”; “Feminists must constantly take into account...” In 
other words, feminists working in the academy may forget that there is, in fact, more to 
feminist theory than particular writing styles, research methodologies or theoretical 
issues. 
The effect of putting feminism into the boxes of feminism and not-feminism is 
to make all feminism seem off-limits for many women. The fact that non-academic and 
non-activist women I know are highly aware of sexism, and the daily strategies we use 
to fight it, indicates to me that the official word on feminism fails to give these women 
credit for social and philosophical awareness. Rather, feminism often functions on the 
perception that most women grope blindly in a system that derides and disadvantages 
them, complacent with their own pseudo-liberation and tricked by ‘the backlash’ into 
hating feminism. That story doesn’t ring true for me nor, I suspect, for a lot of the 
‘blind’ women. “Stand in any local shop anywhere,” Stanley and Wise suggest, “and 
listen to ‘falsely conscious’ women knowing and talking about the fact that they live in Wasley 77 
a man’s world, and that they’re badly done to.”
49 So what’s going on? Why won’t 
‘official’ feminists account for ‘unofficial’ feminism? 
Conclusion: ‘De-limiting’ Feminism 
There’s a lot to lose from prodding at the boundaries. Let’s talk pragmatically 
first: in a world where feminism can be a job, making it available to many more women 
is to be downwardly mobile. Women can work as feminists in the academy, or public 
service, or (occasionally) as activists – and if they own feminism exclusively, they 
become indispensable to an economy that encourages specialisation. So the idea that 
feminism is a ‘field,’ instead of an ideology, allows feminists to find work, get an 
income, and work in a ‘field’ they’re interested in. Moreover, feminism is one hell of a 
journey. Feminism often emerges from a bunch of arduous lessons women take – life 
lessons as well as academic lessons. It’s easy to feel precious about one’s feminist 
journey. We live in a culture that encourages competition. We hoard knowledge for 
personal gain: knowledge is a kind of currency, particularly in the academy. Even an 
institution like a university can produce academics who are reluctant to share their 
knowledge.  
It seems that the capitalist urge to compete has intruded successfully on even 
the most politically radical sites in society. If ‘feminist,’ as I said before, can almost 
become a job title, then it stands to reason that even feminist knowledge is now a 
valuable commodity. For an academic or an activist – hard feminist workers – to share 
feminist knowledge is the equivalent of a miner who, after years of prospecting, 
discovers the mother lode and promptly heads back to town to tell everyone where he 
found it. Perhaps some of my readers will find this point of view a tad cynical – as 
though I am accusing feminists of being careerist and mercenary in motivation. In fact, 
I do not believe this at all. Rather, I believe that knowledge-as-commodity is a concept 
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not often acknowledged, even in radical social theory. Attaining a certain level of 
expertise in academic production, coupled with extensive knowledge of other work 
done in the field, can provide someone with specialised skills that make them highly 
employable. These facts deserve greater attention than they currently receive, as they 
form a background of boxing feminism – an unconscious but inescapable reflection of 
contemporary Western socio-economics. 
I don’t necessarily feel that feminism-as-commodity is a bad thing. It is 
important – vital – that we represent feminist views in the workplace, and academic 
institutions are a workplace that men really have dominated throughout history. 
However, I do feel that guarding feminism, even when done unconsciously, is an 
ethical consideration to which feminists tend to close their eyes. There are complicating 
factors, after all, in the boxing of feminism. For instance, the fact that the presence of 
researching, teaching feminists allows male academics to get on with their own work, 
without that pesky obligation to take women into account, is rarely discussed. Perhaps 
my readers have seen, as I have, male lecturers ‘get a feminist in’ to cover the part of 
the lecture series that deals with women? When I approached a senior academic in my 
school, fresh from an undergraduate degree in literature, and said, “I’m interested in 
working with feminist theory –” he barely let me get the words out before ushering me 
firmly down the hall to the Women’s Studies department! These kinds of things happen 
because we box feminism. 
So, we cannot take lightly women’s career advancement and female population 
of the workplace as reasons for boxing feminism. Women have struggled through all 
the centuries of Western civilisation to become independent and to be able to choose 
their careers. In order to write fiction or poetry (or theory, I would add), a woman needs 
“five hundred a year and a room with a lock on the door,” wrote Virginia Woolf in Wasley 79 
1929.
50 I by no means belittle that necessity: it has been a long-term struggle to get 
female voices and bodies into the halls of universities, medical schools, banks and 
business. I’m aware of these facts with some personal alarm: it was a senior academic 
in my own school who ushered me away from the English department; it is these very 
words, perhaps not ‘scholarly’ enough, that will gain me (or not) the coveted PhD. 
These factors make for compelling and pragmatic reasons to contain feminism within 
certain discourses, disciplines and organizations. The use of Virginia’s lock on the door 
seems to have changed. I want to know who it is keeping out now. 
There are also certain theoretically pressing reasons for the way ‘official’ 
feminists patrol the borders of feminism/not-feminism. I will discuss here a 
historiographical one. The naming as ‘not feminism’ of historical acts of feminism that 
I described earlier is often bound up with the scholarly aversion to what could be called 
‘inaccuracy.’ There is a concern that the women involved in historical forms of 
feminism might not have seen their own strength as feminism, even if the word had 
been around back then. Feminist historians fear that calling women’s resistance 
‘feminism’ might somehow muddy up history with our own contemporary needs and 
concerns. This fear causes historians to assert, for instance, that improvements to 
education, justice, and equity in general, even when instigated by women’s activism, 
were not “the result of feminist agitation,” and that we can, rather, thank “reform” for 
any positive changes in the position of women.
51 In this way of writing feminist 
history, feminism doesn’t get much credit at all for the pressure women put on those in 
power to transform their social status.  
I agree that some caution is necessary when naming historical actions as 
feminism, as well as an awareness of the place and time in which those actions took 
place. But female strength and defiance in the face of punishment, hatred and ridicule 
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is, as far as I’m concerned, feminism. The point historians often take up is that these 
women may have had something quite different from female liberation in mind when 
they did their thing. Well, we’re quite happy to call the push for the vote a major part of 
‘first-wave feminism’ without any knowledge of what was going on in the heads of the 
suffragettes. We don’t know what their personal agendas were, and we can only ever 
come within yards of knowing anyone’s personal agenda. A number of first wave 
feminists disliked the suffragist push, pointing out that it funnelled the inferior position 
of women into one thing: the need for the vote.
52 Getting the vote, some argue, led to a 
general lull in the feminist noise. Kate Millett called the suffrage campaign “the red 
herring of the revolution – a wasteful drain on the energy of seventy years”:  
The suffrage campaign reminds one of nothing so much as a flat tire encountered early 
on a long journey – a flat which takes so much time, labor, and expense to repair that 
the journey is dejectedly abandoned.
53 
 
Others associate suffrage campaigns with the desire to “double the family vote” for the 
temperance and reform movements.
54 In short, the true agendas of individuals and 
groups are not always above suspicion, and they are hardly ever open to public 
scrutiny. All we can work with are the facts we have to hand, and our own agendas. 
The facts I have about the suffrage campaign are: it took a lot of work and difficulty 
and fighting against misogynists to get the vote, and it resulted in winning women at 
least an official recognition as citizens, and permitting women a political voice. My 
agenda is to describe the spreading of feminism through time and space without 
imposing arbitrary limits on what can be called feminism. Therefore, I name the 
political struggle of the suffragettes ‘feminism,’ and take pride in having a history. 
Non-feminist historians have used just this strategy. What might look like an 
objective description of various struggles in a historical period (including women’s 
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struggles) is simply another way of looking at history: a way that tells men’s history. 
Jill Matthews reminds us that: 
Men’s histories have been presented as universally human. The frameworks, concepts 
and priorities of these ‘universal’ histories reflect male interests, concerns and 
experiences.
55 
 
Women’s struggles have always been, for non-feminist historians, contingent to the 
struggles of humankind in general (or what is tellingly referred to as ‘mankind’). 
Naturally, these historians are going to tell the story that way – when they are men, it’s 
in their own interests to do so. Having a history and being able to describe and call on 
that history is a powerful thing. And yet we effectively and consistently elide the fact 
that non-feminist historians have agendas, just as the feminist ones do. Male theorists, 
historians, scientists and activists have always been very successful at appearing not to 
have an agenda other than human freedom and progress – hence the representation of 
male history and endeavour as ‘human.’ Feminists, on the other hand, are never above 
suspicion because they emphatically and obviously do have the agenda of feminist 
political change. 
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to provide a taste of what is to 
come in the rest of this thesis. I have broadly discussed the concept of limiting (or 
‘boxing’) feminism and how this manifests amongst both non-feminists and feminists. I 
have also introduced some of the reasons why we attempt to control feminism. In this 
concluding section, I have started to analyse specifically why feminists attempt to 
control feminism, including practical reasons, as well as theoretical positions associated 
with feminism that tend toward the boxing of feminism. Essentially, I aim in this thesis 
to unpick in more detail the boxing of feminism. I hope to unbox it wherever possible. 
Most importantly, however, I draw some examples of ‘not-feminism’ back into a 
feminist discussion. As mentioned in the Introduction, I use my ‘strategic definition’ of 
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feminism as resistance to the suffering of women as the criterion against which I select 
these ‘unofficial’ feminist practices in order to explore what it looks like to break down 
some of the boundaries.  
Let me finish by doing just this – by bringing a piece of unofficial theory into 
feminism. This is a snippet from a conversation with an unofficial feminist: 
[My feminist priority is that] I’m never treated differently because I’m a woman – in 
respect...You know, the fact that...I have on occasion been given less respect because 
I’m a woman – from students, and some misogynistic-type bloody teachers...And that’s 
when feminism becomes an issue for me. Because I feel like I can pretty much get 
anything I need to get...as a person. Myself; who I am. I’m not saying that’s the same 
for all women by a longshot, but as long as I’m treated with respect and cared for and 
treated equally and with a lot of love and that kind of thing, I feel like my needs as a 
feminist are being met.
56 
 
I account for this speech by calling it feminism. Some would say this feminism does 
not show an awareness of the conditions of women as a group, even though it features 
words that talk about women collectively (“not the same for all women;” “because I’m 
a woman”). Some would say it’s not particularly radical, even though it contains 
demands for respect and expressions of anger (“misogynistic-type bloody teachers”) 
when that respect doesn’t happen. But even without those recuperative wisps of official 
feminism, I call it feminism. It is about a woman’s resistance to the suffering she 
undergoes because she is a woman. No feminism is perfect—someone, somewhere, 
will always find something they don’t like about a particular feminist act or word. So 
why are we spending this inordinate amount of time trying to make a perfect feminism? 
Perfection is not realistic. The word I prefer to use to describe where feminism moves 
and how it moves today in my own country, in my own time, is ‘almost.’ 
 
After all this time, carrying all this knowledge, it is almost impossible to hurt 
me for my sex. I am almost at home with my body. I almost accept that there are more 
differences than just sex difference. I will almost engage in mutual friendships with 
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other women. I can almost laugh at all the history and continuing pain. 
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Part 1 
Feminist Activism 
Definitions of Terms 
Feminism: resistance to the suffering of women. 
Activism: activities undertaken for a political cause. 
Feminist activism: activities undertaken to resist women’s suffering. 
How to be a Feminist Activist 
In this part of my thesis, I talk about the things that count as feminist activism 
and those that do not. I describe some of the ‘other’ things that I believe count as 
feminist activism under the definition I use above. In order to do so, I draw a 
distinction between the things we generally understand ‘feminist activism’ to mean and 
those we don’t. Semantically, I tend to distinguish between ‘conventional’ feminist 
activism and the other things that count by using descriptors in a conscious way (for 
example, ‘official,’ or ‘proper’ feminist activism). It is not a distinction I wish to 
perpetuate. Rather, I would like to interrogate the distinction, and find a way to 
describe all of these practices as part of a continuum. My use of the distinction is 
mainly for sense, and not in any way an attempt to privilege or ridicule the things we 
tend to see as ‘official’ feminist activism. My position is one of respect for all kinds of 
feminist activism. I aim for a rethinking and a renaming of certain practices – not a 
rejection or a reversal of the current hierarchy. 
When we say ‘feminist activism,’ we generally mean activities such as 
demonstrating for women’s rights, protests for equal opportunity legislation, work in 
policy offices, and organising to get more women into non-traditional areas 
(mathematics, engineering, heavy industry, etc.). We also think of things like volunteer Wasley 85 
or paid work within women’s refuges or abortion clinics, making a public stand for 
‘women’s rights,’ being part of a feminist collective, working in non-government 
organizations to promote women’s advancement, writing letters, zines, and producing 
pamphlets opposing practices that violate women’s bodily integrity (rape, 
clitoridectomy, etc.), or producing feminist newspapers. Some people assume that 
feminist activism involves more extreme and even eccentric or malicious practices, 
such as becoming a lesbian (even if you don’t want to!), burning one’s bra, refraining 
from shaving one’s body hair, living in an all-female community, agitating to put in 
place legislation that ‘discriminates against men,’ publicly denouncing motherhood and 
homemaking, and a host of other predictable stereotypes of ‘feminist’ behaviours.
1 
Personally, I thoroughly support many of the radical and daring things women have 
done to publicise feminism or make a political point. I see these kinds of public 
political acts as vital – not just to the public face of the feminist cause – but also to 
women who do this kind of activism, and to women who, for various reasons, do not. 
The last thing I want to do is diminish the importance, vision and heroism of these acts. 
I am not out to detract from these activities in the least; rather, what I’m trying to say is 
that feminist activism doesn’t stop there. 
There are quieter feminist practices that I think count as feminist activism – 
practices that involve living according to one’s feminist ideals in day-to-day life. It’s 
just not the refusal to play the game that makes for feminist activism. It is also an 
awareness that we can, and willingness to, negotiate the game; the awareness that it’s 
possible to manipulate the sex rules we are meant to obey, and make the world a bit 
more habitable for ourselves. This is a kind of feminist activism that includes the little 
revolutions of daily life. Keep in mind my definition of feminist activism: activities 
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undertaken to resist the suffering of women. These activities can be grand or little, 
public or private, fleeting or long-term; they can take place in the world or in our 
homes. In 1881, Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote that she was “fonder of freedom than 
anything else…I like to have my own unaided will in all my surroundings – in dress, 
diet, hours, behaviour, speech, and thought.”
2 Whenever we do something to counter 
the suffering we put up with because we are women, we participate in feminist 
activism. It might be something as small as counselling a girlfriend on how to deal with 
a troublesome spouse, or complaining about treatment you consider patronising or 
bewildering, or helping your sister feel good about her weight. It might turn into 
something more consequential or long-term, like a battle with a financial institute over 
refusing you a loan because you might get pregnant, or a comment to the boss about the 
lewd jokes a male colleague has been emailing you. These activities might never get 
beyond an expressed intention to ‘keep your eye on’ a situation that makes you 
uncomfortable – they might not need to get beyond this kind of feminist monitoring. 
But they are still practices that maintain your safety and reduce your suffering as a 
woman. 
In Chapter 2, I will explain using examples exactly what is required of women 
who wish to call themselves feminist activists. In Chapter 3, I will explore other kinds 
of feminist activism we engage in, and the implications of opening up the definition of 
feminist activism to include non-traditional practices. In order to illustrate how daily 
and banal feminist activism can be, I use the style of a personal diary for Chapter 3. I 
argue that it’s both possible and desirable to take a more inclusive approach to feminist 
activism, particularly in light of my main goal, which is to encourage all women 
willingly to take ownership of feminism. Limiting the term ‘feminist activism’ to 
accepted forms of feminist behaviour is a neat way of excluding millions of women, 
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who practice feminism in quieter ways, from feminism. It is also a good way to elicit 
this kind of apologist statement from women – even from those who are doing what 
many would consider ‘proper’ feminist activism: 
Our group [a consciousness raising group on sexuality] may seem tame, therapeutic, 
and almost regressive in light of the political change that is needed, but this basic work 
is always useful and can form the basis for action.
3 
 
This part of my thesis is both a call to rework the standing definition of feminist 
activism and a starting point for women to identify the practices in our everyday lives 
that do in fact count as feminist activism. 
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Chapter 2 
What Counts as Feminist Activism? 
Some people think that feminists spend all their time 
not shaving under their arms. But really that takes no time at all. 
    — Judy Horacek, 1998
1 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the tendency we have to limit an idea of feminist activism to 
practices that are collective, public, sustained and radical. I explore some of the 
reasoning and history behind these four criteria for feminist activism. I use fiction and 
conversations to explain fully what each of these criteria look like when we 
conceptualise feminist activism. In the discussion of each criterion, I make specific 
points about the contradictions inherent in using such criteria for a definition of 
feminist activism. I conclude with a general discussion of why limiting the definition of 
feminist activism is a problem for feminism, explaining how such a definition excludes 
certain women from identifying their practices as ‘feminist activism.’ 
 
When I started thinking about how to describe feminist activism, I wrote down 
all the images and words that came to my mind. I added some words and images used 
by my interviewees to describe their ideas of feminist activism. Roughly edited and 
reduced, my list looked like this: 
…anger and emotion – rejection of idealised ‘reason’ – evidenced by rejection of 
theory; drama and heroics; drumming up support for a politics – PR, media; making it a 
majority concern; collectivity – drawing on feminine traditions of sharing, groups, 
talking, communication, equality; united we stand divided we fall; feminism as by, for 
and about women; power in numbers; publicising/publishing; “lesbian…mechanic… 
out protesting”
2; goal-oriented/ends-oriented; major goals, not little revolutions; 
mobilizing anger and emotion of women makes it a ‘real’ political effort for the women 
involved and from a PR perspective – not fleeting or ‘hysterical’; conquering the sense 
of isolation especially thru consciousness raising groups; 24-7 – not a contingency 
plan; a developed politics; legitimacy; need for ‘stars’ and charismatic leaders; 
feminism as a journey or process; ‘feminist’ as an identity; quantity and quality; 
marginal knowledge; subversive; not co-opted… 
 
For the sake of writing about these things in a comprehensible way, I’ve broken the list 
down into four areas: collective, public, sustained and radical: 
Collective: drawing on feminine traditions of sharing, groups, talking, communication, 
equality; united we stand divided we fall; feminism as by, for and about women; power 
in numbers; conquering the sense of isolation especially through consciousness raising 
groups… 
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Public: drama and heroics; drumming up support for a politics – PR, media; making it 
a majority concern; publishing; need for ‘stars’ and charismatic leaders… 
 
Sustained: goal-oriented/ends-oriented; major goals, not little revolutions; mobilizing 
anger and emotion of women makes it a ‘real’ political effort for the women involved 
and from a PR perspective – not fleeting or ‘hysterical’; 24-7 – not a contingency plan; 
a ‘developed’ politics; legitimacy; feminism as a journey or process; ‘feminist’ as an 
identity; quantity and quality… 
 
Radical: anger and emotion – rejection of idealised ‘reason’ – evidenced by rejection 
of theory; “lesbian…mechanic…out protesting”; marginal knowledge; subversive; not 
co-opted… 
 
Let’s be clear: I am categorically not claiming that these kinds of actions are the 
be-all and end-all of feminist activism; on the contrary, I think there is a lot more to 
feminist activism. But we don’t generally understand the quiet, private, and perhaps 
even routine resistances we practice as ‘feminist activism.’ In fact, to make a case for 
naming these things ‘activism’ will immediately open up the whole second-wave/third-
wave can of worms in which second-wave feminists are associated with the forms of 
activism described above, and third-wavers are associated with a more individual, self-
serving style of feminism. Of course, it would be unrealistic to try to sidestep the 
generation issue, and I fully expect some readers to interpret this chapter mainly 
through the lens of generational difference. Indeed, in Chapter 6, I myself discuss the 
feminist ‘waves’ framework. However, right now, I will explore representations of 
activism as they are formulated by feminists and non-feminists of all generations – with 
only minimal reference to issues of second- and third-wave differences. Therefore, I 
ask readers instead to seek out and question more general feminist representational 
practices – specifically, the practice of relying on notions of collective, public, 
sustained and radical to define feminist activism. 
Why These Criteria Should Count as Feminist Activism 
  Collective, public, sustained and radical acts of women’s resistance are all vital 
to feminism. Women often find that such acts are the main source of their passion for Wasley 90 
feminism. The sacrifice, power, integrity, and even the drama and poetic beauty of such 
activism attracts attention and reaches out to women in all kinds of different social 
niches. Such acts contribute to major policy changes. Such acts get the job done – the 
miserable, thankless, painful, hidden jobs – when no one else wants to do the job. Such 
acts lend legitimacy to feminism as a social justice movement, whether this is fair or 
not. Critics might question the motive, theoretical grounding, or utility of work done by 
feminist activists, but no one will question their passion. Feminist activism constantly 
creates and recreates a new way of looking at the world, which involves a refusal to 
cooperate with the systematic suffering of women, attention to the suffering of women 
as a group (and willingness to publicly acknowledge this), deliberate subversion of 
institutionalised sexism, and the invention of strategies for moulding a new, better 
system. 
Conflicts of the Criteria 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about these four criteria for activism is how 
they intersect and collide with each other. Kim Borin explains that: 
[A feminist activist does feminism] more actively than how I do. Like, I just argue a 
point if it comes to my attention in a situation. Whereas you’re writing a thesis and 
really putting it out there as much as you can. You’re almost trying to change society’s 
perception of it…I guess I am as well, but you’re doing it more actively. 
…I think what you’re doing is activism…The fact that you’re writing a thesis, 
and I don’t know if you’ve written articles, or…And you get people so often talking 
about it and into it…Being active is doing more than just arguing or having 
conversations about it.
3 
 
In Borin’s explanation, ‘real’ feminist activism seems to require a concept of public 
exposure. She repeats the ideas of “putting it out there” and “getting people talking 
about it.” However, to add to the confusion, as feminists we tend to make a fuss about 
the hidden and thankless tasks of activism, as though we can directly relate the lack of 
exposure that accompanies heroism and sacrifice to feminist activism. Another 
confusing framework for defining feminist activism is that of ‘collective versus 
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individual.’ We extol the virtues of cooperative feminist activism in the same breath 
that we use comparative terms to describe it. We make claims about how others’ 
activities are more or less active, activist, or feminist, than our own, based on the level 
of commitment, starry exposure or covert drudgery.  
That these seemingly paradoxical concepts are used as definitive terms for 
feminist activism illustrates the difficulty of sustaining the boundaries of activism. In 
fact, the contradictions I pointed out in the preceding paragraph just scratch the surface 
of the problematic way both feminists and non-feminists define ‘feminist activism.’ 
With this confusion in mind, please consider the four categories of collective, public, 
sustained and radical merely arbitrary descriptors I use to make my work on feminist 
activism intelligible. I certainly consider them thus myself. The categories constantly 
cross over and clash, in life and in my theorising. I hope to show in the following pages 
that the conflict, contradictions and confusion encountered when we discuss feminist 
activism are not necessarily the grounds for a wholesale rejection of any definition of 
feminist activism. Rather, I constitute these difficulties as something positive – 
something that might actually allow us to conceive of the term ‘feminist activism’ in a 
more productive way than is common. 
Collective Counts 
 
I recall a time when I felt utterly alone in all the questions I had. Nothing made 
any sense. I could not understand why I had no money and no dignity – why I lacked 
respect as surely as I lacked my own property. People spoke to me as through a murky 
fog. Their words came muffled and I could hardly see their faces. The men all blurred 
into one man – impenetrable, stern, contemptuous, paternal. 
During that time, I met a group of women who wanted to talk with me about the 
questions I had. What a revelation – some of our questions were the same! The hard Wasley 92 
isolation started to thaw. We named the problem that someone had once said, “Had no 
name.”
4 We talked relentlessly and even developed some theories to explain the 
injustice. Sometimes we argued, and sometimes we got jealous, but several of our 
number spoke of female misogyny and how it serves the patriarchy. We all understood 
such words by now, so we took the hint and put our differences aside. There was no 
time for anything but consensus: we had work to do. Some of the women had really big 
ideas: communal living, women’s centres, crisis refuges, and more. Ideas by, for and 
about women. These things took organization, time, money, and numbers. 
What skills we were able to share! I learnt to fix my car, to fight off an attack, 
and to verbalize my anger. I taught other women to grow vegetables and design 
banners and posters. How we laughed and how we enjoyed each other. I had done 
those things before, but they had always seemed like work. Now my life was fun, vital, 
and meaningful. The other women appreciated me for my contributions. They 
encouraged me in my learning. I felt myself metamorphosing as though from an 
apparition into a reality, from a wood-and-strings Pinocchio into flesh and blood. 
Like a race memory, like ‘Woman’ was a category I might wear with patriotic 
pride, I felt the words of women vibrating through me with their rich history during 
storytelling sessions. These were real stories of survival and change – not the stories of 
housekeeping magazines, which only taught us how to keep our husbands. Sometimes I 
wished we had elders there with us, as though we were nuns, for instance, with a 
mother superior. In a convent, “[y]ou had older women who were mentors. You did not 
have to invent everything as you went along. With feminism, none of the structure is 
there.”
5 But it felt okay – comforting – just having the network of women around me. I 
felt safe, perhaps for the first time since I knew I was a girl. 
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Foundations of Collectivism in Feminist Activism 
  Collectivism, in feminist activism, manifests in groups of women doing 
feminism together: consciousness raising groups, book clubs, lesbian groups, campaign 
groups, International Women’s Day breakfasts, rallies, storytelling groups, Reclaim the 
Night Marches, women’s refuge groups, and so on. What lies behind collectivism in 
feminist activism is the idea of power in numbers: ‘united we stand, divided we fall.’ 
Indeed, numbers is one of the major things that women have going for us in the 
feminist movement: after all, we do make up at least 50% of the world population. The 
most obvious referent for the power-in-numbers mentality is that of war – the idea of 
amassing an enormous army in order to win a battle or revolution. We often speak of 
feminism as a ‘revolution’ and, tellingly, the words of feminism are often war-related: 
struggle, fight, oppression, battle, etc.
6 Thus the representation of the way the human 
race has effected change is a history of numbers – not a series of little revolutions or 
minimal changes, spanning hundreds of years – but dramatic uprisings (overthrowing 
governments, colonizing new lands, resisting oppression), accompanied by significant 
‘manpower,’ and often over relatively short periods of time. It is logical to assume that 
we are to bring about the feminist revolution in the same way. The concept of The 
Revolution erupts repeatedly throughout discussion of feminist activism, and I discuss 
this monolithic representation of change in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
The other idea, often tacit, behind women’s collectivism, invokes the theory of 
female community. Female community draws on notions (both real and, I’m sure, 
sometimes imagined) of specifically ‘female’ traditions, such as prehistoric gatherer 
roles (that is, groups of women working together to gather and prepare food), 
storytelling and oral history, localized homemaking communities of women, shared 
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tasks like communal childcare and, of course, women’s ‘skill’ as communicators.
7 
Whilst some might counter that this representation of collectivism posits a mythical 
essence of femaleness, theorists like Elshtain celebrate instead of problematising this 
essentialism, explaining that: 
Rather than denying women the meaning their traditional world provided, even under 
conditions of male domination, feminists should move to challenge a society that 
downgrades female-created and -sustained values.
8 
 
Furthermore, women often seem to prefer the premise of egalitarian, non-hierarchical 
feminist collectivism, to the structures we are used to seeing in groups run by men 
(church committees, parliament, etc). Feminists often reject the notions of transcendent 
authority and individual glory, preferring to work collectively in a way that “gives 
value to each woman, allowing her a voice, yet making all members collectively 
responsible for action.”
9 Thus some feminists consider that collective models sit well 
both with women and with feminism. 
Conundrums of Feminist ‘Community’
10 
There is much in feminist activism that works when we do it collectively. As 
Brownmiller puts it: 
…when such a coming-together [that is, second-wave feminist activism] takes place, 
when the vision is clear and the sisterhood is powerful, mountains are moved and the 
human landscape is changed forever.
11 
 
However, it is increasingly rare that such ‘coming-togethers’ occur, and this can be at 
least partly explained by the mythical and idealist status of female community as a 
manifestation of feminist collectivism. Weiss reminds us that communities “can have 
                                                 
7 Weiss, Penny A. “Feminist Reflections on Community.” Feminism and Community. Eds. Penny A. 
Weiss and Marilyn Friedman. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1995. 3-18. 5. 
8 Elshtain, Jean Bethke. “Feminism, Family and Community.” Feminism and Community. Eds. Penny A. 
Weiss and Marilyn Friedman. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1995. 259-72. 268.  
9 In this quotation, Robyn Rowland and Renate Klein are describing the anti-hierarchical nature of some 
collective work in “Radical Feminism: History, Politics, Action.” Radically Speaking: Feminism 
Reclaimed. Eds. Diane Bell and Renate Klein. North Melbourne, Vic.: Spinifex, 1996. 9-36. 14. 
10 There is frequent slippage between the ideas of collectivism and feminist community in feminist 
writings on the topic. In this section, I use the term ‘community’ to describe a manifestation of 
collectivism. 
11 Brownmiller, Susan. In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution. London: Aurum, 1999. 330. Wasley 95 
troubling origins and devastating consequences,” and describes, as an instance of 
problematic origins, society’s division into communities (for example, gay 
communities and Black communities) as a result of the exclusion by the dominant 
group.
12 “Such forces as sexism and homophobia,” says Weiss, “…not only often 
create distinct communities…but also establish relations that pervade and structure all 
communities.”
13 The basis of the family as an origin of an idealized community is also 
a difficult one: after all, the family is not always a safe place in which values of 
intellectual freedom and empowerment are encouraged.
14 In fact, the family can be one 
of the most oppressive and conservative models for connecting with others, wherein 
certain members of the family ‘community’ fail to protect others from violence and 
abuse, or (consciously or unconsciously) curtail their potential.  
One of Weiss’ “devastating consequences” of collectivism includes the 
condemnation of individual difference and ‘unfeminist’ choices. Feminists recount 
situations in which certain women have been excluded from collectives or alienated in 
group situations because they have demonstrated dissent in the face of the stringent 
expectations of other feminists in the group/collective.
15 Rita Mae Brown recalls her 
time in the Furies Collective, in which everything was shared and time alone was 
considered suspicious: “Charlotte Bunch and I were forever suspect because we spent 
so much time at our desks.”
16 Daphne Patai describes similar suspicion or “ideological 
policing” in more recent times:  
I have seen…examples of intolerance among my students – eyes rolled to ceiling in 
exaggerated disapproval of a classmate’s reference to her “boyfriend”; heated 
criticisms by young women in sturdy boots and pants of the “conventional” apparel of 
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other women in the class; an urgent need to ferret out examples of latent unfeminist 
tendencies.
17 
 
These instances undermine the idea that ‘female’ qualities such as supportive 
nurturance and sharing lend themselves to a ‘natural’ collectivism among women 
and/or feminists. Yet another difficult moment in the conceptualization of community 
as ideal is evident in the reactionary politics of non-feminist communitarians.
18 Weiss 
identifies tendencies among communitarian politics that: 
…define women out of certain communities, downplay the negative effects of 
women’s domestication, exclude women in conceptions and calculations of the 
“common” good, refuse to address sexual differentiation and inequality as obstacles to 
personal and political bonds, and advocate patriarchal principles, values and structures 
to guide their communities.
19 
 
Superficially similar ideals, then, cannot always form a basis for positive alliances 
between political groups such as feminists and communitarians – and feminists need 
therefore to be aware of regressive goals associated with the supposedly progressive 
ideal of community.  
Perhaps experiences and analyses like these augured the dismantling of the ideal 
of female/feminist community as the ‘problem’ of differences between women arose at 
the end of the second wave.
20 These experiences pointed to the pressure within 
collectivism to conform (whether to patriarchal or feminist norms) and gave rise to the 
suggestion that collectivism was an unsuitable model under which feminists, with all 
their racial, political, sexual and other differences, might unite. The reality check of 
difference splintered the ‘sisterhood.’ In fact, familial metaphors such as sisterhood 
have become increasingly problematic for feminists. Lugones notes that: 
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…sisterhood is an odd model for white/Anglo-American women to adopt…[because] 
the white/Anglo-American family has not been known…as an extended kinship 
network of support but as a troubled and unstable relation among a few individuals.
21 
 
Lugones goes on to recommend the model of friendship as a more appropriate basis for 
female community because it allows for a greater plurality and working with 
differences instead of attempting to erase these. Lugones explains: 
Because I think a commitment to perceptual changes is central to the possibility of 
bonding across differences and the commitment is part of friendship, I think that 
friendship is a good concept to start the radical theoretical and practical reconstruction of 
the relations among women.
22 
 
Whatever the solution, the point is that this “radical theoretical and practical 
reconstruction of the relations among women” has become necessary. Collectivism 
finds itself fraught with difficulties. However, feminists such as Leila Rupp claim that 
collectivism makes “it possible for feminists to maintain their commitment in the 
hostile environment.”
23 Perhaps claims like these rest on the fact that many feminists 
see the alternative to collectivism as self-interested individualism, upon which there is 
no viable way to base effective feminist activism. 
The Maligning of Individualism 
Women who practice or have practiced collective feminist activism tend to view 
those who don’t with dismay, suggesting that the lack of collective work has lead to a 
loss of impetus or identity for feminism. Susan Brownmiller claims that the trend away 
from organised, “united” feminism is indicative of a “waning”
24 and unhealthy feminist 
movement.
25 Anne Summers sees the need to write a letter to younger women who do 
not practice collective activism to encourage these women to “reach out for the torch” 
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of feminism, which has not yet been “passed.”
26 And Audre Lorde says: “Without 
community there is no liberation, only the most vulnerable and temporary armistice 
between an individual and her oppression.”
27 These are just a few of the warnings 
against the dangers of abandoning collective forms of feminism, and many implied 
vilifications of individual forms of feminist activism as pointless, naïve and unsafe. Nor 
are these confined to the supposedly motherly chidings of second-wave feminists. 
Whilst the younger feminists from the Wench Radio Collective are in general more 
open to individualist forms of activism, some of the members privilege collective over 
individual activism: “I especially admire people who struggle against a systemic 
oppression that they do not personally experience,”
28 says one. “A general activist skill 
I strive for is commitment…to projects and collective organizations,”
29 says another, 
implying that collectivism is something to be achieved, as opposed to individual 
activism, which simply ‘happens.’ 
There is no one definition of individualist feminism itself, but feminists 
generally use the term to refer to individual women making personal and private 
changes to their lives. Kramarae and Treichler associate individualism with an 
“isolated, competitive individual which would mitigate against women coalescing 
together.”
30 ‘DIY’ (Do-it-Yourself) feminists,
31 on the other hand, disavow the need to 
improve the collective lives of women in order to be a feminist, and contend that living 
their own lives as feminists is sufficient. Some members of the Wench Collective, 
whilst obviously in a feminist collective and taking group feminist action in the form of 
presenting feminist material on radio, describe feminist activism in individualist terms. 
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“My activism is about…justice and compassion in the way I treat people immediately 
around me,”
32 “Even day to day survival can be a form of resistance,”
33 and “Activism 
is about struggling everyday to carve out a safe space for yourself,”
34 claim these 
feminists. However, individualist feminism is not always associated with the lofty 
principles of compassion, justice and safety. In fact, some feminists consider individual 
forms of activism selfish or based on a self-interested liberal model of individuality.
35 
The question of moral integrity often hangs over individualist feminists’ heads – a 
question about whether these women have forgotten the broader scale of women’s 
oppression, particularly in non-Western nations. In short, this question acts as a 
reminder that there is a lot of activism that still needs to be done. 
Another of the main complaints feminists have made about individualist 
feminism is that it pays no heed to structural inequality, and therefore cannot go 
towards genuinely improving women’s lot. This perception suggests that improving 
one’s life through personal (feminist) choices ignores sexist structures that (a) put 
women in the position where they must make certain choices (for example, stay at 
home parenting or daycare) and (b) withold from some women the freedom to make 
even these restricted choices. Sandra Friedan suggests that resistance to collective 
feminism is not just caused by, but can even result in, unawareness of structural 
sexism: 
The recognition of large social structures is rarely achieved in the individual instance: 
one woman, examining only her own life, can scarcely know that her arguments with 
prevailing values are echoed in other households. Rather, such recognition occurs as a 
function of sharing experiences and perceptions…
36 
 
In making this complaint, feminists invoke the old standby of false versus raised or 
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critical consciousness.
37 Chilla Bulbeck, discussing the feminism of her students in an 
introductory gender studies course, implies that individualist feminism is an intellectual 
stepping-stone towards a more genuine feminist understanding: 
While she [the student] noted the effects of socialization in survey 1 (through schooling 
and religion), by survey 2 she discussed the limitations on women’s options because of 
‘gender judgment and training,’ for example, the belief that women leave work ‘to have 
babies.’ She had still not produced an understanding of patterned social inequalities 
based on gender, class, and ethnicity.
38 [My emphasis] 
 
Discussing feminist issues using the framework of individual choice is something that 
comes before an awareness of “patterned social inequalities.” Jan Clausen also finds the 
individualist feminism often associated with the younger generation disturbing and 
inadequate: “it has also been discomfiting to encounter a younger generation of 
feminists who have come to feminism in a university setting and have had little or no 
exposure to the realities of attempting to join other people to effect social change.”
39 
Bulbeck’s and Clausen’s assessments of individualist feminists suggest that these 
women don’t yet ‘get’
40 what it is in gender inequality that allows it to get repeated 
from generation to generation, sometimes with hardly any change at all. On the other 
hand, Liz Stanley and Sue Wise object to the primacy of purely structural explanations: 
These enable people to hide in collectivisms, in the sense that they can avoid taking 
responsibility for their own lives and actions. The ‘revolution’ they envisage is a 
revolution of structures – economies, polities. These are seen as lying outside of 
everyday life, in the sense that they are conceptualized as self-perpetuating and so 
outside of ordinary human agency.
41 
 
Stanley and Wise’s comment points out a fact that is often missed in the tension 
between collective and individualist activism: namely, that community and 
individualism are not just related, but intertwined. Understanding their relationship can 
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allow us to prevent some of the exclusion that occurs as a result of rigidly opposing 
these terms. 
Beyond the ‘Collective vs. Individual’ Framework  
Penny Weiss, taking the term ‘commitment’ as a synonym for collective 
activism, reminds us that we “need not accept individualism and commitment as an 
either/or proposition.”
42 It need not be collective vs. individual forms of activism; 
structural vs. personal understandings of inequality; or macro- vs. micro-politics. As I 
have started to show, the very presence of these binary oppositions in perceptions of 
activism works to prevent certain women from identifying themselves or others as 
feminist activists. However, if we begin to find more flexible, less baggage-laden 
terms, such as ‘support’ and ‘solidarity,’ to frame discussions of feminist activism, we 
can discover ways to overcome the mindset that collective and individual practices 
count or do not count as feminist activism. Activism in general, whether collective or 
individual, can be seen as an expression of solidarity with other feminists; a show of 
support for feminist goals. One way to begin using a more flexible framework is to 
look at the potential of the slogan ‘the personal is political’ to shift some of the 
boundaries around feminist activism. 
‘The personal is political’ is a feminist adage that feminists still teach (although 
rather more critically and contextually) in Women’s Studies courses today. 
Interestingly, when we say the personal is political, we are generally referring only to 
women’s oppression. We hardly ever imagine that the personal is political when it 
comes to feminist resistance. So, we can easily identify a husband’s laziness when it 
comes to doing the housework as a moment of political oppression based on ideas of 
male/female socialization, societal patterns of who does the housework, and theories of 
women’s unpaid labour. However, we have more trouble identifying the wife’s refusal 
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to do her husband’s share of housework, or explaining to him that she does the 
equivalent of his paid work in childrearing, as a form of feminist activism. We are more 
likely to require a campaign of education on gender differentials in paid and unpaid 
work before we call it ‘feminist activism.’  
However, it is more useful (and, I would argue, more realistic) to acknowledge 
that, while sexism is widespread, repetitive and institutionalized – that is, structural and 
patterned – it can and does manifest in personal, trivial and surprising ways. And, 
therefore, personal, trivial and surprising ways of resisting do, in the end, count in the 
fight against structural and patterned political oppression. This logic requires us 
continually to widen our perception of activism to include new, unusual, and even 
unsuccessful forms of resistance. Essentially, I am suggesting that ‘individualism’ is a 
kind of myth. We are individuals, but not hermits, and we are created and continually 
influenced by larger patterns of sexism and resistance. Individualist feminist activism 
is, more often than not, about doing what we have learned from feminist communities 
in our lives. By the same token, collectivism is another myth: we are individuals within 
collectives or communities, bringing our own widely disparate experiences and motives 
to any collective practices we might engage in. Nor do we stop doing feminism when 
we leave the collective’s headquarters and go home. That individualism and 
collectivism are myths does not make them any less real for feminist activism. But the 
trick is to accept feminist and activist validity for both. 
Public Counts 
Feminist Publicity 
Fatima Mechtab, of the Wench Collective, describes activism as: 
Taking my personal beliefs into a public forum and acting out my wishes for change 
through speech or physical action (e.g., by marching). Being seen and heard among 
others who share a similar ideology.
43 
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Whilst we may have to account for a cultural difference that makes public feminist 
activism more necessary in Mechtab’s case,
44 it is important to note that her view is not 
an isolated one, even in the Western world. In fact, being “seen and heard” is a 
mainstay of feminist activism and has been for many years. Public activism of the kind 
Mechtab describes has the vital roles of bringing feminism into the world, reminding 
politicians and others in positions of power that feminism is a real presence, and 
spreading feminist messages to a broader audience. Public activism also has a certain 
impressive quality that witnesses must respect: it demonstrates the commitment, 
passion and power of women committed to feminist ideology. 
The negative side of a representation of feminist activism as necessarily public 
is that it can create the sense that women who don’t do feminism publicly aren’t really 
doing feminism. Kerreen Reiger’s article on the activities of mothers’ groups in 
Australia provides an example of this exclusion. Whilst many feminists might consider 
such groups ‘non-feminist’ or even reactionary and conformist, Reiger tells us that the: 
…activists in this mothers’ movement seemingly did not see themselves as anti-
feminist, but rather as following other goals and rectifying the dominant feminist 
emphasis on achievement in the public sphere.
45 [My emphasis] 
 
Clearly, certain women perceive feminist activism as something that necessitates a 
public declaration or demonstration of one’s feminism. My concern is that when public 
activity is a criterion for feminist activism, then more private feminist practices are left 
out in the cold (or, in this case, ‘left in’ private spaces). The perception of distinct 
public and private spheres has long been of importance to feminists.
46 In discussions of 
these spheres, however, the unstable distinction between the two, as well as the 
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problematic valorisation of public over private or vice versa, are recurring themes.
47 In 
other words, just as the distinction between public and private spheres is never simple 
or clear-cut, the boundary between public and private activism needs closer 
interrogation than feminists generally give it. 
  Public activism itself does not always have ideal results: 
 
A: It’s a women’s lib demonstration we’re going to. Try to get some good shots of the 
crowd, especially if they look angry, and one or two close ups of the speakers. 
B: What’s the angle? 
A: Ah, y’know, the usual. Country going to rack and ruin, women abandoning their 
family lives, and so on. 
B: Right. What’s the protest about? 
A: Jesus, do I look like a feminist? Hang on a bit – I remember now. It’s about a 
billboard on East Terrace. Demeaning to women. 
B: A big protest like this, over one billboard? 
A: Naw, it’s about women’s bodies, you know, women as sex objects and all. The 
billboard is just the news focus. 
B: Bet ya there’s no sex objects at this thing! 
A: Earnest types, the lot of them. You should see some of the leaders. 
B: I thought they weren’t supposed to have leaders. Anti-hierarchy, and all that. 
A: Well, every revolution’s got to have its stars. How else do you inspire the rabble? 
Look at Communism. In every two-bit hovel of a commune, there’s some bugger with a 
bit of charisma making the rousing speeches and running the show. More often than 
not, it’s the leaders that get the publicity. 
B: Yeah, bad publicity, mostly. 
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A: No such thing as bad publicity, mate. If you can just get your face in the papers, and 
the words ‘Women’s Lib’ or ‘Feminism,’ then you’re a happening thing. You’re 
current; you’re going places, even if not everybody likes it. And, what’s more, you get 
women thinking. And that’s what started them going in the first place. You can be sure 
that every time we put these birds in the news, some woman clicks to it and says, ‘yeah, 
that makes sense.’ 
B: You’re right there. There was this woman I heard about. Happy as Larry, she 
seemed, looking after the house, taking care of the kids. All the while, she’s hiding that 
book in her closet – that one by Germaine Greer. Reading it while hubby was at 
work.
48 I’ll wager she wouldn’t have had a clue the book existed if it wasn’t for the 
media creating all that hoo-hah over it. 
A: Take a left here – it’s that building on the right. 
B: Ay, there’s no one there. 
A: We must have missed the damn thing. Gawd, the boss’ll have us strung up. 
B: There must be something left to take a snap of. 
A: Nah, not unless we stage something. 
B: Let’s burn a book or something. Burn a “Victoria’s Secret” catalogue. 
A: I’ve got it! Let’s burn a brassiere, mate. 
B: What? 
A: You know, an instrument of woman’s oppression and all that. 
B: I get ya. Right-ho. 
   
  In fact, the story goes that, in 1968, a number of women turned up to protest at 
the Miss America Pageant. A couple of them “tossed some padded brassieres in a 
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rubbish bin.”
49 A journalist seized on the image, erroneously reporting the feminist 
burning of bras. Susan Faludi, author of Backlash: the Undeclared War against 
American Women, claims that she can find “scant evidence”
50 of bra-burnings in the 
name of feminism. Lemisch and Weisstein add that: 
Subsequent to the development of this nomenclature [‘bra-burner’], some public bra-
burnings may have occurred, in imitation of the term. If so, they were at best very 
infrequent.
51 
 
This story illustrates what is possibly the major downside to public activism: that is, 
media representatives who distort representations of feminism, stage stunts, and 
stereotype feminists. Of course, there is also the fact that certain feminists (such as 
Camille Paglia
52) tend to make outrageous statements in the name of feminism – 
statements that are not representative of most feminists’ views. However, what is 
‘outrageous’ and what is a truly feminist belief are relative terms, and it is best not to 
dwell too much on the feminists who make claims for feminism that go against one’s 
own principles (and of course I include myself within the group of feminists who might 
be considered outrageous or truly feminist by different readers). Indeed, I am not in the 
least interested in making a case for the ‘negative’ results of public activism here. 
Rather, I wish to examine the usefulness of ‘public’ as a criterion for feminist activism, 
and consider reasons why it might be constructive to broaden this conception of 
feminist activism.  
Inner Conflicts of Public Activism 
I will start with a brief account of the complicated distinction between the 
public and private spheres and how this has been dealt with in feminism. Historically, 
the public sphere was taken to mean the world of economics, politics and law (the 
man’s world of work), while the private sphere meant the domestic (the woman’s world 
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of the home). Firstly and most obviously, these spheres are not stable entities. Marxist
53 
and, later, Foucauldian
54 understandings of economics, politics, sexuality, law and the 
domestic have informed us that these are intertwined: local, national and global 
economics affect and are affected by supposedly domestic concerns such as the sexual 
division of labour, unpaid labour and undeclared paid labour; politics (the negotiation 
of power) happens everywhere, including within the home; what happens at home can 
become publicly political; law gives us ‘permission’ to carry out certain ‘private’ 
activities; and what we do in the domestic sphere is also subject to the law. However, 
specifically feminist analyses of the spheres, such as that by Iris Marion Young
55 and 
Susan Baker and Anneke van Doorne-Huiskes,
56 suggest that women do not just 
traditionally belong in the private sphere (and men in the public sphere), but that 
marginalised groups such as women, Blacks, homosexuals, etc. actually constitute the 
private sphere – they are the private sphere, and thus cannot be free of it. 
Which brings me to a more recent question in feminist history: should women 
actually want to be free of the private sphere? What is so wonderful about the public 
sphere, and so degrading about the private sphere, that feminists should strive for one 
and renounce the other? The valorisation of the public sphere as ‘the place to be’ for 
women was most common in early (first-wave) feminist thought, but Betty Friedan was 
even encouraging women to get out of the kitchen and to find more “meaningful work” 
in 1981.
57 Furthermore, women were giving the public sphere primacy as the zone in 
which they might make truly effective changes. Janice Raymond describes the way 
such traditional idealism assesses the political value of an action: 
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The criteria for political weight and worth, as defined by men, often amount to the 
criteria for manhood – dramatic self- and group assertion, daring deeds, and open and 
rebellious confrontation with the state. What is granted the status of ‘political’ is 
frequently measured by the old manly heroic ethic.
58 
 
Around the same time that Betty Friedan was suggesting that women exit the private 
sphere, a reversal of that sentiment became evident in the work of feminists such as 
Jean Bethke Elshtain.
59 Elshtain depicts a private sphere that is a location of “the 
deepest and most resonant ties,”
60 suggesting that the denigration of the domestic/the 
private is yet another way of devaluing women and their traditional activities. The 
implication is that the conventional formulation of an esteemed public and devalued 
private sphere needs to be interrogated within feminist thought. 
In fact, feminists often attempt to disrupt and reject ‘masculine’ structures, 
relying on this resistance to define their feminist ideologies. For instance, certain 
French feminist writers disrupt ‘masculine’ ways of using language,
61 and Sandra 
Harding and others have produced work on ‘standpoint epistemology’
62 (or experience-
based knowledge) which questions traditional, masculine-identified empirical or 
‘objective’ approaches to research. In addition to disrupting ‘masculine’ theory forms, 
many feminists reject ‘masculine’ ways of running organizations that value 
individualism and hierarchy
63 (as discussed earlier), and work on the principle of a 
theory/practice divide. For such women, the very idea of unreflectively valorising the 
public over the private sphere, or using what we might regard as a ‘masculine’ 
framework to generate feminist activism, must be distasteful to say the least.  
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Certain feminists’ elevation to celebrity status (in the worlds of both theory and 
activism) creates a similar conflict of interests for feminism when feminist activists (or 
theorists) locate themselves in the ‘masculine’ realm of the public. Stanley and Wise 
criticise the elevation and adulation of “theory stars”
64 in their article “But the Empress 
has No Clothes!”; however, Andrea Petö argues that these theory stars actually hold an 
important place in emerging feminist theory and practice in Eastern European countries 
such as the former Yugoslavia.
65 Jennifer Wicke also discusses the problematic nature 
of feminist celebrity, making such points as: 
The danger of [Catharine] MacKinnon’s position, and it is astonishingly dangerous, is 
that it is celebrity worship disguised as a purgative hatred of celebrity culture.
66 
 
Feminist activism shares just this kind of relationship with the public sphere, criticizing 
it whilst using it; straining against it whilst clamouring to fill it with feminist presence. 
However, feminists consistently deflect the problematic fact that they are using 
‘masculine’ structures to produce and perform feminist messages, and fail to talk about 
the irony of enforcing this criterion for feminist activism. 
Reclaiming Both Public and Private Activism for Feminism 
In light of this ‘double standard’, it is fitting that the next question to ask about 
public feminist activism is: is the use of traditional or ‘masculine’ strategies for the 
purpose of making feminism a majority concern actually a problem? I would say it’s 
certainly not a problem; on the contrary, it is practical, realistic and effective. As I have 
shown, the ‘public’ criterion for feminist activism does not always fit with feminist 
ideals the way feminists want it to. When deploying a conventional conceptualisation 
of feminist activism, there is no way to resolve this issue: we must continue to do 
feminist activism publicly, and put aside the fact that we are making use of ‘masculine’ 
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frameworks to do feminism, no matter how uneasy this makes us. However, if we are 
willing to reflect on this contradiction, then I think we can accept the notion that public 
feminist activism is “meeting the world on its own turf,” but not meeting the world “on 
its own terms.”
67 Reflecting on the contradictions of public feminist activism should 
not lead to the rejection of public forms of activism; rather it should foster fruitful 
discussion on the functions and effects of restrictive criteria in conceptualizing feminist 
activism.  
After all, the idea that feminist activism must be public before it is ‘real’ 
feminist activism excludes those women who do not have the opportunity, motivation 
or urge to do feminist activism publicly. I suggest that we commit more study time to 
exploring private practices as feminist activism. This concept will have its own 
contradictions, but if we have learnt nothing else from the discussion of collective and 
public feminist activism in the preceding pages, then we’ve learnt that contradictions 
are a part of feminism and don’t warrant new hierarchies, rejections and exclusions. 
Moreover, if we accept that finding a way to say or do something about women’s 
oppression (or resistance to that oppression) – even privately – is a valid form of 
feminist activism; if we accept that non-public feminist activism is a legitimate and 
useful form of feminist activism, then we are breaking down structures that protect 
‘real’ feminist activism from less traditional forms. This ‘unboxing’ in and of itself 
constitutes a radical move that is more in-line with some of the most famous and 
significant feminist ideals. In Chapter 3, I give examples and engage in a deeper 
discussion of private practices as feminist activism. 
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Sustained Counts 
Clarifying ‘Sustained’ 
 
Before launching into a discussion of the feminist activism criterion I have 
called ‘sustained,’ I need to explain a little about why I chose this particular word to 
describe certain ways of doing feminist activism. ‘Collective,’ ‘public’ and ‘radical’  
were easy to dig out of my original list, but I had more trouble putting a name to the 
activities that make up ‘sustained’ feminist activism. Many practices floated around the 
concept of a limited perception of feminist activism before I could identify what it was 
that linked them all: effort, organization, commitment, goals, time, quantity, 
quantifiability, development, journey, process, and so on. We tend to envisage all of 
these things as vital to genuine feminist activism. Ruthann Lee mentions 
“commitment”
68 as something she strives for in her activism, whilst Rylee Crawford 
claims that activism “involves sacrifice and determination.”
69 These feminists 
understand feminist activism as a sustained effort. Little, natural, fleeting resistances, 
undeveloped contingency actions – none of these make sense in such a conception of 
feminist activism, just as none of these fits under the heading of ‘sustained.’ Feminist 
activism does, however, survive and persist – and even revitalize – through these 
transitory moments.  
‘Feminist’ as an Identity 
   To paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir: one is not born, but rather becomes, a 
feminist.
70 Participation in sustained feminist activism settles a woman into the identity 
of ‘feminist.’ It becomes as solid as an occupation: one can say, “I am a feminist” as 
surely as one can say “I am a carpenter” – provided one serves the apprenticeship and 
does the required work. As a carpenter proves her/his vocation with a resume of work 
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experience and skills, a woman can prove her feminism by providing evidence of her 
extensive activist work. Sustained feminist activism works out as a solidification of an 
ideology, experiences and even training, into an identity. Identity politics (or basing 
one’s politics on the identity as a woman, Black, lesbian, feminist, etc.) is a bugbear of 
feminism as a movement that has often questioned notions of natural or given identities 
and subjective formation. So the difficulty that I confront in this discussion of sustained 
feminist activism is that of identity – how we formulate a feminist activist identity, 
maintain it, and protect it.
71 In doing so, I also reflect on the fragility of identity and 
identity politics within activism. 
One strong feminist metaphor that to this day has currency with many 
feminists
72 is the “click moment.”
73 This is supposed to be the moment when a woman 
‘clicks’ to feminism because of some particularly oppressive situation in her life. The 
click metaphor is an important one for analysing feminist conceptions of identity 
formation. However, the feminist activist needs to go a step further from the click 
moment to a developed habit of activism. The formation of a feminist activist identity 
is where sustained feminist practices come into play. There are other types of feminist 
practice – sporadic, uncertain, new, occasional and conditional forms of feminist 
activism – that many feminists consider do not count as feminism at all (but which I 
argue should count). These things are usually considered part of the process of 
becoming an activist; by the time one is doing sustained, ‘real’ feminist activism, one is 
allowed to don the title (or graduate’s mortarboard, or witch’s cloak) of feminist 
activist. 
The trouble with assuming that feminist identity is formed like this is that it 
doesn’t allow for that spiralling motion of feminist consciousness I described in the 
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Introduction to this thesis. Again, the rhetoric of false/feminist consciousness rears its 
head: one arrives at a consciousness of the need for action, and one sustains and feeds 
this consciousness through organised activism. Nor does this conception of feminist 
identity allow for the kind of in-and-out movement that accompanies any kind of 
political identification. It is possible, after all, to do feminism without being a 
feminist
74 – it isn’t always necessary, honest, or even useful to settle into the identity of 
‘feminist’ in order to do feminism. Does a racist necessarily speak, breathe and eat 
racism before we can name his/her actions as racist? Does s/he necessarily make a 
sustained effort towards racism to qualify for the term, joining the Ku Klux Klan, 
maintaining a white supremacist website, and getting a swastika tattoo? Of course not. 
In the same way, a woman need not join a collective, start a feminist book co-operative, 
or write hundreds of letters of complaint about sexist advertising, before we can call 
what she does ‘feminism.’ And yet we persist in expecting the kind of commitment to 
activism from women that allows (and occasionally forces) them to ‘be’ feminists. 
The ‘Being’ and ‘Doing’ of Feminism 
I wonder whether click moments and sustained feminist activism constitute 
effective ways to formulate feminist identity. This is not a new problem: Patai and 
Koertge devote an entire chapter of their book Professing Feminism to the discussion of 
the problems of identity politics.
75 And Ien Ang says: 
Feminism must stop conceiving of itself as a nation, a ‘natural’ political destination for 
all women...it will have to develop a self-conscious politics of partiality, and imagine 
itself as a limited political home, which does not absorb difference within a pre-given 
and pre-defined space.
76 
 
Although Ang’s comment is made in the context of a discussion of “white/Western 
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feminism” and multicultural difference, her words describe the way in which feminism 
(“politics”) can be the central or meeting point for women. For me, feminist urges 
constitute feminist activism, rather than only a measurable, developed, ends-oriented 
spell of activity. Cathryn Bailey concedes that one factor for consideration when 
determining whether or not an act is ‘resistant’ is the doer’s “intention.”
77 Diana Fuss 
also talks about it being “politics which grounds affinity” rather than vice versa
78 – in 
other words, one can make a connection with other feminists that does not rely on 
shared history or experience (or, in this case, sustained feminist activism), but rather on 
the more general desire for the well-being of women that feminism is about. And just in 
case it’s not clear, I’m not implying in any way that it’s wrong to call oneself a 
feminist; on the contrary, it is very okay. I want to suggest that it’s pointless to label 
other women as ‘not feminist’ simply because they don’t meet criteria like sustained 
feminist activism, or take on a permanent identity as feminists. 
So, if the woman who does sustained feminist activism has arrived and gained 
citizenship in Ang’s nation of feminism, how do we conceptualize the ‘tourists’ – those 
who visit and depart, those who may stay indefinitely but never attempt to claim 
permanent residency, and those who slip by customs, carrying all kinds of dodgy 
contraband into this illusory feminist nation? To identify women as feminists because 
they meet certain expectations (like sustained feminist activism) is to exclude these 
other women from identifying as feminists – and this is something that happens all the 
time. Says Belinda Rapps: “I don’t go out and make myself out to be a feminist; I just 
believe that I can do just as much as men.”
79 She does feminism, but she does not 
necessarily settle into the identity of ‘feminist.’ Women who do not identify as 
feminists, Rapps goes on, “might feel that they agree with feminism, that they are a 
                                                 
77 Bailey. 149. 
78 Fuss, Diana. Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference. New York: Routledge, 1989. 36. 
79 Rapps, Belinda. Personal interview. 7 August 2003. Wasley 115 
feminist, but they just don’t know how to show it, and bring it out into the world. I 
mean they might really want to…”
80 But I think we need to acknowledge the possibility 
that women who do not know how to put their feminism out into the world, regardless 
of whether they want to or not, may not feel entitled to identify as feminists because 
they do not fit the criteria. Only when we accept that there are many different ways in 
which feminist identity comes about – and that this identity itself can be a delicate and 
transitory thing – can we free up some space for non-identity-politics-based activism 
within feminism. 
Radical Counts 
A History and Semantics of Radicalism 
  Just to be clear from the first moment, this section is not a discussion of ‘radical 
feminism’ per se. In fact, Rowland and Klein point out that radical feminism is 
“marginalized” by contemporary feminism,
81 a point which is quite distinct from my 
argument that radicalism has currency as a criterion for feminist activism. I discuss 
representations of radical feminism as a ‘type’ of feminism in Chapter 6. In this 
section, I explore the meanings and tensions of radicalism within feminism. In her 
Dictionary of Feminist Theory, Humm claims that “second wave feminism first used 
radical to mean a more revolutionary social theory than the theories of the New Left out 
of which it had grown”
82; and Kathie Sarachild describes radical as being “interested in 
getting to the roots of the problems in society.”
83 As you can see, radicalism itself is at 
least partly separate from the set of practices and theories associated with radical 
feminism. We tend to locate the very origins of feminism (and I’m talking about the 
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feminist waves here: first-wave, second-wave, etc) in other radical political 
movements. Rebecca Ellis reminds us that many first-wave feminists were “involved in 
revolutionary struggles like the Russian revolution” and suggests that “other radical 
mass movements such as the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam war 
movement” inspired second-wave feminism.
84 Whether or not you agree that feminism 
can be traced to these co-existent revolutions, most histories of feminism make these 
connections with other radical movements. In other words, we commonly ground 
feminism in radicalism: we give feminism the historical context of radical political 
activity and thought. It’s no wonder that radicalism is a defining criterion of feminist 
activism, when we conceive of feminism itself as a movement born in, and built on, 
radicalism. 
The problem is knowing exactly what defines a movement or practice as 
radical. As Cathryn Bailey explains: 
What counts as resistance [or radicalism] is, to some extent, a relative matter. For 
example, in a traditionally heterosexually oriented club, a woman’s appearance in a 
very short skirt, high heels, and dramatic makeup might be easy to dismiss as 
patriarchally complicit. In the context of a lesbian bar where the prevailing aesthetic is 
quite different, such a woman’s presence might have a different meaning. It is 
reasonable in the second context to consider this woman’s costume to be a sign of 
resistance.
85  
 
In general, we take ‘radical’ to mean anything that disturbs the status quo. The 
dictionary meaning of ‘radical’ is “of or from or going to or being the root, inherent, 
essential, fundamental, primary, thorough.”
86 In other words, the origins of the word 
have to do with grassroots: radical changes are changes to the very foundations of a 
thing. But what exactly does ‘radical’ mean when we use the term to talk about a 
radical act? The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought comes closer, defining 
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radicalism as a “tendency to press political views and actions towards an extreme.”
87 A 
combination of these dictionary and lay-definitions does well as a descriptor of what 
we generally mean when we say the word radical, and enables me to claim that, in 
common parlance, radicalism describes an extreme view or act that goes toward 
changing the very root of life/society/politics as we know it. 
I associate this definition of radicalism with a refusal to compromise with the 
current sexisms of ‘the system.’ Kathleen Barry evaluates radicalism in feminism in 
this way: 
It is a fact of social/political movements that radicalism does not sustain a movement. 
For a movement to endure, its broad base and widespread influence must be assured. 
But radicalism is essential for the life of a movement, as it will bring to it the most 
uncompromising critique which assures us that the movement will not devolve to 
simple reform – that is, patchwork on an exploitative, corrupt and ruthless power 
structure.
88  
 
Barry sets radicalism up in opposition to reform – an opposition that has been widely 
used in feminism.
89 Reform, in this view, is simply a readjustment of the existing 
reality to accommodate a few feminist demands. Barry represents reform as a 
compromise of feminist goals, and worse – as a half-baked kind of feminism: a 
“patchwork.” By extension, radicalism is more developed, and somehow ‘purer.’ In her 
discussion of ‘upward mobility’ (that is, a compromised feminism), Janice Raymond 
unpicks this opposition: 
...many women…succumb to the politics of victimism by regarding failure in the 
man’s world, or downward mobility, as the only ‘pure’ feminist politics. Such women 
mistake worldliness for assimilation to the world.
90 
 
Yet, we constantly find feminists claiming that: “its own institutionalization has made 
women’s studies less transformative and radical…to avoid co-option requires constant 
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vigilance;”
91 discussing the “establishment’s” attempt to make feminism into “lifestyle 
and personal aggrandizement, devoid of political impact;”
92 and even warning that:  
Within this institutionalization, though, lies a danger. Foremost among the problems is 
the likelihood that the original conceptions of culture studies [for instance, the feminist 
foundations of women’s studies] will lose their oppositional edge, become distorted, be 
absorbed, and die the subtle death that institutions can casually impose on dissent.
93 
 
 These claims give radicalism currency as the driving force in feminist politics (not just 
a driving force – which I would not dispute – but the driving force). 
The Importance of Radicalism 
  Notable radical acts (rejections of ‘the system’) for feminists include: the 
disavowal of elite theory and intellectualism;
94 feminist mischief with language (for 
instance, Mary Daly’s reclaiming of words like ‘hag’ and ‘crone’ for positive feminist 
use);
95 the choice to create separate women’s communities (known as ‘radical 
separatism’); and the rejection of the Western enlightenment ideal of ‘reason,’ often 
evidenced by feminist theorising through art, emotional and fictive writing, and so on. 
The idea behind such radical feminist acts is that the oppression of women is at the root 
of all traditional structures in Western society: institutions, cultural values, the law, 
language, sciences and the economy. These radical acts disrupt the very foundations of 
sexism by turning existing structures on their heads. Putting aside discussion of the 
individual value of particular radical acts and perspectives (including the fact that such 
radical ideas and acts within feminism have awesome innovative power in the worlds 
of theory and activism), radicalism achieves two additional interesting outcomes for 
feminist activism. One is the very practical outcome of publicity (radicalism draws 
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attention); the other is inspiration. Radical acts carry with them a kind of dramatic 
beauty that can hardly fail to stir the imaginations of women. 
However, limiting feminist activism exclusively to radical practices can awaken 
in women a sense of inadequacy (which may even emerge as a superiority complex). 
The expectation that every feminist, regardless of her situation, hammers constantly at 
the walls of patriarchy is both demoralizing and unfair. Sometimes, a woman’s most 
inspiring feminist moments are far from radical. In fact, the most enriching experiences 
I’ve had with feminism have been decidedly non-radical: the private booze-ups with 
my friends, the intimate talks with my female relatives, the mischievous joy of 
personally and privately resisting sex rules, and the pleasure of kicking misogynist butt 
in my own life. Obviously, this is not the case for all feminists.
96 However, I think that 
to say that a feminism which negotiates the system – feminism that sometimes seems 
strangely complicit with the system – is not really feminism, does nothing for the 
movement. All feminism is complicit with the system at some level. In the end, we 
have to settle for this life, this language, and these people, no matter how much we 
baulk inwardly that ‘settling for.’ And, god forbid, some of us even learn to enjoy our 
negotiation of the system, and manage to like living here. 
Disrupting Radicalism: Non-radical Feminism  
Here, I wish to examine the way one particular form of non-radical feminism – 
‘girlpower’
97 – fits into the wider framework of what feminism is/isn’t. I will explore 
this idea in the form of a fabricated conversation with Catherine Driscoll, a feminist 
theorist who has studied the Spice Girls.
98 
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Conversation with Catherine Driscoll 
 
Me: You’re studying girlpower as a form of feminist resistance? Are you trying to tell 
me you think the Spice Girls are a good thing?
99 
Catherine: Whether or not the Spice Girls are good, for girls or as music, is not a 
question that interests me here, except insofar as I want to know why this is an issue. 
Why do the Spice Girls need to be good for girls?
100 
Me: Well, because they spout all that stuff about girlpower. Women have doubts about 
whether it’s legitimate feminism or just marketing. 
Catherine: You mean, can anything feminist be so prominently popular (even for a 
short time)?; can feminism be a mass-produced, globally distributed product?; and, can 
merchandised relations to girls be authentic?
101 
Me: Yes. I would have assumed that girlpower is totally co-opted – feminism so diluted 
it isn’t even feminism anymore. 
Catherine: I want to address girl culture as a form of feminism as popular culture.
102 
Me: But some feminists say that feminism, once it’s popular, is no longer feminism. 
That feminism loses its radical edge and becomes co-opted as soon as it appears in a 
widespread medium like pop music. 
Catherine: Yes. Some feminists see the Spice Girls as domesticating and subverting 
feminism, reducing it to a collection of empty slogans and a conventionally sexualized 
image. Ginger Spice recognizes that ‘a lot of people think [Girl Power] is just cheese,’ 
but argues that the principle is bigger than their reputation: ‘if we can give anyone a bit 
of motivation, make any girl just sit up and go, ‘I’m strong,’ then that beats any number 
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one or meeting any star.’
103 As Susan Douglas says: “When adolescent girls flock to a 
group, they are telling us plenty about how they experience the transition to 
womanhood in a society in which boys are still very much on top…So while it’s easy 
as pie to hold a group like the Spice Girls in contempt, we should be wary when music 
embraced by preteen girls is ridiculed…The Spice Girls tell them that feminism is 
necessary and fun. Hey, when I was 10 we had ‘I wanna be Bobby’s Girl.’ Crass 
commercial calculation and all, the Spice Girls are a decided improvement.”
104 
Me: So you see the Spice Girls as an opportunity to start talking about how feminism 
manifests in girls who have less access to the more conventional forms of feminism, 
including radical activism? Maybe some feminists are expecting too much in the way 
of agency from certain groups of women? 
Catherine: A reliance on claims to agency is a problematic foundation for feminist 
politics. When agency is evaluated according to resistance it is inevitable that the 
agency of some people or groups – the ones with least access to modes of cultural 
production, for example – will seem less independent and less individual than others.
105 
 
My conversation with Driscoll highlights one of the reasons why it is counter-
productive to feminist goals to stake out feminist activism in a way that excludes non-
traditional forms of resistance. I would prefer that this part of my argument not be 
mistaken for a discussion about intergenerational differences in styles of feminist 
activism, despite the reference to a postmodern concept like ‘girlpower.’ As I’ve said, 
the discussion on generations comes later in my thesis (Chapter 6). Rather, this 
conversation is about ways that non-radical feminism disrupts the idea that feminist 
activism is necessarily radical, and how dependent such an idea is on the assumption 
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that all women have access to opportunities (and the inclination) to act radically. I am 
not suggesting that we take girlpower out of its context as a contemporary 
phenomenon. Rather, I am using girlpower as an example to look more broadly at the 
effect such non-radical feminism has on women who understand feminist activism as 
something that must be radical, including older women. In other words, it is quite 
possible to draw parallels between girlpower and other marginalized forms of 
feminism. In this way, we can reflect on how we constitute feminist activism and the 
implications for women of various backgrounds, personalities, and feminist 
persuasions.  
Conclusion: the Limits of Feminist Activism 
Collective, public, sustained and radical as the only criteria for feminist 
activism fail to describe feminist activism adequately because adhering to such criteria 
means, firstly, that we must overlook their contradictions and, secondly, that we 
disregard (whether strategically or unintentionally) a whole host of activities that 
deserve acknowledgement as feminist activism. I have shown how the first of these two 
outcomes works in the preceding sections. When we break the criteria down into their 
contextual and semantic bases, it’s plain to see how terms like radical and public are 
altogether ill fitting. If public activities (traditionally done by men only) are the ones 
that we, as a society, value, then it is possible to see the attempt to push feminism 
publicly as settling for the current system of values. Radicalism, on the other hand, 
aims to upset and reconstruct the current system of values by making grassroots 
changes. Another example: sustained feminist activism implies a developed politics 
that can stand up to both critique and the passage of time. However, it is possible to see 
developed politics as co-opted and institutionalized – in other words, non-radical. 
Janice Raymond explores an instance of this conflict, explaining how, “women’s 
reactionary attitude towards thinking and theory has developed an anti-intellectualism Wasley 123 
that values practice without theory.”
106 Raymond continues: 
However, any female or feminist action that lacks the complexity of thought often 
becomes rhetorical. Rhetorical action, like rhetorical words, is devoid of depth. Often, 
it may be a clever and colorful rhetoric whose power derives from its ability to assail 
our sensibilities rather than to arouse our thought. It is a kind of rhetoric that rushes at 
us with something like ‘Words are the absolute in horseshit.’
107 
 
This is just one facet of radical feminist activism that doesn’t gel with the idea of 
sustained feminist activism. Finally, it is yet another interesting confusion of feminist 
goals and activist principles that the things many people consider ‘more activist’ (i.e. 
donning the traditionally male role of the ruthless corporate bigwig to break through the 
glass ceiling) can lead to results we consider ‘less feminist’ (i.e. careerism and 
individual gain). It is clear that the development and maintenance of the boundary lines 
between ‘real’ feminist activism and other, less conventional forms of feminist 
activism, doesn’t actually work for a number of women. The apparently seamless 
boundary of ‘real’ feminist activism is, in fact, fraught with inner conflict and double 
standards. 
As for the second problem with limiting feminist activism (that is, ignoring and 
excluding the ‘other’ acts that I believe count as feminist activism), Narelle Wasley 
explains it in this statement: 
I think [women’s reluctance to identify as feminists has] partly got to do with the 
whole radical feminist culture creating this distance between the average woman, the 
mainstream woman, between Jill Smith, and themselves. And they put themselves on 
this elitist kind of thing, and said, you know, unless you’re like this, you’re not a 
feminist. And women sort of think, well, I’m not that. I’m not a lesbian; I’m not a 
mechanic, or I’m not out protesting, and all that kind of thing, well, I can’t be a 
feminist. And they don’t think, well, I’m married, I’m living with someone who goes to 
work and comes home and cooks dinner, and I go to work, and we’re not married but 
we’ve got three kids, you know, and they go in childcare sometimes…and I mow the 
lawn. You know. Oh! Yeah, I’m a feminist – they don’t think that.
108 
 
Wasley describes here the effect of limiting feminism by setting up stringent criteria for 
what counts as feminist activism: women lose faith in their own ability to do feminism. 
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This limiting reduces women’s willingness to identify as feminists and feminist 
activists. If we accept that two main contemporary feminist goals are to (a) reach as 
many women as possible with the information that it is not okay to suffer for being a 
woman, and to (b) show understanding, respect and compassion where differences 
between women are concerned, then it becomes clear that by limiting what counts as 
feminist activism, we fail to achieve either of these goals. Firstly, limiting feminism 
creates the sense that a large number of women don’t cut the mustard as feminists and 
secondly, it fails to account for differences that might curtail a woman’s access to the 
standard or ‘legitimate’ feminist practices. Belinda Rapps reminds us that: 
[There are] introverts and extroverts…[embracing a feminist identity depends on] your 
sense of wellbeing, and where you are in life, and your husband…it can scare people if 
you do say ‘I’m a feminist’…they might not be into conflict…They might feel that 
they agree with feminism, that they are a feminist, but they just don’t know how to 
show it, and bring it out into the world.
109 
 
Rapps associates the reluctance of certain women to identify as feminists with 
personality differences – something that we don’t like to talk about in feminist 
difference theory. However, this constitutes a valid and (I believe) convincing 
explanation for women’s hesitation when it comes to assuming the tightly-delineated 
identity of feminist activist. 
The explanation of personality is just one obstacle to participating in feminist 
activism. Others include: lack of access to information about feminist activism; 
dependence on others for deciding or influencing the activities one takes part in; and 
lack of time. These obstacles (and I am sure there are others) may be related to 
cultural/ethnic background, age, class, family, economics, and social environment. 
Again, the fragile nature of identity is the issue: many women feel they cannot or do 
not want to take on an identity that rests on such tight guidelines and ‘high’ standards. 
Cathryn Bailey refers to the necessity of “external criteria” for defining practices as 
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feminist or not: 
…otherwise, the fact that I believe myself to be waving in greeting would determine 
that that is what I would be doing even if my arm were actually anesthetized and 
hanging by my side.
110 
 
These external criteria leave little room for a feminist activist identity that doesn’t 
conform, and so there is no way for women to identify comfortably as feminist activists 
on the grounds of individual, private, contingent or conservative forms of resistance. 
Conceptualising the Revolution 
Limiting feminist activism to ‘conventional’ forms of activism suggests that one 
person’s resistance cannot make a difference because women’s oppression is a mass 
oppression: only total overthrow of ‘the patriarchy’ will liberate women. In other 
words, any discussion of how feminist activism is being represented is necessarily also 
a discussion of how we understand ‘revolution.’ The conception feminists and non-
feminists often deploy (if unconsciously) of The Revolution is that of a real and 
concrete, if slow-coming, or even undesirable, moment in time. Stanley and Wise claim 
that: 
Personal change, small piecemeal change in everyday life, such analyses [that is, 
structural analyses] tell us, are irrelevant and useless. These are not the revolution. And 
they are worse than useless, because involvement in them distracts us from real 
revolutionary activities.
111 
 
The ‘real revolutionary activities’ are the planned, massed, grand and heroic ones. I 
argue that this concept of The Revolution is not particularly useful. Firstly, it has been 
shown to be inaccurate: I think if The Revolution was going to happen, it probably 
would have happened by now, and sexism would have been completely eradicated. 
Secondly, it dismisses the efficacy of smaller, slower, less totalistic changes, including 
feminist reform. As it stands, the concept of mass Revolution informs and influences 
the way we represent feminist activism. Therefore, if we could revise that lofty concept 
of The Revolution as a series of mini-revolutions, we might be on our way to 
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developing a more flexible and inclusive definition of feminist activism.  
What do we want from The Revolution? Revolutions are about change. Change 
happens in a number of different ways, including activism, individual decisions, 
discussion, reforms and legislation, reading and writing, and as cultural response to 
major events (such as natural disasters, holocausts, epidemics and wars). Most 
transformations to deeply embedded cultural ideologies (such as patriarchy, 
Christianity, rationalist philosophy, or homophobia, for example) happen slowly, with 
periods of strong activity and rapid change interspersed throughout snail’s-pace change 
over extended periods of time. As well as the ‘forward’ movement we tend to attribute 
to change, it is characterized by temporary returns to the original state, obstacles and 
setbacks. All of this means that it is possible to revise our totalistic tendencies when we 
conceptualize feminist change and The Revolution. Feminists might look toward the 
‘immediate’ – intimate relationships, connections, conversation, the everyday – as well 
as at global, national and cultural structures of oppression. Afshan Ali says: 
My activism is about justice, not just on the grand, lofty level of revolution, but about 
justice and compassion in the way I treat people immediately around me.
112 
 
Afshan shows us that it is possible to deploy concepts like revolution, justice and 
activism in ways that do not draw on Revolution-speak: ways that resonate with events 
and people in our immediate lives. 
Once we are looking at, and thinking about, change in a different way, then the 
path has cleared somewhat for an alternative understanding of activism – an 
understanding of activism as a process or, in Anne Orwin’s terms, a “continuum.”
 113 
Marlene LeGates describes process thus: 
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Ultimately, what makes activism worthwhile is not the chance of success but the 
process of struggle. It is the self-determination individuals achieve over their own lives 
and the supportive culture they create in league with other women or with men in a 
common fight.
114 
 
Whilst I would not agree that the chance of success is an unimportant part of the 
struggle (really, it depends on how you imagine success – as making a real difference 
in a small way, or the complete overthrow of an oppressive patriarchy), I agree with 
what LeGates says about the process of struggle. The term ‘process’ suggests an 
ongoingness, a dailiness, that connects well with my ideas on feminist practice. The 
word ‘struggle’ does not, however, say exactly what I want it to say, as it implies 
something negative – a fight, a sense of being gagged and bound, a prolonged 
suffering. A process of activism is not necessarily a struggle, after all. Orwin’s 
continuum might be a more positive formulation of activism: 
If the concept of activism is confined to the political arena, we exclude those who take 
action in other ways. But if activism means we do something, as opposed to thinking 
about it, then teachers of women’s studies are, by definition, activists … I see teaching 
as part of a continuum of activism that encompasses both political struggle and the 
smaller gestures that derive from acting on one’s beliefs.
115 
 
While Orwin’s discussion is about including teaching in a concept of activism, the 
principle applies to my argument here: a continuum of activism allows for those acts of 
resistance that are neither collective nor public, sustained nor radical, as well as those 
that are. When we talk about feminist activism, as when we talk about any form of 
feminism, we must remain aware of our tendency to delineate an ‘is’ and an ‘is not’ of 
feminist practice. That tendency can do women more harm than good – in short, in our 
haste to disrupt the status quo, we should avoid unwitting complicity in the creation of 
a new one. In hopes of illustrating the points I have made in this chapter, I next move 
onto an exploration of some alternative practices of feminist activism. 
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Chapter 3 
A Day in the Feminist Life
1 
But the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably diffusive: for the 
growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are 
not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who 
lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs. 
— George Eliot, 1874
2 
 
 
In this chapter I use the format of a personal diary to explore some of the ‘other’ 
activities I believe count as feminist activism. This chronicle exemplifies the organic 
spread of feminism into everyday life that I described earlier in this thesis. I present 
practices ranging from ordinary, daily routines to world-changing events in history – 
both of which, for various reasons, we tend to write off as ‘not-feminism.’ Interspersed 
throughout these practices are conversations with theorists and further analyses of the 
effects of a limited definition of feminist activism. This chapter stands as a way 
forward from the last chapter’s critique of a limited ‘feminist activism,’ as well as a 
testament to the uncontrollable multiplicity of behaviours, skills, activities and 
occurrences that figure as feminist activism in a more inclusive definition of the term. 
 
The Everyday 
What did I do that counts as feminism today? I lay like an unresponsive log in 
bed after being up with my daughter in the night, while my husband kissed me goodbye 
and left for work. I breastfed my toddler, even though people have started to ask me 
when I plan to wean. I encouraged my mum to phone her partner after they’d had a tiff 
and ask him a couple of practical housekeeping questions she needed to know the 
answer to, just to show him that her life goes on even when they fight. I abandoned the 
housework in favour of writing some of my thesis on the accessibility of feminism. I 
told another mum from playgroup not to beat herself up because her baby burnt herself 
on the oven door, and discussed the fact that we as mothers feel guilt constantly, even 
when we are aware of the whole idea of mother-guilt. I congratulated another friend on 
her unplanned pregnancy and tried to buoy her up, despite the fact that it messes up her 
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plans, knowing that she won’t consider termination. I solved a couple of computer 
problems for members of the women’s volunteer organisation for which I tend the 
website. And all of this before 11am! 
  These things are feminist activism. I could partially recuperate them into 
official feminist activism by casting my activities as ‘rejecting oppressive gender 
roles,’ ‘consciousness-raising,’ ‘therapeutic feminist counselling,’ ‘educating women in 
new technologies,’ and so on. Only partially, because my activities were a bit too 
individual, one-on-one, private and spontaneous to truly fit the feminist activism 
mould.
3 But I do not want to recuperate them anyway. Trying to pass them off as ‘real’ 
feminist activism does not ring true for most of the things I did this morning. Instead, 
what I’m claiming is that these acts count as feminism in their own right, even if they 
do break some of the feminist activism rules. They count as feminism because they 
involve resistance to women’s suffering (via an often haphazard and incomplete 
mixture of screwing with roles and expectations, respecting and supporting other 
women, strategising and problem solving, and radical practices). As I said in the 
previous chapter, official feminist activism requires that activities be public, collective, 
sustained and radical; however, I will now argue that individual, transient and 
compromised feminist activities also count as feminist activism. Individual acts include 
those things we do in private: solitary practices; internal decisions; unannounced or 
undeclared rejections of sexism and misogyny; and one-on-one instances of support 
and sharing information. Transient acts include those practices that are temporary, 
spontaneous, immediate, incomplete or interrupted. Compromised acts include activism 
that can be recuperated or appears institutionalised; unoriginal or non-radical practices; 
activities that appear reliant on, or contingent to, other political campaigns; and 
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anything else that we write off as ‘suspect’ and ‘questionable’ because it leads to 
comfort or improved habitability rather than the Revolution. 
  The implication of including individual, transient and compromised acts in 
feminist activism is that feminist activism suddenly becomes possible in everyday 
practice. I find Michel de Certeau’s work The Practice of Everyday Life
4, in which he 
looks at everyday practice as potentially political, useful in thinking about feminism as 
everyday practice.
5 As Gordon, et al. commented in 1976: “a relationship between 
ideology [such as social theory, women’s magazines, parenting guides, etc] and social 
practices…may not always exist.”
6 Certeau argues that where there is such a rupture 
between the official word on social practice, and social practice itself, then this practice 
becomes potentially subversive: the “relations of procedures to the fields of force in 
which they act must therefore lead to a polemological analysis of culture.”
7 In short, 
everyday practices are worthy of closer attention than they are usually given in most 
fields of social theory. Although feminist writers have also discussed everyday practice 
as political (and requiring analysis), I’ve found that their emphasis is generally on 
things that happen to women, rather than things that women do in response to these. 
Dorothy Smith, for instance, claims that a feminist sociological aim is to “explicate the 
actual social processes and practices organizing people’s everyday experience.”
8 
Smith’s focus is on the way women ‘do’ the socially normative in their everyday 
experience. But Certeau writes that his: 
…goal will be achieved if everyday practices, ‘ways of operating’ or doing things, no 
longer appear as merely the obscure background of social activity, and if a body of 
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theoretical questions, methods, categories, and perspectives, by penetrating this 
obscurity, make it possible to articulate them.
9 
 
Certeau generated a discussion of everyday practices that brought these practices 
forward as important and significant activities in people’s social and political lives, 
rather than merely ‘the stuff we do’ when we get home from a day out doing political 
activism. 
  Certeau’s categories of “strategies” and “tactics”
10 allow us to differentiate 
between the forms of resistance through which we have cleared a space in culture for a 
marginalised voice, and resistance as that ‘stuff we do’ in privacy or on the spur of the 
moment. In other words, there are particular forms of feminist activism we can 
designate as strategies and others we could describe as tactics. This distinction is not 
normally made in theory about feminist activism. Nor should it be one that is reified, 
allowing us to conceive of an ultimate and impassable divergence between organised 
and everyday feminist activism. I argue for a way of looking at and describing 
feminism that makes room for the discussion of feminist tactics that is mostly absent in 
feminist theory at present. At the end of this chapter, I will use an example of everyday 
activism I have described in the ‘diary’ below to further explain the difference between 
strategy and tactics, but I must reiterate that the difference should not be a way to 
reinforce a hierarchy of activism. 
Such a hierarchy of feminist activism relegates what we do in private to the 
realm of that which makes us become political. Personal resistance, everyday feminist 
activism, does not on its own (in such a limited framework) make us political. I contend 
that personal resistance is, in fact, political – and not only political, but a form of 
feminist activism that is vital to the progress of feminism in general. This kind of 
feminist activism makes feminism as a practice achievable for most women, thereby 
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supporting the slow seeping of feminism into the cultural consciousness. In this 
chapter, I give examples of everyday feminist activism, practiced by women I have 
interviewed, by women whose work I have read, and by myself. My discussion of 
everyday feminist activism manifests as a kind of monologue – sometimes a musing, 
sometimes bordering on a rant. I use fiction and fact, snippets of conversations (real 
and imagined), quotations and stories. I have used the generic convention of a daily 
diary or journal in an effort to come as close as possible to representing a notion of 
‘practice’ while using a written form. In doing so, I do away with the luxury of clear 
sections and subheadings; however, I have sorted my chronicle roughly into the three 
categories of ‘what else’ counts as feminist activism: the individual; the transient; and 
the compromised. 
Days in the Life 
Tuesday 
Been thinking about doing feminist things on my own. Late phone call to Michel de 
Certeau:
11 
Me: A lot of people would say that reclaiming personal activities as political hearkens 
back to the Enlightenment ideal of a rational, self-determining individual – an ideal 
which ignores social context. One feminist scholar, for instance, says that individual 
feminism is not really feminism because it is “indifferent to structural and social 
barriers to equality.”
12 Another says that “(political) analysis takes place through 
consciousness raising,”
13 implying that analysis without consciousness raising is not 
political. 
Michel: This area of theory is not a return to individuality because it shows that a 
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relation (always social) determines this study’s terms, and not the reverse, and that each 
individual is a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such 
relational determinations interact.
14 
Me: So, your ideas of uncontrolled human operations are not so much about suggesting 
that individuals bring an asocial, somehow ‘pure’ form of agency to interpreting and 
acting on cultural structures. Rather, you are invoking the unpredictability of the way 
these people interpret and act, both within and despite such cultural structures. 
Michel: Moreover, the question at hand concerns modes of operation or schemata of 
action and not directly the subjects (or persons) who are their authors or vehicles.
15 
 
I suppose what Certeau is saying is that there is something beyond the binary 
opposition of the individualist and constructivist understandings of personhood or 
subjectivity. It reminds me of a feminist perspective on systemic versus individual 
politics expressed by Janice Raymond. She says that a: 
…purely political definition of the word feminist that accents oppression, struggle, 
conflict and resistance is circumscribed and limited. It is as absurd as the Marxist 
interpretation of the person primarily as worker.
16  
 
Wednesday 
Sometimes I can’t stay silent. I sent this email to an independent media review 
television program today: 
“Hi, 
I don’t know if you guys are interested in hearing about blatant objectification 
of women and implicit paedophilia in the media, but this week’s Danny Katz feature 
article in the West Australian Magazine
17 has me fuming. Katz discusses being 
attracted to the “innocence” of the “young, nubile” little things (women who host 
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children’s television shows), and claims to want to “fertilize” the Little Mermaid’s 
“caviar”. In particular, Katz refers to Hi5’s Kathleen as a “hot-n-horny, wicked 
temptress of male desire.” He talks about being physically restrained from climbing on 
stage when she was singing (from doing what? molesting her?) and closes by claiming 
that, however sexy, she comes across as “the littlest bit thick.” 
I know that Katz is writing humorously (sort of), but there is something 
sickening about the way he describes himself slavering over young women in this way 
– moreover, these are young women working in the field of child entertainment. It 
annoys me, as a feminist, that he feels he has the right to describe female child 
entertainers in this patronising and lewd vein, even concluding with the superior-
sounding criticism of Kathleen’s intelligence. 
Perhaps this is not something that there are overt guidelines for in print 
journalism, but I really feel that the inappropriateness and sexism of Danny Katz’s 
comments should be brought to the attention of editors and the audience in general. 
Please feel free to reply with any questions or comments. 
Sasha” 
Perhaps this email was pointless. I’d be surprised if I got a reply. I’d be 
surprised if it changed anything. But perhaps the point of it is also about me doing it; a 
feminist doing something – as a protest (heeded or not), and as a release of feminist 
intellectual and emotional energy. 
Thursday 
I’ve been spending a few days trying to feel better about the caesarean section. 
It’s nearly a year now since it happened. Maybe the anniversary triggered these 
feelings. Every day now, I have beaten myself up about it. Perhaps I should have 
stopped working earlier, and I could have kept my blood pressure under control. 
Perhaps I was too easily persuaded when I was in hospital, in labour, unable to walk Wasley 135 
because of the epidural, with nothing going as I’d planned it. Maybe I should have been 
more serious about it when I went into labour. It was as if it wasn’t real. I didn’t even 
tell my husband to come in – I told him to go back to bed. They had to phone him and 
tell him to come in because I was having the baby. I wanted to ask him to bring the 
gym ball in, but I thought he’d stress out over trying to get it into the car, and anyway I 
was strapped to monitors and couldn’t get off the bed to use it. I wanted to walk around 
to progress my labour, but they had me lying totally still so they could monitor the 
baby’s vital signs. I wanted mainly midwives, but the doctor was there the whole time, 
and the midwives came and went. What the hell was I doing? I realized my plans had 
all been in my head, and I had just assumed it would work out how I wanted it. 
These feelings were eating away at me. I couldn’t get past this. I was terribly, 
cruelly disappointed in myself for letting the empowered experience I wanted out of 
childbirth slip away. And the worst thing was the way people would look at me when I 
mentioned my sorrow over it. “Natural childbirth is no picnic,” they’d often tell me. Or, 
“You and the baby are healthy, and that’s all that counts.”
18 So why don’t I feel 
healthy? 
I went to the hospital today. Explained what I wanted to the receptionist. She 
was nice about it, although she must have thought it was weird. She sent me down to 
maternity, and I told the midwife I wanted to find out why I’d needed the caesarean, 
then started to cry. She was calm and curious. She took me into the empty nursery and 
got my records out. After looking at the records, she looked at me. “Didn’t anyone 
explain why you’d needed an emergency C-section?” she asked me. “We try to get 
around to talk to the C-section deliveries, but it’s hard when we’re busy.” I told her no-
one had really explained it. She explained that my baby had been a brow presentation. 
“It’s almost impossible to deliver a baby presenting its brow. It’s the widest and hardest 
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part of the head – it’s almost as bad as a breech presentation. That’s why you needed a 
caesarean. The blood pressure made it urgent, but your baby’s position was the real 
reason.” 
I watched her almost uncomprehendingly. Maybe she could have said anything 
to me and I would have felt better. I just needed to hear a reason. Tears were still 
streaming, but they were partly the feeling of reprieve – not so much guilt. “There’s no 
reason why you can’t have a normal delivery next time,” the midwife added. Relief 
lapped at my ankles. 
I walked out of there. I was alone. I only told my husband and my mum that I’d 
gone to talk to the midwife, that I’d taken my guilt and grief and squeezed it, wrung it 
out, hung it out to dry. I couldn’t quite explain how the grief had been living with me 
like another person, like a shadow or a conjoined twin. I was glad to lay her to rest. 
Friday 
Living at the bottom of the treacle well right now – just the baby and me. Need 
to cocoon myself for a few days after the heart-rending of Thursday. I want to be alone. 
I like the solitariness of this quiet power. Sometimes, I don’t even argue the point when 
I hear something sexist. I just think my resistance. What a concept – thinking 
resistance! I think the very notion would make a lot of feminists wince. It probably 
sounds fearful, timid, and even as if I’m fooling myself. But I like it. In a strange way, 
it’s a radical thing to do. To not necessarily spread the word. Some of my oppressions 
are internal, and that’s how I’d like to deal with them. I don’t deny that there is an 
interaction between my consciousness and a wider social environment, between the 
way I let the little hatreds and unfairnesses settle in my mind and the way those hatreds 
and unfairnesses operate out there. But I do deny that the only way to deal with what Wasley 137 
has sunk into me is with an audience. This is not reality TV. This is not Ricki Lake.
19 I 
am entitled to some privacy. 
Misogyny is not always enforced in a public way, so public resistance is not 
always appropriate. We might change the fact that women are still paid considerably 
less than men for their work by lobbying, public awareness campaigns, changes to laws 
and bringing more just attitudes towards work and child-rearing into employer-
employee relations. But what amendments or public demonstrations can alter a phone 
call from a husband to his wife, late home, demanding to know where she (or his 
dinner) is? Unless the situation is specifically not about gender politics – which is 
possible, if unlikely – the wife is recognizably breaking a sex-rule by staying out late 
and her husband is obviously being oppressive by commanding her presence and work. 
But no prime minister, government authority, boycott, or public demonstration can 
change either fact. The only people who can change that situation are the husband and 
wife themselves. They are doomed to argue it out together, as difficult as that may be 
(usually more difficult than changing a law). Neither is there any law against a man 
telling his female lover, mother, daughter or sister that she is fat and needs to lose 
weight (although it should be illegal). There can only be her personal, individual 
resistance: telling him to fuck off; asserting her right to be happy in whatever body 
shape she is; thinking her resentment, her anger and her self-love. Finding personal 
answers to the seemingly trivial dominations and expectations going on in a woman’s 
daily life puts power in the hands of individual women. The saying, ‘United we stand; 
divided we fall’ is profoundly crippling. Unity is great when you can get it – brilliant 
therapy for the isolation that feeling like a second-class citizen can produce. But one 
woman’s resistance to sex-rules can be just as worthwhile, effective and inspiring (if 
only to herself).  
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Saturday 
If I can sort through these thoughts of being a bad mother, I can give my 
daughter the chance to live with a role model of motherhood that is loving and strong, 
active and valiant. I don’t need to start with an epiphany about the domination of 
women as a group – it is enough for me to say: I will not accept that I am a bad mother 
because I place my child into day care and go to work. I do not have to say, I will not 
accept that women are bad mothers if they place their children into day care and go to 
work. It is not the case that “[f]eminism begins with the recognition that all women, 
because of their gender, suffer injustice and with the refusal to accept that situation.”
20 
The kind of personal struggles and silent rebellions that take place in private do not 
necessarily forget about wider social sex-rules. As far as I’m concerned, the fact that I 
even think the concept ‘I am not a bad mother’ means that I am wriggling about in, and 
messing up, the same sticky web of social expectations that we’re all tangled up in – no 
woman or man lives in a social vacuum, after all. Experience and knowledge happen all 
the time outside of what women are supposed to think about ourselves. My own 
experience and resistance to sex-rules have their origins in both the teachings of strong 
women, and my own self – the self that questions and disrupts everything we are taught 
from the moment of conception. Even if I do not verbalize my resentment or anger; 
even if I don’t apply my situation to other women; even if I don’t go and join a support 
group, doesn’t mean that I naively or unthinkingly accept the negative label of ‘bad 
mother.’ 
To my mind, not-going-public with resistance indicates a number of things. 
Firstly, women are busy. We are trying to cope with the too many tasks thrust on us in 
these enlightened modern times. We work, we clean, we raise children, we comfort and 
soothe, we work as volunteers, we maintain friendships, and we are executive managers 
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of the most complex organization in the world: the household. The result of increased 
women’s rights has been the doubling of women’s workloads. How the misogynists 
must have laughed when they saw us get the right to work in the labour market, and 
noticed that we didn’t get any rights not-to-work at home.
21 And how women must 
have kicked (and must still kick) themselves when they realized that no matter how 
liberated a household, men do not get pregnant for nine months, give birth, and 
breastfeed, creating a definite period of time in which our babies actually need their 
mothers – regardless of the fact that motherhood is unpaid and unrecognised as work. 
Not all or even many women have the time or the energy to make our struggles with 
sex-rules public. Most women need simply to make these struggles manageable for 
ourselves, and a struggle that takes place in private, while not always easy to bear, can 
at least be manageable. Being a feminist under public scrutiny is much more complex 
and exhausting than being a feminist in the privacy of everyday life. 
Belinda tells me she wants to raise Georgia to know in her heart that she can do 
what she wants: 
I’ll bring my child up that way, and if she wants to do anything she can do it, as far as 
I’m concerned – it’s what she wants. If she wants to go drive trucks, she can drive 
trucks…It’s just something that’s so common now. There’s not allowed to be that anti-
feminism anymore…
22 
 
She doesn’t need to make a fuss about raising her daughter to believe in equal 
opportunity. She expects it for herself and for Georgia. Maybe our daughters will avoid 
this crippling struggle against guilt. Maybe they will see the choice to return to work 
after having a child as a fiscal or professional one, rather than one fraught with feelings 
about what will become of the child? Kim says that feminism improves the skills and 
confidence of women in each generation. She thinks that many women in our mother’s 
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generation speak feminism but do not act it out. I asked her if that was hypocritical or 
just survival: 
Maybe a little bit hypocritical, but I don’t think they know how to act any other way. 
It’s not a conscious thought that they think, ‘I’m going to act submissive.’ I just think 
it’s happened for so long, and they’ve seen their mothers do it…Mum’s mum would 
have done it a lot and mum feels as though she’s a feminist because she’s improved 
upon her mum, and we feel like we’ve improved upon our mum, and probably our little 
girls…are going to think that of us as well. And they’ll even look at us and probably 
say we’re hypocritical. It’s just something that happens over time.
23 
 
I’d dearly love to end the long legacy of mother-guilt at me. I think my daughter will do 
better without it. 
Sunday 
Sent out emails looking for Victoria again today. Every so often, I send out a 
few emails to her abandoned addresses, hoping to find her again. 
There was this girl I knew, Victoria, in the women’s collective during my 
undergraduate degree. She was the coolest chick I ever knew. She was cuddly, with a 
gorgeous face and clothes that smelt like fruitcake and roll-your-own ciggies. She had a 
great big hairy bear of a dog. Victoria was adorable – loving and encouraging – but 
tender to the point where she was often in emotional pain. She was so damn prickly if 
you got your politics wrong! She hated half-arsed, flaky politics, and she alienated the 
women in the collective to the point where there were few left to help when I took over 
as Women’s Officer. Victoria taught me a bit about the unexpected joy of fighting my 
own battles. 
When I left the ‘collective,’ I was able to value doing feminism alone properly. 
It was a huge relief to just do my own daily resistance and make my own silent 
decisions for a while. Even now, typing this, I am silent and solitary. I have no idea 
whether it will ever get beyond a few examiners. But I still know it is worth doing. 
I will keep trying to find Victoria. I hope she is okay. 
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Monday 
I went and saw my sister, and asked her about her feminist priorities. She said: 
I’m not saying that’s the same for all women by a long shot, but as long as I’m treated 
with respect and cared for and treated equally and with a lot of love and that kind of 
thing, I feel like my needs as a feminist are being met. And also being listened to. That 
my opinion is valued. You know, and the fact that my husband says things to me like 
‘you make me think about things. I can argue things better at work; I can come out with 
quick things…with your influence.’ And that makes me think, ‘wow, I’ve had an 
impact on a man.’ 
I couldn’t be with a man who didn’t totally respect me and care about me. And 
I can’t understand women who are…And I can’t understand my friends who love their 
husbands, who are wonderful men, but who are more focused on their own needs – 
these men – than they are on their wives’ needs. And who will strive for and attain 
their own goals, whilst their wives are sitting there going, ‘Well, I’m not getting my 
needs met. I’m not getting my goals. I’m not getting what I want to do – he’s been 
doing what he wants to do for a long time, and now it’s my turn, but it’s not 
happening.’ And I just sit there and think, well that sucks. I couldn’t be with that… 
Some of them want to do courses and things. But no, they’ve got to stay home and 
watch the kids ’cause the husband’s out playing basketball. You know, that kind of 
thing. And I could never be like that. And if I was like that, I’d be miserable. 
 
“Do you consider those women feminists?” I asked. 
I think they are, but in different ways from me. Like I said, my feminist needs being 
met have to do with care and respect; their feminist needs might have more to do with 
having their opinions valued or… 
 
The variety of priorities is an interesting point, and may go a way towards 
explaining the difference in forms of activism various women undertake. I don’t mean 
to suggest that issues such as the brutal and legal oppression of women in other 
countries, legislation that disadvantages women here in Australia, and levels of sexual 
assault against women are not important feminist priorities, or that it is okay not to care 
about those things. But I do think it is okay not to mobilise about those things. Factors 
such as lack of time, difficult conditions within a job or a relationship, illness, caring 
for others, limited education, poor access to information about women’s rights issues – 
all of these, or simply the need to comfort oneself – contribute to a shift in ‘feminist 
priorities’ from a focus on the collective suffering of women, to a feminist ideology 
that is based on the immediate (the self, relationships, family and personal economics). 
It might not be the best feminist activism in the world; it might not be the loftiest or Wasley 142 
most altruistic, but it is still feminist activism. 
Tuesday 
Was overdue for a pap smear, so I went and had one today. I read Germaine 
Greer
24 a couple of years ago and felt like a great burden had been lifted from my 
shoulders to see what she said about pap smears – that the incidence of cervical cancer 
has not decreased or become more treatable since the pap smear became a regular 
medical procedure for women. Yay, I thought – no more pap smears! Or at least, not 
regular ones. But since then I’ve read other information and medical studies that 
contradict what Greer said. Now I think I will get the procedure done regularly, 
obediently, although I hate it. I hate the whole experience of vulnerability and 
discomfort, but I will suffer it because I want to be healthy, and I want more children. 
When I went for the pap smear I had before conceiving my daughter, the doctor 
said casually “you will have a little bleeding.” No big deal, I thought. I’ve always bled 
before. “Oh, wait,” she said as I went to sit up. She hastily crammed some paper towels 
beneath me and I saw the blood. Pouring, not dripping. “Jesus!” I said. “Why is there 
so much blood?” “It’s because I used the brush.” 
The brush? The brush? I had mental images of the wire brushes my husband 
uses to clean rust off metal. “Oh!” I said. I never questioned her about that, and it 
bothers me. When I’m due for another one, I will ask the doctor about it. 
Wednesday 
I’ve been reading feminist history today. What an inspiration! The writer 
includes many beautiful, proud moments in her history of feminism, although she 
doesn’t always allow them to be feminism. “If this was feminism,” she says doubtfully 
about the Canadian women of the Great Depression, “it remained on the level of the 
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individual and lacked reference to women as an oppressed social group.”
25 But we need 
to remember that, as Janice Raymond says, “one important measure of feminist 
political power must be defined by how women are able to change the quality of life for 
themselves and other women.”
26 Take this woman,
27 for example: 
I’ve helped outside with anything I lay my hands on, and have milked up to six cows 
when the good man was away or busy. I get help with washing and other housework 
when he is not busy. And I can leave him to do a baking of bread and take care of six 
children when I go anywhere.
28 
 
Such women: 
…faced down relief workers, boycotted businesses, or found ingenious ways ‘to make 
do.’ Since women were paid less than men and thus preferred by some employers, 
many became the breadwinners for their families.
29 
 
Even if these women were merely responding to the Depression “with the same 
determination and inventiveness that people have always summoned in hard times,”
30 
why cannot we, with the benefit of hindsight, name these things ‘feminism?’ It seems 
too easy – almost suspiciously easy – to dismiss the feminist tendencies women 
displayed throughout history. 
Janice Raymond, talking about women’s relationships, says that: 
…history and culture of female friendship are replete with obstacles to Gyn/affection. 
And those obstacles must be named for what they are. In the genealogy of this book, 
however, they are not the final word about female friendship.
31 
 
Just as the history of women is replete with obstacles to feminism, writing the history 
of women is replete with obstacles to using the word ‘feminism.’ Obstacles like 
LeGates’ description above (describing feminist acts as unremarkable, or as garden 
variety ‘determination and inventiveness’). But these obstacles are not the final word 
about feminist history, either. How is it productive to deny that women’s resistant 
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activities fit within the boundaries of feminism? Who are we to claim it wasn’t 
feminism, and who do we serve by saying so? Spender says: 
It is disturbing to recognise that what we today have in common with women of the 
past is our experience of being silenced and interrupted; our experience of becoming a 
member of society in which women have no visible past, no heritage, our experience of 
existing in a void.
32 
 
However, it is not just the lack of visible heritage, but also the lack of a history of our 
resistance that disables and isolates us. Surely there is some way to find a balance 
between historical accuracy and representing feminism throughout history. The two are 
equally important and need not be mutually exclusive. 
Thursday 
Mums’ Group at 11am. Tanya wanted to know about my thesis. I told her about 
accessibility, and women who are unwilling to associate themselves with feminism. 
She said she is a feminist. I started to explain the boundaries thing – the categorising of 
feminism and how it excludes certain practices from being named as feminism. She 
told me how she won’t let men fuss over her. Then baby Arianna fell on her face and it 
took a good ten minutes to settle her down again. 
We went over our birth experiences again. Now the kids are nearly one, I guess 
we’re all thinking about it. When I commiserated with one of them over her stitched 
perineum, she tried the old, “See, you’re not missing out on anything!” line. “Yes, I 
am,” I retorted. “You don’t understand!” She apologised immediately and one of the 
other women stuck up for me, saying that she would feel the same as me if she hadn’t 
had a vaginal birth. 
Sara is worrying about her career. She spent nearly ten years working her way 
up in that company and now they tell her that if she doesn’t come back fulltime, they 
can’t give her the same job level. So she has to make a choice – put her little boy into 
day care and see him only two hours a day, or give up her career. She’s pissed off. “I 
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told my supervisor that I don’t see why I should be penalised for having a baby,” she 
fumed. She’s trying to work something out with her supervisor and she’s going to let us 
know what happens. 
Friday 
Bookstore. Outraged that they’d placed feminist texts in the ‘Self Help’ section! 
Complained to the clerk, telling him that they have a section for ‘Philosophy’ and 
another for ‘Politics,’ so why is feminist writing under ‘Self Help?’ He looked at me 
blankly. Fumed all the way home, thinking of more and more reasons why that is just 
wrong. Okay, I can see how they might place feminism in the Self Help section, but 
why then isn’t the philosophical work of male theorists there too? Why is theory about 
women therapy and theory about people (read: men) philosophy? In the words of 
Catherine of Siena: “ingrates, boors and hirelings...fools, worthy of a thousand 
deaths!”
33 
Saturday 
On the way to dinner last night, Cassie and I sat in the backseat to give the men 
more legroom, but really to catch up for a few moments. Cassie was complaining to me 
about the lack of decent celebrants in Perth. She had been to a wedding and was 
disappointed with the celebrant’s style. “You or I could do it a thousand times better,” 
she said. “I think we should start a company of talented female celebrants,” I agreed. 
“We’d have to suppress our personal views a little,” she mused. “It wouldn’t do to start 
a ceremony with ‘We are gathered here today to celebrate the patriarchal institution of 
marriage…’” 
“What are you two laughing at back there?” her partner asked a few minutes 
later, but we couldn’t even catch our breath to explain the joke. 
Sunday 
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  Mum has asked me to fill in at her work tomorrow. I’ve said yes, although I 
hate the work – sales. My only colleagues are a couple of middle-aged men. They have 
a pornographic calendar hanging up in the kitchen that gives me the horrors every time 
I go in there. In December, I got sick of it and tried to turn it around so it faced the wall 
– to give them the idea. Mick walked in as I was trying unsuccessfully to pin it back up, 
with the gorgeous, shaved Jayde facing the wall. 
“Oh! Are you right?” he asked in amazement. 
I went hot and cold, even though I’ve faced down misogyny many a time before 
that. 
“I’m trying to turn it around,” I declared a little breathlessly. “It offends me.” 
“Oh, does it?” he said, blank surprise in his face. “Take it down,” he said 
generously after a pause, but then he added, “It’s only got a few days to run anyway.” 
I handed it to him silently and went back to my desk upstairs. I felt puzzled and 
dissatisfied as I went. Okay, he’d taken the offending thing down, but on what terms? It 
had occurred to him that he could remove it with little inconvenience, as it was nearly 
the New Year. And he’d never asked why it offended me. Did he think I was prim, or 
religious? He’d already proven to me that he didn’t have a clue about feminism. He 
didn’t even know what feminism was when I’d tried to explain my research to him. 
Oh well, I suppose I got what I wanted, and that made my own life a little easier 
when I went into the kitchen after that. I guess it doesn’t matter this time that I didn’t 
fully gain the point. 
Monday 
Bettina Aptheker writes that the: 
…dailiness of women’s lives structures a different way of knowing and a different way 
of thinking. The process that comes from this way of knowing has to be at the center of 
a women’s politics, and it has to be at the center of a women’s scholarship... The point 
is to integrate ideas about love and healing, about balance and connection, about beauty 
and growing, into our everyday ways of being. We have to believe in the value of our 
own experiences and in the value of our ways of knowing, our ways of doing things. Wasley 147 
We have to wrap ourselves in these ways of knowing, to enact daily ceremonies of 
life.
34 
  
Tuesday 
Had a discussion with Barry today. He talked about Peter wanting his new girlfriend to 
have dinner on the table when he got home, and I said “I think that Peter’s living in the 
dark ages,” or “I think Peter’s got something to learn about being in a relationship” – 
something like that. And Barry said, “Well, yeah, it’s a bit of give and take.” I let that 
go for a moment, but then it occurred to me that he was probably reiterating exactly 
Peter’s sexist point, so I said, “Well, like, I said before, Peter’s living in the past, and 
his ideas on women are a bit archaic.” Now, when I said that, I was also talking about 
Barry’s ideas on women. Whether or not it got through to him is a different matter 
entirely, but at least it was an effort on my part to change his views on women and their 
roles.  
Belinda describes a more equitable scheme of household work in her own 
relationship: 
I suppose it’s the way me and Steve share things. It’s not all mine – my drive is that it’s 
not all my job as a female to do the raising of the child, to do the dishes, to do the 
vacuuming. In our house it’s a shared thing. That’s about as far as I go as in driving the 
feminist side of things. He knows that I’m not going to cook dinner every night of the 
week if I don’t choose to.
35 
 
I find Belinda’s self-deprecatory tone intriguing. Why does she hasten to assure me that 
enforcing an equitable scheme of housework is ‘as far as she goes’ in her feminism? It 
is hard to know whether she is making an implicit reference to the limits her own busy 
life has placed on the kinds of feminism she can engage in, or whether she has 
internalised the ‘rules’ of feminist activism, and is reaffirming her own inferior feminist 
status. These questions lead me to wonder which idea of women’s relationship with 
feminism (and feminist activism) has gained more currency with Western women 
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today: that certain forms of feminism are too time-consuming; or that most of us can 
only aspire to an identity as a feminist. Both are important ideas and both are constantly 
ignored by feminists in discussions of how women engage in feminism and how they 
perceive this engagement. 
Wednesday 
Everyday feminism. It’s almost all totally informal, spontaneous, incomplete, 
interrupted, immediate and temporary. Some days it feels like I have achieved nothing 
lasting, nothing finite. I feel like every discussion I have about feminism – every 
attempt to share my knowledge or benefit from someone else’s – will be curtailed and 
cut short by the stupid trivialities of daily life. Sometimes it feels like the only 
feminism I trade in is the stupid trivialities of daily life! So why is it, at the end of each 
day, that I feel the same way Liz Stanley and Sue Wise do? – “almost every day of my 
life I feel knackered by the fact that I’ve been doing feminism all day long.”
36 
Thoughts of everyday-ness and politics inspired another late night call to 
Michel de Certeau.
37 
Michel: It’s like the ambiguity that subverted from within the Spanish colonizers’ 
“success” in imposing their own culture on the indigenous Indians. Submissive, and 
even consenting to their subjection, the Indians nevertheless often made of the rituals, 
representations and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their 
conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by altering and rejecting them, but by 
using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had no choice 
but to accept.
38 
Me: So, we need not base our politics on the extreme, polar ideas of feminist vs. anti-
feminist – that is, altering and rejecting, or passively complying with, patriarchy. 
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Rather, we can recognise that people are active and knowledgeable users of a system 
that can be unfair and oppressive. And, perhaps women in particular manipulate the 
system… 
Michel: Yes – inferior access to information, financial means, and compensations of all 
kinds elicits an increased deviousness, fantasy, or laughter.
39 People in an inferior 
position use clever tricks, know how to get away with things, and make joyful 
discoveries.
40 
Me: So, this kind of using, or manipulation, of what we’re given is actually about 
making it easier to live in our social worlds?  
Michel: It may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or 
transform themselves in order to survive.
41 It is the art of manipulating ‘commonplaces’ 
and the inevitability of events in such a way as to make them ‘habitable.’
42 
Me: A lot of feminists object to the current system and see any effort to make it more 
habitable as a compromise. One particular problem feminists tend to identify with 
manipulation as a political tactic is that it can disadvantage other women. Things that 
make it easy for some women make it hard for others. For example, using one’s 
‘feminine wiles’ to get something out of a man disadvantages women who aren’t 
‘pretty enough,’ or do not know how to – or cannot bear to – use femininity in this way. 
I take such points, but I also see eliminating ‘dodgy’ tactics from the field of feminism 
as disadvantaging certain women. However, it seems very difficult to explain our 
contemporary social environment in any terms other than total oppression, and just as 
difficult to conceptualise conventional responses to this environment in any terms other 
than total submission to that oppression. 
Michel: Look at it as the equivalent of the rules of meter and rhyme for poets of earlier 
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times: a body of constraints stimulating new discoveries, a set of rules with which 
improvisation plays.
43 
Me: That idea works well for ‘dodgy’ feminist practices, actually. Manipulations such 
as using feminine wiles for gain can be seen as creative, if not always politically pure, 
responses to a social order that insists upon the femininity of women… 
Thursday 
More thoughts about historical feminist activism. This time, religious women. 
  Joan of Arc dressed as a soldier and led an army into battle; Guglielma of Milan 
insisted that her female assistant Manfreda would become pope.
44 Lidwina of 
Schiedham, got her parents to “back away from an unwanted marriage” by fasting.
45 
Feminist historian Carolyn Bynum claims that using religion in this way was clever and 
feminist – that women could “control their bodies and their world”
46 by fasting. 
Another feminist historian argues, “food renunciation seems a long way from 
feminism,”
47 and suggests that it conformed to a cultural model of holiness as women 
aspire to models of beauty or thinness today:
48 
Strange as it may seem, these women were not truly defiant. They were exploiting the 
tradition that assumed female inferiority and equated women with weakness and 
humility. These were the very qualities that made women appropriate channels for the 
divine... [T]he woman who became a prophet underscored her own inferiority rather 
than denying it. Prophecy could thus function as a safety valve that allowed women to 
bypass authority in special situations while reinforcing it at all other times. The idea of 
the female prophet was a subtle form of social control. The more women spoke out, the 
more they supported patriarchal assumptions about their second-class status.
49  
 
What sprang to my mind when I read about these women’s activities was not that they 
were supporting “patriarchal assumptions about women’s second-class status,” as the 
idea of fasting in protest might suggest. Rather, I thought of Luce Irigaray’s idea of 
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exposing sex-rules by mimicking and exaggerating these: “To play with mimesis is 
thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse, without 
allowing herself to be simply reduced to it.”
50 In other words, yes, these women 
exploited their femininity – but manipulating sex-rules in this way shows the great 
resourcefulness of opportunism. And, yes, the unusual spectacle of women as prophets 
may have been a kind of “safety valve” – but the need for a safety valve itself shows 
that women were putting pressure on the sex-rules of the time. And anyway, I don’t 
think the ingenious coping strategies women came up with in everyday life merely 
functioned as a safety valve for women’s oppression. At some point, we should 
acknowledge these activities for their subversiveness, and give such women credit for 
their own resistant activities.
51 Too often, we fail to give historical women credit for 
agency and opportunism, the capacity for autonomy, and sly or brazen appropriations 
of the revolutionary ideals of others.
52 
Friday 
  I have been reading Janice Raymond’s book A Passion for Friends. What a 
book! Reclaiming those inspiring moments of resistance throughout history and 
geography; developing an account of women’s relationships. But one statement 
confounded me: 
Caught in the ‘safety net’ of hetero-relations, women pass on to daughters – daughters 
who become mothers, teachers, counselors, and friends of women – a grab bag of 
survival tactics. Such tactics do not provide the kind of ‘Surviving’ that Gyn/affection 
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provides, ‘not merely in the sense of ‘living on,’ but in the sense of living beyond’ – in 
this case, beyond hetero-relations. These are the survival tactics of women who are still 
the victims of hetero-relations. They give women the capacity to suffer and to endure 
and/or to manipulate their way safely and skilfully through the world that men have 
given them.
53 
 
These words do not sit well with Certeau’s idea of habitability. Instead of seeing the 
“grab bag” of tactics as resourceful and positive, Raymond conceives of it as weak and 
reactionary.
54 
I wonder if Raymond is too hasty to condemn the “grab bag” of survival tactics. 
I wonder what kinds of practices I might find in such a grab bag. Does she mean things 
like mincing and flirting to ‘catch a man?’ Or tactics like the ability to think and 
discuss resistance to misogyny with men, rather than publicly demonstrate or withdraw 
from mixed-sex society? “Survival tactics for hetero-relations” could mean any number 
of things, but to me it suggests negotiating one’s way through one’s relationships with 
men, in the same way that woman-to-woman relationships often require negotiation 
and compromise. Flexibility and concession seem permissible in female relationships, 
but inexcusable in female-male relationships. The troubling thing about including 
negotiation of the system in feminism is that certain tactics of negotiation are – rightly 
– viewed with concern by feminism. And there is no way around this except for each 
individual feminist to analyse and evaluate such tactics in order to assess whether or 
not they are the right tactics for her. 
Some tactics are, after all, contingent, conditional actions. They are not always 
appropriate responses to oppression and suffering, and they frequently act simply as 
short term solutions. The longer term solutions often become available through more 
extended opportunities to reflect upon the problem (such as writing or reading feminist 
theory, which of course is not always accessible to certain women – a problem I discuss 
in the next chapters). In the meantime, the grab-bag can be necessary and useful. For 
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instance, there is another way to view the manipulation Raymond speaks of. Narelle 
says: 
I’m not going to say I don’t exploit being a woman to get things. ’Cause I do, you 
know. But I don’t see that as being anti-feminist. I see being a feminist as being a 
strong woman, who doesn’t put up with crap from men or from society or from ... and 
if that means manipulating others, I don’t have a problem with that myself. 
Me: So, you almost see manipulation of others using your femininity, or your being a 
woman, as a feminist strategy? 
Narelle: I do. I think, why throw out the baby with the bathwater?
55 
 
I can’t say that I feel manipulating people in this way is a good or fair strategy. In fact, 
this kind of manipulation can perpetuate the stereotype of women as calculating and 
manipulative, but the way Narelle describes it certainly opens up the possibility that 
manipulation might be a feminist tactic. After all, women who use manipulation often 
use it knowingly, because it increases their power (if temporarily), decreases their 
suffering, and is a tricky little secret and joke that they share with other women. So, 
while I wouldn’t adopt it as a strategy personally, it is unfair to write it off as an 
‘unfeminist’ activity for all women. The way Narelle frames her comments indicates 
that she herself doesn’t believe manipulation is a particularly positive or long-term 
strategy – but it is a strategy nevertheless. Belinda Rapps claims: 
I’ve been dealing with men…probably since I was fifteen…I’ve proven them wrong 
many a time, that if they can do something, I can do a thing. I mean, strength-wise, 
yeah okay, I don’t get away with being that stronger thing, but if I could lift it, or I 
could do without them, I would. But if I couldn’t, I mean, bat your eyelids and use that 
side of things…and they couldn’t help themselves…It’s all in the mind, basically. I 
work ‘em, basically. They don’t realize, but it’s easy. Easy to work ‘em. That’s why I 
would say that men are the weaker sex. Women are definitely the stronger sex. They 
wouldn’t be able to survive, you never see a man without a woman. It’s the wife that 
drives the man, not the other way around.
56 
 
Rapps combines radical statements about women’s mental/emotional ‘superiority’ with 
a description of how to manipulate men to compensate for female physical inferiority. 
She analyses a problematic situation and comes up with a solution that alleviates 
hardship suffered because she is a woman – which is, therefore (dare I say it?) a 
feminist solution.  
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So, why does Raymond devalue manipulation and endurance as feminist 
tactics? It is because they involve compromise. They involve using the reworking the 
suffering associated with femininity to achieve or maintain some state of habitability. 
In another part of her book, Raymond condemns the “language of ‘distaste’” that: 
…devitalizes the political weight and worth of any resistance movement and 
summarizes that resistance as an individual quirk or as a defect of the resisters’ 
collective character. It trifles with the wilful choice, the political philosophy, and the 
public actions of group movements, and it is consistently applied to women who 
choose to spend their lives with women and are indifferent to men.
57 
 
But isn’t she using this same “language of distaste” to discuss the grab bag tactics? 
Why is Raymond allowed to “trifle with” the “wilful choice” and “political 
philosophy” of women who choose manipulation and negotiation of heterosexual 
relationships as feminist tactics? 
Saturday 
I wore my under-wire bra yesterday to go out. Today my boobs are all lumpy 
with blocked milk ducts. Wore a maternity bra today, even though I was wearing a 
stretch shirt and it made my boobs look droopy. I don’t want those painful lumps again. 
I wear that bloody under-wire every so often, and every time, I learn that lesson over 
again. 
On a brighter note, Sara from Mums’ Group worked things out with her old 
workplace. She worked it through with her supervisor. They’ve given her three years 
parental leave from now and then she can go back to work at her current professional 
level. It makes things easier in a way, although she still has to contend with the choice 
the economy/society tends to force upon women when that time comes. As she said, to 
go back to her current job, she would need to travel nearly an hour each way to work, 
in addition to working fulltime. There is no opportunity at that level to work part time 
or closer to home. So the choice would be between working those hours, seeing her 
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boys only a couple of hours per day, plus childcare expenses; or dropping down in both 
professional level and salary in order to work shorter hours and locally. Nice choice, 
eh? And they call this equality. 
Sunday 
Phone call to my sister: 
Me: If your husband’s giving you a hard time, you turn around; you might use the 
whole feminism thing as your defence, or you might just say, “Get fucked.” And either 
way, I think it’s still feminist. I don’t think you necessarily have to call up the politics 
to be political. 
Her: Well, any time you can tell your husband to get fucked and not get a beating for 
being a shrew, I think yeah we’re living in feminist times in this country.
58  
This snippet calls Certeau’s work to mind again. Although Certeau doesn’t 
devote much discussion to people’s intentions, possibly because of his commitment to a 
constructivist (not individualist) analysis, I think intentions are an important factor in 
representations of feminist activism. I see the different instances of messing with the 
system Certeau describes as variously deliberately, covertly, or accidentally political. 
And I see feminist activism in the same way. Sometimes we intend and achieve a 
political act. Sometimes we intend a political act, but the form of activism we choose 
doesn’t reveal this intention. And sometimes something we do or say becomes political 
only upon analysis. 
Monday 
I’ve reached a conclusion about historians of feminism: many of them don’t 
seem to want to admit that there was such a thing as feminism through history! It is not 
as though work on how to write decent feminist history hasn’t been done. As early as 
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1976 – nearly thirty years ago – Gordon, et al. were already analysing the different 
ways historians understood feminist and women’s history, claiming that historians’: 
…categories and periodization have been masculine by definition, for they have 
defined significance primarily by power, influence, and visible activity in the world of 
political and economic affairs.
59 
 
Gordon, et al. describe the way historians effaced the everyday resistances of women’s 
lives by conforming to the model of historiography that uses an “organizational 
perspective,” focusing on “thought and activities of women in public life”
60 above that 
of women in private life. Editors Hartman and Banner, in 1974, say of the contributors 
to Clio’s Consciousness Raised, that: 
Some other studies propose that assumptions about women’s power have been wrongly 
confined to male norms and require drastic revision. Analyzing the situation of women 
in Victorian America, Daniel Smith challenges current notions of a dichotomy between 
the supposedly powerless, static roles of woman-in-the-home, and that of the public 
woman who engages in activist movements for reform and liberation. He provides 
evidence that married women in the late Victorian period moved toward greater 
autonomy and improvement of their condition in the home in a development which can 
be fairly labelled ‘domestic feminism.’
61 
 
Clearly, work on how to produce a fair and faithful account of historical feminism 
which included a vital understanding of the dailiness of women’s lives has been going 
on for some time. 
However, ten years later, in 1985, Jane Rendall still found it appropriate to 
concentrate: 
…less on the careers of individual women … and more on the historical context which 
allowed some, often very few, women to come together and assert in their lives and in 
their actions the values of self-determination and autonomy.
62 
 
Rendall’s chapter titles include: “The Enlightenment and the Nature of Women,” 
“Feminism and Republicanism: ‘Republican Motherhood,’” and “Evangelicalism and 
the Power of Women.” These show how it is possible to diminish feminism by 
associating it ad infinitum with other forms of social change of its time. Of course, I 
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don’t take issue with a historian providing a proper historical context for the feminist 
activities of women; but to focus more on the context than on the activities themselves 
seems to me to be swaying the issue to the other extreme of historical inaccuracy. It 
shows a fear of presentism (the analysis of historical activities using contemporary 
terms) that overrides the urge to share with women a meaningful history of feminism. 
Gordon, et al. cite historian of American women, William Chafe, as another example of 
the ‘writing off’ of feminism to parallel movements and reformations: 
[Chafe claims that] changing employment patterns and a greater acceptance of women 
in the workforce, rather than feminist arguments,…were responsible for altering 
women’s role. In addition, Chafe provides a detailed chronicle of legal, political, and 
economic developments which have affected women in recent American history.
63 
 
I mean, think about it. In the past decade, there has been a resurgence of women’s 
traditional religions, like goddess worship and Wicca. However, I wouldn’t presume to 
suggest that a 17 year old girl stands up for herself in the face of sexual harassment 
because of the popularity of books on witchcraft and spells. I don’t credit the 
resurgence of women’s religion with young women’s feminist activities. Not many 
people would. Movements and revolutions certainly intersect and feed off one another, 
but sometimes they almost completely pass each other by, even though they exist at the 
same moment in history. Patterns do not explain all human behaviour. Sometimes using 
these patterns to describe human behaviour goes further towards constricting than 
explaining it. In fact, in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s theory of ordinary language, 
Certeau claims that: 
He would reject even historiography because, by separating a past from the present, it 
privileges in effect a proper and productive place from which it claims to “command a 
clear view” of linguistic facts (or “documents”)…
64 
 
In other words, the historiographical obsession with presentism is plagued with the 
danger of mistakenly assuming that we have a greater level of objectivity when we look 
back and describe, categorise and name historical events. Neither presentism nor its 
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opposite (whatever that may be) gives us a true or ‘pure’ view of history. 
Another example of writing feminism out of history can be found in the story of 
the Kwangtung Marriage Resisters: 
 
Long ago, I did feminism in this way: I chose not to marry in my hometown of 
Kwangtung, China.
65 That was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some of 
my sworn sisters were made to marry, but refused to consummate the marriage. The 
world sat on us and tried to squash our little bones into a mould we refused to fit: wife, 
mother, shit-cleaner, punching bag. Somehow, I kept my bones hard enough to hold 
out, and eventually the world left me to do what I wanted. I’m not suggesting it left me 
in peace. There were the rants, beatings, tirades, forced marriages, accusations of 
heresy – all the usual clobber when a woman does as she wishes. Sometimes, when it 
was clear we would not succeed in resisting marriage, we would drown ourselves all 
together, lying like logs in the river, hard and triumphant to the last. We had to drug or 
even murder our husbands from time to time. How proud we were! Me and the other 
women who lived with me – the Kwangtung marriage resisters. We went down in 
history. We were so very strong, so respected, so subversive – so feminist.  
 
But historians have traced the Kwangtung marriage resisters back through history like 
guided missiles to name them ‘unfeminist.’ Can you believe it? Even with the benefit 
of hindsight – the ability to say, “that was feminism” – someone was ready to say it 
wasn’t. Marjorie Topley says: 
The antimarriage movement in Kwangtung cannot be regarded as any positive 
progressive movement; the women merely refused to accept sexual relationships with 
men.
66 
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Not a positive and progressive movement? If refusing sexual relationships with men 
was not positive and progressive in a location where/when sexual relationships were 
usually presumed to be a male ‘right,’ and inevitably resulted in numerous, not 
necessarily wanted, babies, then I don’t know what was! It reminds me of Nancy Cott’s 
remark that one criterion by which historians can assess the feminist status of an act is 
by noting: “how a given behaviour opposed, shored up or expressed an intention to 
alter gender hierarchy.”
67 Cott’s comment implies that activities only become feminism 
when the woman who does these activities does them consciously. She declares to the 
world that she is doing them with the purpose of altering gender hierarchy. “I am 
entering public life in order to change the status of women everywhere!” she must 
holler. Then duck for cover from a good stoning. Elisabeth Croll says: 
The anti-marriage associations were an expression of opposition to the traditional 
forces of ‘fate’ but they remained at the level of rejection and furnished a force of 
escapism rather than a significant force for change.
68 
 
But I prefer Janice Raymond’s discussion about tracing genealogies of feminism. I 
hope that, particularly in the contemporary moment, women will use historical 
feminism as inspirational examples. Calling historical resistance feminism: 
…is not simply the restoration of the past or the elevation of old matter into new 
creation. One cannot, for example, see the marriage resisters or nuns as models to be 
lived by, but rather as instructive examples for the forms that female friendship [that is, 
feminism] can take.
69 
 
A more useful way to contextualize historical feminism would be to: 
…reflect current concerns about women and women’s roles. Such a preoccupation is 
‘presentist’ in the best sense, since it involves a rigorous and empathetic effort to 
understand the historical roots of issues that especially touch women today.
70 
 
It is amazing and often depressing to see how little has changed between the traditional, 
sometimes called ‘masculine’ ways of writing history and an era of prolific feminist 
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theory in which women have been writing about more progressive ways to represent 
our history for some decades. 
Tuesday 
It may seem, as many have maintained, that feminism will never have any chance of 
success unless it becomes a mass movement, unless feminists find common ground 
with women who represent the mainstream. But that is precisely when feminism ceases 
to be feminism, when it fails to offer a radical alternative to the status quo.
71 
  
So, should women who identify as feminists decline to find common ground with 
“mainstream” women? This idea of a “status quo” misses a lot about elite versus 
popular culture. Popular strategies for the everyday world, like refusing the common 
‘sexpectations’ of women, are one point where feminists might find common ground 
with other women. And meeting on this common ground would certainly be one way to 
offer a “radical alternative” to the feminist status quo (which can perpetuate the view 
that feminist battles are fought exclusively in demonstrations or women’s studies 
journals). Protecting a status quo that keeps various women out of feminism does little 
to bring about social change in any progressive way. Nor does it account for the way 
feminism has succeeded in becoming a part of daily life. Alison Jacques reminds us 
that the “transformation from underground to mainstream is complex, and relationships 
with mass media and commerce may be scene-specific.”
72 And yet we make 
generalizations about the depoliticization of feminism immediately it enters mainstream 
culture. 
I used to lead a group of Girl Guides, trying to instil in them each week new 
skills and a sense of confidence. Yes, these activities were double-barrelled – a critic 
could claim that I shrank from declaring my feminism to my colleagues and the girls’ 
parents; that I was scared of battle; that I didn’t want to deal with men in an intellectual 
context; that Guides is a regressive organisation which teaches placid good-girl 
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behaviour and selflessness. All sometimes, and for some people, true – but not the way 
I was doing it. I was building the girls’ self-esteem, teaching assertiveness skills, and 
introducing them to adventure. It is worthwhile to look more deeply at activities that 
seem to maintain the status quo – sometimes we will get a surprise. As Carolyn 
Steedman says: 
Personal interpretations of past time – the stories that people tell themselves in order to 
explain how they got to the place they currently inhabit – are often in deep and 
ambiguous conflict with the official interpretative devices of a culture.
73 
 
And the stories we tell ourselves about how to deal with the place we currently inhabit 
are often in “deep and ambiguous conflict” with the official stories of a culture. In Los 
Angeles, a cheerleading squad named Radical Teen Cheer chant: “We’re teens, we’re 
cute, we’re radical to boot!”
74 They twirl pom-poms and create anti-rape chants. 
Duncan Campbell writes that “other radical teams – among them the Dirty Southern 
Belles in Memphis and the Rocky Mountain Rebels in Colorado – are springing up… 
shaking pom-poms for causes from gay and lesbian rights to foreign policy.”
75 
However, the cute, sexy outfits and false smiles might appear to some as co-opted and 
much less than radical. The feminist rhetoric of ‘suspect’ and ‘recuperated’ prevents the 
deeper look at outside forms of resistance. 
Wednesday 
I was talking to Kerry today about capability and being a woman. She was 
telling me about the importance of actively seeking out the people who will make 
things easier for her – people who will show her respect and listen to her when she tells 
them what she wants. She said: 
For me, because I’m a single parent, and particularly because I have cerebral palsy, 
people just get totally shocked to think that I would be capable of running my own 
household and bringing up three children – without a man! (laughing) To pick up all 
the pieces! And that is something that continually amazes me, and it’s something I 
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need to be aware of, because as much as I am independent and feminist, I do enjoy the 
company of men and I don’t want to spend the rest of my life without a partner. So I’m 
careful not to be incredibly defensive when people question me about my ability to 
manage life without the aid of a man…[if I do that, I might] miss opportunities and end 
up spending my life alone. 
It doesn’t mean I don’t want the person to do anything for me – it means I want to be in 
a total partnership, and I will be in a total partnership. 
I will not have decisions regarding my life…or my recreation, or my work, taken out of 
my hands. 
Our community likes to define our roles, and if I go to a mechanic to get the car 
serviced, they won’t give me the same sort of information as they would give a man… 
When you show assertiveness in your roles, people actually like that and they respect 
that. There are lots of everyday occurrences where women have to justify [assert] their 
intelligence… 
Frustration to me is when people assume you’re a woman so you couldn’t possibly take 
on a certain task…my frustration is because of my disability because…people assume I 
couldn’t possibly do half of the half of the things I couldn’t possibly do because I’m a 
woman! 
They’ll tell you what’s going to be wonderful for you, but as a woman and particularly 
as one with a disability, I’m the only one that can tell you what I need and what would 
be good…I have to be very, very cluey [when shopping for service providers]. 
[When I was shopping for a car, one dealer] tried to sell me a ‘lovely little lady’s car.’
76 
 
I see using this kind of active awareness when making decisions as a significant 
feminist practice. It is an awareness systems of patriarchy and capitalism do not expect 
or desire. Patriarchy does not expect women to seek equality, shared tasks, and “total 
partnership” when searching for a marriage partner. Consumer capitalism does not 
expect women to resist the stereotyped desires thrust upon them by marketing 
campaigns. So developing the cluey-ness Kerry describes is a way of resisting being 
subsumed into such systems in the way the concept of ‘false consciousness’ implies 
women often are. The immeasurability of this awareness means that it is a feminist 
practice that feminists can easily forget, ignore and obscure. 
Thursday 
  It’s funny how the activities of our mothers both confound and impress us. My 
sister Kim says: “even though [mum’s partner is] not working and mum is, he still 
takes a dominating [role]…treats mum like a little woman, and she allows herself to do 
that.”
77 But we both know that our mother gets almost frighteningly angry over women 
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and men’s disproportionate pay rates, and issues of corporate discrimination. Belinda 
describes how: 
…ten years ago you would never have got [my mum] on the radio, talking. But it’s 
something that she decided that she could do, and if she put her mind to it, she could do 
it. So, now she’s okay doing it. It’s not something that she loves to do, because she’s a 
shy person, but it’s not stopped her.
78 
 
Kerry talks about how “after having gone through lots of experiences with escaping 
domestic violence” and “becoming really aware of myself and…other women” she 
found herself worrying about her mother. While her parents had been happy together, 
Kerry saw the death of her father as a chance for her mother to break out of the 
‘repressed’ role she had assumed: 
I saw this second chance for her to break out and do something remarkable, and I was 
really worried when she didn’t do it! And I was really sad when she didn’t do it. I have 
to admit that I was sometimes quite angry. And when she found her new partner, and 
suddenly I saw her still making sure she was home at five o’clock…and I felt angry 
about that…‘you don’t need to be doing these things!’…But that’s what my mother 
actually likes to do! She likes to be this person, and she’s safe and secure and happy, 
and looks after all her – takes an interest in her – children and her grandchildren, and 
that is enough for her. And that’s fine.
79 
 
It’s difficult to get past the idea of false consciousness. Sometimes it’s more 
empowering both to ourselves and to other women to take a step back and understand 
that these women have made informed choices about their lives. Some choices may 
appear to be easier than others, but in fact, the easy choices can be harder than we 
know. What appear to be easy choices – choices that involve maintaining traditional 
feminine roles and behaviour – can be choices made in the name of actively liking men, 
actively enjoying traditionally feminine practices, and the active desire to make a 
traditional heterosexual relationship work. For some women, living alone, doing as one 
pleases, going and coming unchecked, can be the easy way out. This is a tough 
principle to run with as a feminist. We are so used to assuming that our mothers make 
choices based on their limited skills, knowledge and confidence – or, at worst, pure 
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habit. Sometimes, we pay lip service to accepting women’s choices (despite our own 
aversion to such choices), but only rarely do we actually make an effort to understand 
and value what lies behind their ‘unfeminist’ choices.  
Of course, unfeminist choices do happen. And although ‘feminist’ and 
‘unfeminist’ are relative terms, I think we can generally identify the moments when 
choices are genuinely unfeminist. As usual, the key is reflection and conversation. The 
rationale for a decision can sometimes surprise us. It may force a new understanding of 
women’s autonomy, of the education they have gained (from friends, sisters, and quiet 
phone calls) of their legal and fiscal rights, of their personal preference for male 
company and chivalry, and of their practiced and committed approach to relationships. 
As feminists, we can be guilty of assuming too much about generational habits. We 
often read behaviours through the therapeutic lens that a culture of medicalisation, and 
television talk shows hosted by psychologists can hardly help but use. Moreover, we 
tend to see feminist and political consciousness as directly proportionate with the 
passing of time: we perceive younger generations as somehow so much ‘more feminist’ 
than older generations of women.
80 We could show so much more respect (not to 
mention critical reflexivity), however, by giving our mothers the benefit of the doubt 
when they insist, as they frequently do, that they have made a knowledgeable choice to 
live as they do. 
Conclusion: the Spectrum of Activism 
  My point is not so much that the finite list of specific practices recounted above 
also count as feminism, but that there are a whole host of other activities out there – 
activities that do not conform to conventions of feminist activism – which we need to 
consider as part of a feminist activism spectrum. These other activities are Certeau’s 
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“tactics.”
81 One example of such tactical resistance is in the Girl Guide leadership 
experience I described in this chapter’s ‘diary.’ There is little room for a reading of Girl 
Guide leadership as strategic (organised feminist) resistance: the organisation has its 
origins in being a mere afterthought of the Boy Scouts, and it originally taught girls the 
principles of obedience, usefulness and servitude to God, home and country. Girl 
Guides has not been viewed as a feminist organisation for some time, and in that sense, 
it does not constitute the kind of formal resistance that clears space for feminist 
perspectives in hegemonic culture. Recent pushes in the organisation in Australia to 
foster an ethos of confidence-building in girls and young women (through, for instance, 
adventurous activities) come closer to being strategic resistance.  
However, my (and many other leaders’) tactical use of the Girl Guides structure 
to make a space for girls to enjoy exclusively female company, to be safe from the male 
gaze and masculine-identified behaviours, and to revalue girldom, is a form of 
resistance which is simultaneously outside the hegemonic perception of women, 
outside organised feminist activism, and outside the organisation’s mission statement. 
In other words, I have manipulated an existing structure, and in doing so, I have 
resisted cultural control. Now you may ask if writing about these tactics in a scholarly 
thesis, or arguing for their recognition as feminist activism, brings them back into the 
realm of Certeau’s strategic. I don’t believe these do – not entirely, anyway. I see 
Certeau’s work as a way of conceptualising the broad spectrum of activity that 
constitutes feminist activism – a conceptualisation that includes both formal and 
everyday ways of doing feminism or resisting patriarchy. I can see how some tactics 
feed into feminist strategies, but tactics are not always a precursor of strategy. I would 
not want to view the useful categories of tactics and strategy in a sequential or 
hierarchical way; rather, these are descriptive terms for the often messy split between 
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official and unofficial feminist activism.  
Because feminism is in ‘real life’ and real life is in feminism. Some feminist 
activism is hard slog, and some of it is fun and silly. Conventionally, the background 
for feminist activism involves organisation and effort. In addition, we ought to allow 
circumstance and personal choice to figure as a background of feminist activism when 
we evaluate the feminism-or-not of any practice. Instead of discussing unconventional 
activism using terms like ‘sell-out,’ ‘recuperated,’ ‘institutionalised,’ ‘unoriginal,’ 
‘incidental’ and ‘selfish,’ we could start to think in terms of women “doing a limited 
best with what life handed out to them: trying to have a modestly good time.”
82 
However, whenever feminism feels like a good time, we immediately suspect it of 
being not-real-feminism. 
We also tend to assume that women are reluctant to identify with the term 
‘feminist’ because they do not want to associate themselves with radical or anti-man 
practices. I suggest that women often choose not to identify with feminism because 
they are too familiar with the limited definition of feminist activism, which says ‘only 
this type of practice counts as feminist activism.’ I suspect that many women genuinely 
believe that they are not feminists because they don’t do the kinds of feminism 
proscribed as activism. Perhaps, if women were allowed to feel that their resistant 
practices were indeed feminist practices, despite their private, transient, or 
compromised nature, then women might be more willing to identify with a wider 
feminist movement.
83 This would involve engaging Ang’s redefinition of feminism as a 
“limited political home” instead of a political “destination” wherein women arrive and 
stay.
84 We would need to characterize feminism as something we can do, rather than 
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something we must always be. This means feminists must relinquish some control; 
adjust some of our judgements; and be more flexible when using external criteria for 
assessing the feminist-or-not of a practice. 
In this chapter, I outlined some of the invisible feminist activism that happens 
every day. At times, this activism crossed over into the realm of theory. It involved 
written critique, letters and chats, emails and anecdotes (as opposed to, or in addition 
to, acts of resistance). The line between theory and activism is very unstable. For the 
sake of being coherent (as I stated in the Introduction), I have marked this line out more 
clearly than it exists in real life, even while I cross back and forth over it. In other 
words, I have made an often arbitrary, artificial, and misleading distinction between 
feminist activism and theory. Right now, I would like to make the transition from one 
elusive ‘field’ to another – namely, from activism into theory. As in the limiting of 
feminist activism, we tend to assume that only certain kinds of conventions (this time, 
linguistic conventions) count as feminist theory. In the next section of this thesis, I 
explain exactly what counts as feminist theory, and explore some of the other ways of 
using language that we can include in a more effective definition of feminist theory.Wasley 168 
Part 2 
Feminist Theory 
Definitions of terms 
Feminism: resistance to the suffering of women. 
Theory:  
1. a logical group of statements used as principles to explain something… 2. a 
suggested explanation not yet established as fact… 3. that part of a science or art which 
deals with principles and methods rather than with practices. 4. opinion.
1 
 
Or, put simply: ideas, explanations and opinions on a subject. 
Feminist theory: ideas, explanations and opinions that work from the resistance to 
women’s suffering. 
What Limits? 
Described thus, it is possible to claim that feminist theory comes in a great 
variety of forms. Academic writing, of course, but also popular writing (novels, poetry, 
self-help books), other communications genres (such as Internet sites, television and 
CDs), songs, personal journals, classroom discussions, and conversations. However, 
these various ways of doing feminist theory are not what we are talking about when we 
use the words ‘feminist theory’ in common parlance. Rather, we are usually talking 
about scholarly works – properly researched, professionally presented academic writing 
about feminism. This is big-F Feminist, big-T Theory. For all its capitalization, I 
embrace and value this form of feminist theory. My point here is not that official 
feminist theory is ‘less feminist’ – or more masculine – because it is more widely 
accepted as feminist theory than other forms of feminist ideology. Rather, the point is 
that there are other kinds of feminist theory that don’t get a hearing as valid feminist 
theory. In the following two chapters, I discuss what makes some theory count as ‘real’ 
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feminist theory, and others not. In addition, I ask that we open up our limited definition 
of feminist theory to include the great variety of non-scholarly works women produce 
in the name of feminism. 
I also ask that we become more conscious of the way we, as academic 
feminists, write feminist theory. I suggest a review of the writing practices of academic 
feminist theorists. In asking for such a review, I do not aim to devalue scholarly 
feminist theory, or relegate it to the status of misguided and inferior feminism. 
However, I do request that these writers look critically at their own work with a view 
to: 
•  widening the scope of their reference material; 
•  using more accessible language (that is, avoiding jargon and wordiness); 
•  targeting broad audiences whenever possible; 
•  concerning themselves less with rhetorical fashions or trends when it comes 
to using personal experience, research methods (such as empirical scientific 
experimentation), and metaphysical positions (such as essentialism); and, 
•  overcoming the fear of co-option (for instance, the fear of one’s work 
becoming ‘mainstream’). 
I appreciate that these practices are not applicable to every feminist’s work, but I 
suggest that when a feminist writer produces work that does not embrace these 
practices, she should do so advisedly. As Stanley and Wise put it: “All feminists who 
are involved in writing and research should be more adventurous, more daring, and less 
concerned with being respectable – and publishable.”
2 I ask these things because, to a 
certain extent, the responsibility to remove the limitations of feminist theory rests 
largely with academic feminist theorists. It is this group, after all, that ‘owns’ feminist 
theory right now – so it is this group that can change the terms of ownership to include 
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a broader group of women. 
In this part of my thesis, you will need to remain aware of my use of the term 
‘feminist theory’ to get the best sense of what I am saying. When I discuss scholarly 
works, I again often use descriptors such as ‘official’ and ‘real’ feminist theory. (I am, 
as always, using these terms in a conscious manner.) I aim for a conceptualisation of 
feminist theory that includes a much wider range of ideas, explanations and opinions 
based on resistance to the suffering of women – in many different forms. Scholarly 
theory makes up part of this spectrum. My argument is that feminist theory must 
conform to certain criteria in order to count as ‘official’ feminist theory. I explore these 
criteria in detail in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 uses the gimmick of the seven deadly 
(feminist/scholarly) sins, firstly, to show how important the rules of writing feminist 
theory are (hence the biblical reference) and, secondly, to provide examples of feminist 
theory that do not conform to these rules.  
Before I begin, I wish to present a mocked-up ‘go-around’ – an activity that 
women frequently use in consciousness-raising groups, and one that teachers also use 
in the classroom from time to time.
3 Here I have collected quotations that make a 
powerful case against the hierarchical and exclusionary effect of limiting feminist 
theory. Imagine the topic of the go-around is: ‘Feminist theory: what counts?’ 
Go-Around 
Diane: Working class women’s own analyses of their situation are frequently seen as 
anecdotal or merely descriptive. I suggest this is a consequence of academic hierarchies 
of knowledge which always give primacy to distanced highly theorised overviews.
4 
Julie: It’s important the emotional side of it gets a hearing as well. Men tend to look at 
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it in black and white.
5 
Ailbhe: I’m not questioning feminism’s/feminists’ need for theory: we must strive to 
comprehend the world and our experiences. The problem is that not all theoretical work 
is recognised or valued as such – hierarchies again.
6 
Kay: If part of our role as academic feminists is to challenge conventions which 
exclude and marginalise less powerful groups, how can we hope to do this if we 
continue to ‘play by the rules’?
7 
Barbara: Theory has become a commodity because that helps determine whether we 
are hired or promoted in academic institutions – worse, whether we are heard at all.
8 
Bob: Disciplines…give as well as withhold power, by controlling who may and may 
not speak on a topic, what must or must not be said, and how a topic must be spoken of 
for knowledge about it to count.
9 
Andrea: People have got to take the economics of the publishing industry very 
seriously and understand that very few writers will survive who do not write according 
to the demands of the marketplace, by which I mean essentially the demands of turning 
out books that you can consume as passively as a television show.
10 
Kim: The general public needs to be more aware of what [feminism is] about. They 
should have some ad on TV or something like that, something that makes a joke about 
how it’s not just burning bras. There needs to be more public awareness of it…
11 
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Meta: Theory becomes more and more unintelligible and esoteric: while theorists 
deconstruct the female body, reproductive rights are being chipped away.
12 
Narelle: [In academic feminist theory,] there’s bound to be some areas where you can 
bring up a little bit [of personal information]…or just have the voices of real women in 
there, saying things about what they think.
13 
Ailbhe: The accusation of incomprehensibility is usually treated with contempt, as old 
hat, impossibly naïve, absolutely from another level of being. But it ought not to be. If 
feminist theorists cannot or will not make ourselves understood to women who resist 
and revolt in other settings, what is the point of making theory?
14 Anger gets the better 
or the worse of me: anger with a certain kind of feminist theory-making – academic, 
Anglophone, assured, plugged in to powerful resource points most of us have never 
even heard of. And apolitical, utterly abstracted from the ‘issues and priorities’ of the 
Women’s Movement anywhere.
15 
Kathleen: Maybe you still don’t understand? Just as well. These theorists like to think 
of theory as too complicated for ordinary folks. Deconstruction theories properly float 
only in the rarefied atmosphere of the ivory tower…Or you understand but don’t agree? 
Clearly you’re a radical feminist stubbornly persisting with the ‘wrong analysis.’
16 
Livi: We need structures and networks which will allow women from all classes of 
society the possibility of meeting and communicating. Perhaps most of all, feminists 
need to listen and this requires a certain amount of humility – to women who may not 
want or need what feminism has been able to offer them so far.
17 
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Maggie: The solution to oppression is not to devalue theory but to revalue, to rename 
what we call theory to  the theoretical status of feminist thinking.
18
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Chapter 4 
What Counts as Feminist Theory? 
In matters of grave importance, style, not sincerity, is the vital thing. 
– Gwendolyn Fairfax
1 
 
In this chapter, I discuss canonical feminist theory, and what exactly makes such work 
count as ‘real’ feminist theory. Under the broad subjects of ‘context’ and ‘style,’ I 
explore the various unspoken rules for scholarliness that operate when we write 
feminist theory. In this exploration, I examine some of the history of such rules, 
existing discussion of the rules, and the reasons why these rules direct the production of 
feminist theory. Finally, I discuss the link between a hierarchy of feminist theory and a 
perception of irreconcilable difference between lived experience and ‘the abstract.’ In 
doing so, I call feminist theorists to account for maintaining a system that excludes 
great numbers of women from claiming ownership of feminist theory. 
 
Who is Feminist Theory for, Anyway? 
Conversation with Liz Stanley and Sue Wise
2 
 
Me: What do you think about the value of canonical feminist theory for feminism?  
Liz and Sue: A lot of writing is so jargon-ridden, mystificatory and elitist in its content 
and expression that it is difficult to believe that it is produced by feminists at all.
3 
Me: Is it fair to say that? I mean, obviously these writers are feminists, because they 
care about women and the quality of women’s lives. The problem is not so much 
whether or not these women are feminists, but how they communicate their feminist 
messages. 
Liz and Sue: Well, we see existing ‘difficult’ or ‘complex’ (more often than not read 
‘badly written’) social-sciences texts as examples which feminists really shouldn’t try 
to emulate. We don’t want the act of reading to be an intellectual assault course which 
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only the especially athletic can get through.
4 After all, feminism appeals because it 
means something – it touches deeply felt needs, feelings and emotions. It makes a 
direct, emotional and personal appeal, or it means very little except as an intellectual 
exercise.
5 
Me: So, it’s not simply a stylistic change we need to achieve? 
Liz and Sue: Certainly not. What we call ‘pretend-naturalism,’ for instance (one-off, 
revised accounts which deal with the idiosyncracies, quirks and problems of research), 
has become popular as a more gossipy, lighter and less ‘academic’ way of wringing yet 
one more publishable paper out of research gone by.
6 
Me: In saying that, aren’t you laying down more laws about what women need to do 
and how we need to write in order to attain the title of ‘feminist?’ 
Liz and Sue: It is rather that we view this development with some dismay, and see it as 
a cop-out from attempting to do and write about research in ways which try to combine 
feminist theory and practice more closely.
7 
Me: So how can one combine theory and practice in a productive way? 
Liz and Sue: By recognizing that we are all of us ‘theoreticians’ because we all of us 
use our values and beliefs to interpret and so construct the social world.
8 
Me: And the ‘practice’ you mentioned? Where does that come in? 
Liz and Sue: We need a woman’s language, a language of experience. And this must 
necessarily come from our exploration of the personal, the everyday, and what we 
experience – women’s lived experience.
9 Women have had the power of ‘naming’ our 
experience of the world taken from us. These experiences have been named for us by 
men; but men have used the ‘language of theory’ not the ‘language of experience.’ Our 
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experience has been named by men, but not even in a language derived from their 
experience. Even this is too direct and too personal. And so it is removed from 
experience altogether by being cast in abstract and theoretical terms.
10 
 
Liz Stanley and Sue Wise’s discussion of the expressive, stylistic and exclusive 
features of feminist theory began in 1983 in Breaking Out and continues to be a topic 
of some consternation and much disagreement among feminists today. In this chapter, I 
wish to add to the conversation on scholarly feminist theory. By ‘scholarly feminist 
theory,’ I mean those works of feminist theory that are part of a scholarly canon, and to 
which other feminist academics often refer. Those we know as feminist theorists 
(women who have been researching feminist issues as a career for some time) usually 
write such works. In other words, women who are not doing academic work, feminist 
or otherwise, do not write them. I wish to make a shift away from this perspective, and 
explore what some feminist theorists such as Stanley and Wise have already noted: 
namely, that non-academic women also theorise. The concept of ‘unofficial,’ ‘non-
scholarly’ feminist theory that I want to touch on in this chapter (and investigate more 
carefully in the next) suggests that many  women theorise about gender, and that most 
women can actually put together or analyse feminist ideas about gender.  
So, why is it that only a handful of women read scholarly feminist theory? Of 
course, there are various reasons why this happens,
11 but it seems that most of the 
reasons that gain credence in feminist academic work involve assumptions about the 
lack of interest or ability of everyday feminists, about women’s general resistance to 
anything that goes by the name ‘feminist,’ and about activists’ condemnation of theory 
as pointless and ineffective. However, I want to investigate the fact that there are tight 
guidelines that dictate what counts as official feminist theory as a reason why few 
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women read academic feminist theory. These guidelines actually ensure that, even 
when we read, write, chat about, or even show an interest in, feminist ideas, we do not 
believe we are producing feminist theory unless it conforms to a certain set of criteria. 
These criteria consist of scholarly conventions: specifically, conventions of scholarly 
context and scholarly style. In this chapter, I will explore exactly what constitutes a 
scholarly context and style, and how we know that such conventions make a text count 
as feminist theory. I also explore some reasons why feminists choose conventional 
ways of producing feminist theory: that is, I will try to establish exactly what is at stake 
when feminists make the decision to write one way or another. Firstly, however, I 
explore a bit of the history of scholarly conventions as they relate to feminist theory.  
During what is now called the second wave of feminism in the 1960s and 
1970s, feminists worked hard to establish feminist ideas and the study of women’s 
issues in educational institutions. By the early 1980s, these women had successfully 
implemented Women’s Studies programs or courses in a number of universities in the 
Western world.
12 The burgeoning of scholarly feminist theory, and its accompanying 
ream of specialised concepts expressed as jargon, was an indicator in the academy that 
feminism had come of age as a serious academic discipline. Many feminists
13 saw these 
changes as a triumph of the women’s movement, and rejoiced that women would now 
have the opportunity to study their own experiences and create their own body of work. 
However, during the 1980s, a number of feminists raised the concern that certain 
women were excluded from feminism as it manifested in organised forms (Women’s 
Studies programs, feminist theory, etc). The excluded women that feminists wrote 
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about at the time were black women,
14 lesbians,
15 and working class women.
16 These 
writers called on other feminists from their various positions of privilege to confess that 
their ideas and research might not apply to such women. 
Around this time, a few feminists raised the point about the exclusion from 
feminist theory of women who differ academically. This is the point I am trying to 
emphasise in this chapter. For instance, when Liz Stanley and Sue Wise published 
Breaking Out in 1983, they exposed feminism’s shift away from (supposedly ‘beyond’) 
everyday experience, and towards a discussion of feminism in abstract terms. As 
British feminists, they tended to see this issue through the lens of class differences. 
However, it is relevant that Stanley and Wise protested the idea that an interest in 
everyday experience is the domain of ‘pre-feminist’ women, and just a stepping-stone 
to higher feminist consciousness. They unpicked the ideas of false and feminist 
consciousness, which had been major tenets of early second-wave feminist thought. 
Bonnie Mann also subverted the idea of ‘higher consciousness’ when, in 1985, she used 
Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology with a group of battered women who – horror of horrors – 
didn’t have the kind of problems understanding it everyone expected them to have!
17 In 
fact, these women were annoyed that no one had deigned to recommend such texts to 
them before. The reaction in the group was: “‘Why didn’t we know this?’ ‘How could 
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this knowledge have been kept from us for so long?’”
18 Stanley, Wise and Mann 
challenged the reaction to the growth of a market for scholarly feminist theory – a 
reaction that played to the rules of scholarliness by grounding itself in grand theories, 
adopting the conventions of ‘serious philosophy’ – as well as assuming that non-
academic women wouldn’t understand such works.
19 Feminists like these argued that 
‘false consciousness’ and ‘raised consciousness’ are fictions, and writing in a way that 
plays up or down to these levels of consciousness is elitist. To separate feminism from 
the real world in this way, they argued, is to alienate real world women from feminism. 
However, from here, the concern to include women of difference in feminism 
appears to have shifted. There was a move to deal more specifically with the alienation 
of particular minority groups of women. Feminists began to tie the criticism that 
feminism was elitist up with the idea that feminism was “white and middle class,”
20 and 
linked, therefore, mainly to issues of race and class. The politics of difference, 
theorized by academics such as Chandra Mohanty,
21 Gayatri Spivak
22 and Trinh Minh-
ha,
23 is one of the most important discussions feminism has taken part in since the 
idealistic proposal that feminism should be by, for and about women. Unfortunately, 
the difference issue has not been an easy one to resolve: we tend to write ourselves into 
tangles about ethical representation. It is a rare joy to see an attitude of basic 
confidence and mutual respect when a feminist writes about women of difference. I 
believe that the way many feminist theorists write about difference reflects our struggle 
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to understand differences between feminists. Some feminist theorists deal with women 
of difference with either timidity or apprehension, or by hoping these women will deal 
with themselves. Woodson notes: 
As publishers (finally!) scurry to be a part of the move to represent the myriad cultures 
once absent from mainstream literature, it is not without some skepticism that I peruse 
the masses of books written about people of color by white people. As a black person, 
it is easy to tell who has and who has not been inside “my house.”
24 
 
And many white/middle class feminist theorists share this scepticism, or at least have 
doubts about mainstream feminists’ ability/right to write about women of difference. 
However, positive outcomes have emerged from the difference conversation, and one 
of these is that we tend to recognise positions of privilege and relative disadvantage – 
and we know that we must try to include women of difference in feminism.  
Strangely, in the desire to account for some kinds of differences, like class, 
sexuality and colour, feminists often forget women who differ academically from the 
feminist norm. Often, we attempt to account for non-academic feminists by naming 
them as working class or uneducated women – or even non- and anti-feminists. This 
categorisation fails to account for educated, middle class women who earn a good 
income, and who live their lives according to at least some basic feminist ideals. 
Mainstream academic feminists don’t often make space for non-academic women to 
read their work, unable to credit these feminists with the interest or ability to engage 
with scholarly feminist theory. Often, there is simply no way through the style of 
feminist theory for non-academic feminists. However, if it is feminism’s dearest wish 
to put itself out of business (in the sense that we might realise social change), then to 
exclude any women at all is not good feminist business practice. 
About Theory: Knowledge, Purpose and Power 
The premise of my argument in this chapter is that knowledge is not a static 
block of ideas magically dropped from the heavens in order to instruct us in how to live 
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more feminist lives. Knowledge is tied to its human maker, and that human maker is in 
turn tied to her cultural, economic and historical environment – not to mention the 
‘discursive’ environment in which she produces knowledge (that is, cultural theory, or 
science, or sociology, or popular fiction, etc.). In other words, theory is never produced 
‘free’ of certain influences and constraints. These include assumed audience, 
publication criteria, geographical considerations, the intellectual climate (that is, what 
kinds of theory and subjects are fashionable), and the political environment. All of 
these influences and constraints lead to decisions (conscious or not) the theorist makes 
about how the theory will look, what its purpose will be, and whom it will ultimately be 
for. The theorist decides, then, whether or not to use scholarly or other conventions, 
based on her writing goals and whom she believes will access the theory. Liz Stanley, 
in the introduction to Feminist Praxis, rightly states that we need to take: 
…seriously at an intellectual and analytical level the academic mode of 
production…[to take] seriously the research and writing process within the social 
sciences generally, and within feminist social science in particular.
25 
 
In addition, we need to have an understanding of the reader’s or audience’s role in 
making meaning from knowledge. Ien Ang discusses a variety of conceptualisations of 
“the audience” in her essay “The Nature of the Audience.”
26 One of these is of the mass 
audience with “low taste and intelligence” as passive consumer of knowledge
27; 
another conceptualisation assumes that the audience uses the media (or a text) because 
“doing so will give them some gratifications.”
28 Another theory of audience (and this is 
the one I would subscribe to), “Reception Analysis,” finds what an audience interprets 
or uses or discards from a text an important object of study.
29 Ang also points out the 
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necessity of attending to how the media (and, I would add, other reading material) are 
“integrated into our everyday lives.”
30 The point I am making here is that some theory 
of the audience’s role in making meaning of knowledge is also essential when studying 
the processes of producing theory. 
In this chapter, I will look critically at these various processes of producing 
scholarly feminist theory, and, in particular, at how these processes define feminist 
theory as legitimate or not. Legitimacy is a major problem within feminist theory. 
Feminist theorists
31 express concerns about validating different forms of knowledge as 
feminist theory, from specific pieces of work, to entire genres, to even broader 
conceptions of theory. Braidotti uses just such a broad conception, describing feminism 
as, “the means chosen by certain women to situate themselves in reality so as to 
redesign their ‘feminine’ condition.”
32 I like this definition and can use it specifically 
for feminist theory. However, my claim that the means of producing feminist theory 
(and practice) are many and varied should not suggest that I make a blanket claim for 
the theoretical or feminist validity for all the experience or theory of women. I do not 
wish to fall blindly into the trap Joanna Russ describes: 
In some quarters …the crucial idea that all women’s experiences are equally valid has 
been supplanted by the new and totally muddling idea that all women’s opinions are 
equally valid, a piece of mystification that accepts almost anything any woman says or 
does as ‘feminist’ merely because it was a woman who said it or did it.
33 
 
Rather, I suggest that scholarliness and validity as theory need not go hand in hand. I 
argue for a wider conceptualization of ‘legitimate’ feminist theory, based on the work’s 
principles of critical reflection and strategic development, as well as the uses to which 
the reader puts this work, rather than on the simple presence of the scholarly 
conventions of feminist theory. 
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Obviously, my discussion in this chapter rests on the idea that feminists within 
the academy privilege the application of scholarly conventions in feminist theory. I 
discuss later in this chapter how I know that this happens. Right now I need to ask: 
what are the implications of this privileging? In 1985, Dianne Court warned that elite 
styles of theorising would lead “gender studies [into] an elitist, depoliticised ghetto 
which ultimately would play into the solidification of the empowered knowledge we 
hoped to challenge.”
34 Court’s is a significant criticism. Feminism has a history of 
breaking down pretensions to capital-T ‘Truth’ that makes any production of privileged 
knowledge both thorny and suspicious. An interesting effect of this conflict of interests 
is that highly scholarly feminist theory does not always enjoy the same acceptance and 
applause as abstract theory from other disciplines – it has to validate itself over and 
over as furthering the feminist political cause despite having ‘lost touch’ with 
experience. This is another one of those contradictions between feminist principles 
(that is, the renunciation of conventions of ‘malestream’ theory) and the reality of 
doing feminism that I explored in Chapter 2. 
However, even while we keep this contradiction in mind, it is fitting to ask 
questions about the effects of privileging highly scholarly feminist theory over all other 
forms. After all, to ask questions is not to suggest that we should discount scholarly 
theory as feminist theory. I utterly resist a wholesale rejection of scholarly theory. 
Scholarly feminist theory allows us to increase understanding, decrease isolation, 
demonstrate both the commonality and diversity of women’s experiences, share 
strategies, unpick double meanings, and expose sexist messages and acts that are 
obscured by their familiarity. But we do need to examine the purposes scholarly 
conventions serve for feminism as a movement. The purposes these conventions serve 
are to allow academics easily to carry on a conversation about topics seen as important 
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to feminism, they show that feminist theory has come of age, that it can measure up to 
traditional high academic theory, that it belongs in the academy…but hang on, are these 
appropriate as goals for feminist theory? In one sense, they are appropriate, but they are 
questionable as the only goals for feminist theory. These goals do little more for 
feminism than show how, as Adrienne Rich puts it, feminist theory can speak nicely 
and “wear a dress.”
35 Moreover, I believe scholarly conventions are likely to play keep-
it-off with feminist theory, creating a barrier between women who know how to play 
the game of scholarly production and those who don’t. 
Scholarliness tends to be an identifier of ‘real’ feminist theory – and it shouldn’t 
be. In order to rethink ‘what counts’ as feminist theory, we need to internalise a 
particularly radical idea: namely, when a woman’s description of her experience fails to 
gel with my own scholarly theorising, maybe I could move beyond the possibility that 
she is falsely conscious. I could also admit the possibility that I, as a theorist, could be 
looking more widely at the world. After all, we cannot always assume that: 
…forms of feminism that identify women’s oppression or inequality in terms of 
structural conditions, …have made less impact at the level of consciousness …[so 
women] have difficulty articulating the structural constraints that frame women’s 
choices …
36 
 
Is it really about an inability to articulate feminist theoretical concepts, or is it that 
many women have a different feminist focus altogether? Must we assume that women 
who have this supposed difficulty are ignorant of structures of women’s oppression, or 
is it possible that they might produce sophisticated feminist theory by referring 
exclusively to their personal experiences?  
An unnamed feminist, whom Patai and Koertge describe as “a prolific and 
highly visible scholar in one of the social sciences,” makes the point that: 
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…there is bound to be a relationship between feminism as a political enterprise and 
Women’s Studies, but…you can’t collapse the two, because then everything Women’s 
Studies people do is judged by some political result, and then it’s not scholarship 
anymore.
37 
 
I would argue that feminist theory does need to be subject to some form of political 
judgement: a judgement primarily made by the theorist herself when she reflects on the 
purpose of her work. Beasley notes that, “some writers adopt the view that feminism 
should not be conceived in terms of ideas alone, since it also refers to political 
struggles.”
38 After all, feminism (whether this is in the form of theory or some other 
form) is a social justice movement. Social justice movements generally have two aims 
we can consider identifiable and universal: one being to change unfair conditions of 
existence, and the other being to reach and ‘recruit’ people to the movement. Using 
scholarly conventions such as relentlessly deploying highly abstract concepts, or 
writing exceedingly dense language may, therefore, require greater self awareness in 
the feminist framework. Stanley urges:  
…a continuing shared feminist commitment to a political position in which 
‘knowledge’ is not simply defined as ‘knowledge what,’ but also as ‘knowledge for.’ 
Succinctly the point is to change the world, not only to study it.
39 
 
Theorists need, therefore, to ask and answer questions about who the theory is for, 
what the theory is about, and what purpose the act of producing the theory serves – 
both immediately, and in the bigger political picture. 
Scholarly Conventions Count 
As shown in the ‘conversation’ earlier in this chapter, I disagree with Stanley 
and Wise that some writing can be “so jargon-ridden, mystificatory and elitist in its 
content and expression that it is difficult to believe that it is produced by feminists at 
all.”
40 I do not find it difficult to believe that feminists produce feminist theory, no 
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matter how dense or difficult. I think it is unfair to call into question these writers’ 
feminist integrity just because they write in the way the academy requires them to.
41 On 
the other hand, I do agree that if there is an intelligent, thoughtful woman who cannot 
understand a piece of feminist writing because of jargon, or because she finds her eyes 
sliding off the abstract concepts, perhaps we need to rethink our motivations for writing 
in these highly scholarly styles. It might well be that it is not the main points or ideas of 
a work that are too difficult for this woman – it’s the language used to describe these 
ideas. Any feminist writers who are concerned that non-academic women take little 
interest in their theory might do well to look at their own work. Is it accessible to more 
than an audience already immersed in academic-speak?  
Feminist and ethnographer Kamala Visweswaran says: “It has taken me some 
time to realize different audiences might require different forms of writing and 
theorizing.”
42 Using this axiom, one would assume that the academic world requires 
one thing, and the non-academic world another. But must it be so? Cannot the 
academic world of feminism form a better relationship with the non-academic world of 
feminism? Personally, I object to any suggestion that we must ‘dumb’ feminist theory 
down for the non-academic world. Perhaps Visweswaran could have said, “It has taken 
me some time to realize different audiences respond to different forms of writing and 
theorizing.” The idea of a non-academic audience requiring a certain form of writing is 
rather disrespectful, and a way of avoiding responsibility for writing accessibly. Of 
course, there are different levels of reading ability and educational background, not to 
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mention intelligence, amongst women, but even when we account for such differences, 
there is a gap between scholarly theory and educated, intelligent, reading women who 
wish to read feminist writing. By the same token, I object to the notion that we ‘smart’ 
theory up for an academic audience. This idea calls to mind the discussion of levels of 
consciousness that Stanley and Wise initiated.
43 In essence, it is saying that experience, 
creative writing, conversations and other non-scholarly forms, are not enough to 
constitute ‘real’ feminist theory.  
When I first presented some of my own work to a group of colleagues, one of 
them suggested that I write two texts for this project: one that would satisfy the 
requirements of the university for scholarliness, and another that might be a kind of 
‘translation’ of the scholarly work into everyday language – something that could be 
marketed to a wider audience.
44 Another colleague suggested writing in a scholarly 
style, but adding a glossary of terms to the thesis so that non-academic women might 
wade through it. Neither option sits well with what I’m trying to achieve through this 
work, because neither admits even the possibility that a scholarly work does not need to 
be written in a lofty scholarly style. For me, the only ethically adequate thing to do is to 
write a thesis that proposes that feminism is not confined to conventional forms of 
academia and activism, without adhering strictly to the scholarly conventions I 
describe. Any other approach would be hypocrisy. 
Dumbing down and smarting up theory are ways of describing stylistic 
attributes of a text. I have apprehensions about the style of my own work. In an ideal 
world, my work is scholarly in that it is reflective, critical, and engaged with other 
theory on the subject; but in this world, some readers might find it lacking in the 
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stylistic conventions expected from a PhD thesis. Which says it all really: accusations 
of unscholarliness often come down to differences in style rather than content. Just look 
at what happened to Mary Daly when she applied for full professorship at Boston 
College in 1974: 
  By any and all standards of academia/academentia this was a highly appropriate time to 
have applied for the full professorship. I had published (in addition to dissertations) two 
major books – The Church and the Second Sex (first brought out by Harper and Row in 
1968) and Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation 
(Beacon Press 1973). By the fall of 1974 the latter was used as a college text in 
universities and seminaries across the country and was excerpted in several 
publications. In addition I had made contributions to more than ten books and had 
published more than twenty articles in professional journals as well as in feminist 
periodicals. I had done substantial committee work in a variety of areas, had given 
more than seventy public lectures, and had presented papers to learned [sic] societies. I 
was listed in a dozen or so Who’s Who Dictionaries and Encyclopedias. I also had 
seven degrees, three of them doctorates. 
  I mention these tedious details of qualifications because the university’s 
decision, unbelievably, was negative. My students and many other supporters 
demanded an explanation, so the department chair ‘explained’ to interviewers from The 
Heights, the student newspaper (February 10, 1975): ‘She has made no significant 
contribution to the field. In terms of achievement, Mary’s case seemed to rest on that 
book [Beyond God the Father], and it is not a distinguished academic achievement.’
45 
 
Any academic who has read any of Daly’s books will see immediately why she was 
refused full professorship. Her writing is dramatic and ferocious, cutting, teasing, and 
playful. Her work is intellectual in a complex way, being wise but not scholarly in the 
way we tend to understand scholarliness. Indeed, non-academics might find it more 
difficult to understand why such brilliant, insightful work is an insufficient “academic 
achievement.” Daly herself acknowledges that her academic training means she can 
articulate her argument with precision and clarity, but reminds us that this is quite 
different from the academic rhetorician, who “merely argues to score points but does 
not seek the truth.”
46 
Although this is a dated example, and perhaps a good part of the prejudice Daly 
experienced relates to the reception of feminism in the 1970s, I include this example 
because it is important to show how those entrenched in powerful levels of academia 
                                                 
45 Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology. London: The Women’s Press, 1991. Xv. Emphasis in original. 
46 Daly. Xxix. Wasley 189 
can frame the argument for scholarliness. Scholarliness, or lack thereof, is not always 
just a matter of style; it can actually be a political or philosophical statement. In Daly’s 
case this is particularly true. Daly’s experience demonstrates how accusations of 
unscholarliness can be a way of quelling an unpopular or undesirable line of thought, 
whether this quelling is done from outside or within feminism. Daly was saying some 
amazing and radical things about religion, men and women, and systems of learning, 
and it’s not surprising that higher powers within her institution baulked, not just at 
promoting her, but at recognising her work as genuine academic theory. Feminists (and 
of course non-feminists) today use similar strategies to discredit work they find 
politically suspect – particularly those works which question or threaten to overturn 
deeply valued beliefs.
47 However, this is not an honest way to have a feminist 
conversation: attacking unusual methods as ‘sloppy,’
48 or making claims about the 
level of scholarliness of a work can be more of a deflection of the real issues that are at 
stake. It might be more useful to listen to and confront what is being said, rather than 
relentlessly judging how it is being said.
49 
Scholarly Context 
The environment we generally associate with the production of ‘real’ feminist 
theory is the Academy (universities, research institutes and colleges). We will 
occasionally accommodate theory produced in fieldwork situations, such as women’s 
refuges or anthropological studies of women in different cultures, under the official 
feminist theory umbrella. But outside of these study environments, anyone calling 
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herself a feminist theorist immediately becomes suspect. In essence, research and 
writing become more respectable if they have the express support (often financial) of a 
university, research institute or college. Even my own research, supported and funded 
by a university, allows one of my interviewees to describe me as a legitimate or 
‘official’ feminist. In an interview, we started to talk about some of the comments I’ve 
had since I got married. “Oh, you got married? It’s always the ones you don’t expect. 
You seemed too independent for that.” The interviewee was shocked by the 
disapproving tone of these responses, and assured me that she’d never had to put up 
with remarks like that. She added, after a thoughtful pause, “You know, you’re doing 
this feminist studies and thesis, all the rest of it – [people] see you differently, perhaps, 
to how they see me.”
50 In other words, writing and researching feminist theory at 
university means I’m now seen as a different kind of feminist – divorced from the real 
world of daily life and work and marriage – part of a scholarly context that is the 
Academic Old Girls’ Club.  
Conversation with Shulamit Reinharz
51 
 
Me: You list a lot of different people’s definitions of what feminism is about in the 
introduction to your book, Feminist Methods in Social Research. 
Shulamit: The variety of definitions of feminism is fortunate because the lack of 
orthodoxy allows for freedom of thought and action.
52 
Me: It must make it difficult, though, to choose texts for a study of feminist 
methodology like the one you have produced. Many feminists work with a single 
definition. 
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Shulamit: I reject the notion of a transcendent authority that decides what constitutes 
‘feminist,’ consistent with the antihierarchical nature of many feminist organizations 
and much feminist spirit.
53 
Me: Well, how do you decide what is feminist in your work? 
Shulamit: Researchers must either identify themselves as feminist or as part of the 
women’s movement; or they must be published in journals that publish only feminist 
research, or in books that identify themselves as such; or they must have received 
awards from organizations that give awards to people who do feminist research.
54 
Me: So, you include works in you analysis based on the context of institutional 
feminism only? 
Shulamit: Yes. It seems unfair to apply a current definition to people’s work two 
decades ago.
55 It is also consistent with a feminist valuing of people’s self-
identification.
56 
Me: I’m concerned that your method of defining feminism means you include only 
works by researchers who are willing and able to identify as feminists, and works that 
are published in the ‘right’ journals and given awards by the ‘right’ organisations. 
When you exclude works and research practices resistant to this kind of 
institutionalisation you might actually be ignoring writers who have avoided systems of 
institutional feminism by not declaring themselves feminist, or getting published, or 
being given awards for feminist research. To categorise feminism thus limits your 
analysis.  
Shulamit: It is true, sadly, that my definition prevents me from discussing the work of 
feminists who were somehow prevented from using the term ‘feminist.’
57 
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Me: You can avoid this unhappy result by ensuring that you don’t slip into using a 
“feminist framework which defines some women out of existence.”
58 After all, just 
because some forms of feminism are problematic, doesn’t mean they are not feminism. 
Your criteria for selection of feminist works don’t really gel with that freedom of 
thought and action you say the multiplicity of definitions of feminism provides. You 
cannot overcome the ethical dilemma posed by this debate when you pass the 
responsibility for naming feminism onto other people. You can name things feminism 
yourself – you could have chosen to include ‘illegitimate’ feminist works, such as 
unpublished or ‘undeclared’ feminist writing, accompanied by a rationale for including 
them, and perhaps some acknowledgement of problems you had deciding what to use… 
 
One of the problems Reinharz demonstrates is the fear of identifying others as 
feminists when they don’t identify themselves thus. This problem is in part connected 
with the identity politics quandary I described in Chapter 2, but it is also an ethical 
consideration that feminists must take into account. How do we talk about women who 
clearly act in feminist ways, or produce feminist theory, but who do not identify 
explicitly as feminists? Is it fair to call them feminists? Is it potentially damaging to 
them or their work to call them feminists? Again, this involves consideration of the 
concept of agenda: that is, what was the theorist’s agenda when she produced the 
theory? As I’ve already noted, agendas are only ever knowable by the subject who has 
the agenda. Therefore it becomes the reader’s or audience’s responsibility to decide 
whether or not a work or an act is feminist (and whether we can ethically name it 
‘feminism’). This is not a ‘death of the author’
59 attitude; rather, it is the 
acknowledgement that specific motivations for producing theory are not always 
                                                 
58 Spender, Dale. Qtd. in Reinharz. 9. 
59 The concept of the ‘death of the author’ is that of Roland Barthes. “The Death of the Author.” Image, 
Music, Text. Ed. and trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill, 1977. Wasley 193 
penetrable. Even when theorists declare their agendas, it is possible to read other 
motivational factors in a text and, therefore, the reader’s active role in interpreting the 
theory, as well as considering cultural factors surrounding the production of the 
theory, become significant. 
However, I wish to focus here upon the way that the choice (like Reinharz’s) to 
discuss only works located in a particular context (in this case, institutional feminism) 
points up an insidious habit amongst feminist theorists. This habit is to seek out and 
focus almost exclusively on those works of theory that appear in a scholarly context, in 
a tacit agreement that it is the context which makes the theory legitimate. A couple of 
different factors make up this context. The network of colleagues we read and write 
amongst is one of these. Readers of feminist writing can keep track of whether or not it 
counts as feminist theory by looking at the bibliography and in-text referencing. To 
whom does the writer refer for support or dissent? Usually, it is to big-name feminist 
theorists,
60 or feminists who write about big-name theory. The woman from down the 
street is never an appropriate reference unless it is strictly for raw data (because she 
probably has false consciousness and we can use her words to show how she needs a 
proper feminist education!). We also expect feminist theory to be published by the 
‘right’ publishers. The wrong publishers may be those who publish popular fiction and 
autobiography – any of the non-academic publishers, for instance. Self-publishing is an 
absolute no-no. If no-one except you wants to publish your work, how can you expect 
anyone to take it seriously as feminist theory? In this section I examine in detail how 
one produces feminist theory in the correct scholarly context. 
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The Company We Keep
61 
There are certain theorists to whom one knows it is always safe to refer (Butler, 
Harding, Bartky, Spivak, Irigaray
62), regardless of whether or not one concurs with 
their work. But there are other theorists to whom we refer with more trepidation, 
anxious somewhere in the back of our minds that these are not ‘real’ theorists, but in 
fact merely scientists, or activists, or neither of these! They may be non-theorists or 
non-experts, who are far too bound up in theorising the concrete realities of their 
fields/worlds to be producing ‘genuine’ intellectual theory. This phenomenon can even 
take place when the theorist doesn’t come from the ‘right’ discipline (the right ones 
being Women’s Studies, Sociology, Philosophy, Cultural Studies or Literary Theory). 
The reaction of other academics to our choice of reference material is a good indication 
that the company we keep counts! For instance, when I presented a paper at a 
discussion group for women postgraduate students at university, some of the group 
members wanted to know who a particular writer I was talking about actually was. Her 
name was Marlene LeGates – not a famous feminist name. The trouble was that I was 
talking about how feminists can over-define feminism, and using LeGates
63 as an 
example of this. In other words, I was discussing a general problem and referring to a 
specific situation – but using an example that was not familiar to the academic 
feminists in the room. Alarm bells immediately start ringing for these feminists. Where 
was Marlene LeGates coming from? Well, she had written a history of feminism in 
Western society, so I guessed she was coming from the academic discipline of History. 
And there was the problem – I was talking about this woman as though she was a 
proper feminist theorist to be used as an example when discussing the production of 
academic feminist theory, but really, Marlene LeGates was just a historian. History 
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(even feminist history) is dates and facts, not feminist theory. “I’d just like to know a 
bit more about Marlene LeGates,” one of my colleagues kept saying. “I’ve never heard 
of her.” 
Perhaps I failed to introduce my topic properly, but I rather think my colleague 
wanted to know that Marlene LeGates wasn’t just a writer posing as a feminist theorist. 
Well, what if she was? Does that make her research any less suitable for my study? Not 
unless the kind of limiting of feminism I was trying to generalize about was exclusive 
to LeGates’ writing (which it wasn’t). Now that I check the details of LeGates’ book, I 
realise with some disappointment that her research is, in fact, suitable for scholarly 
attention. One of the right academic publishers (Copp Clark) published her work, and 
she is, in fact, a teacher of tertiary-level Women’s Studies in Canada. In her preface, 
she mentions lectures and academic audiences.
64 In other words, LeGates’ book does 
manage to slide in with the appropriate scholarly context for official feminist theory: it, 
like other accepted feminist theory, has behind or around it the correct publishing 
houses, conferences and lectures, research reputations, academic qualifications, 
dissertations and periodicals. These contextual necessities involve attention to, however 
neatly concealed: 
…how literary canons are formed; the conventions that have defined some texts as 
‘literary’; why some histories and interpretations prevail while others struggle to get 
into print; the differences made by gender, sexual orientation, ethnic background, and 
political and economic power in the writing, publication, and reading of texts; writers, 
texts, and readers as cultural commodities; the roles of educational and other 
institutions in defining objects, methods, and values of education; and the relations 
among educational institutions, governments, business interests, and other cultural 
components.
65 
 
As you can see from my experience of using a ‘suspect’ text in my postgraduate group, 
all of these things count. 
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Publication Do’s and Don’ts 
In 1981, Dale Spender’s essay “The Gatekeepers: a Feminist Critique of 
Academic Publishing” appeared in Helen Roberts’ book Doing Feminist Research.
66 
Spender describes some of the problems of academic publishing of the time – most 
notably, its domination by men. According to Spender’s essay, feminist writers 
struggled to get their work published in mainstream academic journals that were edited 
and reviewed primarily by men. Spender also urges feminists to open a discussion of 
the problems of publishing within feminist journals: namely, a system of reviewing and 
auditing whereby only those whose work is politically or philosophically acceptable to 
editors and reviewers (who are often the editors’ friends), gets published; the eagerness 
to publish big names to the exclusion of emerging writers; and the necessity of getting 
one’s work published in an academic environment in which the printed word is 
esteemed over other forms of theory. Interestingly, it does not appear that this 
discussion has developed in the way Spender hoped it would. Existing work on 
feminist theory and the publishing industry focuses more on topics such as historical 
records or profiles of feminist publishers,
67 and the differences between feminist and 
mainstream publishing,
68 than on self-reflective investigation of the publication process 
itself.
69 Other work has detoured from a discussion of the publication process to 
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describe how publication relates to academic tenure and other professional issues.
70 
Although I do not use empirical research on feminist publication, I will now describe 
how the publishing of feminist theory works, and explore further some of the problems 
Spender identified back in 1981. 
The publishing houses, journals, or compilation editors who select and publish 
feminist writing count when it comes to deciding what is or is not feminist theory. The 
selection of publishing houses is less important these days, but it is interesting to note 
that when I look at the bibliographies of many of the articles and books I have read 
during this project, very few of the publishers listed are unfamiliar to me, or, more 
significantly, unknown to me as publishers of scholarly work. The publisher of a book 
is still something I think many feminist scholars idly take note of when we work on our 
own bibliographies, or even flick through others’ bibliographies. A number of the 
publishing houses become familiar to us as the ‘right’ publishing houses – (in 
Australia) Allen and Unwin, Oxford University Press, Virago, Routledge, Sage, and so 
on. Then, when we submit our own work for publication, these become our first 
preferences. We will settle for other publishers if necessary – even with joy and pride – 
but that doesn’t change the fact that we send our work to the big-name publishing 
houses first. Nor does it change the fact that we  and respect the author who has 
managed to get one of these big names to publish her work. However, in the end, the 
publisher of a work only has a minimal effect on its readership. 
The journal in which a scholarly work is published is infinitely more significant. 
Feminist scholars have definite favourites when it comes to journals. Big-name 
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feminist journals vary from country to country, but in Australia they include: Signs, 
Hecate, Feminist Studies, Feminist Theory, Australian Feminist Studies, and Women’s 
Studies International Forum. Although we generally look through a journal simply 
because we’re trying to trace some article or another in that issue, there are a large 
number of scholars and libraries who actually subscribe to periodicals. This 
subscription means that it suddenly becomes important to get published in one of the 
big-name journals – because the more famous the journal, the wider your readership. 
Of course, the clamour to get published in the important periodicals means that the 
editors of such journals can pick and choose what they publish. The essays themselves 
are peer-reviewed by other feminist scholars. Actually pulling off a big-name journal 
publication is, therefore, more difficult, and gives you quite a bit of prestige as a 
feminist scholar. Universities collude with this elitist system by allocating extra 
resources to schools and departments within the university that produce scholars who 
get published in audited, peer-reviewed journals (‘audited’ means that circulation is 
restricted to certain kinds of subscribers, such as academics and libraries):  
Under the Research Assessment Exercise, university funding is now augmented by 
funding which is directly tied to a measure of the quality of the research multiplied by 
the volume of research outputs.
71 
 
The “quality of the research” can generally be assessed by where it is published: the 
audited, big-name journals, of course, only publish “quality” research. 
The edited compilation of scholarly essays is another publication context that 
counts when it comes to ‘real’ feminist theory. It would be highly unusual for an editor 
to make a general or public call for submissions for a book. Rather, the editor actively 
seeks contributors to the book, making a request to contribute both exciting and 
prestigious for a feminist scholar. However, this selective approach puts both editors 
and scholars in a precarious position. Editors must select their contributors with care, 
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ensuring that the contributions they seek will improve and forward the books they edit. 
They must often consider how the selection of contributors will make their books more 
saleable or respectable in the academic community. To seek out the big names or up-
and-coming big-name feminist theorists is frequently a priority for editors who are 
working for the success of their publications. The scholars approached for contribution 
must also take care. After all, once one’s work is published in a book, it will generally 
become part of the overall message of the book, regardless of how it was originally 
intended. Scholars must ensure that they don’t connect their work with anything 
politically disparate from their own theory, controversial (or alternatively, reactionary), 
or – worst of all – unscholarly. 
Publishing houses and journals prefer to publish the big names, the big names 
prefer to get published by the big name publishing houses and journals, editors prefer to 
include the big-name authors in their compilations – which all goes to show that 
publishing in the academic world is an incestuous business. What does this highly 
selective and elite publishing process actually mean? Why is it done this way? One 
answer to this question is complacency. We simply don’t think about the fact that the 
publication process works like this, or the implications of such a process. As a result, 
the publication process becomes invisible. As Stanley points out, there is an “effective 
denial” of every stage of the academic mode of production until we arrive at 
“‘knowledge’ and ‘science.’”
72 I would argue that, much of the time, this denial is not 
even a conscious one; rather, it is simply that we take for granted all of the processes 
that occur before a work appears in published form. Even when we understand the 
process, it is something we do not tend to think about or find relevant to our own 
feminist theorising. 
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Another answer to the question of why the publication process works to 
delineate what counts as feminist theory is that, as authors, editors and publishers, we 
attempt to protect our work from and ourselves from association with something we 
don’t like. This ‘something’ might be controversy (or lack of controversy), the wrong 
kind of politics, the wrong audience, colleagues (for instance, in a compiled book) we 
disagree with or don’t think we belong alongside in a publication, or even publication 
style (the scholarliness, for example, of a publication). In the end, our careers are at 
stake. Sometimes we might not wish to look too radical or too reactionary, too pop or 
too learned, too middle class or too marginalized. And none of us ever wants to look 
half-baked, unprofessional, cheap or desperate. So we perpetuate the incestuous cycle 
of publication, occasionally bemoaning the difficulty of getting into print, but generally 
accepting the rules that make it so hard. 
Scholarly Style 
In addition to its context, the style of a work also affects its reception as 
feminist theory. What exactly constitutes the scholarly style? The choice of topic is no 
longer one of the main criteria for scholarly writing – one can write about almost 
anything, from Barbie dolls to surf culture, so long as one sticks to the rules. But we 
generally use formal language, jargon and specialised terms, and a serious tone in order 
to comply with stylistic conventions. Scholarly style also involves an approach of 
‘attack and defend.’ Academic rhetoric characterizes differences of opinion as a 
battlefield: we argue, debate, shoot down, deconstruct, form alliances; resist, 
interrogate and clash.
73 Generic styles are yet another indicator of ‘proper’ feminist 
theory. For instance, feminist theory is generally published in a scholarly form (as an 
essay, a journal article, a book, etc.). If it is to be accepted as ‘proper’ theory, it is 
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unlikely to be in the form of a poem or story, life writing, a magazine or newspaper 
article, a film, a song, or a conversation. Finally, scholarly style often requires abstract 
theory, as opposed to theory tied to, or based explicitly on, personal experience and 
concrete events. In the following section, I will explore these stylistic attributes in more 
detail, and discuss some of the reasons why these things count when it comes to 
feminist theory. 
Scholarly Words: Jargon and Difficult Language 
Jargon (technical terms, or words that are specific to the field, which are used in 
official feminist theory in a self-evident way) tends to be an obvious way to distinguish 
scholarly feminist theory from its non-scholarly counterpart. Many academic feminists 
overuse words like ‘constructivist,’ ‘ontological’ and ‘foundationalism,’ confusing the 
issue for feminists who don’t have access to the secret code language for academics 
(“Psst, what’s the password?” “Dominant paradigm!”). In other words, much jargon 
renders theory highly exclusive. Some work has been done on jargon in the 1980s and 
1990s, but little has been resolved on the issue.
74 One of the problems with jargon is, of 
course, that once you have been inducted into the academic way of thinking and 
speaking, it’s very easy to revert to the technical terms, even when you don’t intend to. 
The following is an excerpt from a conversation I had about feminism with a non-
academic feminist: 
Me: What we were talking about was not knowing how to talk to boys and men. 
Communicating. And you were talking about the facilitators at school. My question 
was ‘rather than learning to cope like these books, for example Raising Boys, 
encourage women to do, can we look at the rupture created in sexist structures of 
language when women can’t communicate properly with men as an opening for 
feminist work? 
Narelle: I don’t understand the question. 
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Me: Okay, what I’m trying to say is, rather than going ‘okay I better read this book so I 
can work out how to communicate with men,’ can we look at the break in the 
continuity of the sexist system that we all just go along with every day—
‘commonsense’—there’s a break in that when we suddenly realise that women and 
men aren’t communicating properly. So rather than learning to cope with it by reading 
these books, can we use that rupture as a space to start feminist work?
75 
Narelle: What do you mean by feminist work? Writing, action? What do you mean?
 76 
 
What happened in the above snippet of conversation? Even after I broke down what I 
meant by “rupture,” “sexist structures of language” and “opening,” I still assumed that 
my interviewee would know exactly what I meant by “feminist work” – a term that 
seems self-explanatory but is actually quite mystifying. This is a good example of the 
way official feminist theorists maintain an academic Old Girls’ Club. It's got its own 
language, its own interests, and its own modes of communication. The scary thing is 
just how easy it is to slip into the common mode of communicating when talking about 
feminism. I did it – even in a conversation that was supposed to be about accessible 
feminist theory! 
Personally, I feel somewhat critical of feminist theorists who use jargon heavily 
in their writing.
77 Every field has its own specific language, and some fields more 
forgivably have their jargon than others do – fields, for instance, that do not concern 
themselves with political and social change and therefore do not have a need to reach a 
large number of people. There are terms that began as feminist jargon, such as ‘sexual 
harassment’ and ‘reproductive rights,’ that have made their way into common use and 
are, in fact, important expressions for describing feminist issues in society. However, I 
am not calling into question the use of terms that describe practical feminist issues; 
rather, I question the heavy use of academic terms in works that might hold interest and 
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usefulness for women who are not familiar with such terms. Feminist academics need 
to decide whether the convenience and clarity of academic terms outweighs the 
importance of communicating with women outside the academic circle. Overusing 
jargon is not in feminist interests because it limits the number of women who have 
access to the wisdom and challenges of scholarly feminist theory. Feminist academics 
are already thinking feminists – it’s not only the academics we should be trying to 
reach through writing. For me, the feminist movement (and by movement I refer to 
actual motion) that will occur when feminist theorists stop writing in the secret 
language of jargon will be towards the women who might enjoy a more thoughtful, 
deeper, and wider understanding of the way their sex shapes their lives. The movement 
will be that of reaching out, extending a respectful hand to the non-academic women, 
rather than the wild gesticulation of wordiness.  
It’s not, after all, as though women do not want to read about sex, sexism and 
sex-rules. We know how popular books on gender are. Look at bestsellers like Men are 
from Mars; Women are from Venus,
78 and Why Men Don’t Listen and Why Women 
Can’t Read Maps.
79 Women in particular are very anxious to know why men and 
women have such confusing relationships; why women find it so hard to climb the 
corporate ladder or even to get paid decently; why we get that feeling of floating 
alienation and isolation in a man’s world, and why men are still raping and beating us. 
But non-academic women read books that do not promote change – that simply 
encourage us to better understand (and even value) the failures of men – at least partly 
because feminist theory is dense with unfamiliar terms. bell hooks notes that: 
Awakening women to the need for change without providing substantive models and 
strategies for change frustrates, creates a situation where women are left with 
unfulfilled longings for transformation. We may know that we need transformation, we 
may crave transformation, but lack a sense that these desires can be addressed by 
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feminist politics or radical politics. It is this space of longing that has come to be filled 
by a variety of self-help books, which offer models for personal change applicable to 
everyday life.
80 
 
Whilst hooks is more generally concerned with the hole left by feminist education, the 
statement also applies to the problem of inaccessible language in feminist theory. The 
subtlest form of pessimism in feminist theory is not that which weaves misery and 
suffering into its own tale of oppression, but theory that leaves the reader feeling 
hopeless. Contemporary women writers often fashion exciting theories – one cannot 
accuse them of failing to put forward strategies for women to resist sexism, or unravel 
the problems of feminism; but these women often present their strategies in such 
difficult and obscure language and only a few women are able to understand them. No 
one wants to read with the book in one hand and a dictionary in the other. These 
theories become unworkable. As bell hooks rightly points out, we cannot discount the 
effects of unworkable feminist theory on women readers, because feminist writing that 
leaves the reader with only confusion over how to work with the strategies it offers (or 
doesn’t offer) is not really doing anything positive with women’s suffering. 
The main reason I criticize the pessimism that scholarly feminist theory can 
foster is that I feel strongly that optimism is vital to women’s social and mental health. 
Because feminism is very important to me, I’m super-aware of the subtleties of sexism 
in my social environment. It’s easy for all of that to bring you down. It’s easy to feel 
that feminism is a dead-end road – that the government will continue to systematically 
swipe resources from women; that women will continue to be slaves to beauty; that 
men will continue to rape and control and abuse. Reading feminism that gives me 
workable strategies helps me because I can feel like maybe it’s going to be okay. 
Optimism is the saving grace of feminism: “just as feminism is a politics of risk and 
resistance, it must hold out to women some promise of happiness now,” says Janice 
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Raymond.
81 Without such a promise, who would want to do it? Only the tough – or 
maybe the masochistic. Optimism is, therefore, what allows most women to continue to 
do feminism, and that’s why it is so important. And exclusive language can curtail 
women’s feminist optimism because it can make otherwise excellent strategies 
inaccessible and impracticable for many women. 
And there is more to it than just that. I also object to jargon because it can lead 
to a kind of laziness when theorising. As Robert Lifton puts it: 
The most far-reaching and complex of human problems are compressed into brief, 
highly reductive, definitive-sounding phrases, easily memorized and easily expressed… 
[Jargon is] relentlessly judging, and to anyone but its most devoted advocate, deadly 
dull: in Lionel Trilling’s phrase, ‘the language of nonthought.’
82 
 
Sometimes, when writing for my undergraduate degree, I found myself using words of 
which, had I stopped and thought about it, I would have realized that I scarcely knew 
the meaning. Today, I wouldn’t dream of using words I didn’t understand. The point is 
that using jargon encourages a kind of complacency towards meaning. Not using jargon 
is almost necessarily more thoughtful because it means the writer has to think of new 
ways to say the ideas that have hardened into scholarly words. Coming up with a new 
way to speak an idea clears space for a new way of thinking that idea as well. At least 
some rethinking of a concept must accompany re-naming that concept. After all, jargon 
is not the language of the real world, and it certainly doesn’t bring feminists any closer 
to the truths of sexist existence. Rather, jargon often distracts its readers from what’s 
really being said – or not said. When thinking stops, when meaning goes into stasis, 
jargon has stagnated the development of feminism: as Raymond puts it, jargon makes 
for “posturing instead of action;” “gestures instead of movement.”
83 Feminist theorists 
need to make the use of highly academic language more transparently a choice, and to 
be able to consciously – and in good political conscience – rationalise that choice.  
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Scholarly Tone: Attack and Defend 
When one writes scholarly feminist theory, one goes to war. It is a war against 
sexism, a war against anti-feminists, but it can even be a war against one’s own 
colleagues and contemporaries. “Did you ever think of how warlike much of the 
writing is in the academy?” ask McNabb, et al. “We attack a position, defend a point, 
set out strategies for demolishing opponents, and try to dominate our readers.”
84 We 
unpick each other’s arguments, and shred each other for failures, compromises, and 
lack of integrity. Reading critically is one thing, but reading merely to criticize is quite 
another. More often than not, we search for the holes in each other’s writing and 
quickly discard anything suspect (perhaps after a perfunctory sneer at another’s errors). 
Whelehan notes that the shift in approaches to writing theory after the second wave 
resulted in “a tendency to attempt ‘ownership’ of feminism by the hostile discrediting 
of another’s perspective.”
85 Moreover, we vigorously defend our own work. Sometimes 
we do this overtly, answering back to criticisms with explanations of what we really 
meant,
86 or even retaliating against critics by attacking their work.
87 But by far the most 
common way we defend our work is by building fortresses of literary support, quoting, 
paraphrasing, and faithfully referencing other established feminist theorists. We back 
up our statements with examples of ideas and problems drawn from other works of 
theory, and we scour the pages of our contemporaries’ works for words that illustrate 
our own points. It is a pre-war reconnaissance: an exhaustive and fastidious picking 
over of all the relevant works until we have ammunition for the aggressive act of 
scholarly writing.  
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But we also write defensively by writing cautiously. Many writers are clearly 
reluctant to commit to a political standpoint, a radical ideal, or even to one way of 
describing women, without first confessing their feminist sins (usually their whiteness, 
or economic privilege, or heterosexuality, but sometimes even their disciplinary 
position – history, sociology, or literature). Although interrogating one’s own position 
in society is important, particularly when writing about underprivileged groups, it is 
crucial not to be glib about it. Scholarly feminist theory abounds with disclaimers, 
many of which act as a way of alleviating guilt when writing about a group rather than 
for that group. Defensiveness extends into rhetorical strategies as well as political ones. 
Many writers even hesitate to promote their own ideas as resilient – as ‘stayers.’ 
Instead, they humbly claim that their solution to whatever ethical dilemma they are 
addressing is a situated, specialised, immediate solution, only applicable to a very 
specific problem. Evidence of this phenomenon can be found in the proliferation of 
essays that go towards solutions, keeping their ideas in motion – see the multitude of 
scholarly theory titles containing the word “towards.”
88 Conversation and self reflection 
are admirable, but sometimes these kinds of rhetorical practices seem to be more about 
the fear of making a stable, permanent comment. I argue that it is actually okay to find 
a solution and claim some kind of closure on a topic. Theorists need not fear that they 
are closing down the discussion by proposing a solution or resolution. The conversation 
within feminist theory will continue regardless of the terms in which theory is couched. 
Feminists such as Jane Flax, after all, encourage the “anxiety…created by the 
lack of closure” in official feminist theory, and resist “leaping at the prospect of a new 
system or general theory – which would only repeat past schemata.”
89 One could say 
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that feminist theorists do not usually write, and do usually condemn, grand narratives.
90 
This is a recent phenomenon. In The Second Sex,
91 written back in 1949, Simone de 
Beauvoir was able to generalise about women – and still make some powerfully 
abiding points. This is not to say that she succeeded in producing a theory that works 
for every woman and in every culture. But at least in the 1940s feminist theorists were 
not obliged to start writing with thoughts of how they might be critiqued (except 
perhaps by men and misogynists). They did not start writing with trepidation, or by 
arming themselves with a formidable bibliography of supportive fellow-writers 
(because few fellow feminist writers even existed), and a paranoia about failing to 
account for someone – anyone. Although it may seem that I’m nostalgic for the way 
theory ‘used to’ be written, actually, I am trying to contextualise the phenomenon of 
cautious defensiveness as something that has emerged with the increasing importance 
of postmodern principles of impermanence, flux, dialogue and reflexivity. 
Stanley and Wise identify a group of theorists they call “translators,” who 
interpret the work of the theory “stars” (those who produce highly abstract, often 
difficult work, and occasionally even a grand narrative).
92 It is in the body of work (that 
is, feminist criticism) by these translators that we see the most warlike writing, as they 
find themselves engaged in theoretical battles with other translators (whilst the stars 
themselves continue to write their high theory, unhampered by such petty semantic 
considerations). Gallop, Hirsch and Miller discuss features of feminist criticism in their 
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conversation, “Criticizing Feminist Criticism.”
93 In this piece, the conversation centres 
on the writers revisiting episodes that caused pain and confusion: Gallop has written 
harsh criticisms of both Hirsch’s and Miller’s theoretical work. Hirsch recalls that: 
My response to your [Gallop’s] piece has to do with power. I think reading as well as 
you do puts you in a position of power over me. So my first response was to try to do it 
back to you. For about a month or two what I wanted most in life was to take a piece of 
yours and do the same thing to it.
94 
 
Hirsch’s articulation of the defensive response that having one’s work attacked 
provokes is very honest, as well as telling. In fact, the language throughout this 
conversation is highly emotionally charged: Miller felt “betrayed” and “angry”
95; 
Hirsch felt “exposed and criticized.”
96 Even Gallop (the critic), relates an all-
consuming “wish for …approval”
97 when writing a book. Hirsch goes on to claim that 
“some people’s work has gotten more careful and circumspect, some people have 
begun to write out of hurt and fear.”
98 This conversation exposes the hidden emotional 
side of writing theory, and explains why we engage in attack-defend habits. Essentially, 
we put our work into the world as we would send a child to its first day at school – with 
pride, apprehension and fear. The warlike tone and practices of feminist criticism are a 
result of that fear – the fear of attack and the fear of being unable to defend our ideas 
competently. 
MacNabb, et al make this point: 
Some women say that we should make academic writing more humane. Only writing 
that is more cooperative and respectful of one another, they say, can help to change the 
imbalance of power in our society. Others say that women need to learn exactly these 
battle tactics in writing if they are to compete in our tough society.
99 
 
A humane way of writing feminist theory within a worldwide academic community 
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sounds pleasing, but it would not make feminist criticism any less feminist, or any less 
theory. I agree with Deborah McDowell that criticisms of feminist theory like my own 
should: 
…not be read as a resistance to ‘theory’ but as an insistence that we inquire into why 
that category is so reductively defined and why its common definitions exclude so 
many marginalized groups within the academy.
100 
 
One of these definitions – not so much reductive as unspoken, and even unconscious – 
expects warlike theory. The failure to attack (possibly misread as a failure to read 
critically) often bars a work from admission to the realm of feminist theory. The failure 
to defend (possibly misread as a failure to support one’s work with examples, or as too 
sweeping and generalised a thesis) similarly rules out a work as theory. And when these 
things don’t exclude a work from the bounds of scholarly theory, at very least they 
open that work to critical annihilation instead of reflective consideration. At some 
point, as feminist theorists, we need to ask ourselves how useful this kind of literary 
violence really is in a movement that promotes an end to discrimination and 
vilification. Jane Gallop concludes her conversation with Hirsch and Keller with this 
comment: 
Maybe one has to distinguish between a criticism that actually attends to something 
and a criticism that’s really dismissive. We’ve had too much of this debate about 
whether we should or shouldn’t criticize. What we need is an ethics of criticism.
101 
  
I believe that such an ethics of criticism would allow readers to put aside the relentless 
concern with scholarly style and conventions (including the attack-defend habit), and 
sensitively “attend” to the ideas being expressed. 
Scholarly Genres: the Importance of the Essay 
  There are few genres or types of texts that are acceptable as scholarly feminist 
theory. Essays, in the form of an article in a scholarly journal, or a chapter of an edited 
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compilation, or a series of essays, presented as a book or thesis, are pretty much the be-
all and end-all of feminist theory. At a pinch, we will include an interview transcript as 
feminist theory, provided it is with a big-name feminist theorist, and appears in 
published form. As Spender puts it, “references in published sources which contain the 
terms ‘private communication’ do not seem to carry the same weight as those that have 
been printed.”
102 Genres we don’t count as feminist theory include those that feature 
fictive or experiential writing (autobiography, stories, novels, popular press articles, 
etc), and the non-written genres (songs, poetry, films, conversations, etc). We might 
acknowledge the feminist messages of such non-scholarly genres, but we still consider 
them by-products of feminism, data for analysis, feminist PR, purely political 
messages, or just plain marketing. These things should and, in some instances, do 
inform ‘true’ feminist theory (see my discussion of Steedman’s work on page 226-227). 
However, they rarely qualify as ‘true’ feminist theory – as part of the feminist 
conversation.  
Note the significance of the essay in explicating feminist theory. What do we 
know about the essay? We know it has structure, including an introduction and 
conclusion; we know it is substantiated, usually via reference to other texts; we know it 
is permanent (written down, and usually published in hard copy – even web publication 
is suspect!); and that it is logical and analytical. The essay follows an Aristotelian 
model of logical rhetoric, which gave written form to the abstract idea of logic. The 
essay maintains conventions of academic rhetoric as honed, perfected, and passed down 
through the ages. However, the essay is not always the ideal genre for producing 
feminist polemic: Elaine Showalter describes feminist Susan Sontag’s experience with 
the essay: 
After many years of producing learned essays…, Sontag realized that she had always 
felt constricted by the demands of the essay form and had found writing essays difficult 
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and limiting. For years she had been trying to write in a way that would give 
expression to her volcanic feelings.
103 
 
I believe that many scholars, especially women, but also men, find the essay a difficult 
mode of expression for political ideas. However, the conventions of the essay form are 
what we, as scholars, continue to use. 
So, what is it about feminist theory that does not appear in essay form that 
makes it unscholarly? Firstly, lack of conventional structure. A conversation, for 
instance, might lack the traditional introduction: an event or observation, or just an idea 
flitting through one of the participants’ heads, might spark the discussion. It might also 
lack a conclusion, particularly if the conversation ends because of an interruption, or if 
it just dribbles away into other topics. Secondly, writers using non-scholarly genre 
often fail to substantiate their writing. In fact, the very idea of quoting notable 
academics and accurately referencing them in a poem is laughable.
104 Can you 
imagine? I could spoil Sylvia Plath’s quiet, beautiful, tragic poem, “The Mirror” for 
you by mocking up a snippet of the poem with a reference to a feminist who has 
theorized the loss of beauty associated with ageing as a loss of female identity, but I 
won’t. Instead, enjoy some of its lines undistracted by the miniaturized numerals of a 
footnote: 
Each morning it is her face that replaces the darkness. 
In me she has drowned a young girl, and in me an old woman 
Rises toward her day after day, like a terrible fish. 
 
Perhaps those engaged in creative writing and life writing do not feel the need to 
defend ideas using substantiation – as we do when we write ‘real’ feminist theory. 
Thirdly, songs, poetry (when unpublished or orally performed) and conversation are 
often mutable – they lack the permanence of a written work. Writers change them from 
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one performance to the next, either through editing and revising, or on the spur of the 
moment; or they are altogether unable to replicate them. 
  Non-scholarly works can also lack logic. ‘Real’ scholarly works proceed 
logically from one point to the next, explaining and substantiating each idea before a 
smooth transition into the next proposal. The essay unfolds in order, developing 
through a number of different ideas and culminating in something that looks tidy and 
entire. Non-scholarly genre, on the other hand, might be creative, emotive and illogical. 
They might skitter about from point to point, leaving one undeveloped before 
proceeding to the next. Transitions might be bumpy and confusing, or hearken back to 
previous ideas without any warning. Neat completeness is a pre-requisite of 
scholarliness, and often an anathema in non-scholarly kinds of feminist theory. Finally, 
non-scholarly genre messes up the accepted model for analysis in feminist theory. 
‘Real’ feminist theory analyses things. It analyses patterns of behaviour, cultural 
norms, and, importantly, it analyses the non-scholarly genre. In their article about the 
fraught relationship between women’s studies and activism, Silliman and Bhattacharjee 
say:  
[Life experiences are] not seen as part of intellectual wealth, which is usually narrowly 
defined to include only printed and published material, written in a certain way and in a 
certain language(s).
105 
 
While Silliman and Bhattacharjee describe the life experiences gained in an activist 
context, their point translates into a discussion of women’s everyday experiences. They 
go on: “As a community activist, I was somehow then the keeper of ‘real’ information 
– or raw data, if you will – as opposed to ‘theorized’ information.”
106 If organised 
activist information is “raw,” everyday information is positively bleeding! Again, we 
can see how the notion of levels of feminist consciousness comes into play: theory is on 
the highest level of feminist consciousness, with activist data receiving a barely-above-
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false-consciousness rating. Everyday theorising doesn’t rate at all in the feminist 
consciousness stakes. Exclusion is inevitable: how can the academy admit non-
scholarly feminist theory to its body of work if canonical, accepted, scholarly feminist 
theory uses films, poems, novels, interviews – uses works within these non-scholarly 
genre – as its raw data? 
Scholarly Foundations: Experience and the Abstract 
  My statement that feminist theory takes experience as its raw data introduces 
the concept of ‘the abstract.’ I want to now turn to the curious divide between ‘the 
abstract’ and ‘experience’ in order to further explore the generic conventions of 
scholarly theory. Before going any further, however, I will define both terms – a task 
which will also entail exploring a little of the history of the discussion of experience 
and abstraction within feminist theory. An abstract idea is an idea that floats. It cannot 
be pinned to an object, like a ball, or a dog. It describes something intangible. It has tie 
lines to the ground, where we all live, but it is all too easy to cut those tie lines and 
watch it float away. Definitions of the word ‘abstract’ from the Fontana Dictionary of 
Modern Thought are telling: “theories which distort in order to simplify…which do not 
give accurate descriptions, predictions, or explanations of what actually happens.”
107 
Even the definition of abstract art is interesting and relevant: “making no identifiable 
reference to the visible world.”
108 Highly abstract writing is a relatively new 
phenomenon in feminist theory, having emerged in the 1980s
109 in response to a more 
critical and reflective approach by feminists to feminist practices. Whelehan describes 
the effects of this shift: 
This has the positive effect of demonstrating that feminism has the theoretical maturity 
to reflect upon its own processes. The obverse effect is, of course, that self-reflection 
begins to take over from reflection upon the original object of study.
110 
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The increasing presence of highly abstract feminist theory caused (and still causes) 
some consternation among certain feminists,
111 while for others it allows for important 
discussions of feminist approaches, or a higher level of scholarly integrity.
112 
The idea that experience is somehow the opposite of the abstract is misleading. 
Experience involves emotion and introspection, as well as concrete happenings – in 
other words, it is the stuff of everyday life, but this doesn’t mean it excludes thinking 
and analysis. It does mean that the language of experience is usually basic, local and 
specific. To some, it can feel unintellectual, anecdotal or flippant. Personal experience 
has held a significant position in feminism for a long time – feminists in the first wave 
(1800s and 1900s) were interested in the separation between the public and private 
spheres of life.
113 Perhaps the significance of experience for feminism is related to 
women’s socialisation (we are socialised to value personal experience), but also to the 
fact that the place women really feel the pinch of sex rules is in our personal lives. For 
a long time, women were obliged to feel inferior about valuing personal experience 
because, as the ‘important’ people in society told us, there were much more significant 
things going on in the public than in the private world. During the second wave of 
feminism (the 1960s and 70s), many feminists criticized this hierarchy of public-over-
private, and created opportunities to talk about personal experience
114 – but even more 
importantly, feminists began to validate the life experiences of women and tried to 
reclaim some scholarly legitimacy for personal writing.
115 This was a radical move. It is 
one thing to claim something for one’s sex, but it is another thing entirely to say 
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personal writing is just as valid and important for all people. Men were quite happy to 
see women as the keepers of the private domain for a long, long time.
116 So, to suggest 
suddenly that the private and experiential in life have just as much importance as 
abstract ‘high theory,’ was a shocking thing indeed. 
The world – everyday experience of the world – is, of course, filled with 
intangibilities and, therefore, we need abstract terminology and discussion to describe 
the world. The way we make sense of our experiences is also through the use of 
abstract ideas and analyses. Therefore, abstract analyses and discussions of abstract 
concepts are not simply necessary, but an inextricable part of the way we theorise our 
lives and the world. The difference between experience-based analyses and abstract 
scholarly theory is twofold: firstly, there is a difference in expression. I have already 
covered stylistic features, such as the overuse of jargon and warlike writing. Other 
expressive devices also come into play: the serious tone of a work and its often 
exclusive focus on abstract ideas or other works of abstract theory. Secondly, there is a 
big difference in the reception of experience-based analyses and abstract scholarly 
theory. Aside from the obvious difference of limited distribution, abstract scholarly 
theory is accorded a much higher value than the experiential analyses. Moreover, even 
theory produced within the academy, when it does not read as highly abstract work, 
receives a lower value than more conventional abstract scholarly theory. Such work 
might include quantitative and scientific studies, fieldwork descriptions, creative and 
ficto-critical works, life writing and popular publications. Notice that these works draw 
heavily on the foundation of experience as a place to start thinking and writing.  
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To be clear: the simple presence of abstract theory in feminism is not the 
problem. Rather, it’s how we treat abstraction in political discussion that causes 
problems. Stanley and Wise refer to the “absence of ‘real world’ criteria for assessing 
the adequacy of [feminist theory’s] in-passing ‘descriptions’ of the world.”
117 In other 
words, we do not often ask questions about the reverence we seem to have for highly 
abstract feminist theory – nor do we often hold this kind of theory up against 
experience to see how well it describes (or not) lived reality. My criticism in this 
section is of the uncritical acceptance of highly abstract theory as the best, most 
appropriate, most intelligent, highest, or most important form of feminist theory. My 
aim is to point out how and why this happens, to explore other ways of conceptualising 
the relationship between the abstract and experience, and to break down the way we 
tend to value highly abstract theory over other forms.  
At this point I might need to clarify – to show how I know which forms of 
theory are more highly valued than others. We can perceive the hierarchy of feminist 
theory simply by looking at what is treated as theory. In other words, we simply need 
to check which works are being published in scholarly journals, which works are being 
quoted by feminist academics, and which feminist writers are being employed as 
professors and given tenure at universities. However, there is also a conversation within 
feminist theory concerning what should and should not count as theory. bell hooks, for 
instance, claims that creative writing and other such experiential forms should not be 
required to serve the purpose of feminist theory:  
Novels and confessional writing can and do enhance our understanding of the way 
individuals critically reflect about gender, the way we develop strategies to resist 
sexism, to change lives, but they cannot and do not take the place of theory.
118 
 
Whilst I agree with hooks’ injunction that creative forms of writing should not always 
have to measure up as instructional models for living/thinking (which may well further 
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restrict what could be written in the name of feminist literature), I’m not sure exactly 
what more she requires from a work than critical reflection and strategic development 
to elevate it to the realm of theory. Sylvia Walby makes the case that genres such as 
storytelling are inadequate for producing feminist theory. Walby is: 
…happy to agree that the rich repertoire of feminist narratives in the public sphere has 
been a powerful part of feminist politics…But I am reluctant to equate feminist politics 
with feminist theory.
119 
 
A number of other feminist theorists have also recently contributed to the discussion of 
what counts and doesn’t count as feminist theory – and why.
120 I consider some of the 
other work done on the validity of theory later in this section. 
But I wish to leave this discussion for the moment, because Walby’s words 
bring me to my next point. I think that there is an interesting connection between the 
supposedly irreconcilable dualisms of politics/theory and experience/the abstract. 
Walby defines feminist theory as “an attempt to explain the nature and complexities of 
gender inequality.”
121 Presumably, feminist politics is more about trying to change that 
inequality. On the other hand, ‘the abstract’ generally refers to existing structures and 
patterns, and experience is about living in those structures and patterns. By extension, 
theory is a way of acting on the abstract (that is, analysing structures and patterns), and 
politics is a way of acting on experience. The interconnected relationship between the 
abstract and experience that I’ve been trying to explain, then, highlights the similarly 
interconnected nature of theory and politics. To elucidate – I find it hard to believe that 
the act of analysing inequality is not in itself a political gesture. It is a delusion to 
imagine that politics doesn’t occur without a theory of injustice, and feminist theorists 
do not tend to write explanations of gender inequality that are an end unto 
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themselves.
122 The nature of feminism as a critique of sexism means that feminist 
theory necessarily has a political edge, regardless of the demands of scholarship. 
In fact, the oppositions between experience/the abstract and politics/theory are 
even defended within feminist theory. I would suggest that certain theorists push to 
protect abstract theory from the muddying influence of politics and/or experience. This 
phenomenon is most prevalent in the increasingly powerful canon of post-structuralist 
influenced feminism of the mid-1980s until now. Post-structuralism insists on the 
primacy of language in constructing our experiences and identity, and in doing so 
backgrounds experience and identity as valid starting points from which we might 
forge theory or politics. Denise Riley, for instance, warns that the terms “woman” and 
“women” should be carefully guarded from too simplistic a function as identity politics. 
“‘Being a woman’,” says Riley, “is also inconstant, and can’t provide an ontological 
foundation.”
123 Joan Scott cautions that using experience as a foundation for theory 
“reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems.”
124 Scott also contends that 
doing so may produce theory or knowledge that ignores the historical and discursive 
contexts of the experience
125 – or worse, it could be a treacherous stumble into a new 
hierarchy of knowledge, uncritically privileging experience over attempts at 
objectivity.
126 Thinking in a similar vein, still other feminist theorists scramble to 
‘save’ feminism from itself, expressing concern that an insistence on principles such as 
experience and politics is a total rejection of rationality, higher reasoning and larger 
societal patterns – the “wholesale condemnation of nonfeminist writings and ideas.”
127 
Says an unnamed political science professor quoted in Patai and Koertge: “I have not 
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thrown off the yoke of one master to have it replaced by another, even if its name is 
feminism.”
128 
Perhaps this very instinct to protect scholarly theory has led to the recent re-
marginalisation of personal experience in feminist theory. Stanley and Wise note the 
“barrage of critical comments about ‘experience’ (try living without it) over the past 
decade.”
129 It seems that the feminist reclaiming of experience was closely followed by 
a period of intense questioning and a now emerging repudiation – because experience 
can only provide a flawed and paradoxical foundation for feminist theory and politics. 
Once again, emotions, conversations, action, relationship, and the everyday make for, if 
not ‘sloppy’ theory within the academy, then certainly a questionable foundation for 
knowledge. Some feminist writers even imply that personal experience is little more 
than an entry point into feminism. Leder, et al claim that the students in their Women’s 
Studies program have “relatively little grasp of how or why society is structured around 
women’s subordination,” and take “liberation” merely to mean “having opportunities 
and achieving personal empowerment.”
130 To get somehow beyond personal 
experience appears to be the goal of some of the feminist writers and teachers I have 
discussed in this section. Experience is simply stuff for feminist theorists to unpick and 
dig around in, instead of valid theory to hear and value, argue with, answer, and 
account for.
131 
I believe that experiential forms of writing can function as feminist theory in 
that they can raise profoundly reflective questions and produce powerful cultural 
critique. It is certainly possible to write politically and philosophically about 
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experience, as well as broader social patterns. Look at theoretical/autobiographical 
work by Carolyn Steedman (Landscape for a Good Woman
132) and Drusilla Modjeska 
(Poppy
133). Steedman’s work is an analysis of class relations in Britain and a feminist 
theorising of motherhood told through the story of her mother’s material and 
psychological life. Modjeska’s Poppy is a highly reflective feminist discussion of 
psychology, autobiography, and history that again uses the genre of 
autobiography/biography as its medium. These texts make abstract analyses of the 
cultural conditions in which the authors and their mothers live, using experience to both 
build and supply those analyses. It is misleading, therefore, to distinguish theory 
produced in non-scholarly genres, such as storytelling, from scholarly theory using the 
blurry ‘oppositions’ between politics/theory or experience/the abstract. 
A Final Thought on Scholarly Style 
  It is extremely important that my readers understand that my criticism of these 
conventions of scholarly feminist theory does not mean that I consider works that 
conform to these conventions any less feminist. Scholarly and academic work does not 
become ‘unfeminist’ simply because it adopts the stylistic conventions of its genre; and 
nor is non-scholarly feminist theory somehow more authentically feminist. I wouldn’t 
want to give an impression that I believe scholarly feminist writers always privilege 
abstraction over experience, or deliberately exclude non-academic women, or care only 
about their ambition and careers. This is why I have tried to keep my discussion these 
conventions general and free of personal attack: if scholarly feminists are guilty of 
anything, it is a lack of reflection on the effect of these scholarly conventions on their 
audiences (or potential audiences). My view is that, when producing scholarly feminist 
theory, we should make every effort not to engage in practices that exclude interested 
women from engaging with that theory. 
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Conclusion: Inbreeding and Feminist Theory 
I hope my readers can now see just how repetitive the cycle of academic 
feminist theory production can be. The same institutions fund the same researchers, 
who produce the same kind of writing for the same publishers, which the same 
audience reads. There is not much movement on and off this carousel. The same people 
get to ride all the time. To let people who produce different kinds of feminist theory 
onto the carousel would take something momentous: we would need to let the carousel 
slow down a bit. This braking is a grinding deceleration of the whirling cycle that 
feminist scholars take part in; a pause to reconsider what constitutes valid theory, and 
who counts as a legitimate theorist. As hard as it may seem, the responsibility for this 
reconsideration rests mainly with feminist theorists – with women who deploy the 
conventions of feminist theory. Because it is by listening to and reading a wider range 
of work as legitimate feminist theory, and including such work in one’s own scholarly, 
funded, institutionally-supported research, that such non-scholarly texts will start to 
count. 
These feminist theorists, then, must make the first move – and that move is to 
recognise exactly what it is that makes us feminist theorists. It would be easy to say that 
the ‘real’ feminist theorist exists only in the minds of non-academic feminists, but that 
doesn’t explain the ivory tower we, as feminist theorists, build and sit in. We tend to 
blame the barriers between academic feminists and non-academic women on their 
reaction against the radicalness of feminism, or their complacency with the status quo. 
It cannot possibly have anything to do with our failure to share. However, at some 
point, we must take responsibility for the exclusion that our contentment to rest in the 
secure, closed environment of the academy, and play the scholarly game, can cause. 
Feminist theorists play a significant part in the estrangement between non-academic Wasley 223 
women and ourselves when we write feminist theory that has “got to be,” as Narelle 
Wasley puts it, “in a certain style and inaccessible to the masses to be valid.”
134 
Therefore, my criticism of feminist theorists is not really about criticising 
scholarliness per se as the favoured style of feminist theory. Rather, it is about calling 
feminist scholars to account for perpetuating the exclusion that means scholarliness is a 
compulsory attribute of ‘legitimate’ feminist theory. After all, the carousel of theory 
production we are riding is not whirling us towards The Revolution. Rather, little 
revolutions happen daily, both on and off the carousel. At the moment, we spend much 
of our research energy riding that carousel. We could look a little broader. In fact, we 
could simultaneously look inwards and outwards – inwards at ourselves, at our own 
writing, at our own judgements about others’ writing, and at our motivation for writing 
the way we do. And outwards, at what else counts as feminist theory. As Mary Zeiss 
Stange puts it: 
…to bring more women into the conversation, we professional feminists need to learn 
to speak, and to hear, another language: one that comprehends, without necessarily 
trying to change, certain political and cultural perspectives that most of us, as 
individuals, may not share. That means not imposing our structures of thought and 
belief on politically “other” women, hearing their take on feminism, learning from it, 
and allowing it to enrich our understanding of the many forms women's empowerment 
can take. There are models for that: the evolving literature on global feminism provides 
one; the current debate on black conservatism among African-Americans another.
135 
 
In the next chapter, I look to some of the texts on the ‘outside’ of feminist theory and 
make the case that these texts do, in fact, count. 
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Chapter 5 
Seven Deadly Sins 
Sometimes it seems like the gulf between progressive academia and the real world is so huge 
you need to sprout wings to get from one to the other. 
     — Ruthann Lee, 2001
1 
 
This chapter illustrates seven deadly sins of feminist theorizing – in other words, this is where I 
give you some examples of feminist theory that doesn’t fit the official mould. I have moved 
from an analysis of the typical situations, trappings, and agendas of feminist theory, to a more 
creative location. This is a space where I can build and develop a picture of ‘unofficial’ 
feminist theory. I use seven arbitrary categories to organize my examples, but the works of 
theory themselves cross over the boundaries of the seven sins. The limited space I have to 
provide some instances of the abundant array of ‘unofficial’ feminist theory means that this 
chapter should act as a seed. Grow the seed at your leisure into a fruitful source of feminist 
theory for your own use. 
Bridging the Gulf 
Bless me father, for I have sinned… 
I recount here the sins of my own feminist theorizing, as well as those of others.  
I am guilty of feminist theory without a feminist agenda. 
I am guilty of common-sense feminist theory. 
I am guilty of optimistic feminist theory. 
I am guilty of pragmatic feminist theory. 
I am guilty of pop feminist theory. 
I am guilty of post-feminist theory. 
I am guilty of suspect feminist theory. 
Accessibility and Out-thereness 
This chapter explores two styles of feminist theory that many academic 
feminists find difficult to accept as valid feminist theory: accessible theory, and theory 
that is ‘out there.’ When I say accessible, I mean theory that is readable, 
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understandable, and enjoyable. Even if we don’t agree with it, it engages us. We feel 
like we can make a genuine response to accessible theory, and whether we respond to 
criticise or to agree, the response will be valued. To explain accessibility, I want to talk 
about the difference between the theorising we do at home, compared with that we do 
in the public eye. At home, we use real words: intelligible, colourful, unpretending 
words. We use them generously. Stinginess with knowledge generally happens away 
from home, at work, in the academic ivory tower. A feminist theorist has different sets 
of words for home and work: at home she can be herself; at work, she is expected to 
prove herself (usually through words). Kamala Visweswaran suggests that we do our 
“homework” when we theorise and research: 
…questioning of heretofore unexamined points of privilege and blindness forms the 
basis of an accountable positioning that seeks to locate itself in and against the master 
discourses of race, class and sexuality [and I add to those master discourses 
‘academia’] that inscribe it.
2  
 
This questioning is difficult, but essential. Daphne Patai explains the conundrum in 
which official feminist theorists often find themselves when we question ourselves 
honestly: 
On the one hand, we are obligated to our academic disciplines and institutions, within 
which we must succeed if we are to have any impact on the academy (and this in itself 
involves us in numerous contradictions, as part of our project entails transforming those 
very disciplines and institutions). On the other hand, if we take feminism seriously, it 
commits us to a transformative politics. In other words, most of us do not want to bite 
the hand that feeds us; but neither do we want to caress it too lovingly.
3 
 
Homework involves selectively picking back through the layers of intellectual privilege 
that an education in canonical feminist theory can provide. Homework is keeping and 
loving the knowledge that contributes to an understanding of women’s position in a 
man’s world; keeping and loving the ideas and visions that encourage us to make 
changes to the state of things; and recognising the conventions of academic snobbery, 
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simultaneously discovering a new affection for that which doesn’t fit the traditional 
mould of feminist theory. Homework means being accountable to women and, 
importantly, to those women at home. After all, home is vital – especially where 
feminism is concerned: 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home ... 
Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks out equal justice, equal 
opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning 
there they have little meaning anywhere.
4 
 
Then there is the feminist theory that is ‘out-there.’ Out-there theory is unusual, 
unconventional, and non-traditional. We might find it where or when we do not expect 
to find it. Adrienne Rich nostalgically describes the out-thereness of feminist theory 
prior to what she sees as its domestication through institutionalization: 
[W]omen’s studies programs [are] ‘the dutiful daughter of the white, patriarchal 
university – a daughter who threw tantrums and played the tomboy when she was 
younger but who has now learned to wear a dress and speak almost as nicely as Daddy 
wanted her to.’
5 
 
However, the out-there feminist theory I am referring to is not a hearkening back to the 
heady days of second-wave feminism; rather, it is that which never really counted as 
feminist theory in the first place. It is the things feminist theorists know about, but are 
reluctant to admit to the canon. For even experts (in this case, the feminist theorists) 
worry that outside, and in spite of, academic learning, there are other things we know: 
The most monstrous...are those things that people know or believe without benefit of 
(in opposition to the claims to expert status of) disciplinary experts – and what experts 
themselves know or believe in spite of, and outside, the hard-won knowledges that 
have made them what they are.
6 
 
These are the things that go beyond ‘official’ feminist theory, but also beyond false 
consciousness. Narelle Wasley makes the point that an academic woman might think, 
in conversation with a non-academic woman: “my understandings are so much greater 
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than what she understands and knows about, so I can dismiss what she thinks and 
believes.” But, as she reminds us: “always, in any group where you’re not getting 
people widening their viewpoints, other people are losing out.”
7 Feminists lose out 
when we draw strict lines between what is and is not feminist theory. We enhance the 
effects of the backlash against feminism. Our hesitation to call non-academic women 
feminist theorists effectively confirms and deepens those women’s unwillingness to 
identify thus. And just as important is the fact that when we act as though non-
academic women’s theorising is not ‘real’ feminist theory, we undermine our own 
politics and careers: we limit our field of study, and distance ourselves from the 
strategies we, as real women, use daily to get by in the real world. Worst of all, 
however, we are most unwisely denying ourselves access to the huge reservoir of 
feminist knowledge and practices created by non-academic women who must cope in a 
sexist society just as the academic women do. 
I also use the term ‘out-there’ in the sense that this kind of feminist theory is out 
there in the world, and not confined to institutions or establishments. It is impossible to 
keep track of, because it is now here, now there, in time and space. It is found in banal 
places such as shops and bank queues and staff rooms, as well as ‘loftier’ locations, 
such as science laboratories and government ministries. Feminist theory is out there in 
homes and marriages, and hospitals, and late night movies. New developments occur 
unremarked. Major breakthroughs disappear into oblivion a moment after they occur. 
Triumph and feminist revolution happen within one person’s soul, and give that woman 
a secret smile, but remain private and uncelebrated. In Chapter 4, I briefly described a 
book Carolyn Steedman wrote about socialist and feminist theory in the everyday life 
of her mother. This work can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, we can see the book as 
Steedman ‘using’ her mother’s experience and ideas as fodder for feminist study. 
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However, there is this statement at the end of the book:  
I must make the final gesture of defiance, and refuse to let this be absorbed by the 
central story; must ask for a structure of political thought that will take all of this, all 
these secret and impossible stories, recognize what has been made out on the margins; 
and then, recognizing it, refuse to celebrate it; a politics that will, watching this past say 
‘So what?’; and consign it to the dark.
8 
 
Steedman asks us to allow her mother’s story to remain ‘out-there.’ Steedman’s 
ambition (whether or not she succeeds) is that her own work – a work that exists inside 
the ‘official’ context of a political movement and institution – will not subsume her 
mother’s theory. Likewise, feminists can explore the fine line between drawing on and 
engaging with out-there feminist theory, and using and manipulating it to prove their 
own ‘higher’ theories or finding other ways to capture and pin it down and bring it 
inside. In the words of Donna Haraway, we need to go “Coyote”: to “give up mastery 
but keep searching for fidelity, knowing all the while that we will be hoodwinked.”
9 
We need to accept and get excited about the existence of feminism beyond our control 
without trying to bring it back under our control. In this chapter, I will discuss ‘outside’ 
forms of feminist theory. 
Feminist Theory without a Feminist Agenda 
One question that plagues feminism is: is it fair to call a work ‘feminism,’ when 
these works were written before such a term even existed, or with an altogether 
separate overt purpose? In other words, can we call a work feminist when it wasn’t 
written as feminism? I argue that we can name historical and undeclared feminism 
‘feminism’ when it is necessary or useful. Under my definition of feminism (feminism 
as resistance to women’s suffering), we have the privilege and opportunity to take a 
stand, to take that which is outside the boundaries in a clumsy, squirmy embrace, and 
be prepared for a slap in the face for doing so, because we are doing something vital – 
letting that which is outside know that it is welcome as/in/to feminism. This is not to 
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say that those who claim we should refrain from unproblematically using categories 
such as ‘feminist’ and ‘woman’
10 do not make valid points. Points like: we should 
make a greater effort to understand people’s various agendas; it is flat-out inaccurate to 
call something feminism unless it was done as feminism; we should respect people’s 
decisions to resist identifying as feminists; calling a work feminism arrogantly takes it 
over, subsuming and sinking it in an established movement, when it might have 
something more to offer the worlds of academia, metaphysics, or politics. Sometimes, 
in the case of works produced in different cultures, we need to be especially cautious 
about naming the work feminism – if there is a chance that the author might come to 
harm by us calling her a feminist, then we should indeed refrain.  
However, I contend that to name some out-there works ‘feminism’ does 
something of great significance – it allows us to have such discussions, but to put them 
aside in order to go forward with feminism. We can debate without reaching impasse. 
The important thing we do when we name outside things as feminism is to highlight to 
the world that feminism is greater and older and more present in our daily lives than we 
suspected. That it is a normal, everyday, positive thing, and has been for longer than we 
know. Can you imagine with what optimism women could start their days knowing we 
are part of something real and powerful that has our interests at heart? And knowing 
that we are not only part of it, but that it has its own history? Narelle Wasley names the 
authorship of nineteenth-century novelist, Colette, as a feminist activity, despite the 
fact that she did not write explicitly as a feminist: 
And she was with that husband, who put her down so much, and treated her so badly,
11 
but eventually she got away, and created her own life and lived a better way. Not a 
better way – it was hard, you know, but she got out and did something, she became an 
actress, you know, which was a…radical kind of thing to do. And then also claimed 
back her work, and writing, and all that kind of thing that she’s done. And I think, to 
me, all those years that she just sort of sat with him, in a lot of ways wasn’t very 
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feminist – although she was writing books, which was a good feminist activity. 
Whenever you write a book, I think that’s a good feminist activity.
12 
 
It is the tone and content of this kind of statement that shows not only that we, as 
women, have a history of resistance to suffering and oppression, but how exciting the 
discovery of that history can be. Knowing these things can do something profound for 
the way women resist suffering – it can provide a buffer to disappointment and failure, 
and a sense of pride and collaboration in our successes. I cannot measure the value of 
these things. 
In Chapter 4, I showed through a conversation that author Shulamit Reinharz 
chooses to not name out-there works as feminism. In her book, Feminist Methods in 
Social Research,
13 she uses feminist works as her research data, but ensures that such 
works are openly declared or accepted as feminist theory. She does this in order to 
avoid casting feminist pretensions on works whose authors did not intend them as 
feminism, ostensibly from the perspective that it is disrespectful and inaccurate to 
describe such works as feminist. However, I want to turn the idea of disrespect on its 
head by saying that feminist theory is such a grand, empowering, exciting body of 
research that authors can and should actually feel honoured to have their works referred 
to as ‘feminist.’ It is strange and sad that, while feminist theorists rejoice that their own 
work is classified as feminism, they are reluctant to drag outside works into the same 
category. More than anything, I think this reflects the ambivalence many feminists have 
towards the category of feminism – loving and embracing it, whilst entertaining a 
perverse kind of repulsion to it. As for accuracy when naming outside works as 
feminism, as I have said before, history is always ‘inaccurate’ because it is always an 
interpretation. Naming something ‘not-feminism’ is as inaccurate as naming it 
feminism. There is no one Truth. Nor does naming a work as feminist presuppose that 
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the work is unambiguously feminist, or that it is free of ignorance or critical gaffes. 
Once again, one woman’s feminism is another woman’s failure of feminism. Just 
because we name something feminism does not mean we are calling it perfect and 
unproblematic.  
In an analysis of her grandmother’s experiences, Katherine Borland works 
around this problem in an admirable way.
14 Borland frames, in feminist terms, an 
instance where her grandmother (Beatrice) triumphed over male ridicule and authority 
in betting on a winning horse. Borland uses Beatrice’s experience as an example of “a 
female struggle for autonomy,”
15 and effectively names it feminism. When her 
grandmother reads Borland’s interpretation, however, she is resentful and outraged that 
Borland describes her actions as feminism. Says Borland: 
Beatrice brings up a crucial issue in oral narrative scholarship – who controls the text? 
…I agree that the story has indeed become my story in the present context.
16 
 
However, Borland “cannot agree” that her reading “betrays the original narrative.”
17 
She explores ways of conceptualising such stories to justify interpretative analysis, 
discussing the way Beatrice sees the story as inextricable from her intention in telling 
the story, whilst Borland sees the story as inextricable from the activity of listening and 
interpreting. Borland claims that she offers “instead a different reading, one that values 
her story as an example to feminists of one woman’s strategy for combating a limiting 
patriarchal ideology.”
18 In other words, Borland shows how interpreting and naming a 
story as feminism, however ill received, unwelcome or deplored, can deepen, broaden, 
and enhance a subject: 
[Not] all the differences of perspective between folklorist and narrator, feminist scholar 
and speaking woman, should or can be worked out before the final research product is 
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composed. Nor am I suggesting that our interpretations must be validated by our 
research collaborators. For when we do interpretations, we bring our own knowledge, 
experiences, and concerns to our material, and the result, we hope, is a richer, more 
textured understanding of its meaning…Lest we, as feminist scholars, unreflectively 
appropriate the words of our mothers for our own uses, we must attend to the multiple 
and sometimes conflicting meanings generated by our framing or contextualizing of 
their oral narratives in new ways.
19 
 
Sometimes theory turns feminist on us without warning. In my vision for an ideal 
world, it would be a pleasant surprise to have someone point that out to us. In the 
meantime, reflection, not fear, ought to surround our decision to call a thing 
‘feminism.’ 
Common-sense Feminist Theory 
Carolyn Steedman writes: 
[The] tension between the stories told to me as a child, the diffuse and timeless 
structure of the case study with which they are presented, and the compulsions of 
historical explanation, is no mere rhetorical device. There is a real problem, a real 
tension here that I cannot resolve...
20 
 
Every day, people interpret and contemplate the meaning of life.
21 Every day, many 
women interpret and contemplate the meaning of their own suffering or happiness. As 
Steedman points out in the above statement, the widely accepted interpretations of 
stories and experiences do not always gel with the micro-interpretations of individual 
people. People commonly adapt the accepted interpretation of a story, manipulating 
that interpretation so that it fits more comfortably with their knowledge of existence. In 
other words, we carve ourselves into the big story in a way that makes our own 
existence more habitable – curdling and transforming the story as we go. We are “after 
all, only people doing a limited best with what life handed out to [us]: trying to have a 
modestly good time.”
22 So we use our sixth sense: ‘common-sense’
23 – that is, the 
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understandings of situations that are common to a people. Some might say common 
sense is simply the hegemonic interpretation, or the interpretation we’re supposed to 
make. However, Prell reminds us of the way people bend and adjust the grand 
narratives of their culture: 
Robert Redfield drew a distinction between the ‘great tradition’ and the ‘little tradition’ 
...the great tradition was upheld by the literati. It was the written, elite, self-conscious 
body of knowledge of an often urbanized priesthood...the little tradition coexisted with 
that elite formulation. The ideas of the folk, their beliefs and practices thought of as 
superstitious by the priesthood...Great and little traditions were connected and mutually 
effecting...the idea of two traditions...[allows us] to explain how individuals continue to 
place themselves in a great story even when they alter it, often beyond recognition.
24 
 
Women bend the official words on sexism and feminism in the same way. Common 
sense doesn’t usually involve saying anything completely radical or revolutionary, but 
nor does it mean accepting the oppressive ideology of capitalist patriarchy. 
Common-sense feminist theory is made up essentially of mutations of the 
official word. It includes the folklore of contemporary western society: proverbs, 
sentiments and sayings we use daily, ‘naughty’ thoughts and diarising, jokes, reverse 
sexism, backchat, laughing up stereotypes, and practicing these stereotypes to ironic 
excess. What distinguishes these things from the more usual interpretation of such 
things as false consciousness is that women – and I’m sure people in general – often (I 
cannot vouch for always) use this common-sense theory knowingly, consciously, and 
shrewdly. Feminist theorists tend to assume that common sense is a rehashing or blind 
spouting of those things we hear and repeat on a daily basis. It is not always so. It is not 
even frequently so. Rather, these common-sensical things are (more often than not) 
meta-sexism or meta-feminism: thoughts on, or critique of, the ‘isms’ through laughter 
or pragmatism. For instance, I received the following piece on why it’s good to be a 
woman via email: 
New lipstick gives us a whole new lease on life. 
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If we’re not making enough money we can blame the glass ceiling. 
If we’re dumb, some people will find it cute. 
If we cheat on our spouse, people assume it’s because we’re being emotionally 
neglected. 
We have an excuse to be a total bitch at least once a month.
25 
 
Whether or not it was written by a woman is irrelevant. The fact is that many women 
read it and feel a resonance with it. It pokes fun at men and at women – yet the piece is 
somehow more complicated than, and as simple as, that. It pokes fun at the 
expectations we place on each other as men and women – at the stereotypes and gender 
tensions. The piece presupposes common sense. It expects an understanding of how to 
read it: with humour and recognition, with rue and rolling eyes. Women read it and 
laugh, but we are laughing at the simultaneous gravity and stupidity of gender 
expectations. We are laughing because we recognise ourselves in those expectations, as 
well as recognise ourselves messing about with those expectations.  
A good example of common-sense feminism is Elizabeth Wurtzel’s book Bitch: 
in Praise of Difficult Women.
26 Wurtzel makes the revolutionary claim that nasty, 
miserable, difficult women are actually okay. She suggests that these women have 
often chosen to be that way in a society that contradictorily values good-girl behaviour 
but tends to reward bad-girl behaviour. However, Wurtzel insists that bad things 
usually happen to bad girls. Not in the simplistic sense that some people say, “If you 
dress and act like that, you should expect to be sexually harassed,” but in a much more 
complicated way that ties in with a sexist reality. Wurtzel recovers for feminism the 
women who didn’t know what they wanted, who were confused and angry, who 
messed up, and who walked into their own dire consequences. For Wurtzel, these 
women are the ones neither patriarchy nor feminism were able to rescue – patriarchy 
couldn’t make them behave themselves and feminism couldn’t make them be 
reasonable. Nicole Brown Simpson is one of Wurtzel’s examples. Nicole empowered 
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herself to escape an abusive marriage and rebuild her life, but she also flirted with 
dumb, unfeminist decisions like repeatedly returning to O.J., breast augmentation, and 
accepting trophy wifedom as a career. Wurtzel asks why Nicole made these choices, 
exploring the contradictory forces in her life that tempted her to make the bad choices 
that culminated in her murder. But Wurtzel also rebukes the mentality that casts Nicole 
as purely a victim, claiming in her chapter, “I Used to Love Her but I had to Kill Her,” 
that Nicole played out her life in a way that led to her fate as inevitably as any 
Shakespearean tragic hero. The implication is similar (although not necessarily 
identical) to the common-sense injunctions we all hear from our parents: if you’re 
going to act a certain way, accept the consequences. Be accountable for your fate and 
take control of your choices. 
Wurtzel’s message simultaneously affirms and confounds both patriarchal and 
feminist thought. She explicates and criticizes the dangerous and oppressive systems 
that allow women to get themselves into bad situations, but she drags these women 
back from the status of utter victim. Wurtzel resists an uncomplicated view of male-
female power relations in the same way that people using their ‘common sense’ do. To 
give another example, the following statement made by a woman interviewed for a 
documentary on women’s suffrage makes use of existing stereotypes and expectations, 
but makes a radical statement of female superiority: “Women run a home, and if the 
country was run a bit more like a home, things might run a bit smoother,” the woman 
says.
27 Common-sense feminism frequently makes an in-depth and powerful 
assessment of women’s positions in society, drawing on ideals from a variety of 
sources, including those from feminism. It shows: 
…with what creativity people may use the stuff of cultural and social stereotype, so 
that it becomes not a series of labels applied from outside a situation, but a set of 
metaphors ready for transformation by those who are its subjects.
28 
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Common-sense feminist theory is that which we cannot be told by experts, that which 
we create for ourselves, and that which we cannot in good conscience deny – in spite of 
the chasm between our own common-sense knowing and the ‘official word.’ 
Optimistic feminist theory 
I want to say something amazing. Even without ideals, or a vision of the future, 
staying true to the reality of feminism when writing actually forbids pessimism. If 
reality were simply sexism, feminism wouldn’t exist. Sexism and feminism have a 
relationship that feeds back and forth. Sexism tries continually for mastery over 
feminism; feminism reacts continually to sexism’s mastery. China Galland explains the 
tension between reality’s misery and its pleasures: “It is in this grappling to remain 
affiliated, to keep the community intact, to include suffering, that we find grace – not 
hope, but grace.”
29 I love her idea of grace – dignity, wisdom and alertness within 
injustice. But I think that we find hope, too. Grace is dealing with reality of sexism and 
feminism. Grace is realism. Hope is striving further. Hope is finding happiness, either 
in realism or through idealism. Optimism is possible with just the bare bones of our 
own realities today. The hope is located in the grace. Unfortunately, we often mistake 
optimism for naivety. Janice Raymond warns that feminists ought to avoid a “quietistic 
confidence”
30 – an expression that conjures the image of women wandering through 
patriarchy with expressions of vacuous happiness on their faces. Awareness and 
analysis of the reality of women’s suffering “serve as correctives to a shallow 
sentimentalism”
31 that optimism might otherwise become. However: 
…one-dimensional emphasis on the ‘State of Atrocity’ in feminist literature, in 
feminist organizing, and in women’s sharing of experiences can inadvertently impress 
women with the fact, almost like reinforcing a painful ancestral memory, that woman is 
for man…
32 
                                                 
29 Galland, China. The Bond Between Women: A Journey to Fierce Compassion. Rydalmere, NSW: 
Hodder Headline, 1998. 257. 
30 Raymond. 210. 
31 Raymond. 211. 
32 Raymond. 23. Wasley 237 
 
I am sure that Raymond does not mean here that woman actually is for man; rather, she 
is saying that women’s suffering is based on the ideology that woman is for man. 
However, women usually know we are not for men. Theory that supposes we are for 
men, even in order to disrupt this idea, is pessimistically predicating itself on an 
illusion that most women do not share. Optimism resides in the very real fact that many 
women, despite their decisions and actions, understand our independence of men, and 
our ultimate autonomy. 
So, what exactly is optimistic feminist theory? Optimistic works come in two 
varieties. There are those that present us with strategies and describe advances in 
women’s resistance. The book I’m Not Mad I’m Angry: Women Look at Psychiatry
33 is 
an example of this kind of optimism. This book contains work on the dreadful 
experiences of women in mental institutions, as well as recommendations for women’s 
therapy and writing about women’s ‘madness.’ Such works usually count as ‘proper’ 
feminist theory. Another example is Janice Raymond’s A Passion for Friends. This 
book is a positive discussion of hetero-normative, homosocial and lesbian relationships 
between women today and in history. See also Pauline Bart’s work on the avoidance of 
rape, which she describes in her essay, “Being a Feminist Academic.”
34 Then there is 
the second kind of optimistic feminism: feminist works with happy endings. Happy 
endings, while desirable and enjoyable, are somewhat rare and definitely suspicious as 
feminist theory. It is much more appropriate for official feminist theorists to conclude 
their writing with humility, disparaging their own imperfect methodologies or 
inadequate representations, or even with a timely warning to the reader to go about 
their own feminist theorising with vigilance and prudence. To finish by saying, “I did 
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all these things – I talked about all this sexism and feminism, and now I’m damn proud, 
and hey, look at the great person I’ve become,” is unthinkable – even frightening. A 
Creole SISTREN Theatre Collective member describes her own happy ending: 
All my life, me did haffi act in order to survive. Di fantasies and ginnalship were ways 
of coping wid di frustration. Now me can put dat pain on stage and mek fun a di people 
who cause it.
35 
 
The function (a function that is often unintentional) of the feminist happy ending is a 
vital one for feminist theory: it is inspiration. Happy-ending feminism encourages 
women by example to use analyses of their own sexist realities in positive ways. China 
Galland does this in her book The Bond Between Women. The book is about Galland’s 
spiritual quest, but a large part of the story is taken up with coming to terms with 
oppressive realities: her own childhood rape, child prostitution in India; the 
unwillingness of anyone but mothers of ‘the disappeared’ in Latin America to ask 
questions about what happened to their children. Galland uses the inspiration of strong 
women’s activism and altruism, and the wisdom she draws from various spiritual 
teachings, to cope with these real sufferings in practical and useful ways. For instance, 
analysing her own assault in terms of her rapist’s self-delusion and her own capacity 
for peace of mind and forgiveness enables her to confront and reconcile with the man 
who raped her as a child, without for a moment condoning or even understanding the 
act. Galland gets somewhere. She doesn’t just make moves towards closure, or initiate 
a journey – she works something through, and offers us the wisdom of her own 
resolution.  
In Don’t Take Your Love to Town,
36 Ruby Langford also writes optimistic 
feminism. An Australian Aboriginal woman, Langford has written a book about her 
personal life that is also about feminism and politics. But it has a happy ending. 
Langford loses three of her children in heartbreaking circumstances. She writes about 
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being unable to read, and stuck for words for days after reading a report on black deaths 
in custody when her own son was in gaol.
37 And yet, while on a journey with her sisters 
to the place she was born, Langford can listen to the song “Ruby, Don’t Take Your 
Love to Town,” and think over her many pregnancies and failed relationships and 
abusive partners. Her sisters look at her “sideways,” but Ruby fronts up in a moment of 
self-reflection: “I turned on a high black mama voice and patted my chest. ‘I took my 
love to town too many times!’ and burst out laughing.”
38 This joke is a thrilling 
political gesture! However, the blurb on the book makes no mention of political 
resistance: Langford’s story is simply “the ultimate battler’s tale.” The interpretation of 
Don’t Take your Love to Town as an inspirational and optimistic feminist text is beyond 
the publisher’s imagining. For a final example, one of this thesis’ interviewees, Kerry 
Allan, kept a journal throughout a messy and painful divorce during which her ex-
husband threatened and abused her. She is now a successful professional in a happy 
relationship. She hopes to publish her journal, and use her own experiences of suffering 
and strength as a resource for women in similar situations: something that will help 
these women know they are not alone, and to help them see the light at the end of the 
tunnel. However, such texts usually receive recognition only as texts for feminist 
review and analysis. I contend that inspiration is a relevant political gesture in a cynical 
era prone to the production of texts that act as harsh correctives to confidence and 
optimism within the women’s movement. 
Pragmatic feminist theory 
  Pragmatic feminist theory generally comes in the form of instructions. We are 
often unable to extend these instructions to other situations. They range from the advice 
given by a friend, to pamphlets and other bureaucratic literature, to the financial advice 
of a divorce lawyer. They might conflict with the official ‘feminist line’ on a subject, 
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but they count as theory because they indicate a considered feminist position on sexism 
or resistance. However, instructions do not usually count as ‘proper’ feminist theory 
because they are foremost, non-scholarly, but also practical, concrete, direct slices of 
information. Often, they are informal and impromptu, as in friendly advice (“You can’t 
stay in this relationship. He’s abusing you, for God’s sake!”). Sometimes they can be 
cynical and negative, as in a statement such as “If you’re after work in the male-
dominated meatworkers industry, I advise you not to bother.” These still constitute 
statements of feminist analysis. At times, pragmatic feminist theory does not seem 
particularly intellectual, and even slips into the much-maligned (within feminism) 
realm of psychotherapy.
39 (Recall how irate I was to discover feminist texts in the 
‘Self-Help’ section at my local bookshop?) Self-help books for women dealing with 
problems such as depression may fall into this category. Below I have produced a list 
of examples of pragmatic feminist theory to illustrate these points. 
Instructions: 
•  If you wish to write, and you are a woman, make sure you have a room of your 
own and five hundred pounds a year.
40 
•  Look, you’ve got to sit down with him, right? Sit down with him and tell him, 
“I’m not happy with they way things are right now.” You’ve got to explain that, 
as you get older, you’ve gotten more assertive – you’re not going to sit back and 
take his rudeness and criticism anymore. And as you get even older, you’ll get 
even more assertive. That’s why you’re having these arguments all the time – 
because you won’t take it anymore. I swear, it will bust you up if you let it go 
on. He can’t get away with it forever. I understand that it’s his insecurities 
making him act this way, but you’re fed up, aren’t you? I mean, how long are 
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you going to let him hide behind his own lack of confidence? Sit down with 
him, all right? 
•  Me: So how do you think that we could write about feminism in a way that still 
makes a push for change, but still reaches women? 
Narelle: Presentation is a big thing, I think. Ease of language. Case studies. 
Like I said, women are so interested in case studies. I find that, often if I’m 
flicking through a book, I’ll stop if there’s a case study. If it says like ‘Susan, 
54’ up the top, then I’ll read that… 
Me: So, case studies. 
Narelle: I think are really good. 
S: What can they show, though? I guess that we’re not isolated. 
Narelle: Yeah!…I don’t know how you’d present them. I mean, I think if you 
look at what a topic in your chapter is about; like if you’re doing ‘abuse,’ or if 
you’re ‘clitoridectomies,’ or if you’re doing um... 
Me: Okay, let me give you some of my topics, and let me show you how 
difficult it would be to do a case study! Okay...writing about the backlash in 
feminism, and whether or not it actually exists, which is something I’m going to 
be talking about. I personally think that it’s been overplayed, or played up as an 
excuse for why women aren’t interested in feminism. 
Narelle: Mm. I think you could present case studies of that perhaps if you talk 
to women…who do feel that feminism doesn’t apply to them anymore, and ask 
them some questions, and say to them, “Look, what about this issue? What 
about women not getting equal pay here? What about there being such a 
percentage of women in education and such a percentage of them in 
administration, which is a big disparity? What about those sorts of things? Do 
you think those sorts of things apply to you?” Different things like that. Bring it Wasley 242 
up, and say to them, “Well, consider.”
41 
•  Before you begin, make sure you have something to drink and if you so desire, 
a snack and something to read or the remote control! I prefer just to watch my 
baby during feeding times though. It's a great time for eye contact. Make sure 
you're in a comfortable environment with lots of pillows. A Boppy is an 
excellent U-shaped pillow that goes around your waist and supports your arms 
or your baby.  I like to nurse in a quiet, dark, area if possible as babies tend to 
be more responsive when there are fewer distractions. Newborns especially tend 
to dislike bright lights and will fall asleep if the room is too lit. If your baby 
falls asleep and doesn’t finish eating, you may want to undress her down to her 
diaper for feeding time. Of course wrap a blanket around the both of you so that 
she won’t become chilled. Also, tickling her feet is a good way to keep her 
awake. Do not tickle her chin or cheeks during a feed though as this triggers her 
rooting reflex and she’ll let go and turn her head…When latching on, tickle the 
baby’s chin or the side of her cheek. Wait for her to open her mouth really wide. 
If it doesn’t look wide enough, just wait and then when her mouth is as wide as 
it can be, bring her to your breast. Do not lean over and put your breast into her 
mouth that way, as you’ll develop a backache over time. If you feel really 
uncomfortable or something hurts, slip your pinkie finger into the corner of her 
mouth to break the suction and start over. The baby shouldn't be sucking on 
your nipple but on the areola, the dark tissue around the nipple. The nipple itself 
should be way back along the roof of the baby’s mouth.
42 
•  The use of male (or sex-specific) terms for generic situations is one form of 
generalization, one of our sexist problems. However, there is another aspect to 
the same problem: the use of generic terms for sex-specific situations, which is 
                                                 
41 Wasley, Narelle. Personal interview. 10 March 2000. 
42 Andrews, Christy. Email to the author. 13 September 2003. Wasley 243 
just as problematic as is the first manifestation. For example, if researchers talk 
about workers in general while only having studied male workers (constantly 
and cautiously using ‘they,’ ‘people,’ ‘the individual,’ ‘the person,’ and so on, 
with nary a female in sight), they simply replace one sexist problem with 
another in the manner in which language is used…In other words, when the 
content is sex specific, the language used should also be sex specific.
43 
•  Breathe in. Breathe out. Imagine your unhappy thought in a clear bubble. Allow 
it to float away… 
Pop Feminist Theory 
What do I mean by popular feminist theory? Widely read works, such as 
autobiographies and novels, as well as works that appear in mainstream genre, like 
television and music videos, film, radio, Internet discussion forums, chat rooms, and 
websites. These things do not count as feminist theory because, in the minds of many 
academics, popularity precludes a radical position. As Marlene LeGates puts it: 
“feminism ceases to be feminism, when it fails to offer a radical alternative to the status 
quo.”
44 After all, if popular theory could also be pertinent feminist theory, where would 
that leave the academic, with her years of training in high theory and abstract thought? 
The academic who calls popular writing a thinking work of feminist theory is 
(hypothetically speaking) doing herself out of a job! Feminists stand at a fork in the 
road when we write: we must choose between “popular success and the struggle for 
literary status.”
45 The academic view of popular feminist writing, therefore (even when 
it is thinking feminism), is that it can’t cut the mustard as an intellectual analysis of the 
ways sexism and resistance work. Academics rarely refer to these works in intellectual 
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debate or writing, except perhaps to disparage or to analyse as a phenomenon/raw data. 
They certainly do not use them to support their arguments, or to argue against as a 
respectable critical position.  
Lyn Thomas and Emma Webb carry out an interesting experiment in their 
article, “The Place of the Personal in French Feminist Writing,” on the fiction writers 
Marie Cardinal and Annie Ernaux. Cardinal and Ernaux are French feminists who write 
in a personal but not academic style “which attempts to speak more directly to an 
audience.”
46 Thomas and Webb compare these books’ reception by “women 
journalists, both in the mainstream press, and in women’s magazines,”
47 with that by 
the academic world. Not surprisingly, Thomas and Webb find that, whilst the 
mainstream press “produced almost entirely positive reviews”
48 of Ernaux’s Passion 
Perfect, scholarly writing on the books is relatively scarce: 
The MLA database (1981-97) produced a list of sixteen articles and one book on 
Ernaux ... For Cardinal, nineteen articles and two books were listed. In comparison, in 
the same period, the MLA listed 150 entries for Irigaray, and 226 for Cixous.
49 
 
(Irigaray and Cixous are, of course, ‘genuine’ feminist theorists.) The mainstream 
popularity of Ernaux’s and Cardinal’s novels effectively slaps a ‘co-opted’ sticker on 
them. Kathleen Karlyn noted a similar reaction to her work on popular feminist 
television icons: 
Recently I spoke to a large group of academics and other professionals who work with 
girls about the ways such media icons as Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Xena Warrior 
Princess and the Spice Girls challenge familiar representations of femininity by 
affirming female friendship, agency and physical power.  While my audience was 
entertained by my examples, many could not see past the violence, overt sexuality and 
commercialism in the clips I showed and in fact were troubled by my argument.
50 
 
Popularity is suspicious because, in the official feminist imagination, feminism cannot 
be that which is mainstream – it is only that which is against the mainstream. The 
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mainstream comes to stand for anything patriarchal, sexist or oppressive; and anything 
that suggests patriarchy in popular texts simply confirms the suspicion of feminist 
theorists. Many feminists have even adopted the term ‘malestream’ to talk about 
conventional practices/theories/research.
51 For many official feminist theorists, 
mainstream feminist theory is a contradiction in terms. 
  The one criterion for popular feminism is that it is widely circulated. Wide 
circulation happens when a piece is accessible. For many people, there are two main 
things that make theory accessible: a pop context and colourful language. The pop 
contexts I am referring to include the Internet, television, radio, music, high-selling 
publications (novels, magazines, self-help manuals, etc.) and anything else that has 
currency and a wide audience in contemporary Western culture. Cyberfeminism has 
comics, zines and all the riot grrrl sites,
52 which, as Kathleen Hanna’s original 
manifesto claims, exist: 
BECAUSE we are angry at a society that tells us Girl=Dumb, Girl=Bad, Girl=Weak.  
BECAUSE we are unwilling to let our real and valid anger be diffused and/or turned 
against us via the internalization of sexism as witnessed in girl/girl jealousy and self 
defeating girltype behaviors.  
BECAUSE I believe with my wholeheartmindbody that girls constitute a revolutionary 
soul force that can, and will change the world for real.
53 
 
Cinema has films like Thelma & Louise
54 and Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon
55. 
Television has sitcom characters like Lisa Simpson,
56 comediennes like Judith Lucy, 
and funny little low-budget series like Life Support.
57 Music has Bikini Kill, Ani 
DiFranco, Tori Amos, Hole, No Doubt and even Spice-esque girlpower. Print has 
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books like Naomi Wolf’s The Beauty Myth,
58 Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Bitch,
59 Alix Kates 
Shulman’s Memoirs of an Ex-Prom Queen,
60 Helen Garner’s The First Stone,
61 and 
Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale.
62 
   As for colourful language, I don’t mean it in the usual sense;
63 rather, I mean 
language that is interesting and fun, funny and human, warm and passionate. Colourful 
language is not the sum total of popular feminist theory, but it is certainly the most 
common factor. More than a rejection of the jargon and big words that characterise 
official feminist theory, colourful language embraces features as simple as italics and 
expressive punctuation. However, my referencing manual
64 warns me that, “Italics for 
emphasis…is a device that rapidly becomes ineffective. It is rarely appropriate in 
research writing.”
65 Similarly, when I was at the editing stage in my honours thesis, my 
supervisor crossed out an exclamation mark. Another editor, equally immersed in 
academia, but with a different point of view, crossed out my supervisor’s crossing out. 
She recognised that sometimes, when writing, we experience emotions, private smirks 
and recollections that we want to share. It’s valuable to share these, because they make 
the writing mean something. Bells of recognition and understanding go off in the 
reader’s head. Narelle Wasley is enthusiastic about colourful language in popular books 
about gender: 
Well those books are fun! They’ve got cartoons in them; they’re written in simple 
language; they’ve got gags; they’ve got case studies, which women love – you know, 
they love to read a real story about a real person. And they’re accessible to men too, 
cause they’ve got funny things. You know, like the brain hemisphere – for men, the 
‘fart section’s’ like, that big, and in women the ‘fart detection section’ is, like, that 
big…
66  
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Wasley goes on to say that she would not think “to go out and buy them [canonical 
feminist texts] because, you know, I’d much rather go out and spend fifteen dollars on a 
nice fantasy book, that I’ll read again and again.”
67 The “nice fantasy book,” while 
Wasley’s personal preference, represents that which official feminist theory cannot 
provide for many of its readers: pleasure. Reading pleasure makes colourfully written 
feminist theory popular. 
Funky ex-breakfast radio presenter Helen Razer made a speech at Sydney 
University: “Antagonism as Therapy.”
68 Her speech is about feminism in the younger 
generation – how it manifests as hard-nosed cleverness, audacity, and an I-know-how 
attitude to negotiating the world. It is an idea many contemporary feminist scholars are 
working on, theorised as the shift from ‘second wave’ to DIY feminism.
69 But Razer 
says it this way: 
I rub my eyes every day and I’m starting to see a new kind of kick. I went to see Iggy 
Pop and there were women at his side...grungy little babes of no more than fifteen 
who’d outrun the boofy bouncers to join him briefly at the microphone to scream ‘Lust 
for Life’...No boy will mess with these rock and roll juniors. And if they do, they’d 
better watch out...cos when they take their penile pole projections and play at plugging 
them in to a nurturing feminine desk, the women of the heavy metal tomorrow are 
prepared. They have learnt the girlish art of electrocution.
70 
 
Razer’s essay is a pleasure to read – it is my version of one of those fantasy books that 
Narelle Wasley can read “again and again.” I feel like Razer cares about me as a reader 
enough to make her words interesting. What many feminist theorists seem to miss is 
that colourful language works from a position of respect, for both the subject of 
discussion and the audience. The respect for the subject translates as a passionate 
interest in, and an attempt to make current, the subject. Respect for the audience 
translates as the presumption that they can cope with the ideas presented, no matter 
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what their academic background, and an attempt to make the subject interesting for 
them. 
Post-feminist Theory 
HUGE DISCLAIMER: I don’t identify as a post-feminist.
71 I refer here to the 
version of ‘post-feminism’ that assumes we have reached the period after feminism, 
and that feminism is no longer necessary.
72 I don’t think we live in a post-feminist age. 
I live and breathe feminism and see its vitality and necessity everywhere I look. As 
Susan Douglas puts it: 
I would think it [post-feminism] would refer to a time when complete gender equality 
has been achieved. That hasn’t happened, of course, but we (especially young women) 
are supposed to think it has. Postfeminism, as a term, suggests that women have made 
plenty of progress because of feminism, but that feminism is now irrelevant and even 
undesirable because it has made millions of women unhappy, unfeminine, childless, 
lonely, and bitter, prompting them to fill their closets with combat boots and really bad 
India print skirts.
73 
 
I am not a post-feminist. But I certainly would like to know why I feel the need to put 
that disclaimer there. Post-feminism is a dirty word in ‘pure’ feminist politics. 
Feminists baulk at the idea that we are in a post-feminist world: “To say that feminism 
is over and that postfeminism means that we don’t have to fight for our rights anymore 
since it’s all cool now because we’re equal is wrong because we’re not.”
74 So where, if 
at all, do post-feminist writers fit into feminist theory? Believe it or not, I think this 
form of post-feminism does have a place in feminist theory. Just because I don’t agree 
with it, doesn’t mean that post-feminism is invalid or a backlash-derived smokescreen. 
Intelligent women are theorising feminism, and theorising that feminism is no longer 
necessary (or no longer necessary as it was formerly practiced). That in itself is 
significant, and to ignore or dismiss such claims would be, once again, disrespectful 
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and limiting. 
Therefore, I propose the somewhat radical idea that post-feminism does, in fact, 
count as feminist theory – feminist theory that is glad, proud, and even satisfied with 
the contemporary state of feminism. Often, feminists mistake this kind of feminist 
theory for complacency and false consciousness. The common understanding is that 
women who make post-feminist theory don’t see a broader picture of women’s 
suffering. However, little attention is paid to the fact that many of the sanguine 
statements about gender are written in relative terms: that is, these statements make 
some kind of comparison with a time or place in which women had/have very little 
control over our lives. Documentary street interviews yield comments like: “Women 
didn’t have that right centuries ago,” “A bit of power ... I don’t think we had a lot of 
that back then,” “I think there’s equity now,” and “More ‘say’ than we used to.”
75 This 
kind of feminist theory might also make claims about the opportunities available to 
women in Western culture, or in the contemporary period. “I can make changes for my 
daughter,” said one woman interviewed. Narelle Wasley comments, “[In some 
fundamentalist Muslim societies] little girls can get raped and be stoned to death and 
things like that…And you think, well, god, we are lucky.”
76 These statements do not 
necessarily suggest that we have no further to go, or that all’s right with the world for 
women. In an interview with Narelle Wasley, we discussed popular books on gender 
(Raising Boys, Why Men Don’t Listen and Why Women Can’t Read Maps, etc). I 
questioned and requestioned her about the political worth of such texts. My sister 
explained and re-explained that writing about the present state of gender was actually 
political because it accounts for and accepts how women and men’s social lives have 
changed because of feminism. It is only now, years later, that I ‘get’ what she was 
talking about: 
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Me: Do you think, though, that it’s actually furthering the cause of women’s value 
being improved in society? 
Narelle: No. It’s not the aim. That’s not the aim, and that’s not what it’s doing. 
Me: It’s just exploring gender in a fun way? 
Narelle: That’s right, it’s just exploring gender, and letting you know how men’s 
brains work and how women’s brains work, and how that distance can be shortened. It 
can never really meet; never the twain shall meet, but there are times when you can 
communicate and be effective and understand each other and... 
Me: So it deals with life and society as it is now, but it doesn’t actually make any push 
for change. 
Narelle: No. Well, the push for change is that we’ve got to this point, men and 
women’s roles have changed, the lines have blurred, the guy doesn’t just go out and 
work anymore; the woman just doesn’t stay at home and do the housekeeping anymore 
... roles are swapping: how do you deal with that? How do you still communicate with 
each other when it’s the wife coming home and saying, ‘hey honey, I’m home and I’m 
hungry’? Rather than the husband always coming home and saying that, and how do 
you cope with those differences? And especially – I think – helpful, because families 
are smaller. And like us coming from a family with not a lot of men, and we don’t 
understand how they think. And it helps me to understand how [my husband] thinks, or 
how any man thinks. And it helps me with my students. 
Me: So, they’re helpful, but not promoting some kind of revolution, or something... 
Narelle:  No, no, I don’t think they promote revolution. I think that the only revolution 
that they promote in a subtle way is that if men and women understand each other and 
they’re more thoughtful of each other, people will be kinder to each other. You know? 
You start being unkind to each other, and that’s when things go downhill. You know, 
you’re off having affairs…you’re beating each other up…
77 
 
In my understanding of feminist theory at the time, there was simply no way to include 
such complacency in the realm of feminism. I returned doggedly to the point that the 
books don’t talk about future change, determined to ignore my sister’s attempt to point 
out that, sometimes, such theory is working with what feminism has already achieved. 
How doggedly will some readers of this section of my thesis insist that such 
feminist theory is a ruse – that I have been tricked as have so many before me, into 
accepting the status quo of women’s suffering? I don’t think women are that ignorant. I 
think of much post-feminism as glee rather than ignorance – a kind of ongoing wicked 
joy in an inner knowledge. The knowledge is that change has already occurred, and that 
it is happening now. As Janice Raymond puts it, “the more that endeavor is 
transformed into existence, the more one is ‘life-glad.’”
78 Accepting life-gladness as 
feminist theory is one of the toughest things I can ask feminists to do. After all, is not 
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the very premise of feminism, as I explain it, resistance to women’s suffering? Where is 
post-feminism’s understanding of women’s continued suffering? But there is another 
way to look at it: I think that there is something quite profoundly heartening about the 
fact that many women, even young women, feel contentment and find happiness 
(however contingent and limited) in the state of gender today. Oughtn’t feminism also 
encompass the distance we have come to end women’s suffering – that is, the here and 
now of feminist success? “The world is more than men have made of it,” says 
Raymond.
79 Discussion, analysis, and pride in what women have made of the world up 
to this point, also counts as feminist theory. 
Suspect Feminist Theory 
I’ve saved the most difficult section for last. I think the best way into this 
section is to discuss representation, because it seems to result in enormous suspicion 
amongst feminist theorists. Representation is the way we talk about a topic – women, 
for instance; all women, everywhere; women as a group. For thousands of years it was 
good enough to talk about women as women. Then certain thinking men
80 started to say 
that language can only ever be a means for expressing reality – and a means laden with 
specific cultural beliefs at that. Language cannot express reality in its pure form. From 
there, the idea of a ‘pure form’ of reality started to fall apart, and the most popular 
philosophical view now is that culture and language make our realities. That is, people 
make their realities – reality is not there first.
81 Neither language nor reality can be 
trusted, which makes representing women a tricky business. Since these revelations, 
almost all we’ve done in the humanities is wonder how to represent people and events. 
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We know we can’t do it perfectly, so we try various strategies to do it in the most 
accurate way possible. 
To start with, what makes a woman?
82 Is it the ability to bear children? Breasts? 
A vagina? Or something less tangible, like ‘womanliness,’ nurturance, emotivity and 
tenderness? Is it her psychosexual development: passivity and penis envy? Or is it 
simply the way she is socialized to be a little carer, to be neat, helpful, obedient and 
needy? Any set or combination of these beliefs can be said to make a woman. There is, 
in other words, no one, true, pure thing that makes a woman. However, early feminist 
theorists
83 had to start talking about female oppression somewhere, and the place they 
started was in a fairly confident assertion that there was such a biological and social 
thing as ‘women.’ Unfortunately, this assertion was quickly denounced as ‘essentialist.’ 
The slipperiness of the word ‘woman’ makes it very difficult for feminist theorists to 
feel comfortable with writing about a universal ‘woman.’ Moreover, the pressure that 
trends in social theory place on feminist theorists to account for this slipperiness makes 
us even more tentative about discussing ‘women.’ As Nina Baym puts it: 
Feminist [literary] theory addresses an audience of prestigious male academics and 
attempts to win its respect. It succeeds…only when it ignores or dismisses the earlier 
paths of feminist literary study as ‘naïve’ and grounds its own theories in those 
currently in vogue.
84 
 
As feminist writers, we feel like we must try to avoid predicating ‘woman/women’ on 
any of the known criteria for being a woman altogether. We must account endlessly for 
difference, as is the popular push in theoretical writing. 
It is hard to write about real, stable forms of oppression when the oppressed 
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subject of your writing is neither real nor stable itself. This problem must seem insane 
to those outside the sphere of academic social theory. I assure you, sometimes it seems 
insane to academics as well. Certain feminist theorists question the increasingly 
prevalent recourse to post-structuralist theory to analyse and describe the world. Judith 
Evans, in an analysis of Joan Scott’s post-structuralist reading of a famous sexual 
discrimination court case,
85 is puzzled as to “why we should need a technique called 
deconstruction, a theory called poststructuralism, to understand a legal case.”
86 Evans 
implies that other forms of theorising are also available and sufficient for feminist 
analysis. On the other hand, Rosi Braidotti calls attention to “the theoretical complexity 
and the subversive potential of post-structuralist philosophy,” and warns against 
“replacing them with a generalized nostalgia for humanistic ideals.”
87 I certainly do not 
wish to dismiss post-structuralist principles because I draw heavily on these myself.
88 
In the case of representation, many feminists take Braidotti’s warning on board and 
decide that, despite the fact that representation is necessary, imperfect representation is 
as good as it gets. Such feminists tend to write with the knowledge, often made explicit, 
that we write in a moment of time, that our writing is not an ultimate truth, and that it is 
just part of a bigger conversation between feminists. They may talk about keeping 
representation in motion, and never letting it sink into stasis.
89 Often, this kind of 
theorist chooses a representation that does not harm too many women, and goes with it 
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in order to get somewhere.
90 In other words, these theorists choose a representation that 
is adequate rather than accurate. Kamala Visweswaran warns that this attitude of 
“success-in-failure”
91 can be a cop out from trying to achieve a more ethically sound 
way of writing about women. But she goes on to quote Gayatri Spivak, explaining that 
we must be able “to question the authority of the investigating subject without 
paralyzing her.”
92 However, we do increasingly paralyse ourselves; we are more and 
more reluctant to choose a representation of women to work with, even when we know 
it’s not the be-all and end-all of ‘woman.’ 
An example of adequate representation (which uses but does not drown in post-
structuralism) is the way some feminists work with the idea of ‘essential woman’ – not 
to debunk it as a myth, or even to make claims for the Truth of a female essence – but 
to say, yes, many women have certain traits, and the way society values these traits has 
got to change. In diverse ways, theorists such as Mary Daly,
93 Luce Irigaray
94 and 
Helene Cixous
95 all valorise the ‘feminine.’ Negative associations with ‘the feminine’ 
are revised: fickleness might become flexibility; passivity becomes pacifism; 
irrationality becomes the ability to see from every angle, and dependence becomes 
intimacy and responsiveness. Many feminists
96 baulk at what appears to be an 
assignation of personality traits to an entire sex. However, whether or not you agree 
with this perspective, you have to admire it for its no-nonsense approach to the ethical 
problem of representation – it is an approach that feminists can work with and from, 
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embracing and defending their ‘womanhood’ instead of trying to be like men in order 
to get equal recognition. Women will, after all, inevitably be shunted into the categories 
of slut, bitch, angel, ballbreaker, no matter how we try to resist them. A woman might 
do things so varied and unexpected that there is no way to accurately represent her 
through these categories, but never fear – society will still try. Therefore, there is room 
for a politically and theoretically strategic position which valorises traits specific to 
women. 
However, there is another group of feminist theorists who show no post-
structuralist ‘paralysis’ – no such awareness of, or interest in, post-structuralist theories 
of representation. Such theorists represent women in an untrendily static way, using a 
definition of ‘woman’ that assumes a biological or social (as in socialised) foundation. 
Andrea Dworkin,
97 Catharine MacKinnon
98 and psychoanalytic feminists such as Juliet 
Mitchell
99 come to mind. Whilst we question the representations these feminists use, 
we must remember that they are also doing something quite valid: they are accepting, if 
just for the writing moment, a responsibility to describe and thus represent the ‘women’ 
they are writing about so that they can theorise the oppression and resistance of those 
women. The essentialist approach in no way has the only answer to the representation 
problem – but it certainly provides one way to deal with myths about women. 
Essentialist representations of women are obviously not perfectly accurate. If the 
nurturing and relational qualities are to be attributed to all women, then what do we say 
about women who are not nurturing or relational – what do we say about hard, rational, 
independent and decidedly unmotherly women? However, when used for the purpose 
of questioning female subordination, the essentialist representation works. It is 
adequate. And, for the most part, such theorists run with it, rather than 
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circumnavigating it, bewilderedly trying to make it work for all women, or abandoning 
all hope when it doesn’t. 
  The discussion of representation above shows how notions of being 
theoretically mature/correct/up-to-date allow theorists to criticise and even reject 
feminist theory that doesn’t adopt popular concepts and methods. Although the 
complete list is much longer than I have the space for here, I will recount two or three 
more of these unpopular positions. One of these positions is ‘unsituated writing’ – that 
is, writing from nowhere. This is the “god-trick” of objectivity – of effacing oneself as 
an embodied writer of theory.
100 In order to avoid vilification as a pseudo-omniscient 
narrator, writers often rattle off a few personal details and then consider themselves 
exonerated from fronting up about their situations as writers any further. As Daphne 
Patai says: 
A currently popular strategy is that of ‘situating’ oneself by prior announcement: ‘As a 
white working class heterosexual…,’ or ‘As a black feminist activist…’ Sometimes 
these tropes sound like apologies; more often they are deployed as badges. Either way, 
they give off their own aroma of fraud, for the underlying assumption seems to be that 
by such identification one has paid one’s respects to ‘difference’ – owned up to bias, 
acknowledged privilege, or taken possession of oppression – and is now home free.
101 
 
An honest and faithful account of oneself as writer is preferable to a tokenistic one, but 
what about when there is no such account at all? Must we automatically question the 
work’s argument, research, and integrity as feminist theory?
102 
Similarly, we tend to distance ourselves, as feminist theorists, from radical 
statements of female superiority and man hating. Little consideration is given to how 
feminists use these positions, strategically speaking. Instead, people often talk about 
such positions as ‘letting the side down,’ and blame such extreme politics for the 
backlash against feminism. Emotion, however female-associated, is not an appropriate 
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political stance. Discussing her working class mother in relation to socialist theory, 
Carolyn Steedman describes how: 
Her envy, her sense of the unfairness of things, could not be directly translated into 
political understanding, and certainly could not be used by the left to shape an 
articulated politics of class…Envy as a political motive has always been 
condemned…
103 
 
However, theories based on emotion and anger have a strategic place in feminist 
theory. Further work has been done on negative emotions as theoretical and political 
starting points, but the field is very new and, as yet, little used in feminism (work done 
on shame, for instance, is usually located in the fields of psychology and 
psychotherapy).
104 Generally, feminist theorists still cringe slightly when women make 
claims like: “[Without the vote] you’re just a servant to the male race,” and “In the dark 
ages women were treated as subhuman.”
105 “Do you know what it feels like for a girl in 
this world?” asks Madonna as she drives off on a wild spree with an elderly woman, 
running down various men.
106 Such statements cast men as the enemy, but in doing so 
they make a point about living under patriarchy: namely, that oppression can be flesh-
based. That men can and do indeed oppress women. Naming an enemy is, however, 
passé. One must move on to blaming systems and structures to be a feminist theorist to 
be reckoned with. “Feminists do not so much hate men as they hate male-dominated 
socialization that both men and women undergo,” says Leigh Fought, attempting to 
defend feminism from negative stereotypes in the article “Popular Myths make 
Feminism Unpopular with Women.”
107 But the fact is that some feminists do appear to 
hate men, and some cast men as the enemy – and it is all too easy to dismiss what such 
feminists say because man-hating is perceived as so utterly, childishly emotive and 
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outmoded. 
Finally, one of the most common faux pas that makes feminist theory suspect is 
‘equality feminism,’ captured in statements like: “Women are the same as men,” 
“we’re just like men,” “[the vote] shows that women are taken equally and taken 
seriously.”
108 Many feminists treat equality feminism as a red herring of the women’s 
movement, casting the notion that men and women are the same as reductive and 
unfeasible as a premise for feminist work. Helen Lobato claims, “True feminism is 
about liberation, for all human beings, not a search for equality in a flawed system.”
109 
But equality politics has always been a vital part of women’s liberation, allowing for a 
multitude of changes in areas such as family law, suffrage, employment practices, 
sexual harassment education and anti-discrimination policy. Some feminists
110 have 
attempted to resuscitate the concept of equality through critical discussion of ways of 
using the term ‘equality.’ But the very idea of using the term ‘equality’ in a self-evident 
way would raise gasps from many contemporary feminist theorists. There is little 
attempt to go beyond criticism to take seriously feminist theory that uses such ideas. 
So how do we go beyond condemning unpopular/suspect feminist positions as 
‘not feminist?’ Devoney Looser, in an essay about eighteenth century poet and writer 
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, shows how quick we are to discard suspect feminist 
theory, and how counter-productive this practice can be.
111 Looser explores the 
inspirational effect of the historical feminist, Montagu, on her contemporaries, as well 
as modern-day women. But there is a problem with Montagu’s politics: her travel 
writing from her time spent in Turkey is filled with culturally-insensitive descriptions 
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and analysis of Turkish women’s customs, and sentiments that are difficult to reconcile 
with contemporary feminist positions. In recent times, some feminist theorists have 
expressed discomfort over whether or not we can recuperate Montagu’s politics so that 
they sit happily with contemporary feminism.
112 Writers such as Barbara Smith make 
claims about racist politics precluding feminism: “To me,” says Smith, “racist white 
women cannot be said to be actually feminist.”
113 But Looser begins to ask questions 
about the either/or mentality that not only causes feminists to reject suspect works as 
feminism, but also causes feminists to react defensively to such rejection: 
The sense remains in some feminist circles that you are either with us or against us. 
‘With us’ means primarily lauding the female/feminist writers of history, as well as 
recent feminist critics; ‘against us’ means critiquing historical female subjects or 
criticizing other feminists’ work.
114  
 
Patai describes the potential results of this kind of ‘either/or’ feminism thus: 
My fear is that the search – and demand – for feminist purity (of both attitudes and 
identity) will eventually result in a massive rejection of the very important things that 
feminism, broadly speaking, aims to achieve. Today, feminists who have the temerity 
to criticize negative tendencies within feminism risk being automatically placed in the 
enemy camp, thus seeming to swell the ranks of opponents of progressive 
scholarship… Marginalizing friendly critics will not advance the credibility of 
women’s studies or other revisionist scholarship.
115 
 
Nor will it be conducive to the kind of healthy dialogue of differences that characterises 
feminism and that might allow ‘impure’ feminist theory to reside within the boundaries 
of feminism. 
Looser examines the way feminists variously celebrate and condemn Montagu’s 
writing because it simultaneously reflects contemporary feminist ideas, demonstrates 
some elite and racist tendencies, and stands as a beacon and inspiration in the progress 
of feminism from the eighteenth century till now. Some theorists call Montagu a 
heroine; some suggest she is a traitor. Looser asks: “Must Montagu be held up as a 
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politically progressive figure at all costs?”
116 In other words, does feminism have to fit 
all the criteria of a ‘good’ contemporary social movement in order for us to call it 
feminism? Must all of Montagu’s work be nameable as feminism? Or, conversely, if 
she wrote some suspect texts, must we discard her as a feminist icon? Looser suggests 
that we reject such a black-and-white approach: 
Rather than scolding or exonerating her (or any of our predecessors), we might instead 
move toward more complex tasks of shifting, local theorizing, and examining 
complicity as thoroughly as we do resistance.
117 
 
Instead of rejecting a work as feminism because it does not work from popular and 
acceptable feminist positions, perhaps we might become more willing to embrace such 
feminist theory’s accomplishments as comfortably and keenly as we expose its flaws. 
Perhaps we might use ‘suspect’ positions strategically, rather than disposing of them as 
universally flawed and untenable. 
  Over-emphasizing the imperfections of a work or a practice “fosters a policy 
and a style of antiracist, anticlassist, and/or antiheterosexist consciousness and 
behaviour that is based on terrorizing other women in both an intellectual and social 
way.”
118 This guilt tripping is exemplified in this scenario described by a feminist 
scholar in Patai and Koertge’s Professing Feminism: 
I remember the kind of debates we had in my C-R [consciousness-raising] group. There 
was one woman who wore makeup, and we were down on her like a ton of bricks! We 
said it was a betrayal of feminism and so forth. At one point she literally said to us, ‘if 
you’re going to say that I can’t put eye makeup on when I come to this group, you’re 
not going to see me.’ And in fact shortly thereafter she was gone. We didn’t ease up. 
I look back at that now and I’m horrified at myself. I always associate that with 
a form of competitiveness, a kind of pressure to be the most pure and the most 
ideologically untainted…
119 
 
Raymond describes a similar kind of hounding “in women’s groups where some 
women berate other women for racism, classism and/or heterosexism.”
120 Feminist 
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scholars do not need to be in women’s groups to berate other women in this way. In 
fact, feminist theory is rife with guilt tripping. As well as fruitful dialogue about issues 
of race, representation, and any of the other hot potatoes of suspect theory, this guilt 
tripping unfortunately seems regularly to culminate in ultimatum. Feminist theorists are 
quick to point the finger of judgment without first assessing the political goals of the 
suspect theory they are judging. However, there must be a way to find a balance 
between the plaintive voice that asks, “Can’t we all just get along?” and the accusatory 
shriek that commands, “Get thee to a consciousness raising group!” 
Conclusion: a note on suspicion 
This chapter was exceptionally difficult to write. Fitting the variety of forms of 
theory I discuss into seven categories was, at times, a confusing task. I did a lot of 
cutting and pasting of examples into different categories. I found this happened most 
often with the sin of ‘suspect’ feminist theory. Essentially, almost all of the other sins 
are sins because they use suspect concepts, methodologies or writing positions. But 
there are certain feminist theories that official feminist theorists consistently question 
and condemn, so these needed a category of their own – hence the conception of the 
‘suspect’ section. I also needed a place to discuss the fact that the search for perfection 
and purity in feminism is a major factor in the limiting of what counts as feminist 
theory. ‘Suspect’ feminism is that which we suspect is not perfect – not the real thing. 
However, it is significant that we only suspect imperfection. Imperfection is not 
provable because there is, of course, no such thing as perfection. There are only 
attempts, strategies, confessions and judgements. 
A wealth of knowledge and wisdom opens up before us when things we suspect 
of imperfection count as feminist theory. I think the hardest thing to achieve when Wasley 262 
reading/listening to feminist theory is a sense of trust.
121 It is rare that we accept in 
good faith the theorist’s feminist intentions. It is more usual to read, not just critically, 
but suspiciously, watching for lapses into false consciousness or underlying prejudice. I 
want to trust in the good faith of feminists, because I do not believe that doing so 
diminishes my ability to read critically. It just helps me to read with greater 
understanding and a wider perspective, accepting all kinds of feminist theory as 
contributions to the feminist conversation. In the next chapter of this thesis, I explore 
the rhetoric of ‘suspect versus trustworthy’ further, scrutinizing the preconceptions with 
which ‘second-wave’ and ‘third-wave’ generations of feminists approach each other’s 
work. 
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Part 3 
 
Problems of ‘Intergenerational’ Feminism 
 
In this part of my thesis, I explore the way we limit feminism by pinning certain 
practices and theoretical styles to certain moments in history. Discussions of feminism 
tend to divide the women’s movement into three finite historical periods: the first, 
second and third ‘waves.’ We also tend to envisage contemporary resistance to 
feminism as a giant ‘backlash’ against feminism – which we conceptualise as a 
phenomenon parallel to feminism. I have explored ways we represent first-wave and 
other historical feminism in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In this part of my thesis, I wish to 
focus more on unravelling the web of complicated and criss-crossed expectations we 
associate with the second and third waves, and the backlash. I have found such tensions 
to be intriguingly absent from discussions of intergenerational interaction of first- and 
second-wave feminists. It is difficult to say whether this is an actual phenomenon or 
simply the way the two waves have been represented (that is, the characterization of the 
first and second waves as having different goals: first-wave ‘reformist’ goals versus 
second-wave ‘grassroots’ approaches). Jane Newman discusses some of the “narrative 
manipulations of the relationship between the past and the present” in “The Present and 
our Past.”
1 However, conflicts between second- and third-wave feminism have proven 
divisive and demoralizing to feminists of all ages, and thus deserve urgent 
interrogation. 
Second-wave feminism was the strong movement that arose in the late 1960s 
and continued into the 1970s, often called ‘Women’s Liberation.” We (as a culture) 
tend to associate second-wave feminism with liberal campaigning (that is, campaigns 
for equal rights, equal employment opportunities, equal pay, greater representation in 
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parliament, etc.), and with radical practices (separatist female communities, public 
demonstrations, graffiti protests against the sexual objectification of women, Reclaim 
the Night marches, etc.). The second wave (or at least its inception) is often located 
geographically in the United States.
2 When the second wave ended is less obvious. 
There is some dissent over whether it ended around the early 1980s (when the 
corporate and media bigwigs of the greedy eighties led a campaign in which the 
pressure to consume ‘oppressive’ products, such as fashionable clothing, as well as the 
rise of negative feminist stereotypes, are supposed to have forced feminism back 
underground
3), or whether the flurry of feminist activity called the ‘second wave’ died 
down at the end of the 70s. There is additional confusion over the possibility that 
second-wave feminism is still going. 
The third wave is a lesser-known phenomenon. It is mainly ‘official’ feminists 
and social theorists who claim we are living in the third wave of feminism. The third 
wave is thought to have begun around the late 80s or early 90s. The character of the 
third wave is less defined than the other two waves, but the general consensus is that it 
is a movement led by a number of ‘young’ women who have spoken out against the 
problems of second-wave feminism. Katie Roiphe (The Morning After: Sex, Fear and 
Feminism
4), Naomi Wolf (The Beauty Myth
5; Fire with Fire
6), Kathy Bail (DIY 
Feminism
7) and Natasha Walter (The New Feminism
8) come to mind. These women 
tend to criticise the ‘second-wave style’ of doing feminism, claiming that improved 
women’s rights mean that women can now enjoy a more relaxed attitude towards 
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feminism, can make personal choices independent of feminist dogma, and can reclaim 
our femininity. We also associate the third wave with a burgeoning of abstract feminist 
theory and a general retreat of feminist activism.
9 Key foci in third-wave feminist 
theory are issues of difference, sexuality, language and technology. The interesting 
thing about the third wave is the fact that we are in it right now, and yet, many women 
do not seem to know this. In fact, some
10 might even dispute that we are in the third 
wave of feminism; rather, they suggest, we are living through the backlash against 
(second-wave) feminism. The backlash dates from the early 1980s, and involves a 
general loss of interest and sympathy in the women’s movement, on behalf of both men 
and women. This indifference soon turned to hostility, marked by increases in anti-
woman practices, from restrictive fashions
11 to soaring sexual assault statistics. Other 
markers of the backlash include the men’s movement, which urges men to reclaim their 
machismo,
12 and claims of reverse discrimination (the old “feminists have gone too far, 
and now men are getting the short end of the stick” line). 
That the campaigns, practices and effects of feminism are genuine historical 
events I have no doubt.
13 However, the use of such miscellany to circumscribe periods 
of feminist history has its share of problems. I have been at some pains in this thesis to 
present feminism as an ancient and enduring response to women’s suffering under 
patriarchy. In the following chapter, I re-emphasize the ever-present and evolutionary 
nature of feminism by looking critically at the way we have tried to control the 
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presence of feminism by defining it in terms of waves and troughs. The wave metaphor 
is a strange one: I like the conception of feminism as a wide, spreading ocean in which 
waves of organised activity rise up from time to time. However, the image of ‘waves’ 
that really pervades cultural consciousness is that prior to and after a wave, there is 
nothing; that feminism is in a lull when it is not part of one of the waves. Also difficult 
for me is the idea that the women doing feminism in each wave are completely 
different – not to mention the problem of assuming that women of previous waves are 
dead and gone (or at least silent). ‘Third wave’ feminist Deirdre Carraher, writing in 
Bell and Klein’s Radically Speaking, describes how: 
Far from feeling distant from Catharine McKinnon and her peers [‘second-wave’ 
feminists], I feel inspired by the possibilities for striking a powerful union between the 
second and third waves.
14 
 
This “powerful union” almost makes second- and third-wave feminism out to be enemy 
camps, with only the “possibility” of working as a harmonious community. For me, 
breaking down the factionalism that we associate with contemporary feminism will not 
only come from creating coalitions between younger and older women; rather it will 
come from a different way of talking about feminist history – one that dismantles the 
generation gap between the second and third waves via a greater awareness of both the 
diversity and the evolution within feminism. 
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Chapter 6 
Which Wave am I Surfing? 
Inside academia or out, whether as demonstrations, community activities, 
popular books, scholarly articles, rap groups, and so on, feminism persists. 
It does not, however, persist unchanged. 
 – Joanna Russ, 1998
1 
 
In this, the final chapter of my thesis, I take my argument about the limiting of 
feminism into a discussion of generational feminism. In order to expose the problems 
of stereotyped and limited ways of looking at the feminist ‘waves,’ I adopt the persona 
of a formulaic ‘second-waver,’ criticising the attitudes of certain third-wave feminists 
towards second-wave feminism. Throughout this parody of second-wave attitudes, I 
have placed comments and quotations that variously confirm and confound the 
comments made by the second-wave persona. I then expose two distinct stereotypical 
characters of the ‘third-waver’ in the same way. One piece takes up the persona of the 
post-feminist who believes we have moved past feminism, and the other illustrates the 
supposed ‘postmodern feminist,’ who has abandoned activism and the ‘fatally flawed’ 
foundations of second-wave feminism. The final part of this chapter questions the 
assumed monolithic character of ‘the backlash’ and makes the effort to get past some of 
these stereotypes and unproductively restrictive boundaries. 
 
During the term of this project, I was urged over and over again by older 
(‘second-wave’) feminists to consider generational issues in my argument. Perhaps 
these women were concerned that I would be labelled. Perhaps they themselves saw my 
attempt to describe a more inclusive feminism, and particularly my vindication of 
personal, daily practices, as the marks of a third-wave feminist. Imagine my relief when 
I saw that Robyn Wiegman (an older feminist!) had made the point that: 
Generation is of course a limited way of thinking about time and transformation, too 
wound up in reproductive logics, much too bound to the nation. It has no analytic 
ability to comprehend diasporic or counter-nationalist political subjectivities, and 
routinely fails to situate feminism and social change in a complex interaction among 
organizational, epistemological, and political modalities.
2 
 
Generation (the waves of feminism) does not tell the whole story about differences in 
the ways we do and think about feminism. Generation certainly constitutes one form of 
difference between women. However, the most ghastly thing about grouping people to 
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theorise them (which is something all social theorists do – not just feminists) is how 
badly we tend to cope with difference. Generational difference is no exception.  
Prominent contemporary feminist writers, including Katie Roiphe (The Morning 
After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism
3) and Christina Hoff Sommers (Who Stole 
Feminism?
4), having noticed changes in women’s outlook on their own oppression, 
wrote books about these changes. These authors explore the types of feminist practice 
the writers find appropriate to the current social climate; however, in doing so, the 
authors do tend to come across as accusatory and vitriolic about certain feminist 
practices (often characterised as second-wave or, in Sommers’ case, as the practice of 
“gender feminists”
5). Sommers, for instance, refers to the “mind-numbing” polemic of 
“gender feminists,”
6 and describes a “feminism of resentment that rationalizes and 
fosters a wholesale rancor in women.”
7 Likewise, Rene Denfeld makes claims about a 
large group of older feminists: 
A movement that began in the 1960s with a fierce fight for economic, social, and 
political parity has degenerated into a series of repressive moral crusades that have 
little to do with most women’s lives.
8 
 
In doing so, such feminists associate ‘second-wavers’ with extremism and man hating. 
Similarly, feminist writers such as Germaine Greer
9 and Helen Garner,
10 criticize ways 
of doing feminism associated with the third wave respectively as superficial lifestyle 
change and over-litigious hypocrisy. These kinds of texts set off a sometimes 
frightened, sometimes triumphant response from both feminists (young and old) and 
anti-feminists. All are quick to label the books, using words like ‘extremist,’ ‘radical 
feminism,’ ‘backlash,’ ‘post-feminism,’ or ‘the death of feminism.’ However, I want to 
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suggest that we take a more respectful interest in the claims of such feminists, and 
analyse the shift their writing illustrates in terms of how feminism has come along, 
rather than giving in to the temptation to shoot names at them. Attempting to 
understand these texts solely through the lens of generational disparity disregards the 
idea of feminism as a historical process. Such an interpretation accepts only in the most 
superficial way that the Western feminist struggle is a different struggle today from 
what it was ten, twenty, or thirty years ago. Rather, we need to acknowledge that 
feminism, as a radical political movement, has its mutations and evolutions. When we 
decided that feminism happens in ‘waves,’ instead of as a continuous historical process, 
we created a definite them-and-us feel in the feminist community.  
The parodies I have created below expose the pigeonholed ‘differences’ 
between them and us and, I hope, show some of the actual continuity between the 
‘waves.’ In order to understand the next section, I will now briefly explain its structure. 
The parody itself is the main body of the section, written physically from the left to the 
right of the page, in regular font. The comments appearing on the right hand side of the 
page are quotations and analyses – things for us to think about as we read the parody. 
In order to keep the indented commentary pieces distinct from the main body of the 
parody, I have also italicized my own comments (the words and quotations of other 
theorists are presented in the commentaries in regular font so that they are easily 
distinguishable from my own comments). Thus there is a minor dialogue going on 
within the parody so that it does not become too static a bloc of stereotypes. Read the 
section as you will: you may wish to read past the commentaries in your first reading, 
to get an idea of the parody as a whole, and then return to the commentaries in a second 
reading. Or you may wish to read the commentaries alongside the parody. Most 
importantly, keep in mind as you read that I am discussing representations of second-Wasley 270 
wave feminism – please do not mistake the parody for a serious description of a 
second-wave feminist. 
Boxing Second-Wave Feminism 
Women are again the dupes of capitalist patriarchy! 
The ‘Second-waver’ says: 
When it comes to feminism, we are living in a drought. Forget the third wave – 
what is happening now is more like a trough. 
 
A number of feminists, such as Ann Brooks
11 and 
Suzanna Walters,
12 use the term ‘third-wave 
feminism’ interchangeably with ‘post-feminism,’ 
and sometimes even with ‘lifestyle’ or ‘DIY’ 
feminism and, rather unsettlingly, ‘the backlash.’ 
 
“We have reached a point when the way ahead seems to have petered out.”
13 Feminist 
activity in the developed world has been at an all-time minimum for around twenty 
years now, and there are no signs of improvement. Lifestyle feminism
14 is yet another 
way to back out of doing real feminist work. ‘DIY’ feminism
15 makes no connections 
between women’s individual lives and the structural oppression of patriarchy. It is all 
self-gratification. Never mind the sexual enslavement of Eastern-European girls going 
on right under our noses, so long as we have the ‘right’ to wear lipstick. Never mind the 
confinement of Muslim women to the house, as long as we have the ‘right’ to stay at 
home and pop out babies. 
 
Leder, et al, describe beautifully the tense and 
muddy relationship women have with ‘official’ 
feminism in this statement: 
Writers and the media have portrayed feminism as 
the cause of women’s problems and have 
complicated matters by co-opting the language of 
feminism: women have the right to beauty, 
romance, and maternity.
16 
 
DIY feminism shows no understanding of systemic power relations, and is ignorant or 
indifferent about international women’s issues. Big-name feminists of today bear no 
relation to those of the second wave. Political activism has been replaced by theorizing 
– and not even the inspiring polemical theory it once was. Now it is just a wishy-washy 
wondering, asking unanswerable questions and harping on about ethics. Ethics! What 
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an irony. What I’d like to know is how it is ethical to do nothing but talk. How ethical 
is it never to act on women’s behalf, even after exhausting the discussion of ethics? 
Diane Reay notes that: “[m]uch has been written 
from a feminist perspective about the way in 
which power imbalances compromise research 
endeavours.”
17 More recently, feminists are 
writing about the way in which the obsession with 
such ethical matters compromises political work.
18 
 
The fact is that post-feminism is just a re-appropriation of feminism into 
patriarchy. Patriarchy hijacks various structures and discourses to recuperate feminism, 
and by far the two most successful are consumer capitalism and postmodernism. 
Consumer capitalism has fooled younger women into thinking that feminism is a 
saleable commodity, available to buy, wear and discard whenever it is required. They 
buy it as girlpower or raunchy lingerie, or trendy books about being a single thirty-
something in a corporate world. Magazines barely pause for breath between articles on 
why men “need” to masturbate
19 and why dieting screws with a woman’s mind.
20 
“Postfeminism is, in fact, an ongoing engineering process promoted most vigorously by 
the right, but aided and abetted all along the way by the corporate media. Postfeminism 
is crucial to the corporate media because they rely on advertising. If millions of women 
stopped and said, “Hey, I don’t think I need lipstick, Lestoil, Oil of Olay, Victoria’s 
Secret boulder holders, Diet Coke, L’Oreal or Ultra Slim-Fast anymore,” that would 
lead to a serious advertising revenue shortfall.”
21 
 
One of the young women Chilla Bulbeck 
interviews in her article on Women’s Studies 
students and how they talk about their feminism 
says that: 
I don’t see femininity as a handicap. I revel in it. 
When I read a fashion magazine that is filled with 
beautiful women, I do not feel as though my 
gender is being exploited. These magazines are 
produced mainly by women and are filled with 
articles and images of professional women 
pleasing themselves…
22 
On the contrary, Leder, et al, claim that such 
young women are “seduced…by the culture of 
narcissism – the emphasis on self promoted by 
capitalism – and… blinded by women’s token 
advances.”
23 Who can we say is right here? At what 
point does the notion of false consciousness go 
from being insightful to just plain insulting? 
 
Similarly, the patriarchal world of academia has almost entirely absorbed feminism, 
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regurgitating it as post-feminism, clouded by wanked-up terminology, parenthesis and 
chic little wordplays, and held afloat by irrelevant abstractions. Feminism in this form 
appears indifferent to the real suffering of real women, and bears almost no 
resemblance to the political movement it once was. 
 
Ailbhe Smyth asks: 
…questions about trends and directions within 
western feminist thought which appear to be 
exacerbating distinctions between activism and 
theory-making or, more concretely, increasing the 
distance between Women’s Movement activists, 
feminist theorists – and women.
24 
And Jane Martin also worries that:  
In assigning theory a kind of sovereignty over 
practice...the academy's conception or model of the 
theory/practice relationship coheres nicely with a 
self-definition as an institution having as few 
dealings as possible with the everyday world. 
Indeed, it allows academy members to pursue 
theoretical knowledge while letting the chips fall 
where they may. But the trap of a practice-
independent theory can do feminists two sorts of 
harm. On the one hand, it obscures the potential of 
feminist practice to inform feminist theory and 
even serve as its source. On the other, in 
establishing a hierarchical relationship in which 
feminist theory is the dominant and feminist 
practice the subordinate partner, it all too easily 
leads to the valuing of feminist scholars and 
theoreticians over feminist activists and 
practitioners.
25 
 
Third wavers are horribly tangled in the trivia of sexism – the wee little insults 
and irritations of being a woman. There is no scope, no perspective. And they don’t 
fight their own battles. Everything takes place in court. They get litigious over some 
unwanted workplace slap and tickle
26 that they could easily fend off with a swift kick to 
the offender’s groin, or by exposing the culprit’s actions to the rest of the office. 
 
Virginia Trioli questions whether associating anti-
legislation rhetoric with an older generation of 
feminists and cowardly litigiousness with younger 
feminists is not the “easy way out…[posing] the 
knowing, mature, libertarian feminists on one side; 
the cringing, punishing young things on the 
other.”
27 
 
Post-feminism, in both its forms (which, let’s face it, amount to pretty much the same 
thing – the abandonment of anything in feminism that matters or means something), 
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focuses on time-wasting individual grievances rather than the higher cause of collective 
women’s oppression. It diverts attention away from the things that need work. It takes 
one or two instances of men getting their come-uppance (say, a woman sexually 
harassing a man, or a man staying at home with the kids), and makes a big deal out of 
them, suggesting that things have come full circle. Post-feminists are so damn 
ungrateful for the work we did. Our reward is the effective obliteration of the most 
important political movement that ever rocked our society – an obliteration that finds 
its cause in the in-fighting and disruption that has broken the women’s movement into 
factions, dismantling women’s collective power. 
 
It is easy to become confused by the two different 
kinds of post-feminism: that which describes ‘life 
beyond feminism’ and that which draws on 
postmodern, postcolonial and poststructuralist 
theories. 
 
It’s a damn shame that consciousness-raising is so unpopular these days, 
because these girls could certainly use some of it. I went to a women’s group the other 
day and “half the women are talking about where they buy their meat, having rummage 
sales, telling and retelling labor and delivery stories.”
28 Women today seem to think sex 
play and queer sex is sexual liberation. They think women’s getting equal wages makes 
up for the women who never make it to the level of tenured professor, or school 
principal, or CEO. They think staying home to do unpaid housework is somehow a real, 
positive choice for a woman. They think date rape is just some college girl pissed off 
with bad sex.
29 They think that differences among women override the fact that women 
– all women, to varying degrees – are oppressed by virtue of being women. 
  
Sandra Coney says: “Postfeminism is not a 
political position, it’s a style.”
30 Ailbhe Smyth 
further explains the claim we tend to associate 
with second-wave feminism – that third-wave 
feminism is apolitical or, at best, underpolitical: 
There is, for me, a loss of politics in the Women’s 
Studies I know – defeminism, in Kathleen Barry’s 
phrase…Is this a “personal problem” (my state of 
mind)? Generational, perhaps (the weary 
disillusionment of middle age)? Internal to 
Women’s Studies (institutionalisation, 
“professionalisation,” Americanisation)?
31 
The variety of Smyth’s questions highlight the 
uncertainty with which we approach the issue, as 
well as the inadequacy of universalising 
statements of ‘generation’ as the key to such 
critiques of third-wave feminism. 
 
There is a profound and overarching lack of understanding of the deeply systemic 
injustice done to women. With all their posturing, vacuous happiness, superficiality, 
indifference, and bratty, childish self-gratification, these women are selling out their 
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sisters. They are young, often pretty, upwardly mobile and utterly self-indulgent. What 
the third-wavers don’t understand is that lifestyle feminism is just pissing into the wind. 
And one day, when they’re tired and middle aged, and have nothing to show for a life 
of playing at kinky sex games, and are abandoned by their gay male friends, it’s just 
going to hit them in the face. One day, in all the fighting feminism for women’s rights, 
they will realize that they need feminism to fight for their rights. 
 
Comment: Confusion about Second-Wave Feminism 
  Perhaps I need to re-emphasize here that the parody of second-wave attitudes 
above is much more complicated than a jab at second-wave feminism. In fact, it is more 
of a jab at the representation of second-wave feminists by writers such as Rene 
Denfeld. Denfeld’s book, The New Victorians, criticises second-wave feminists as 
puritanical and anti-sexual, over-reactive and outdated. The feminist movement, 
declares Denfeld, “has become bogged down in an extremist moral and spiritual 
crusade that has little to do with women’s lives.”
32 In Fire with Fire, Naomi Wolf also 
suggests that a number of feminists associated with the second wave have lost touch 
with contemporary reality: 
The focus of some feminists, like Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, and 
Adrienne Rich, on female victimization foreshadowed over female agency, derives 
from conditions that were once truer than they are now.
33 
 
And in Who Stole Feminism?, the feminists Christina Hoff Sommers is criticising are 
“articulate, prone to self-dramatization, and chronically offended.”
34 Such writers 
represent second-wave feminists as either encouraging victimhood in women or 
enacting it in themselves – and, for these writers, victimhood is the ultimate in 
undesirable traits for women. According to Rebecca Stringer, Wolf and Katie Roiphe 
both “argue that feminism has become an exercise in representing women as victims,” 
and Roiphe even “uses the word ‘victim’ to refer to a fully-fledged, calculating and 
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duplicitous agent engaged in a cynical feminist ‘performance.’”
35 The concept of the 
female victim is one of a woman without power – and perhaps this is the reason 
feminists such as Wolf and Roiphe object to second-wave representations they see as 
forcing the victim card. It is possible that these writers look at a ‘second-wave 
preoccupation’ with the notion of woman-as-victim as stripping women of the power 
they have earned through feminism (or perhaps, in Roiphe’s case, in spite of feminism).  
What is particularly interesting about the second-wave ‘victim’ association is 
that certain second-wave feminists actually see third-wave feminists as clinging to 
victim status: Helen Garner, for instance, describes the political position of young 
women who went to the police in a particular sexual harassment case as “based on the 
virtue of helplessness.”
36 Christina Hoff Sommers throws further spanners into the 
works, ‘debunking’
37 myths of female victimhood and oppression supposedly 
perpetuated by what she calls “gender feminists”
38 (as opposed to “equity feminists”).
39 
Sommers adds to the confusion over the second-wave/third-wave distinction, claiming 
that gender feminists are a new breed
40 (despite the fact that the gender feminists she 
discusses include many feminists frequently associated with the second wave, a number 
of whom are definitely senior to certain (‘old’ style) equity feminists against whom 
Sommers contrasts them). Sommers relates equity feminism to a “First Wave”
41 kind of 
feminism, which is populated not only by first-wave feminists, but also feminists 
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generally considered second- or third-wave.
42 Clearly, the issue of who is an old, new, 
first-, second- or third-wave feminist, is a convoluted one over which few writers can 
agree. 
More confusion arises when those who box the ‘second-wave feminist’ invoke 
(as, for instance, Rene Denfeld does) the image of the radical feminist. Sommers even 
pokes fun at these feminists, describing with an acid tongue the “gender” (read: radical) 
feminists she encounters at conferences, whom she represents as constantly attacking 
male speakers, disregarding or condemning ‘liberal’ sentiments, and wallowing in their 
own oppression.
43 These representations of ‘radical feminist’ usually operate in the 
negative (the lack of). We only know what she is not, does not, and argues against. She 
does not shave her body hair. She needs a man. She cannot understand the present time. 
She is man hating, anti-individualist, anti-sex, devoid of fun, under-theorizing, 
ahistorical, irrational, censorious, unethical, angry and never satisfied. Un-, anti, under, 
lacking, without. These are all words that say something about what the stereotyped 
second-wave/radical feminist is not. The words betray the fact that some of the critics 
do not know what radical feminism is. We do not account for affirmative attributes 
when we grasp onto an idea of the radical feminist, because we cannot. We are not 
interested in what she stands for. What radical feminism does stand for—the positive 
ideals, visions and positions that make up the vast and complex number of women who 
may or may not be ‘second-wave’ feminists – makes no sense in the closed definition 
we tend to use. Later in this chapter, I will make some attempt to give a more realistic 
picture of what second-wave feminism is and who participates in it. Right now, I will 
explore some of the ways we misrepresent third-wave feminism and feminists. Again, I 
have structured the parody as the main body of the section, with my own commentaries 
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Boxing Third-Wave Feminism 
Box 1: Feminism – I’m over it. 
The ‘Third-waver’ says: 
 
Well, seriously, the second-wavers can’t think that the radical sort of feminism 
they were doing is still relevant? I mean, sure, it worked for the time.  
 
As I pointed out in the previous section, many 
people confuse second-wave feminism with radical 
feminism, as our ‘third-wave’ persona does here.  
I find it intriguing that this happens in just the 
same way that critics of third-wave feminism often 
conflate third-wave and post-feminism! The usual 
result of the second-wave/radical feminism 
conflation is the view of radical feminism as a 
“spent force:”
44 
One mechanism by which contemporary feminists 
can discredit and dismiss radical feminism is 
through claiming it is outdated and therefore old-
fashioned.
45 
Diane Reay explains this phenomenon further, 
describing how the academy is a territory that is 
“heavily discursively policed.”
46 Academics 
discount “modernist statements that assert gender 
and class inequality [seen as, second-wave 
sentiment]…as simplistic, reeking of old 
discredited metanarratives.”
47 
 
Sexism was so ingrained in the fifties and sixties. It was all like, post-war, woman get 
thee back in the kitchen, make babies for the nation, and so on. I know there was a lot 
wrong with the world for women then. They were getting paid much less than men, 
they didn’t have any opportunities to work in different fields, there was a general 
silence on rape and sexual abuse, women had to put up with sexual harassment, or get 
blamed for being provocative, and a woman didn’t even have the right to terminate a 
pregnancy. There were hardly any women in parliament, no women heading up the 
multinationals; work for women was just something you did until you found a husband. 
Women had mental illnesses because of the contradictions they lived with – they would 
find that they had all the right ingredients for happiness in their lives, and yet they were 
miserable. So what happened to them? Shut up in institutions, of course. Men treated 
women like possessions. Wives were trophies, sitting pretty alongside their collections 
of guns and model cars. The father gave the bride away at her wedding, and the 
husband took her into his home, having procured her promise to “obey.” You just have 
to look at the representations of women in old advertisements. Smiling women 
concerned about getting their hair curled right for their fundraiser fete meeting, or 
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getting dinner ready on time for when the husband gets home. It was enough to make 
you sick. 
The organising done in that era was necessary and timely. If they went over the 
top, they did it for a reason. They had to make a big fuss, because they had to let 
women know that things weren’t right. And that they weren’t alone in their frustration 
and resentment. Consciousness raising groups, for instance, were great because they 
encouraged women to talk to each other about the things that happened to them – to see 
that those unfair things were happening to all women, and to see that the personal is 
political.  
Leder, Plotnik and Venkateswaran, Women’s 
Studies teachers at a community college, claim 
that: 
It is hard…for our students not to believe that 
women have already arrived at their liberation, 
limited though their concept of liberation may be. 
For them, liberation means having opportunities 
and achieving personal empowerment. 
They…don’t easily connect their situation with 
that of patriarchy more broadly.”
48 
These writers imply that ideals associated with 
third-wave feminism are little more than 
innocently erroneous, just requiring a bit of 
consciousness raising. 
 
Feminists were getting important messages out to women: sexual images of women can 
be degrading, pornography can objectify women, women’s work is as good as men’s, 
women can do any job, sexual harassment and assault is unacceptable, domestic 
violence is unacceptable, and so on. In a way, the feminists of that time had to be 
extreme. They had to spread the word and get noticed. For such a long time, everything 
was male-oriented, so to even things up a bit, feminists pushed really far the other way, 
blaming and hating men, claiming that women were victims… 
 
As Marcia Ann Gillespie points out, instead of 
crediting feminism with women’s empowerment, 
women today frequently claim their assertiveness 
and independence as qualities they have in spite of 
– not because of – feminism. She claims 
ironically: 
…the movement was nothing more than one big 
pity-party, where we gathered to wallow in our 
victimization and trade tales of woe.
49 
 
…creating separatist communities, converting to lesbianism as a political move, 
interfering in women’s personal lives if they had problems with their men. Going crazy 
over workplace sexism and equal opportunities legislation, and bullying women out of 
the home and into the workplace. 
 
Whatever the era, people have always said that 
feminism is too narrow. Gillespie rails against 
journalists attacking feminism:  
…those smug hypocrites acted as if we were part 
of the problem. First they do the “Critics charge 
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that mainstream feminism hasn’t done enough for 
women in poverty,” and then in their conclusion 
the writers declared, “Now that American feminists 
are looking beyond abortion, their priorities may 
be more relevant to the forgotten women at home 
and overseas.
50 
In addition to its radical persona, second-wave 
feminism is also likely to be represented as 
obsessed with liberal-associated policy change 
and demonstrations against institutional sexism. 
 
But you can understand it, because it was so male-dominated for so long. The rash of 
demonstrating and publishing and organising that went on was totally necessary at the 
time. 
But things are different now. Women and men have equal rights in employment 
and family law. In fact, women’s rights in family law are probably even better than 
men’s. Women have entered the workforce at every level, and they now have the 
opportunities to pursue almost any career they like. It is the choice of the individual 
woman to go as far or as high as she would like in her career – she just has to have the 
guts to go for it. And many women do. But there are women who wish to stay home 
and raise a family too – and really, that’s their choice. No one should bully women into 
the workforce just to prove some feminist point. If they want to stay at home with the 
kids, and look after their husbands, and do housework, well, that’s what they want. 
Isn’t that what feminism is about? Giving women the right to do what they want to do? 
And the legal system has become more protective of women.  
 
Films such as Disclosure
51 (in which a man is 
sexually harassed in the workplace by a woman) 
go towards the notion that men can suffer sexism 
in just the same way as women – with the added 
disadvantage of poor legal recourse. In addition, 
men’s rights agencies push for more ‘equitable’ 
legislation regarding child custody and 
maintenance payments, using the rhetoric of 
‘discrimination against men.’ 
 
Women can stand up to sexual harassment, and pursue the issue in a court of law if 
necessary. They have the opportunity to obtain justice for sexual assault and 
molestation. There are shelters and welfare for battered women. Divorce doesn’t 
penalise women anymore: single mothers are most often awarded custody of the 
children, as well as child support payments from both the government and the kids’ 
father. As for images of women in the media, there are obviously still some pretty 
suspect images around, but there are a lot of smart, sassy, sexy and strong female 
images to counter that. Samantha from Sex and the City.
52 Any of the three Charlie’s 
Angels.
53 Even Felicity Shagwell in Austin Powers: the Spy who Shagged Me
54 knows 
what she wants and goes for it. These women aren’t the victims feminism has 
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sometimes made them out to be, just because they’re sexy. They are powerful, 
independent and, yes, they like men. 
 
Coney says: 
I’m not clear who made the decision that the 
feminist task is completed and we can move on to 
the next stage. There were no resolutions that I 
know of passed through feminist conferences, no 
proclamations in women’s bars. It comes as a bit of 
a shock to find that you’re redundant, that you’ve 
been beavering away on something when it wasn’t 
really necessary, like surfacing from the coalface 
with black lung only to find everyone’s converted 
to natural gas.
55 
 
In fact, men are the ones who often get the short end of the stick these days. 
Women were encouraged to blame, castigate and reject men. They were also made to 
feel inadequate if they chose to live with a man as a partner. Women are made out to be 
pathetic if they want a man – as if they feel incomplete without a man to make them 
whole. Second-wavers are resistant to the fact that more equal partnerships of men and 
women are taking place in contemporary culture. Women have risen in terms of power, 
whilst men have fallen. Many men live in fear of feminism. 
 
According to one presumably male webpage 
writer, “feminism is the world’s most 
significant ideology, ‘cleansing’ our minds from 
dawn to dusk”: 
I get on the bus but there is only one seat left. 
There is a woman my own age who gets on behind 
me and I let her take the seat. Was I being sexist? I 
feel unsure about that but I know that I have to 
stand for half an hour.
56 
 
Once, men had all the privileges, but nowadays, they cannot so much as hold a door 
open for a woman without the fear of being charged with sexual harassment.  
 
Chilla Bulbeck writes: 
The yearning for both equal opportunities and 
respect for women’s differences expressed in these 
comments was so pervasive among Riley-Smith’s 
(1992, p.39) women of “middle Australia” that she 
labelled it “the car door dilemma”: “If you want to 
be a bloody feminist, open the door for yourself.” 
In my research…I found this viewpoint expressed 
most frequently by women in their 60s and older. 
Its significance also to young women in my classes 
is thus of interest.
57 
  
In fact, radical feminism of the second wave made nearly as many problems as it 
solved. Commonly over-reactive, often man-hating, feminism of the day was more like 
reverse sexism, creating a deadly political correctness that took over the Western world 
and led to an imbalance of women’s and men’s rights. Its frequently downwardly 
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mobile politics were relevant to a moment in time that is now over. Second-wavers who 
berate third-wave women for their independent style of dealing with gender are the 
women of yesteryear, clinging to feminist ideals no longer relevant to young women 
today. In essence, the third wave, or post-feminism, exposes some of the inadequacies 
of feminism.  
Some contemporary feminists dislike the 
polarisation of men and women they believe 
second-wave feminism produced. Cherry Smyth, 
for instance, “both desires and sees the possibility 
for new alliances across gender, as well as 
sexuality and race, through queer politics.”
58 
Diane Richardson notes that gender polarisation 
is seen as a cause of “dangerous” and “self-
indulgent” radical feminist strategies, such as 
separatism.
59 
And Deirdre Carraher, et al, remind us that: 
…we do have foremothers and calling us 
“Generation X,” as if we were lost and without 
moorings is not accurate. Similarly designating us 
the “Third Wave,” must not be a way of driving a 
wedge between us and radical feminists…
60 
 
The beauty of post-feminism is that it has been the first political movement qualified to 
point out that there are times when feminism doesn’t work, and there are situations in 
which a radical feminist approach is inappropriate. 
 
Comment: Feminism or ‘Humanism’? 
  What I have done above is parody a limited or ‘boxed’ representation of the 
first kind of ‘post (meaning ‘after’) feminist.’ It describes the way some
61 believe this 
version of the third-waver/post-feminist thinks about second-wave feminism. Anne 
Summers claims that a younger generation of women vehemently resist what they see 
as second-wave feminist behaviour, afraid that they will become like second-wave 
feminists. “They,” explains Summers, “had looked at us and seen a bunch of sad and 
lonely people who lived only for their jobs and their politics and they had pitied us.”
62 
In the parody I have produced, the ‘third-waver’ is similarly deluded: she confuses 
‘second-wave’ feminism with radical feminism, and makes an uninformed and naïve 
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claim that all is now well with the world when it comes to women’s oppression. She 
claims that men and women have attained equality in the western world. Of course, she 
knows that there are still some international issues requiring feminist work. She knows 
feminism still has its uses, mainly as a bandaid to some leftover patriarchal injuries. 
However, rather than working for greater, deeper changes – say, working on 
eliminating men’s predation on women – she is ‘content’ to do what some feminists 
may consider the patch up job of increasing women’s awareness and recourse to the 
legal system. She distances herself from more radical approaches to feminism, giving 
such practices some credence as relevant to the inequality women suffered in history, 
but affirming that these are quite ridiculously passé in contemporary society. She uses 
words like “self-actualization” and “individual” and prefers a modest, discreet kind of 
feminism. She dislikes making a fuss, not because it is embarrassing so much as 
unnecessary. “If someone tries to discriminate against you, for God’s sake, just sue 
their ass,” she exclaims. Of course, this representation of a third-wave feminist is 
severely limited and stereotypical. Later in this chapter, I will attempt to do a bit of 
‘unboxing’ of third-wave feminism, but first I would like to look at another common 
representation of the post-feminist: that of the third-wave feminist with a postmodern 
theoretical turn of mind. 
Box 2: Post-feminism and the ‘Posts.’
63 
The ‘Third-waver’ says: 
The reason feminists abandoned the radical forms of feminism associated with 
the second wave is, for the main part, that these approaches make certain critical gaffes 
that can no longer be ignored.  
Richardson points out that there are, in fact, clear 
links between the ideas of radical feminism and 
post-feminism: 
…many of the ideas associated with post-
modernism are products of radical feminist 
thinking: [for instance,] the idea of knowledge as 
contextual and situated…
64 
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Second-wave feminists struggle particularly with issues of difference, and find 
themselves unable to account for women of colour, multiple sexual identities, and the 
fragmentation of postmodern subjectivity. It is an unfortunate truth of second-wave 
feminism that, in feminists’ eagerness to mobilise all women into action against 
oppression, they elided, forgot, or even deliberately played down the differences among 
women.  
With particular regard to a discussion of 
difference, radical feminism comes off as “at best, 
theoretically naïve and unsophisticated.”
65 
However, Richardson reminds us that: 
…it is important to distinguish between 
productions of radical feminist explanations for 
women’s oppression in terms of patriarchy and the 
claim for the universal validity of theoretical 
models developed…
66 
In other words, we ought not to confuse 
universalist approaches, or the idea that all 
women can mobilise against a basically similar 
experience of oppression, with the misconception 
that all women are, in fact, the same. Kathleen 
Barry makes the interesting point that “no politics 
of difference intends to include. It is the making of 
the ‘other.’”
67 
 
Contemporary feminists have made use of postcolonial and queer theories that expose 
the inadequacies of identity politics, paving the way for more thoughtful work on some 
of the pressing abstract problems of representation and location that feminism must 
now face. Too frequently, feminists of the second wave relied upon essentialist 
representations of women, using the valorisation of these as a political tool. 
 
Diana Fuss exposed the theoretical pitfall of 
unproblematically opposing essentialism to social 
constructionism, making the case that essentialist 
tendencies appear in all areas of social theory. 
Moreover, Fuss explains how we constantly 
deploy the “risk” of essentialism as a political 
strategy.
68 Tania Lienert, on the other hand, 
argues that radical feminism is not necessarily 
essentialist, describing how noted radical 
feminists have shown awareness “of how men 
have ‘defined’ women” and of the problems of 
“patriarchal socialisation.”
69 
 
In the same way, these women wrote about men as the enemy, failing to locate the 
subject position of ‘man’ within any kind of structure of power relations – in short, 
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assuming male guilt instead of analysing gender relations within patriarchy. 
Contemporary work starting in the 1980s explored more fully the concept of 
subjectivity, exploding the idea that the self is static, and developing ideas about 
multiple discursive and contextual identities. 
  Methodology, too, has emerged as a major factor in the modern-day feminist’s 
decision to identify with a post-feminist position. Second-wave methods were often 
masculine identified or insufficiently interrogated as acceptable feminist research tools. 
Feminists have since done much work on the method of interviewing, for instance. 
Theoretical work
70 shows that interviewing can be either a collaborative process of 
research or a game of deceit and hierarchy. 
 
‘Speaking for’ another woman is an object of 
deeply-held feminist fear, particularly when doing 
any kind of collaborative research with women of 
different cultures, classes, sexualities, etc. Diane 
Bell describes her experience of working with 
close friend Topsy Nelson (an Aboriginal woman) 
to produce a journal article about rape in 
Aboriginal communities. She was “accused of… 
appropriating Topsy Nelson’s voice by citing her 
as “co-author” rather than “informant.”
71 The 
accusers, in their rush to rescue this Aboriginal 
woman from appropriation, effectively silenced 
her, “demoting” her from co-author to 
informant.
72 
 
Until recently, interviewing was often an exercise in academic superiority, wherein the 
interviewer would stake out a position of power over the interviewee, leading and 
directing the discussion, making decisions about what (if anything) was important 
enough to include in her work, and presuming to interpret the words of her subject in 
any way she chose. The feminist theorist must divulge as completely as possible the 
topic and aims of her research, finding out which areas the participants believe deserve 
research, discussing methodology with the participants, reciprocating during 
interviews, in order to avoid replaying traditional power relations of researcher-
researched relationships. In addition, she should do multiple interviews, confirming the 
information and analysis with the participants, presenting the participants’ voices in as 
unmediated a way as possible, and allowing the interviewees to self-analyse. 
Interviewing has the dangerous potential, as do many time-honoured research methods, 
to reinstate phallocentric imperatives and ethically violate the rights of interviewed 
subjects. 
Part of the reason why second-wave feminists used such suspect methods was 
the political pressure to act, and the thinking endemic to second-wave feminism that 
theory was ‘just words,’ and theorising research approaches and activism was a waste 
of feminist energies.  
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Lynn Bentz claims: 
Third wave feminists…have opportunities to 
obtain a formal education in women’s history, 
philosophy, and sociology that our foremothers did 
not have. I believe that this helps us to be more 
secure in our activism.
73 
Moreover, Jan Clausen, an activist during the 
‘second wave’ and an academic during the ‘third 
wave,’ makes the interesting claim that it was: “a 
big relief to get away from the strain of anti-
intellectualism that has sometimes plagued 
grassroots feminism.”
74 However, Clausen feels 
that her students: 
…need something more than just intellectual 
approaches to understanding why the world is shot 
through with suffering and injustice…
75 
Meanwhile, LeeRay Costa wonders why she is 
unable to integrate academic and activist work in 
the United States “without being labelled ‘too 
political’ or ‘not scholarly enough.’”
76 The amount 
of words women spend justifying their 
‘unscholarly’ or ‘apolitical’ feminism in response 
to the tyranny of those who police activism and 
academia is surely out of proportion to the 
importance of what makes for ‘the best’ feminism. 
 
The decrying of academic theory is the thorn in the side of second-wave feminism. 
Perhaps due to the immediacy of women’s oppression, but also because of the 
mentality that condemns theory as divorced from ‘real life’ and ultimately counter-
productive for the movement, many second-wave feminists engaged in activism and 
renounced theory, widely and urgently. Not only did many of these women reject the 
grand narratives of religion, nationalism, economics and metaphysics that they 
identified as masculine, but they rejected theory altogether as a viable political outlet. 
Theorising created divisions in the perspectives of these women: divisions between, 
and even hierarchies of, the women who acted and the women who wrote. Even the 
Women’s Studies courses that were emerging in the Western world (programs that 
were perhaps the birthplace of feminist theory as we now know it) preached activism 
and contained heavy activist components. Post-feminists are conscious of the 
importance of theory – an importance that encompasses both the ethical transgressions 
committed against women and men in the name of ‘acting not yakking,’ as well as the 
maturity of feminism as an ideology, with its own canon and set of research practices.  
 
Diane Reay argues that: 
Paradoxically, there is insufficient contestation, 
disruption and destabilisation of dominant 
understandings in our supposedly postmodern 
times. In an era when there is ‘no such thing as 
truth’ just myriad versions, only a few select 
versions are circulated among academic, media and 
political elites – those that play around with the 
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dominant constructions of ‘the way things are’ 
rather than challenge them.
77 
One criticism of ‘post-feminism’ is that its 
theorists claim multiple truths whilst adhering to 
specific dominant conventions of style and 
subject.
78 
 
Developed feminist theorizing locates and celebrates feminism as belonging among the 
academic disciplines of the metaphysical realm. 
 
Comment: “Just be sure you can tell a fin de siecle from a fin de shark”
79 
Above is a parody of the stereotypical academic ‘post-feminist.’ She has a solid 
grounding in Foucauldian and Derridean theory, and writes “abstractions about 
abstractions.”
80 She thinks blaming men for crimes against women is dreadfully lacking 
in a structural analysis of power relations. She is concerned about ‘othering’ women of 
difference, but takes little interest in the actual lived realities of, say, third world 
women. She emphasizes a divide between feminist theory and practice, and cautions 
against the folly of untheorised practice whilst carefully defending theory as a form of 
feminist practice. At the same time, she encourages ‘praxis’
81 – the integration of 
theory and practice (neatly avoiding any deeper investigation of how such integration 
might actually work). She analyses feminist research methods but rarely uses any such 
methods herself, unable to get past the ethical tangles these create. She is careerist in 
focus, bent on academic tenure, and reluctant to associate herself with the discipline of 
Women’s Studies (more likely to pursue her career in Gender Studies or Media and 
Cultural Studies)
82. She is hopelessly entrenched in the jargon and rhetoric of scholarly 
theory – to the point where we find her politics disconnected from real women’s 
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suffering. In the conceptual world of the academic post-feminist, it is less important 
that men rape women with their fleshly penises than it is that theorists ‘rape’ their 
subjects through phallogocentric
83 writing. 
The next necessary task is to look in more depth at why these representations of 
post-feminists not only persist, but gain such currency within feminist thought. Indeed, 
it is necessary to explore why we feel the need to pigeonhole numerous historical 
periods of feminism and their ‘representatives.’ Looking at the reasons why we box the 
waves is the first step towards unpicking the stereotypes. As I’ve already suggested, 
representations of second-wave feminism are tightly bound up with a misconception 
that feminists during the sixties and seventies practiced a monolithic kind of feminism. 
This misconception is pointed up most obviously by the way the terms ‘second-wave 
feminism’ and ‘radical feminism’ are frequently used interchangeably in common 
parlance. On the other hand, representations of ‘post-feminism’ are deeply snarled by a 
contradictory relationship with the backlash against feminism. For this reason, it is vital 
to take a moment to consider ‘the backlash’ before we go on to break down 
representations of the feminist ‘waves.’ 
Boxing ‘the Backlash’ 
The backlash against feminism is a supposed reaction within mainstream 
culture against the fury and power of second-wave feminism. Feminists generally 
accept that men stand to gain from the suppression of feminism. Therefore, we usually 
understand the backlash against feminism as driven by men, or at least as driven by 
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supporters of patriarchy. Books such as Men, Sex and Other Secrets illustrate male 
backlash explanations of where feminism went wrong or what to do about it: 
What threatens me is what feminists refer to as the personal-political, the nexus 
between the general and the particular. What I say to my partner is understood by her 
to have a political context, and a meaning beyond that which I intended…It is a very 
powerful weapon women wield when they politicise the emotional dynamics of two 
people.
 84 
 
Andrea Dworkin confirms this sense that the Backlash is driven by the powerful (that 
is, men), claiming that feminists: 
…apparently didn’t anticipate that people who had power were not going to be thrilled 
to give it up and might actually start fighting back. When they started fighting back 
some blood was going to flow because they have the means to hurt you very badly.
85 
 
But what truly confounds us as feminists is when women participate in the backlash, 
embracing and publicising the idea that feminism has gone too far, supporting men’s 
and father’s rights groups, and condemning feminism as narrow and restrictive. Some 
women have decided that feminism has been profoundly damaging to their 
relationships with men. These women may even turn the tables on feminism, taking on 
pre-feminist roles within marriage and rebuilding on more traditional terms the remains 
of unhappy and confusing relationships with men.
86 Other women seem wilfully to 
misunderstand feminism, believing it to be about man-hating, overbalancing gender 
equality in favour of women, or forbidding some of the traditional perks of womanhood 
(such as staying at home with the children; male chivalry in the form of holding the 
door and paying for the meal; and the pleasure of feminine adornment). Even when 
feminists try to get the word out on what feminism is really about, these women refuse 
to listen, having made up their minds that feminism is reverse sexism. 
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The two concepts feminists most invoke in a discussion of women’s roles in the 
backlash against feminism are false consciousness and upward mobility. In false 
consciousness (as discussed in the Introduction), women fail to understand the 
seriousness of oppression and the ‘true’ goals of feminism, and end up as the butt of the 
giant practical joke that is patriarchy. Meta Plotnik, Women’s Studies teacher, takes up 
the rhetoric of false consciousness when she explores the reasons why her young 
students are reluctant to identify with feminism: 
…[young women] have endured the intensification of corporate and consumer society 
and the years of backlash against feminism. They have experienced the pressure of 
popular culture, fashion, TV, MTV, movies, violent sexuality, macho posturing, and 
anti-intellectual attitudes. Advertisers sell the beauty myth with images of anorexic 
thinness and makeup that in one ad resembled black eyes. These are just some of the 
aspects of societal backlash that Susan Faludi and Naomi Wolf described so well. 
Many of my women’s studies students have issues with their appearance. Many have 
been starving themselves since junior high school, dumbing themselves down, reading 
little or not at all, fearing to use the “f” word – feminism.
87 
 
Clearly, feminists call on false consciousness as a pervasive and highly effective 
weapon of the patriarchal overlords to explain the backlash. We also tend to 
conceptualise false consciousness as an imposed ‘training’ for women. We think of it 
as the way culture provides hegemonic, patriarchal ‘reasons’ for the awkward questions 
women sometimes ask about power imbalances. Travis describes how colleagues 
“repeatedly reinterpreted” the experiences of a feminist faculty member who had 
experienced harassment, “explaining them as having nothing to do with sexism.”
88 The 
idea of false consciousness has traditionally been important to feminism, because it 
allows us to explain the behaviour of women who reject feminist ideals. 
The other important idea invoked in discussion of the backlash, upward 
mobility, allows us to claim that when successful women participate in the backlash, 
they have ‘succumbed’ to the temptation of ambition in a patriarchal world, forsaking 
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their sisters for either phallic (inauthentic female) power, or power enjoyed vicariously 
through men. Clara Ehrlich says, combining the rhetoric of false consciousness and 
upward mobility: 
Women need to know (and are increasingly prevented from finding out) that feminism 
is not about dressing for success, or becoming a corporate executive, or gaining 
elective office; it is not being able to share a two career marriage and take skiing 
vacations and spend huge amounts of time with your husband and two lovely children 
because you have a domestic worker who makes all this possible for you.
89 
 
As Dworkin puts it, “women are making decisions for individual survival over political 
solidarity and political, what I would call, honour.”
90 Somer Bodribb names the 
“politics of flirtation” women are encouraged to adopt when discussing matters of 
discrimination with offending male colleagues.
91 When we adopt such politics, we are 
supposed to be participating in the backlash. Stanley and Wise even develop a 
convincing discussion of selling out within academic feminism as backlash-esque 
behaviour in their article “But the Empress Has No Clothes!”
92 They describe how 
‘official’ feminist theorists have replicated patriarchal structures wherein the 
production of highly abstract theory in the institution dominates, and feminists fail to 
look towards themselves to criticize elitism. Judging from the comments of (amongst 
others) Bodribb, Dworkin and Stanley and Wise, ambition, career success, and even 
professional relationships with powerful men, are often regarded as highly suspect and 
stinking of the backlash against feminism. With two such powerful notions (false 
consciousness and selfish upward mobility) underlying so many explanations of 
backlash activity, it is not surprising that the backlash becomes something we can 
neatly package into one big glut of conservative reactionism. 
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  So far in this chapter, I have sketched what the boxing of feminism into waves 
and ‘the backlash’ looks like. I have explored some of the confusions and erasures that 
characterise such limited concepts of the history, currency, and suppression of feminist 
activity. In particular, I have exposed the myths and stereotypes that fuel such limited 
definitions. Some writers have already d these misconceptions: Virginia Trioli’s 
Generation f, Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards’ ManifestA: Young Women, 
Feminism and the Future
 93 and Kathy Bail’s DIY Feminism, all of which analyse and 
revalue third-wave feminism; Bell and Klein’s Radically Speaking: Feminism 
Reclaimed,
94 which sets the story ‘straight’ about radical feminism and its conflation 
with second-wave feminism; and Susan Faludi’s Backlash,
95 which gives rarely seen 
detailed attention to individual backlash practices. In the next part of this chapter, I 
discuss the effects of stubbornly locating feminist activities and styles in generational 
contexts, and challenge this practice by giving examples of intergenerational crossovers 
and backlash anomalies. I examine what happens when feminism itself breaks out of 
these boxes and encourage feminists to do what some of us are already doing: actively 
interrogating restrictive categories that close down possibility and connection among 
feminists and feminist practices. 
White Water 
I have some questions about a so-called ‘generation gap’ in feminism. Audre 
Lorde says, “The ‘generation gap’ is an important social tool for any repressive 
society.”
96 We lost some valuable things when we accepted as real and concrete the 
idea of a generation gap and chose to sort feminism into waves. We lost the possibility 
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of seeing the exchange of ideas between younger and older women. We lost the vision 
of feminism as a continual historical process. We also lost the ability to see differences 
amongst young women and amongst older women. We tend to gloss over the 
interaction between older and younger women’s feminist theory, presuming that it will 
be divergent or antagonistic in nature. However, women of different age groups 
constantly draw on each other’s work, (particularly when their theory is about anything 
other than intergenerational feminism). A feminist generation gap also misses a lot 
about the nature of ageing, including the vital point that there are women in a fuzzy 
area (say, 40ish years of age) who do not figure at all in the concept of a generation 
gap. Would it not be more useful to look at feminism as a continuum? It certainly 
makes for a better (more realistic and optimistic) view of the changes and successes, 
legacies and developments. To be always claiming a feminist generation gap also elides 
the differences that exist between an older feminist and other older feminists (and ditto 
younger feminists). We discount and recuperate these differences, forcing them into the 
moulds of second- or third-wave feminism, paying lip service to the diversity within 
the waves. Are there not other ways to talk about what it is trendy to call, somewhat 
ungrammatically and evasively, “feminisms?” Ways that allow for continuity, 
interaction, and relationships between differing historical moments, styles, animosities 
and correlations, of feminism? 
To answer such questions, we must first decide in which contexts we can use 
terms like ‘second-wave’ and ‘third-wave’ feminism. In fact, the practice of boxing 
feminism into waves, other than for the purposes of historical location, is not useful, 
and frequently inaccurate. The practice of sorting feminists into waves is the worst kind 
of controlling. Claiming that all feminism of one kind belongs in one wave or another: 
•  obfuscates and obliterates the feminist work that was done between the waves; 
•  shuts down the possibility of historical feminism (prior to the ‘first’ wave); Wasley 293 
•  misinterprets and misapplies the work of women which doesn’t actually fit into 
a wave. Boxing it into a wave can lead us to miss its potential for other readings 
and meanings; 
•  ignores the transitions, stases and evolutions of feminism; 
•  leaves feminists in the ‘third wave’ without a paddle for future feminism. The 
spectre of the third wave finds us wandering aimlessly, hoping this is not really 
‘post-feminism,’ frightened of the mystery that is to come, and without any 
sense of legacy, to us or from us; and, 
•  compares all feminism to all other feminism, making claims about what is 
better, more modern, outdated, more radical, etc. 
Secondly, we must slowly start to chip away at the great monoliths we call ‘second-
wave feminism,’ ‘third-wave feminism’ and ‘the backlash.’ This means we need to 
approach the things we have already boxed with a fresh perspective, willing to see the 
points where they escape categorization. Think of feminism as snakes in a cage, a 
seething mass of movement; wound and knotted together so you can’t see where one 
ends and another begins; creeping out between the bars, slithering back in so they find 
themselves simultaneously inside and outside the box. The trick is to be happy with the 
glorious slithery mess, and to relinquish – even avoid – control. 
Unboxing the Second Wave 
  Oh, how to unbox the second wave! 
There is, of course, no point in denying that there was an explosion of feminist 
activity in the 1960s and 1970s. There is, without a doubt, a period we can confidently 
name the second wave of feminism (just as we named the first wave based on the 
historical fact that many women organised to resist women’s suffering and 
subordination between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). However, the 
facts that women worked to create social change and to make feminist ideas a public Wasley 294 
concern during this time really are the only boundaries we can safely work with when 
we talk about a second wave. Everything else is hearsay. We construct the meaning of 
the second wave of feminism – it is not inherent in the activities that occurred. 
Frequently, we construct the meaning in order to trash it. As we grow more distant 
from the second wave, it becomes easier to trash. We make claims about extremism, 
and outdated concepts and practices. But even when we don’t trash it, we still box it, 
longing nostalgically for the rich and heady days of feminist energy, rejecting current 
feminist practices as impure and co-opted. As one feminist says, “I had some young 
students read Sisterhood is Powerful last semester and they really noticed the difference 
– said they wished they’d been around then.”
97 And, even if we don’t trash or valorise 
it, we still box it for the sake of pseudo-objective analysis, classifying and dissecting its 
components, naming some bits ‘cultural’ and other bits ‘radical’ and still other bits 
‘liberal.’ This becomes a problem when we trap such terms in the second wave and 
resist the idea that they might apply to feminism before and beyond the second-wave 
era.  
In the unboxing of second-wave feminism, some unalterable facts arise: 
•  Fact: feminism continued after the second wave had finished’ (as well as 
existed before it ‘began’); 
•  Fact: many women who organised and wrote or otherwise did feminism during 
the second wave, are still around, and still doing feminism; 
•  Fact: many of the styles, concepts and practices we associate with second-wave 
feminism persist in contemporary feminism, and are even deployed by young 
women (supposed ‘third-wave feminists’); 
•  Fact: second-wave feminism took many forms, including liberal, radical, 
separatist, Marxist, socialist, social constructionist, reformative – and even what 
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we might now call postmodern or post-structuralist! Often, a single campaign 
would include all these different kinds of feminism. Often, a single woman 
would enact many different kinds of feminism.  
These facts require our attention. It is not good enough to pretend that the second wave 
was a kind of feminism, and that that particular kind of feminism is now done with. The 
unethical thing we do when we box second-wave feminism is to blank out the 
interaction of whole groups of women. Women who did feminism during the second 
wave become ‘second-wave feminists,’ part of our history, branded with a specific 
style. They do not appear even to exist in current feminism, except as relics or 
examples of ‘second-wave attitudes.’ The activities of feminists between the second 
and third waves become shadowy and silent. We do not know how to understand these 
activities because we cannot brand them with a name. Contemporary young women 
who do the kinds of feminism we associate with the second wave become a nonentity, 
incomprehensible and unrepresentable, except as an oddity. The only way to avoid the 
deadly boundaries is to unbox the second wave – a move that involves a broad and 
radical revisioning. 
  One of the first steps in revising second-wave feminism is to sink that dominant 
and universalising conflation of second-wave and radical feminism. Importantly, while 
we extricate the two, we need to recognise that radical feminism was and is a vital force 
in both second-wave feminism and feminism of other periods. I believe the most 
alarming thing to face, if we were to rework the definition of radical feminism in this 
way, would be the ebb and flow of the term ‘radical feminism,’ which we generally use 
in a rigid, monolithic way. Women of all eras and locations would be seen to be doing 
radical feminism (to give an example, George Sand’s wearing of men’s clothing in the 
1830s can be compared to the ‘masculine’ dressing styles of some radical lesbian 
feminists today). It would become clear that many young women are producing radical Wasley 296 
feminist theory. It would also become clear that many young theorists are producing 
theory that relies heavily on concepts we associate with radical feminism – but that 
their theory does not resemble radical feminism as we know it. One particular group of 
young feminist theorists claims that: 
…the work of Catharine McKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Gloria Steinem and many 
others, form the theoretical base from which many radical feminists of my generation 
formulate their own questions and activism.
98 
 
However, it is not even as simple as basing one’s work on earlier works. Rather, my 
point is that ideas we associate with radical feminism cut right across generations of 
women. They are not confined to ‘second-wave’ feminists. 
Another step towards unboxing the second wave involves making room for a 
positive re-conceptualisation of the radicalism associated with the second wave, and 
rejecting the negative (anti-, lacking, etc.) definition we use. The variety of affirming 
and – importantly – continuing practices and ideals we would discover in second-wave 
feminism would force us both to undo our own categorisation of what second-wave 
feminism is, and to recreate for it a much more slippery and uncomfortable definition. 
First and foremost, we would be obliged to admit that ‘second-wave feminism,’ as a 
category, cannot work as a description of styles, practices, theories, activism, 
intellectual material, propaganda, or artistic endeavour, because these things are quite 
simply far too diverse, even when they fall within the historical timeframe of second-
wave feminism. That diversity persists. We naïvely designate our current period the 
‘third wave’ – and yet, women are still doing many of the feminist things we associate 
with the second wave. We might be doing some things we didn’t do during the second 
wave, but we are still doing much of what we did do back then. So, are we really being 
as clever as we think we are when we label some practices ‘new’ and others ‘old?’ In 
1927, Elizabeth Abbot knew that: 
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The issue is not between ‘old’ and ‘new’ feminism. There is no such thing as ‘new’ 
feminism, just as there is no such thing as ‘new’ freedom. There is freedom; and there 
is tyranny. The issue is between feminism…and that which is not feminism.
99 
 
When we encounter new (present-day) feminist activities that look more like second-
wave than third-wave feminism, should we really think of them as hearkening back to a 
time gone by? Should we really make nostalgic statements that disparage contemporary 
feminism, such as, “Spender’s work gives me hope that the straightforward, hard-
hitting feminism of fifteen years ago may be in for a revival”?
100 Perhaps we could 
clear away some of the associations that box second-wave feminism and say, “ah, that 
straightforward, hard-hitting feminism persists even today!” 
Unboxing the Third Wave 
Joanna Russ warns: 
The attempt to substitute for the uncompromising radicalism of the feminism of the late 
1960s and early 1970s an account of women that sees us as a group with a ‘unique’ 
psychology and ‘special’ needs, possessors of an already existing ‘culture’ that needs 
only to be recognized, is about to land a great many of us in the tar pit where (so to 
speak) our bones will be found in a hundred years or so and confused, not 
unreasonably, with those of the dinosaurs – who also hadn’t enough sense to trot onto 
drier and safer ground.
101 
 
Sometimes I think that unboxing the third wave is an even harder task than unboxing 
the second wave. Perhaps it is because, at the very least, second-wave feminism is 
respectable feminism. It was groundbreaking, it was widespread, and it was energetic. 
And what label does third-wave feminism get slugged with? Apathy. Apathy is 
probably the worst stereotype third-wave feminism has to shake – can there be anything 
more repulsive in a radical political movement than apathy? Anne Summers asks the 
younger generation directly: “Will apathy replace activism and seem to signal that, 
once again, women are content with what they already have?”
102 Michele Landsberg 
quotes “distinguished law professor Eleanor Holmes Norton, rejecting the idea that the 
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young have abandoned the movement”: “We [second-wave feminists] were catalytic 
feminists.
”103 The implication is that second-wave feminists set the revolution in 
progress – that they were the very agents of change in feminism. Comments like 
Norton’s represent third-wave feminism as merely the fizzing (or fizzling out?) that 
happens after the catalyst has worn out. I guess that means we’re now well on our way 
to the conclusion of the chemical reaction that was feminism. If a high profile feminist 
makes this kind of statement in support of third-wave feminists, what are the feminists 
who revile third-wave feminism saying? Well, they’re saying a lot of things, whether 
they are older or younger feminists. In particular they are saying that the third wave is 
characterised by the lack of a collective feminist identity: that feminism for younger 
women is about personal lifestyle choices. However, such feminists frequently criticise 
this focus: “Emphasis on identity and lifestyle is appealing because it creates a false 
sense that one is engaged in praxis,” says bell hooks.
104 Attending a first year women’s 
studies lecture when I was tutoring, I noticed that the lecturers criticised third-wave 
feminism, and distanced themselves from the ‘post-feminism’ of the third wave, despite 
the fact that most of the students were young women. By contrast, another lecture, this 
time a discussion of some of the ‘wimmin’s’ religions that re-emerged during the 
second wave, such as Wicca, was respectful and uncritical, despite the fact that the 
lecturers were not actively involved in any such religions. Many feminists
105 tend to 
represent third-wave feminism as ‘wet,’ soft, and apathetic feminism. The implication 
is that third-wave feminists require quite a bit of consciousness raising to become truly 
political.
106 I contend that third-wave feminism demonstrates several things: the 
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evolution of feminism; diverse responses to contemporary western society and 
economy; feminist reaction to backlash practices; and feminism’s continuing political 
role. 
  Again, unpicking a conflation of terms (as well as the terms themselves) is the 
starting point for unboxing third-wave feminism. Third-wave feminism is a particularly 
badly defined term: we frequently conflate it with post-feminism, which allows us to 
cast the third wave both as part of feminism, and as part of the backlash against 
feminism. Post-feminism, when it describes that which comes after feminism (or 
women calling feminism ‘obsolete’), generally refers to the backlash. As Ann 
Braithwaite puts it: 
Increasingly…the term “backlash” has come to be used almost interchangeably with 
that other ubiquitous late 90s/early twenty-first century word, “postfeminism.” Both of 
these terms are most often wielded as a kind of shorthand to identify and denounce 
examples of what are perceived to be anti-feminist (and in some arguments, even anti-
women) emphases throughout popular culture.
107 
 
On the other hand, we have a definition of post-feminism which refers to: 
…a continuing relationship to an earlier moment, as the ‘post’ in other current and 
equally contentious terms such as postmodernism, postcolonialism, and 
poststructuralism does. Thus, rather than being an ‘anti-feminism,’ postfeminism 
instead becomes…a way to talk about the changes in and growth of feminist thinking 
over the last 40 years, especially as it has intersected with a variety of other critical 
languages and approaches (including those other ‘posts’).
108 
 
This definition actually describes practices within the boundaries of feminism.
109 
Already, we find that we are using a monolithic ‘third-wave feminism’ to describe 
diverse and often irreconcilable sets of practices and theories. The problem this 
conflation causes is twofold: firstly, the third-wave-as-backlash produces a 
conceptualisation of third-wave feminism that is tangled up with the associations of the 
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backlash (women with false consciousness and ruthless ambition). Secondly, ‘third-
wave-as-feminism’ is the context for production of a whole body of work that, by 
virtue of its association with the backlash, is immediately suspect (having supposedly 
been created either in an environment of naïve and misguided sanguinity, or one of 
complicity and co-option). Braithwaite suggests that defining backlash and post-
feminism as ‘anti’-feminism: 
…leads to a dismissal or rejection of the complexities and nuances of both 
contemporary feminist theories and popular culture overall, rather than a critical 
engagement with the many changes in both of these fields [and]...overlooks – indeed, it 
cannot see – how those examples of a supposed backlash against feminism might 
alternately be seen as illustrations of how much something about feminism has instead 
saturated pop culture, becoming part of the accepted, ‘naturalized,’ social formation.
110 
 
The best way we can deal with the confusion these conflations create is to investigate 
and dismantle them. Again, the designation of a ‘wave’ ought to be mainly historical – 
not descriptive of a style or kind of feminism. In this case, the term ‘third-wave 
feminism’ makes more sense as a description of the period following the second-wave 
period of feminism than it does as a puzzling blend of feminism and anti-feminism. 
  Dismantling the problematic conflation of post-feminism and third-wave 
feminism is best done by examining what the third wave is actually about. What 
characterises the third wave is the same as that which characterises the second wave: its 
diversity. Older feminists and young feminists alike participate in all kinds of practices: 
demonstrating, speaking out, writing, teaching, and quietly making use of feminism to 
combat sexist oppression in their own lives. Those who practice ‘official’ feminism 
interact widely. Younger women in particular often identify with older women’s 
feminist positions, drawing on older feminists’ wisdom to inform their own work. 
Young women read second-wave history with awe and excitement. Older women 
marvel at the seemingly natural self-sufficiency that feminism has brought about in 
young women: 
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The contrast between where young women in their twenties are today and where I was 
at their age is hard to grasp. It didn’t occur to me to talk to women friends as Tsering 
talks to us now, to ask for advice.
111 
 
Many feminists, regardless of their ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ status, are willing to listen 
to and learn from each other, putting aside all concerns about who hails from which 
wave. I do not pretend that there is not antagonism between some ‘second-wave’ and 
‘third-wave’ feminists (as I have already documented in this chapter), but that 
antagonism is not the final word on feminist generations. Patai, discussing identity 
politics feminism versus other feminist ideologies, claims that feminism has become 
self-destructive in its “rigid factionalism”: 
Where will it end? My fear is that the search – and demand – for feminist purity (of 
both attitudes and identity) will eventually result in a massive rejection of the very 
important things that feminism, broadly speaking, aims to achieve.
112 
 
Is it truly possible that feminists (and especially older and younger feminists) cannot, 
by virtue of their massive ideological differences, agree, empathise, or even co-
operate? Feminism daily proves this is not the case. Women continually resist the 
suffering of women both singly and collectively. We struggle to unite across 
generation, culture and geography. We do not always succeed – but sometimes we do. 
And when we don’t, we try to figure out where it went wrong – hence the cautionary, if 
somewhat pessimistic, articles such as Patai’s. The periods of energy described as 
waves are just that – waves, in a sea of women doing feminism across time and the 
continents. 
Finally, I find it is necessary to address briefly the problem of claiming a 
current phenomenon as a discrete and describable period of time. First (and most 
amazing), we are living in the moment that we identify as third-wave – and yet, we 
don’t even know how this part of the feminist revolution is going to pan out! However, 
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in our Western eagerness to name periods of social history, we complacently discuss 
the third wave, as though we know exactly how it works/worked, or what was 
distinctive about it as an historical moment. Okay, it is a myth that we can stand at a 
truly objective distance, but isn’t this going a little too far in giving up on any hope of 
objectivity? One cannot accurately contextualise the present in this way. We can locate 
what has led us here, but we cannot describe what our future holds. In my view, this 
ought to permit us to speculate but not to make definitive claims about the third wave. 
Fifty years from now, we might look back and say, “well, it turns out what we called 
the third wave was just the middle of the second wave after all,” or “what we called the 
third wave was actually the precursor to the third wave.” I do not believe that we 
should stop analysing the directions of feminism, particularly in terms of its 
transformation over time; but I do think that we are too hasty to brand ourselves an 
historical event, complete with its own set of styles and dogma. The second problem 
with a ‘third wave’ is the fact that all the young women on the third-wave side of the 
gap are ageing, and even younger women are coming into play as feminist theorists. 
These women are, of course, going to reflect their own historico-cultural moment in 
their feminist practices and writing. But if their views don’t match the views associated 
with the third wave, what will we say about them? Are we really ready for a fourth 
wave, or post-post-feminism? The women who will begin producing feminist theory 
over the next few years stand as a reality check for us. Try as we might, we cannot 
stand outside ourselves and analyse the picture. The picture will always be distorted. 
The best we can do is look out from where we stand and decide where we can align 
ourselves, to whom we do harm, to whom we are responsible, and where we want to 
go. Wasley 303 
Unboxing the Backlash 
  We experience the backlash differently when it comes from men and women. 
When it comes from men, comprehension accompanies our exasperation, despair, and 
scorn. We know why they hate feminism. We are used to the ways they express that 
hatred and fear. But when women turn to other women and say, sometimes quite 
aggressively, “I don’t want your help. I don’t need your help,” feminists are taken 
aback. We experience shock and pain. The shock and pain turns quickly to anger and 
disbelief. “How can you be so stupid?” we find ourselves shouting. “How can you be 
so ungrateful?” Hastily, we shuffle through our papers looking for answers. The 
answers bring relief:  
[Women don’t identify as feminists] because they’re weak. I don’t know why they 
wouldn’t want to, because it’s out there now – they don’t have to fight for it anymore; 
it’s part of life, of bringing up.
113 Belinda Rapps 
 
[Women refuse to identify as feminists] possibly because they are submissive 
people…Or maybe they have the wrong belief that feminists believe all women should 
be working, and they don’t want to work.
114 Kim Borin 
 
…the women who are committed to achieving various kinds of reform and 
improvements in women’s lives, as opposed to changing the complete structure…are 
very important and there are fewer and fewer of them. I think that what it means is that 
you can save a woman’s life by doing something that helps her get past the problem 
that we have not socially been able to solve…I think that women who work in what I 
would characterise as the reform part of the movement have very, very little tolerance 
for people who work in the radical part of it. In other words, they don’t understand that 
we’re necessary to them but I think a lot of us understand that they’re necessary to 
us.
115 Andrea Dworkin 
 
…they don’t call themselves feminists through lack of understanding about what 
feminism is, and also because sometimes if you declare yourself a feminist, it can have 
detrimental effects from the people around you. And when you’re out there you’ve got 
to protect yourself in any way you can. And if that means not acknowledging your 
feminism, then that’s what you will do.
116 Kerry Allan 
 
While third wave feminist zines, web sites, writings, and art are fun, ground-breaking, 
and challenging, they aren’t being met with a widespread renewal of feminist activism, 
organizing, or campaigns…Young women like myself are drawn into individualist 
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activism and thought because we have few other ways to channel our feminism.
117 
Rebecca Ellis 
 
When one is feeling stranded, finding a safe harbour inevitably becomes a more 
compelling course than struggling against social currents. Keeping the peace with the 
particular man in one’s life becomes more essential than battling the mass male culture. 
Saying one is ‘not a feminist’ (even while supporting quietly every item of the feminist 
platform) seems the most prudent, self-protective strategy.
118 Susan Faludi 
 
Another angle on young people resisting the label/idea of feminism: many of my 
students resist *anything* that denies that individuals have the ultimate power to 
control their own destinies.  I see this resistance not only in relation to “the F-word” 
but in their arguments about everything from drunk driving to racism.  They prefer to 
argue for total individual responsibility and change that happens “one bad apple at a 
time,” than to consider solutions or responses that involve policies, campaigns, mass 
education, or other group-based action.  This resistance is particularly true of but not 
limited to white middle-class traditional-age college students.  It’s a mainstream culture 
response (pop culture, American culture, 2004-5 culture), an adolescent response, 
sometimes a survival response, and perhaps even a cognitive/developmental response.  
There may be a darker side – deliberately sweeping problems under the rug or denying 
responsibility – but I see that more malevolent kind of mindset happening more on 
Capitol Hill than in my students’ lives.
119 Shelley Reid 
 
Fear of feminism is also fear of complexity, fear of thinking, fear of ideas – we live, 
after all, in a profoundly anti-intellectual culture.
120 Lisa Hogeland 
 
The answers bring relief, and they do present us with genuine reasons. We cling to the 
answers, using them to assuage our anger and heal our wounds. We write about 
women’s ‘backlash’ behaviours as choices made through pressure, ignorance or 
personality defects.  
  In spite of this, we know the answers do not tell the whole story. We know there 
is more to it than this. The only answer that allows us to enter the swamps of the 
backlash with wisdom is simply this: that women and men have unfathomably diverse 
reasons for rejecting feminism. Adopting a set of explanations like those above as the 
final word on the backlash creates (once again) a monolithic vision of ‘the backlash’ – 
one that I would suggest confirms its imagined status as the most powerful force 
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shaping women’s lives today. Susan Faludi accords blame for the currency of ‘the 
backlash’ to 1980s journalism, which:  
…delivered the backlash to the public through a series of ‘trend stories’, articles that 
claimed to divine sweeping shifts in female social behaviour while providing little in 
the way of evidence to support their generalizations.
121 
 
‘The backlash’ comes to describe everything that counters feminism in contemporary 
society. Interestingly, the number of descriptions of backlash behaviour goes on, and 
on, and on. Why? Because ‘the backlash’ itself is too diverse and diffuse to fit the 
definition we proscribe. We claim that the backlash is a setback for feminism; a 
reaction to second-wave feminism. But the truth is that the backlash is just a word we 
use to describe the things that have been going on since patriarchy began. Susan Faludi 
points out that there have been backlashes against every feminist uprising in history.
122 
I would add that there are even backlashes against a vast number of daily feminist 
activities. If we unpick ‘the backlash’ and allow ourselves the luxury of looking at it as 
a great many things (male disgruntlement, fatherly control, misogynist words, fear of 
women’s economic independence, sexual restriction, the sanctity of motherhood, 
conservative government, unjust legislation, contentment with personal lifestyles, 
media hype, etc.) within the seething mass that is feminism-within-patriarchy, it 
becomes something we can understand. Revolution-speak makes us want to crash down 
obstacles, but that’s not how change usually happens. Real change happens slowly, via 
a sometimes loud, sometimes quiet, picking away and building up. Unpicking, 
unboxing the backlash allows us to set a course for change. The single, giant, 
exhausting block we think of as the backlash becomes a multitude of activities, 
behaviours, ideologies and movements. We can focus on one thing at a time. We make 
our revolution do-able. 
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Conclusion: Resurfacing  
Conversation with Kerry Allan
123 
 
Me: Why do you think it is that women who are clearly living their lives according to 
feminist ideals are often reluctant to identify as feminists? 
Kerry: One of the reasons that a lot of ‘true feminists’ would deny their feminism is 
because there are many women who are looking for a type or looking for a niche – 
feminism is a very marketable niche in modern society, so it’s very easy for people to 
declare themselves a feminist. But I think the most true feminist is one who is by nature 
a feminist…a true feminist will find themselves ‘there’ before they will ever 
acknowledge their feminism…Anybody can get up on their soapbox and say “I am a 
feminist” and be very loud and violent and jump up and down, and make…noise and 
make the politicians listen and do what’s an expected feminist act, and I think that’s 
really detrimental to lots of true feminists who will be out there working very hard to 
be the individual that they are, and doing the best work that they can do by themselves, 
by their families, by the people they work for – they’re the quieter achievers…Within 
any group of people there are a minority who will set up a public impression…Within 
feminism…the ones who stand up and make the most noise are not always the true 
feminists. 
Me: What about women who reject what we tend to see as feminist ‘goals,’ like 
economic independence and career, and so on? 
Kerry: [Some women will] never understand feminism, they’ll never understand 
women in independent roles…if you are a true feminist, you need to have some sort of 
thought for that minority of people, and not judge. Just as we wouldn’t want people to 
judge our feminism, I think that we should be really mindful not to judge other people’s 
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choices not to be feminists…There are still women born today who would choose these 
absolutely non-feminist roles…[and] as long as you’re happy, as long as the situation 
that you’re in is not being taken advantage of, then we should respect each others’ 
decisions…Many people who have that drive [to always be striving for 
something]…find it very difficult to accept and understand people who don’t have that 
drive. 
Me: There seem to be so many different levels of doing feminism, and being feminists. 
It’s like we have an uncontrollable urge to control people by classifying them. 
Kerry: [Nowadays,] instead of just putting women and men into their respective 
boxes,…we put women into feminism and non-feminism and within those boxes there 
are hundreds of boxes. 
Me: I wonder which box I’ll be put in…. 
 
Representing historical moments (the waves) in feminism as monolithic sets of 
styles and practices limits both the way we participate in feminism, and the people we 
reach with it. Representing the backlash as an overwhelming current phenomenon 
tempts us to down our tools and give up on the project. Neither is useful for feminism. 
I know that younger feminists hardly ever get away with writing any kind of 
critique of, or vision for, feminism without being lumped in together with all the other 
‘third-wave post-feminists,’ who supposedly gripe about feminism or gaze at our 
navels. This is where I come in. It will be too easy either to dismiss or parade my work 
as an example of third-wave feminism, simultaneously contracting my ideas about 
everyday feminist activism and theory into an illustration of DIY practices, and cutting 
off whole generations of women from identifying with what I say. It would also be 
tempting to some to call my work part of the backlash against feminism – the parts that 
call ‘official’ feminists to account for some of the exclusive practices we perpetuate. Wasley 308 
Such categorisation weakens my work and extracts it from the bounds of the earth-and-
flesh world, distancing it from real women doing feminism, transforming it into just 
another theoretical position for us to critique or support, and then put back on the 
bookshelf. It relieves us of any responsibility for acting on the ideas I have produced 
here. Therefore, I resist the boxing of my feminism. I want to ask now that you defy the 
urge to categorise my thesis as merely part of some wave or backlash, and listen with 
an open mind to the things I have said. I ask you to attempt to put aside the baggage 
that makes us read with prejudice, waiting for those telltale slips into what we assume 
to be radical/post-feminist/backlash rhetoric, forgetting how we miss some important 
things in our false vigilance. I ask you to read my words with interest and respect, to 
take note of the points where our ideologies intersect, the points where my words 
resonate with or diverge from your thoughts, and to be prepared to respond with your 
own wisdom. 
I think of these women bringing light to dispel the darkness, responding to each other’s 
call, not leaving each other isolated and alone to contend with danger, but coming to 
each other’s aid with a firm, clear form of nonviolent resistance – their steady gaze, 
their unmovable presence, the light they carried.
124  
 
This feminism is a liquid thing, is it not? Sometimes we crest the waves like surfers; 
sometimes we get dumped; and sometimes it’s tempting to slip under the water and 
take refuge from the battering. I appreciate the liquid form of feminism. It’s nice to 
think I can wade, bask, churn and splash about. 
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Conclusion 
In Praise of Awkward Questions
1 
“I would not creep along the coast, but steer 
Out in mid-sea, by guidance of the stars.” 
— George Eliot, 1874
2 
 
One way we organise our understanding of the world in Western culture is by 
privileging certain kinds of knowledge over others. In doing this, we leave ourselves 
with a comfortable bank of knowledge we are prepared to accept as ‘The Truth.’ But 
“what has masqueraded as truth is largely an exercise of power.”
3 The people who 
possess ‘The Truth’ are ‘The Experts.’ For instance, we would generally privilege a 
doctor’s medical advice over a friend’s medical advice. We generally regard the advice 
of a doctor as based on a long period of study and practice, up to date with the newest 
developments, and ‘safe’ or accountable (because medical practice is policed by higher 
bodies). We consider the medical advice of a friend less reliable. It is more likely to be 
based on personal experience, and there is no possibility of legal recourse if your friend 
gets it wrong and makes you even sicker. The basic idea underlying the privileging of 
different kinds of knowledge is that some knowledge is purer than other knowledge. It 
is pure because it is widely accepted, often backed up by repeatable controlled 
experiments, and unsullied by personal biases. Sometimes, the privileging of certain 
information is tried and true. Medical advice from a doctor probably is more reliable 
than that of a friend. It is entirely possible that the doctor has both more experience and 
a stronger educational grounding in issues of medicine than your friend. Sometimes, 
however, purism is inappropriate. There are, in fact, certain things about which we can 
                                                 
1 Stanley, Liz and Sue Wise. “But the Empress Has No Clothes!: Some Awkward Questions about the 
‘Missing Revolution’ in Feminist Theory.” Feminist Theory 1 (2000): 261-288. 
2 Eliot, George. Middlemarch. 1872. London: Penguin, 1994. 419. 
3 Zalewski, Marysia. Feminism After Postmodernism: Theorising Through Practice. London: Routledge, 
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all be regarded as experts. One of these things is gender. Everyone is an expert on 
issues of sex, sexism, and feminism, because everyone is gendered. 
Whilst attending a conference in the United Kingdom a couple of years ago, I 
was travelling alone. You meet a lot of people when you travel alone. One of the 
standard questions was, “What do you do?” This would lead to an explanation of my 
studies, and onto the topic of feminism. I would inevitably end up taking part in long 
and sometimes tiresome discussions about things like women’s rights, reverse sexism, 
where feminism ‘went wrong,’ child custody law, and so on. I used to complain that I 
wished I were studying Heidegger or the structure of plant cells – because at least then 
I would have been left alone when I told people about my project! But everyone I 
spoke to about feminism had an opinion. And that is just the thing I am trying to say in 
this thesis: everyone has an opinion about feminism. Everyone’s an expert. We cannot 
arbitrarily privilege one person’s knowledge of feminism over another’s. This is not to 
say that the academic’s years of study, or the activist’s years of work, have been in 
vain. It is still possible to develop proficiency in feminism the sense that one can gain a 
high level of skill in writing and research, become widely read in the field, be able to 
produce thoughtful and sophisticated theory on a topic, and have significant experience 
in effective ways to practice. Rather, I am suggesting that there is no pure feminism. 
Feminism is an ideology, not a science, and we must relinquish the idea of ‘The Expert’ 
when it comes to ideological knowledge. As Janice Raymond puts it, “It would be 
much more fruitful to talk about the issues and the content of our differing positions 
than about relative postures of authority.”
4 But this is not happening. Rather, the 
boundaries around ‘pure’ feminism close and tighten, and the number of ‘experts’ 
grows ever more exclusive. This thesis is about the increasing amount of feminist 
purism that closes the doors of feminism to countless women.  
                                                 
4 Raymond, Janice G. “Connecting Reproductive and Sexual Liberalism.” Radically Speaking: Feminism 
Reclaimed. Eds. Diane Bell and Renate Klein. North Melbourne, Vic.: Spinifex, 1996. 231-46. 236. Wasley 311 
The irony is that almost every woman can be discounted as a feminist in some 
purist perspective or another. The motivation to discount certain types of feminists and 
feminism is this: it is hard to see a wide range of people’s (sometimes antagonistic and 
competing) knowledge as worthy of consideration. Doing so jeopardises some of the 
things we hold dear – like the sense of mastering an academic discipline; or the strength 
of a powerfully-held political conviction; or the belief in a closed community of 
feminists; or the feeling that feminism is stowed safely away somewhere (not causing 
us grief). However, change happens when an issue remains current, and currency is 
people talking about an issue. Ideological issues (feminist or not) must, therefore, 
remain the topic of conversation – and a broad one, at that. In a broad conversation, it is 
easy to see some comments and questions as crazy or dumb. But it can pay to take a 
closer look. Perhaps these are the awkward questions that lead to major changes in the 
way people think about feminist issues, or groundbreaking new areas of research, or 
just an upsurge in the conversation (which boosts feminism’s currency). In this thesis, I 
have begun to ask some awkward questions about feminism. The questions are 
awkward because they force us to reflect on our own positions of security in relation to 
feminism – whether we feel secure as anti-feminists, non-feminists, feminist theorists, 
feminist activists, second-wave feminists, or post-feminists. In essence, I am asking 
those who think about feminism to shift the boundaries and rethink the way we limit 
what counts as feminism. 
I was asked an awkward question a couple of months before I completed this 
project. A male acquaintance asked me what I was writing about in this thesis. I told 
him it was about feminism and its accessibility. He said: 
Okay, you know about feminism – women’s rights and all that. Tell me this. How come 
women want equal pay and equal rights, but if you take a woman out to dinner, she still 
expects you to pay? 
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I sighed inwardly, wishing that, just once, someone would ask me for more details 
about my work rather than air his/her own private beef with feminism. I deflected his 
question quite deftly: “I see that as more to do with questions of chivalry. I’m not 
dealing with things like that in my thesis. I’m looking at the way we put boundaries 
around what counts as feminism and what doesn’t.” He deferred to me respectfully, 
praising my analytical skills. Perhaps it was his politeness that made me think more 
about his question later on – he didn’t get indignant and harp on about having to pay for 
a date’s meal, but accepted my ‘expertise’ in the field of feminism as sufficient grounds 
for me to put his question imperiously aside. But doing so didn’t answer the question 
for him. The truth is that that question is still out there, and it is one being asked by 
great numbers of people, along with other questions feminists might find awkward. In 
this situation, I could have thought seriously about a great number of issues that spring 
from this man’s question. What are the differences between charming old-fashioned 
customs of heterosexuality and practices that represent women as dependent and 
reinforce male economic control? Where does one end and the other begin? How do the 
gains women have made through feminism sit alongside more traditional privileges of 
being female and any disadvantages of being male? Why is it that practices many 
women tend to regard as ‘chivalry,’ and about which it has become highly passé to get 
political, cause such a high level of disgruntlement with men? Why does feminism get 
the blame for anyone and everyone’s dissatisfaction with gender behaviour? 
There are more awkward questions being asked all the time. These questions 
deserve good answers. It was a woman of colour who first asked the awkward question: 
“Why do I feel alienated from these white women’s descriptions of oppression?”
5 – a 
question which gave rise to a whole new area of feminist work on difference. Awkward 
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questions are a sign of feminism’s health, not its demise or illness. These questions 
indicate the continuation of the conversation and the flourishing of knowledge. As 
Harding puts it: 
We need to be able to cherish certain kinds of intellectual, political, and psychic 
discomforts, to see as inappropriate and even self-defeating certain kinds of clear 
solutions to the problems we have been posing.
6 
 
What I am saying is that the questions we consider the most annoying, the most 
repetitive, and the most uncomfortable, are actually very valuable. Such questions 
make us cringe and squirm; they force us to look inward to the things we avoid and 
deride, and they also remind us to look outward to what others find important in the 
power relations between men and women. Awkward questions make us feel 
uncomfortable – which means they are resonating with our experience, even while they 
clash with our beliefs. In short, we must attend to these questions because they strike a 
chord of truth within us. As feminists, we have become adept at deflecting the hard 
questions because there is always something more pressing to which we must attend. 
However, at some point (and I suggest that point has arrived), we do have to treat these 
questions as serious and valuable questions about our own practices and beliefs, or 
people will not take feminism seriously. 
Heed the awkward questions, because these are the ones that grow into chasms 
of hatred and misunderstanding when we try to ignore or cover over them. Hear them, 
ask them, and answer them. Be not afraid, sisters. Steer into the rough sea. 
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